The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
SHREVEPORT DIVISION
LATRICE WALKER, ET AL. CIVIL ACTION NO. 25-0258
VERSUS JUDGE S. MAURICE HICKS, JR.
JULIAN WHITTINGTON, ET AL. MAGISTRATE JUDGE HORNSBY
MEMORANDUM RULING
Before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants Blake Hines (“Officer
Hines”), Hunter Jenkins (“Officer Jenkins”), Ryan Kirkhart (“Officer Kirkhart”), Mark Lyons
(“Lt. Lyons”), Danny Soliz (“Officer Soliz”), Neysa Washington (“Officer Washington”),
Jessie Bearden (“Officer Bearden”), Quinton Black (“Lt. Black”), Buck Boudreaux (“Sgt.
Boudreaux”), and John Carroll (“Sgt. Carroll”), (collectively, the “Deputy Defendants”).
See Record Document 37. Plaintiffs Latrice Walker and Holly Rouse (collectively,
“Plaintiffs”) oppose. See Record Document 48. The Deputy Defendants replied. See
Record Document 55.
For the purposes of this Ruling, the Deputy Defendants are broken up into two
groups: the Day Shift Deputies and the Night Shift Deputies. The Day Shift Deputies
include Officer Bearden, Lt. Black, Sgt. Boudreaux, and Sgt. Carroll. The Night Shift
Deputies include Officer Hines, Officer Jenkins, Officer Kirkhart, Lt. Lyons, Officer Soliz,
and Officer Washington.
For the reasons stated below, the Deputy Defendants’ Motion (Record Document
37) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Their Motion is GRANTED with
respect to Plaintiffs’ § 1983 inadequate medical care claim against the Day Shift Deputies
and their state law fault and negligence claim against all Deputy Defendants. These
claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Their Motion is DENIED as to Plaintiffs’ §
1983 inadequate medical care claim against the Night Shift Deputies. This is the only
claim that remains.
BACKGROUND
A full recitation of the facts can be found in the Court’s previous Memorandum
Ruling. See Record Document 56. The Court will summarize the instant Motion for the
purposes of this Ruling. In their Motion, the Deputy Defendants assert that all individual
capacity claims against them should be dismissed because Plaintiffs’ allegations do not
show a violation of any constitutional right or of clearly established law. See Record
Document 37-1 at 12.
Plaintiffs allege the Day Shift Deputies arrived at Bossier Parish Maximum Security
Facility (“Bossier Max”) at 5:30 a.m. on March 6, 2024, the day Jerry D. McCoy (“McCoy”)
died. See id. The Deputy Defendants submit that the Day Shift Deputies were not at
Bossier Max when McCoy started experiencing symptoms. See id. Additionally, they
contend that the Day Shift Deputies could not have provided any medical assistance
because they were simply not present. See id.
The Deputy Defendants claim the Night Shift Deputies began to notice McCoy’s
symptoms and placed him in isolation. See id. at 13. The Deputy Defendants assert that
by Plaintiffs’ own admission, the medical staff had been at sick call on March 4, wherein
McCoy reported heavy daily liquor use to Nurse Molli Lyles (“Nurse Lyles”) and others on
the nursing staff, but not the corrections staff. See id. While Nurse Lyles allegedly
documented a nursing plan to monitor McCoy daily, the Deputy Defendants advance that
the correctional staff was not notified of any plan. See id. Thus, they argue it is difficult to
see how either the Day Shift Deputies or the Night Shift Deputies acted with deliberate
indifference to McCoy’s condition if they were never made aware of the medical staff’s
plan and were not present when the symptoms manifested. See id.
The Deputy Defendants submit that Plaintiffs’ allegations fail to state a claim for
constitutionally inadequate medical care on either the second or third element of such a
claim. See id. at 15. Even if these allegations, taken as true, show that the Deputy
Defendants were aware of facts from which an inference could be drawn that a substantial
risk of serious harm existed, they argue these allegations are insufficient to show they
subjectively drew the inference that a substantial risk of serious harm existed. See id.
Additionally, they contend that Plaintiffs’ §1983 inadequate medical care claim fails at the
second step of the qualified immunity analysis. See id. The Deputy Defendants aver there
is no precedent clearly establishing that their alleged acts or omissions violated any
constitutional right. See id.
