Green v. Willoughby Hills Police Department

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

JONATHAN MICHAEL GREEN, ) CASE NO. 1:25-cv-1512

)

Plaintiff, ) JUDGE CHARLES E. FLEMING

)

v. )

)

WILLOUGHBY HILLS POLICE ) MEMORANDUM OPINION AND

DEPARTMENT, et al., ) ORDER

)

Defendants. )

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Jonathan Michael Green, proceeding pro se, filed a civil rights complaint against

the Willoughby Hills Police Department (“WHPD”), as well as nine individual defendants; he

asserts various federal claims related to an alleged unlawful traffic stop and search, subsequent

state court proceedings, obstruction and suppression of evidence, and retaliatory actions. (ECF

No. 1). Plaintiff then filed an amended complaint that added eighteen additional defendants and

asserted RICO, § 1983, and criminal statute claims against these new defendants. (ECF No. 22).

With his complaint, Plaintiff filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 2).

That motion is GRANTED. For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiff’s complaint and amended

complaint are DISMISSED.

II. BACKGROUND

On June 28, 2025, WHPD officers initiated and conducted a traffic stop of Plaintiff

allegedly due to his “window tint.” (ECF No. 1, PageID #3, 5; ECF No. 22, PageID #377–78).

Defendants Sergeant Paul Cocanower, Officer Jordan Taylor Warren, and Officer Vincent

D’Eusanio, handcuffed and detained Plaintiff, and then searched his vehicle discovering

marijuana. (ECF No. 1, PageID #3, 5; ECF No. 22, PageID #377–78). Plaintiff was issued two

traffic citations for violating city ordinances regarding open containers and tinted glass (both minor

misdemeanors), which resulted in the initiation of state court proceedings against Plaintiff in the

Willoughby Municipal Court on July 14, 2025. See City of Willoughby Hills v. Green, Nos.

25CRB01375, 25TRD02827 (Willoughby Mun. Ct. July 14, 2025). These state court proceedings

are currently pending, with bench trials set for September 17, 2025. See id.

On July 18, 2025, Plaintiff initiated this federal action by filing his initial civil rights

complaint. (ECF No. 1). The complaint provides various allegations that: (i) the traffic stop and

subsequent search of Plaintiff’s vehicle were initiated without probable cause or consent;

(ii) various city officials and employees provided delayed, incomplete, or obstructive responses to

various records requests by Plaintiff; and (iii) Defendant Chief Matthew Naegele sent a “retaliatory

letter to Plaintiff stating that the “matter is closed” in response to sworn affidavits and other notices

submitted by Plaintiff to the WHPD and city officials. (Id. at PageID #5–13). The same day,

Plaintiff filed twelve motions, (ECF Nos. 2–4, 6–7, 9, 11–16), and three notices, (ECF Nos. 5, 8,

10).

On July 28, 2025, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint that purports to add eighteen

additional defendants (all various Willoughby city officials or employees) and asserts RICO,

§ 1983, and criminal statute claims against these new defendants. (ECF No. 22). The same day,

Plaintiff filed five affidavits, (ECF Nos. 17–21); he also filed four new motions, (ECF Nos. 25–26,

29–30), two new affidavits, (ECF Nos. 23–24), and three notices, (ECF Nos. 27–28, 31).

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, so his complaint is subject to initial screening

under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Under that statute, federal district courts are expressly required

to screen all in forma pauperis complaints filed in federal court, and to dismiss before service any

such complaint that the court determines is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted, or seeks monetary damages from a defendant who is immune from such

relief. See Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the dismissal

standard articulated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550

U.S. 544 (2007) for determining a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (b)(6) governs

dismissals for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)).

To survive a dismissal for failure to state a claim, a pro se complaint must set forth

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a plausible claim for relief on its face. Id. at

471. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court

to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal,

556 U.S. at 678. Although detailed factual allegations are not required, the “allegations must be

enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. A pleading

that offers legal conclusions or a simple recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not

meet this pleading standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Even though the standard of review for pro

se pleadings is liberal, the generous construction afforded pro se plaintiffs has limits. Pilgrim v.

Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 1996). Pro se plaintiffs must still meet basic pleading

requirements, and courts are not required to conjure allegations on their behalf or “guess at the

nature” of their claims. Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989). The Court is not

required to conjure unpleaded facts or construct claims against defendants on behalf of a pro se

plaintiff. See Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985) (District courts

are not required to conjure up questions never squarely presented to them or to construct full claims

from sentence fragments. To do so would “require ... [the courts] to explore exhaustively all

potential claims of a pro se plaintiff ... [and] would ... transform the district court from its legitimate

advisory role to the improper role of an advocate seeking out the strongest arguments and most

successful strategies for a party.”) (citation omitted).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Insufficient Pleadings

Although specific facts are not required, to meet the basic minimum notice pleading

requirements of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the pleadings must give the

defendants fair notice of what the Plaintiff’s legal claims are and the factual grounds on which

they rest. See Bassett v. Nat’l Collegiate Ath. Ass’n, 528 F.3d 426, 437 (6th Cir. 2008); see also

Scheid v. Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc., 859 F.2d 434, 437 (6th Cir. 1988) (providing that all

complaints must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all material elements of

some viable legal theory to satisfy federal notice pleading requirements) (citations omitted).