The Deputy Defendants also advance that all claims against them, in their
individual capacities, for punitive damages fail because they did not act with the requisite
culpable mental state. See id. at 16. They assert that there are no factual allegations
showing they were “motivated by evil intent” or acted with “reckless or callous
indifference” to McCoy’s constitutional rights. See id. Furthermore, they submit that the
state law claims against them should also be dismissed because they were not informed
of the medical plan for withdrawal treatment. See id. at 17. Therefore, the Deputy
Defendants request that all federal constitutional claims against them in their individual
capacities and all state law claims against them be dismissed. See id.
Plaintiffs oppose, asserting that their inadequate medical care claim “falls within
the broad scope of necessary, reasonable medical care and is actionable under § 1983,
particularly when the night shift deputies are aware of the delirium tremens and failed to
provide medical care.” Record Document 48 at 10. They contend that the Deputy
Defendants “were aware of the need to transport McCoy to a medical facility immediately
upon display of the symptoms of alcohol withdrawal and/or delirium tremens.” Id. at 14.
Plaintiffs submit that the Deputy Defendants “violated a clearly establish right of [] McCoy
by failing to provide medical care with knowledge of his serious medical condition.” Id.
Additionally, Plaintiffs argue qualified immunity does not shield the Deputy
Defendants. See id. at 17. They maintain that “[t]he conduct of the individual deputies
was objectively unreasonable as alleged because they had the knowledge and the
awareness of the substantial risk of serious injury including death due to delirium tremens
if McCoy was not transported immediately.” Id. They aver the Deputy Defendants were
on fair notice that the failure to provide medical care for delirium tremens was a violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 18.
With respect to their claim for punitive damages, Plaintiffs assert that the standard
for punitive damages is embodied in the Fifth Circuit’s pattern jury instructions and
accompanying footnotes. See id. Plaintiffs advance they have alleged facts which meet
the standard for deliberate indifference, therefore meeting the standard to support an
award of punitive damages. See id. at 19.
As to their state law claims, Plaintiffs cite to Louisiana law and the duty it imposes
on a police officer. See id. They submit that “[t]he standard of care imposed by Louisiana
law upon the confining authority is that medical services be adequate and reasonable.”
Id. They maintain they have “alleged that the treatment of [] McCoy by the named deputies
was not only below the standard of care but was deliberately indifferent and negligent to
his serious medical needs.” Id. at 20. Therefore, Plaintiffs claim Sheriff Julian Whittington
(“Sheriff Whittington”) “is liable for fault of his deputies committed during the course and
scope of their employment.” Id.
Alternatively, Plaintiffs request the opportunity to amend their First Amended
Complaint. See id. They claim they can further allege details “as to efforts to release
McCoy from jail to avoid the cost.” Id. Plaintiffs also provide a list of other detailed factual
allegations they may be able to provide in another amendment. See id. at 21–22.
In their reply, the Deputy Defendants assert that Plaintiffs’ opposition adds nothing
to their argument. See Record Document 55 at 1. The Deputy Defendants contend there
was no deliberate indifference to McCoy’s condition because he was afforded medical
care, and the medical staff did not inform the Deputy Defendants of his condition. See id.
at 2. Furthermore, they argue allegations of punitive damages are meritless because
there is no evil intent or indifference alleged. See id. at 3. Therefore, the Deputy
Defendants request a denial of the instant Motion and reasonable attorney’s fees. See id.
at 4.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
I. Pleading and Dismissal Standards.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) governs the requirements for pleadings
that state a claim for relief and requires that a pleading contain “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
The standard for the adequacy of complaints under Rule 8(a)(2) is now a “plausibility”
standard found in Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007), and
its progeny. Under this standard, “factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to
relief above the speculative level…on the assumption that all the allegations in the
complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Id. at 555, 1965. If a pleading only contains
“labels and conclusions” and “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action,”
the pleading does not meet the standards of Rule 8(a)(2). Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citation omitted).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows parties to seek dismissal of a
party’s pleading for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. FED. R. CIV.