Plaintiff’s complaint and amended complaint, fail to meet the requisite pleading standard because

the pleadings fail to set forth “a short and plain statement of [any] claim showing that [Plaintiff] is

entitled to relief[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Both the complaint and amended complaint provide a

bevy of facts and allegations. However, apart from the RICO and criminal statute claims in the

amended complaint, it is not entirely clear what specific claims Plaintiff intends to assert in this

action. In fact, the pleadings and the attached documents comprise more than 300 pages and

consist largely of conclusory allegations, rhetoric, and seemingly unnecessary or inappropriate

citations to legal authority. Much of Plaintiff’s pleadings are no more than mere “unadorned, the

defendant unlawfully harmed me accusation[s].” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

The Court cannot ascertain for certain what specific claims are being asserted and against

whom any individual claim is specifically alleged. The pleadings also run afoul of the

requirements of Rule 10(b), which requires separately numbered paragraphs and separate “counts”

for each claim asserted in a pleading. Fed R. Civ. P. 10(b). The Sixth Circuit has noted that “the

separation of claims into separate counts is mandatory only if more than one claim has been joined

in a complaint and separation will facilitate clear presentation.” See id. (citing Nw. Airlines, Inc.

v. Gleen L. Martin Co., 9 F.R.D. 551, 552 (N.D. Ohio 1949)). It has also added that the failure to

separate each cause of action or claim for relief into separate counts can constitute impermissible

“shotgun pleading” that violates the requirement under Rule 10(b). See Lee v. Ohio Educ. Ass’n,

951 F.3d 386, 392–93 (6th Cir. 2020) (citing Cincinnati Life Ins. Co. v. Beyrer, 722 F.3d 939, 947

(7th Cir. 2013) (holding that a single count raising five causes of action constituted an

impermissible “kitchen sink” pleading)). Other circuits have adopted an approach of requiring

separate claims to be asserted in separate counts, particularly when the failure to separate results

in a lack of proper notice. See, e.g., Anderson v. Dist. Bd. of Trustees of Cent. Florida Cmty. Coll.,

77 F.3d 364, 366 (11th Cir. 1996); Stanard v. Nygren, 658 F.3d 792, 797–98 (7th Cir. 2011).

Here, the lack of any section labeling and setting out the specific claims and causes of

action Plaintiff intends to pursue fails to provide sufficient notice to the defendants as to what

specific claims are asserted against them. As a result, the Court concludes that the complaint

constitutes an impermissible “shotgun pleading.” See Lee, 951 F.3d at 392–93; Loggins v. Costco

Wholesale Corp., No. 2:22-cv-2026, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106711, at *8–9 (W.D. Tenn. June

15, 2022) (noting that improper “shotgun pleading” typically arises in disputes involving multiple

defendants because the pleadings do not provide sufficient notice as to which defendant is liable

for which count).

Although a district court is permitted to dismiss complaints after screening under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2), the Sixth Circuit has held that dismissing a case for Rule 8 violation without first

granting leave to amend and an opportunity to fix pleading deficiencies is a harsh sanction and an

abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Bickham v. Macy’s, Inc., No. 25-5062, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS

13278, at *5 (6th Cir. May 30, 2025) (“We have held that a district court abused its discretion

when it dismissed a complaint on Rule 8 grounds without granting leave to amend, even when the

dismissal was without prejudice.”); Miller v. Alco Mgmt., No. 22-5825, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS

6981, at *4–5 (6th Cir. Mar. 20, 2023) (“Dismissal is a ‘harsh sanction’ that is generally

appropriate only after the court gives ‘multiple opportunities to fix the complaint and the plaintiff

has persisted in noncompliance.’ Thus, before dismissing the case, the district court should have

given [the plaintiff] an opportunity to fix the deficiencies it identified in his complaint.” (internal

citation omitted)). This approach conforms with Rule 15’s mandate that leave to amend should be

freely granted “when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. 15(a). Even so, “[a] court need not grant

leave to amend . . . where amendment would be ‘futile.’” Miller v. Calhoun Cnty., 408 F.3d 803,

817 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S. Ct. 227, 9 L. Ed. 2d 222

(1962)).