P. 12(b)(6). In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a court generally “may not go
outside the pleadings.” Colle v. Brazos Cnty., Tex., 981 F. 2d 237, 243 (5th Cir. 1993).
Additionally, courts must accept all allegations in a complaint as true. See Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. However, courts do not have to accept legal conclusions as
facts. See id. Courts considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) are only
obligated to allow those complaints that are facially plausible under the Iqbal and Twombly
standards to survive such a motion. See id. at 678–79, 1949–50. If the complaint does
not meet this standard, it can be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted. See id.
II. Qualified Immunity.
“Qualified immunity shields an officer from liability if his ‘conduct does not violate
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known.’” Benavides v. Nunez, No. 24-20445, 2025 WL 1943949, at *2 (5th Cir. July
16, 2025) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231, 129 S. Ct. 808 (2009) (internal
quotation marks omitted)). “To overcome qualified immunity, the plaintiff must show ‘(1)
that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was clearly
established at the time of the challenged conduct.’” Id. If an officer defeats either prong,
he is entitled to qualified immunity. See id.
III. Analysis.
(a) Section 1983 Inadequate Medical Care Claim.
Plaintiffs allege the Deputy Defendants and Defendants Nurse Lyles, Jennifer
Johnson, and Jennifer Grimm, (collectively, the “Nurse Defendants”), failed to provide
medical assistance to McCoy and violated Plaintiffs’ rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Record Document 27 at ¶ 27. They claim McCoy had an obvious and
serious medical condition that these Defendants were aware of. See id. Plaintiffs assert
that these Defendants “were aware that McCoy required immediate emergency medical
attention but none was provided and that failure to provide medical care presented a
substantial risk of serious injury and excessive pain up to and including death.” Id. They
allege these Defendants “acted with deliberate [in]difference being aware of the serious
medical conditions but failing to take well established actions to avoid serious bodily injury
including death.” Id.
A § 1983 inadequate medical care claim “occurs only when the conduct amounts
to ‘deliberate indifference to [the prisoner’s] serious medical needs’ that ‘constitutes the
“unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.”’” Sencial v. Lopinto, No. 23-3351, 2025 WL
1371822, at *8 (E.D. La. Jan. 23, 2025) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104
(1976)). The Fifth Circuit has held that “‘[t]he Fourteenth Amendment requires that state
officials not disregard the “basic human needs” of pretrial detainees, including medical
care.’” Id. (quoting Reed v. Krajca (Estate of Henson), 440 F. App’x 341, 343 (5th Cir.
2011)). Under the deliberate indifference standard, “a prison official is not liable unless
the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Id. See
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994); Bradley v. Puckett, 157 F. 3d 1022, 1025
(5th Cir. 1998). This standard “is an extremely high standard to meet.” Belcher v. Lopinto,
No. 18-7368, 2018 WL 5847822, at *2 (E.D. La. Nov. 8, 2018). “‘[A] plaintiff must show
that public officers were aware of facts from which an inference of a substantial risk of
serious harm to an individual could be drawn; that they actually drew the inference; and
that their response indicates subjective intention that the harm occur [sic].’” Id.
A cognizable claim requires a plaintiff to “allege acts or omissions sufficiently
harmful to evidence deliberate indifference that can offend ‘evolving standards of
decency.’” Sencial, 2025 WL 1371822, at *8. The “mere disagreement with medical
treatment is insufficient to state a claim of deliberate indifference.” Id. “In some
circumstances, even delay in providing needed medical treatment may amount to a
constitutional violation.” Cosey v. Gusman, No. 05-3990, 2007 WL 2710804, at *4 (E.D.
La. Sept. 12, 2007). “However, the delay must be caused by the defendant’s deliberate
indifference if it is to rise to the level of a constitutional violation.” Id. With respect to
alcohol withdrawal, the Fifth Circuit, in dicta, has suggested “that ‘ignoring the dangers of
alcohol withdrawal and waiting for a “manifest emergency”’ could constitute deliberate
indifference in certain circumstances.” Freeland v. Tarrant Cnty., Tex., 789 Fed. Appx, 406,
409 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Thompson v. Upshur Cnty., 245 F. 3d 447, 458 (5th Cir.
2001)). However, “‘[m]edical records of sick calls, examinations, diagnoses, and
medications may rebut an inmate’s allegations of deliberate indifference.’” Id. (quoting
Banuelos v. McFarland, 41 F. 3d 232, 235 (5th Cir. 1995)).
At the Rule 12(b)(6) stage, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have successfully pled a
§ 1983 inadequate medical care claim against the Night Shift Deputies; however, they
have not pled a plausible claim against the Day Shift Deputies. Plaintiffs’ First Amended
Complaint alleges sufficient facts showing that the Night Shift Deputies had direct contact
with McCoy and “were personally aware of his serious medical needs.” Abraugh v.
Altimus, No. 20-252, 2023 WL 6055491, at *6 (W.D. La. Sept. 14, 2023). The Night Shift
Deputies placed McCoy in isolation after supposedly recognizing something was wrong
with him. See Record Document 27 at ¶ 11. The Night Shift Deputies “noted that McCoy
could not say where he was and noted he was agitated, profusely sweating, heavily
breathing with delusions, hallucinating and had a fever.” Id. McCoy “display[ed] the
symptoms of alcohol withdrawal and delirium tremens.” Id. Even though he started having
seizures, and his symptoms increased, Plaintiffs allege the Night Shift Deputies failed to
notify any medical personnel or provide medical assistance. See id.
While the Night Shift Deputies were on duty, “McCoy began hiding behind furniture
for protection against imagined enemies, and began swinging his blanket as though
defending himself.” Id. at ¶ 13. Plaintiffs claim Lt. Lyons entered his room and applied
chemical spray to McCoy; however, no medical assistance was provided. See id. The
Night Shift Deputies “summoned no medical assistance nor sought medical consultation
contrary to established training and the Sheriff’s policy.” Id.
From the pleadings, it does not appear that McCoy ever rejected medical care or
received a visit from a medical professional before his death. See Smith v. Wellpath
Recovery Solutions, LLC, No. 21-00235, 2022 WL 4534997, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 25,
2022). “The Fifth Circuit has defined a serious medical need as one which is ‘so apparent
that even laymen would recognize that care is required.’” Id. Here, Plaintiffs have
sufficiently alleged the existence of a serious medical need with respect to McCoy’s
alcohol withdrawal symptoms. Plaintiffs have plausibly pled that the Night Shift Deputies
“(1) knew [McCoy] faced a substantial risk of serious harm and (2) disregarded that risk
by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.” Id. Over a period of hours, the Night
Shift Deputies observed McCoy’s condition worsening and failed to seek any medical
assistance. Instead, McCoy was in isolation, was placed in a room with a malfunctioning
air conditioning unit, was restrained, and was sprayed with a chemical spray. The Night
Shift Deputies “failed to act despite knowing that [McCoy] displayed symptoms of serious
medical distress.” Id.
While Plaintiffs have alleged facts supporting the deliberate indifference standard
under § 1983 for an inadequate medical care claim, their allegations must overcome the
defense of qualified immunity. The first prong of qualified immunity has been met because
Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that the Night Shift Deputies violated McCoy’s
constitutional rights by exhibiting deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. See
id. at *6.
The second prong of the qualified immunity analysis requires the violation of a right
that has been clearly established. See id. “A Government official’s conduct violates clearly
established law when, at the time of the challenged conduct, ‘[t]he contours of [a] right
[are] sufficiently clear’ that every ‘reasonable official would have understood that what he
is doing violates that right.’” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “‘An inmate must rely
on prison authorities to treat his medical needs; if the authorities fail to do so, those needs
will not be met.’” Id. (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103). Thus, “[t]he Constitution…clearly
guarantees persons in custody a right not to have officials disregard excessive risk to
their safety, and ‘not to have their serious medical needs met with deliberate indifference
on the part of the confining officials.’” Id.