As a result, the Court will grant Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint to fix the general

pleading deficiencies under Rule 8, allowing him an opportunity to address the various pleading

deficiencies and provide Defendants sufficient notice of the claims against them. That said,

Plaintiff shall not be permitted to amend the specific claims discussed below that are subject to

dismissal with prejudice because they would be subject to dismissal regardless of any general

pleading deficiencies—rendering any attempt to amend futile.

B. Criminal Statutes

To the extent Plaintiff asserts claims that certain defendants violated 18 U.S.C. § 241

(conspiracy to deny civil rights), 18 U.S.C. § 242 (deprivation of civil rights), 18 U.S.C. § 1512

(tampering with a witness), 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (destruction, alternation, or falsification of records),

or any other criminal statute, such claims fail as a matter of law. These various criminal statutes

do not create or provide a private right of action for Plaintiff or any private citizen. See Williams

v. Infantino, No. 5:18-cv-1021, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134499, *3 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 9, 2018); Bey

v. Ohio, No. 1:11-cv-1306, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119867, at *7–8 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 17, 2011)

(citing United States v. Oguaju, 76 F. App’x 579, 2003 WL 21580657, *2 (6th Cir. 2003)). To the

extent Plaintiff is attempting to bring criminal charges against the defendants, he lacks standing.

See Williams v. Luttrell, 99 F. App’x 705, 707 (6th Cir. 2004) (A private citizen “has no authority

to initiate a federal criminal prosecution [against] defendants for their alleged unlawful acts.”)

(citing Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 64–65, 106 S. Ct. 1697, 90 L. Ed. 2d 48 (1986)); Poole

v. CitiMortgage, Inc., Civil Action No. 14-cv-10512, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135488, 2014 WL

4772177, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 24, 2014)). Thus, any claims asserted under criminal statutes

are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

C. RICO Claims

To the extent that Plaintiff is asserting RICO claims against the defendants named in the

amended complaint, those claims also fail as a matter of law. “[T]o state a civil RICO claim, a

plaintiff must allege (1) two or more predicate racketeering offenses, (2) the existence of an

enterprise affecting interstate commerce, (3) a connection between the racketeering offenses and

the enterprise, and (4) injury by reason of the above.” Grow Mich., LLC v. LT Lender, LLC, 50

F.4th 587, 594 (6th Cir. 2022); see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961, 1962, 1964. First, the Court has serious

doubts that Plaintiff sufficiently alleged the existence of an enterprise that is engaged in or whose

actions affect interstate commerce. The enterprise alleged by Plaintiff is a collection of various

government officials whose supposed purpose is to stymie both Plaintiff’s various records requests

and his attempts to initiate investigations into government misconduct. (See ECF No. 22, PageID

#377–90). The pleadings themselves do not allege any connection between this enterprise, or its

predicate RICO actions, with interstate commerce, nor do the pleadings imply any such

connection.

Regardless, Plaintiff’s RICO claims fail because he lacks standing to assert such claims.

To state a civil RICO claim, a plaintiff must allege injury to “business or property by reason of”

the alleged violations under § 1962. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). The Sixth Circuit has consistently

held that this statutory language excludes recovery for personal injuries. See, e.g., Jackson v.

Sedgwick, 731 F.3d 556, 563–65 (6th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (“[C]ourts ‘have uniformly recognized

that the ordinary meaning of the phrase ‘injured in his business or property’ excludes personal

injuries, including the pecuniary losses therefrom.’”); Drake v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 782 F.2d 638,

644 (6th Cir. 1986). Here, Plaintiff has failed to allege any damages to his “business or property”

and solely alleged damages related to personal injuries. The pleadings do not mention the word

property or business and the factual allegations and Plaintiff’s claims are clearly related to and

intimately associated with injury to his own person. As such, Plaintiff’s RICO claims would

ultimately be dismissed for lack of standing regardless of any Rule 8 pleading deficiencies. See

Aces High Coal Sales, Inc. v. Cmty. Bank & Tr., 768 F. App’x 446, 458 n.5 (6th Cir. 2019) (“The

‘injury to business or property’ requirement excludes personal injuries and is sometimes

characterized as ‘statutory standing.’”); Arnold v. Alphatec Spine, Inc., No. 1:13-cv-714, 2014 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 87079, at *21–24 (S.D. Ohio June 26, 2014) (“Specifically, Plaintiffs lack statutory

standing under the civil RICO provisions because they fail to allege injury to their ‘business or

property.’ . . . It is well settled that personal injury is not cognizable under RICO’s civil remedies

provision.”); Lewis v. Drouillard, 788 F. Supp. 2d 567, 570 (E.D. Mich. 2011) (Because Plaintiffs’

alleged damages are intimately related to their personal injuries, they do not have standing to sue

under RICO.”). Therefore, Plaintiff’s RICO claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