In the instant case, Plaintiffs can “demonstrate such a constitutional violation by
showing that [the Night Shift Deputies] ‘refused to treat [McCoy], ignored his complaints,
intentionally treated him incorrectly, [] engaged in any similar conduct that would clearly
evince a wanton disregard for any serious medical needs,’ or ‘intentionally den[ied] or
delay[ed] access to medical care.’” Id. “To define this right at the appropriate level of
generality, the Court compares [the Night Shift Deputies’] conduct to facts of similar cases
to determine whether, upon observing [McCoy’s] situation, ‘any reasonable officer would
have known that the Constitution required [them] to intervene.’” Id. at *7. For several
hours, the Night Shift Deputies observed McCoy in serious medical distress, an altered
mental state, and unable to properly interact or communicate. See id. Plaintiffs allege that
“McCoy should have been transported to an appropriate facility when [the Night Shift
Deputies] first began to observe McCoy’s symptoms including agitation, profuse
sweating, seizures, heavy breathing with delusions, hallucinating and had a fever.” See
Record Document 27 at ¶ 13. Plaintiffs assert that they “should have been aware that the
failure to provide detoxification protocol would risk serious injury or death.” Id. at ¶ 14.
In Thompson v. Upshur Cnty., the Fifth Circuit held that a reasonable jailer “would
have recognized the constitutional obligation to summon medical assistance well before
[the inmate] died.” 245 F. 3d 447, 464 (5th Cir. 2001). In Thompson, “the jailer was aware
that the inmate (1) had a high blood alcohol level, (2) was hallucinating and speaking
incoherently, (3) was experiencing delirium tremens, and (4) was harming himself” for
about eight hours. Smith, 2022 WL 4534997, at *7 (citing Thompson, 245 F. 3d at 463).
In Smith, a Texas district court found that the plaintiff’s “confusion and erratic behavior on
top of his other symptoms should have particularly indicated that he was likely incapable
of advocating for his own serious needs.” Id. Similar to the instant case, the jailer in Smith
sought no medical advice. See id. The district court held that “[i]t is the detainee’s obvious
medical distress and inability to help himself which in government custody that triggers a
constitutional duty to attempt to provide some measure of assistance, rather than
intentionally ignoring him.” Id.
In the instant case, the Night Shift Deputies were aware of McCoy’s dire medical
condition but did nothing to secure medical help. See id. at *8. In conjunction with other
courts, this Court concludes that once the Night Shift Deputies “observe[d] signs of a dire
need for medical assistance, [they] [had] a basic responsibility to take some action
regarding medical care, especially [since] [McCoy] show[ed] signs of real helplessness.”
Id. Plaintiffs have alleged a plausible § 1983 inadequate medical care claim against the
Night Shift Deputies because “no reasonable official could have believed this failure to
act was lawful, given the alleged facts.” Id. Therefore, Plaintiffs’ allegations of McCoy’s
medical condition, along with the Night Shift Deputies’ knowledge and observations of
McCoy for several hours, could plausibly support a finding that they were deliberately
indifferent. See id. at *9. Plaintiffs’ allegations, taken as true, overcome the defense of
qualified immunity at this stage of the proceeding. See id.
Therefore, the Deputy Defendants’ Motion (Record Document 37), with respect to
the § 1983 inadequate medical care claim against the Night Shift Deputies, is DENIED.
Additionally, Plaintiffs’ allegations, at this stage, are sufficient to state a claim for punitive
damages against the Night Shift Deputies. Therefore, Plaintiffs’ § 1983 inadequate
medical care claim and punitive damages claim are retained, but only with respect to the
Night Shift Deputies.
With respect to the Day Shift Deputies, however, Plaintiffs have failed to plausibly
allege a § 1983 inadequate medical care claim. Plaintiffs have not pled sufficient facts
demonstrating that the Day Shift Deputies were personally aware of McCoy’s serious
medical needs. See Abraugh, 2023 WL 6055491, at *6. Plaintiffs have not sufficiently pled
a link connecting these Defendants “with any wrongdoing based on their ‘direct
participation.’” Id. (quoting Sanchez v. Young Cnty., 866 F. 3d 274, 281 (5th Cir. 2017)).
The Day Shift Deputies reported to working around 5:30 a.m. the morning of March
6. See Record Document 27 at ¶ 21. Lt. Lyons, one of the Night Shift Deputies, allegedly
informed Lt. Black, the oncoming shift supervisor, of McCoy’s serious medical condition
around 5:00 a.m. See id. at ¶ 23. Lt. Lyons supposedly recommended medical treatment
and examination, but neither Lt. Lyons nor Lt. Black took action to address McCoy’s
serious medical condition. See id. Plaintiffs allege that Lt. Black failed to inform the
medical staff of McCoy’s serious medical condition. See id. The other Day Shift Deputies
were never made aware by either Lt. Lyons or Lt. Black. Plaintiffs generally claim that the
other Day Shift Deputies “became aware of McCoy’s alcohol withdrawal and other serious
medical symptoms and conditions…,” but this conclusory and speculative allegation is
insufficient to demonstrate the other Day Shift Deputies knew of McCoy’s condition. See
id. at ¶ 20. From Plaintiffs’ allegations, it is unclear how these other Day Shift Deputies
could have known of McCoy’s condition if Lt. Black never told them. See id. at ¶ 23.
Plaintiffs have provided a “confusing web of alleged liability and scattershot allegations,”
thereby making it difficult for the Court to understand the extent of the Day Shift Deputies’
alleged wrongdoing. See Abraugh, 2023 WL 6055491, at *7.
Furthermore, Plaintiffs’ allegations regarding Lt. Black’s awareness of McCoy’s
serious medical condition are insufficient to demonstrate deliberate indifference. While
they claim Lt. Lyons informed Lt. Black of McCoy’s serious medical condition, there are
no allegations demonstrating Lt. Black had personally observed or had direct contact with
McCoy. Plaintiffs’ general assertions that Lt. Black knew, without more, are insufficient.
Plaintiffs do not claim any of the Day Shift Deputies observed McCoy’s symptoms or
worsening medical condition. In fact, Plaintiffs allege the Day Shift Deputies “attempted
to discharge McCoy from their custody….” See Record Document 27 at ¶ 24. While
Plaintiffs claim this attempted discharge was for improper reasons, the Day Shift Deputies
nonetheless attempted to act. There are not enough factual assertions to meet the high
standard of deliberate indifference. The Day Shift Deputies had only been on duty for
three to four hours by the time McCoy died. Unlike the Night Shift Deputies who observed
McCoy’s deterioration throughout the night and failed to contact medical personnel, there
are no allegations the Day Shift Deputies ever directly interacted with or observed McCoy.
The Court concludes Plaintiffs have not pled a plausible § 1983 inadequate
medical care claim against the Day Shift Deputies. Therefore, the Deputy Defendants’
Motion (Record Document 37), with respect to the § 1983 inadequate medical care claim
against the Day Shift Deputies, is GRANTED. This claim is DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE, but only as to the Day Shift Deputies. Additionally, because the Court has
found that the Day Shift Deputies did not show reckless and callous disregard and
indifference to McCoy, Plaintiffs are not permitted to recover punitive damages against
the Day Shift Deputies.
(b) Louisiana Fault and Negligence Claim.
Plaintiffs submit that all Defendants, including the Deputy Defendants, violated
Louisiana Civil Code Article 2315. See Record Document 27 at ¶ 32. Plaintiffs allege that
Defendants’ “failure to provide adequate medical assistance to [McCoy] under the
circumstances was below the standard of care of jailers in a jail setting.” Id. at ¶ 33. Rather
than transporting McCoy to a “health care provider,” he was placed in a WRAP which
allegedly aggravated his symptoms. See id.
Plaintiffs assert Defendants “had a duty to provide medical care, access to
services, adequate housing, and accommodations.” Id. at ¶ 32. Additionally, they submit
that “[j]ailers as custodians have a duty to protect and care for their charges.” Id. They
allege that “[t]he failure to cause the prison doctor or send him to a hospital or other health
care provider when [McCoy] was suffering from alcohol withdrawal delayed needed
medical treatment which in turn caused [McCoy] to suffer from a coronary infraction
leading to his death; and also caused other symptoms leading to death including but not
limited to pain, discomfort, distress, anxiety, and mental health issues.” Id. Plaintiffs
maintain that Defendants’ “failure to provide adequate medical assistance to [McCoy]
under the circumstances was below the standard of care of jailers in a jail setting.” Id. at
¶ 33.
The Court finds that Plaintiffs’ allegations against the Deputy Defendants, with
respect to their Louisiana fault and negligence claims, are insufficient legal conclusions.