D. Leave to Amend

Having analyzed the pleadings, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint

so that he may have an opportunity to address the various Rule 8 pleading deficiencies identified

in this Order. Plaintiff’s amended complaint should set out his claims in distinct and separate

counts that: (i) clearly identify and label the claim/cause of action asserted in that count;

(ii) provide citation to the specific statute, Amendment, or legal basis under which each specific

claim is brought; (iii) clearly identify the defendant(s) against whom each specific claim is

asserted; and (iv) identify the specific factual allegations that apply to each specific defendant or

defendants, if a claim is asserted against more than one defendant. Plaintiff is warned that any

claim or request for relief that asks a federal court to interfere with or assume jurisdiction over a

criminal state court proceeding is improper and will be subject to dismissal. Plaintiff shall not

replead any of the claims that the Court dismissed with prejudice (RICO and criminal statute

claims).

D. Premature and Frivolous Filings

The Court notes that Plaintiff has submitted a large number of filings in this action in a

short amount of time. The same day Plaintiff filed his original complaint and motion to proceed

in forma pauperis, he filed nine motions (e.g., motion to compel discovery, motion to freeze assets,

motion for evidentiary hearing), a notice of pending federal litigation, and a judicial notice of

evidence and facts. (ECF Nos. 3–16). On July 28, 2025, after filing his amended complaint,

Plaintiff filed four additional motions and three notices. (ECF Nos. 25–31). Because the Court is

dismissing the complaint and amended complaint, all pending motions are DENIED.

The Court separately notes that all of Plaintiff’s various motions, notices, and affidavits

are either premature, frivolous, or otherwise improper at this stage of the proceeding. Plaintiff has

also established a pattern of submitting voluminous and largely frivolous filings across various

state and federal cases. In the pending state court proceedings against Plaintiff in the Willoughby

Municipal Court, Plaintiff appears to have engaged in vexatious, harassing, and abusive filings.

See City of Willoughby Hills v. Green, Nos. 25CRB01375, 25TRD02827 (Willoughby Mun. Ct.

July 14, 2025). In each of these state court cases, Plaintiff filed 181 affidavits, motions, demands,

notices, and other miscellaneous documents in less than one month. See id. After filing more than

40 of those documents in each case in the first 8 days that the cases were active, the Willoughby

Municipal Court Magistrate issued an order on July 30, 2025, striking them from the record

because they did not comply with the Ohio Rules. On July 31, 2025, the day after the Magistrate

issued that Order, Plaintiff responded by submitting an additional 42 filings in just one day.

Having reviewed Plaintiff’s voluminous and repetitive filings in federal and state court,

Plaintiff’s conduct appears to reflect a strategy and intent to flood the Willoughby Municipal

Court, this Court, and the defendants with large amounts of paperwork in an attempt to impede the

progress of the pending state court prosecutions against Plaintiff. While the Court cannot stop

Plaintiff from using this tactic in state court, it can curtail such tactics in federal court if such

conduct is continued by Plaintiff. Federal courts have both the inherent power and constitutional

obligation to protect their jurisdiction from conduct which impairs the ability to carry out Article

III functions. Procup v. Strickland, 792 F.2d 1069, 1073 (11th Cir. 1986). Moreover, the Court

has the responsibility to prevent litigants from unnecessarily encroaching on judicial machinery

needed by others. Id. To achieve these ends, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth

Circuit has approved enjoining vexatious and harassing litigants by requiring them to obtain leave

of court before submitting additional filings. See, e.g., Feathers v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 141 F.3d

264, 269 (6th Cir. 1998) (“There is nothing unusual about imposing prefiling restrictions in matters

with a history of repetitive or vexatious litigation.”); Filipas v. Lemons, 835 F.2d 1145 (6th Cir.

1987); see also Wrenn v. Vanderbilt Univ. Hosp., Nos. 94-5453, 94-5593, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS

5470, 1995 WL 111480, at *3 (6th Cir. Mar. 15, 1995) (“This court has the authority to enjoin

harassing litigation under its inherent authority and the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (a).”).

Thus, the Court warns Plaintiff that if he should continue to file frivolous, premature, or

otherwise improper motions, notices, and other documents in this Court, he will be deemed a

vexatious litigator and the Court will issue appropriate sanctions, which may include filing

restrictions or monetary fines.

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the complaint and amended complaint are DISMISSED

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(e). Plaintiff's RICO claims and his claims premised on various

criminal statutes are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Plaintiff is GRANTED leave to file an

amended complaint in accordance with the instructions of this Order on or before September 16,

2025. Plaintiff's various pending motions (ECF Nos. 3-4, 6-7, 9, 11-16, 25-26, 29-30) and any

outstanding requests are DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: August 26, 2025 “Vad Huive

CHARLES E.FLEMING ts

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

1]