While Plaintiffs generally reference Louisiana Civil Code Article 2315, their allegations are
a mere recitation of the elements for a state law negligence claim. Article 2315 is a generic
code article dealing with liability for acts causing damages; it does not set forth a certain
duty or standard of care. Plaintiffs’ assertions that the Deputy Defendants acted below
the standard of care and violated a duty are insufficient legal conclusions that do not
survive dismissal.
Additionally, Plaintiffs group together “the Defendant Bossier Parish Sheriff’s
employees, and jailers, including but not limited to named individual defendants herein….”
Id. at ¶ 32. They impose a general duty on a group of defendants, some not even
specifically identified, which is insufficient at the pleading stage. Plaintiffs’ attempt to
assert state law fault and negligence claims against unnamed defendants is improper,
and the Court will not address such claims against unknown defendants. Moreover, the
Court does not find Plaintiffs’ allegations state plausible claims for relief; rather, their
allegations are general, speculative legal conclusions that cannot overcome dismissal.
Therefore, with respect to Plaintiffs’ state law fault and negligence claim against
the Deputy Defendants, the Deputy Defendants’ Motion (Record Document 37) is
GRANTED, and this claim is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. As to Plaintiffs’ claim for
punitive damages, “Louisiana law prohibits ‘punitive or other “penalty” damages … unless
expressly authorized by statute.’” Mallet v. Geans, No. 19-00427, 2020 WL 548764, at *3
(W.D. La. Feb. 3, 2020). Since Plaintiffs have failed to identify a Louisiana statutory
provision that authorizes a punitive damages award for their state law claims, they are
not permitted to recover punitive damages against any of the Deputy Defendants for this
state law claim as a matter of law. See id.
(c) Amendment.
Federal Rule 15(a) “provides that ‘leave to amend shall be freely given when
justice so requires,’ but only ‘applies where plaintiffs “expressly requested” to amend.’”
U.S. ex rel. Jamison v. Del-Jen, Inc., 747 Fed. Appx. 216, 221 (5th Cir. 2018). Moreover,
“a district court is justified in denying leave to amend when a plaintiff has ‘fail[ed] to cure
deficiencies by amendments previously allowed.’” Id. Here, the Court will not give
Plaintiffs an opportunity to amend their First Amended Complaint.
On May 8, 2025, Magistrate Judge Hornsby stayed all discovery and allowed
Plaintiffs until May 27, 2025 “to file an amended and restated complaint that pleads their
best case with respect to the claims against the individual defendants (in anticipation of
their qualified immunity defense) and with respect to any other claims, including those
challenged by the [old] pending Rule 12 motions.” Record Document 22 at 1–2. In May
of 2025, Defendants had all filed Rule 12 motions to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims, which
asserted similar arguments to the currently pending motions to dismiss. See Record
Documents 9, 10, 11, & 14. These previously filed motions to dismiss were handled by a
joint order entered by the undersigned; however, Plaintiffs were put on notice and
cautioned that they needed to assert more specific allegations and anticipate the qualified
immunity defense. See Record Documents 22 & 32.
Plaintiffs seek to amend their complaint once again to cure the same problems
previously mentioned by this Court. Even though they have alleged they can provide
additional facts to support their arguments, these facts are uncorroborated should have
been included in their First Amended Complaint. The Court find further amendment would
be futile; therefore, Plaintiffs are not permitted to amend their First Amended Complaint.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above,
IT IS ORDERED that the Deputy Defendants’ Motion (Record Document 37) is
GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Their Motion is GRANTED with respect to
their § 1983 inadequate medical care claim against the Day Shift Deputies and state law
fault and negligence claim against all of the Deputy Defendants. These claims are
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Their Motion is DENIED as to Plaintiffs’ § 1983
inadequate medical care claim against the Night Shift Deputies. This claim remains.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs are not permitted to receive punitive
damages relating to their § 1983 claim against the Day Shift Deputies or their state law
claim against all of the Deputy Defendants. However, Plaintiffs may be able to receive an
award of punitive damages relating to their § 1983 claim against the Night Shift Deputies.
An Order consistent with this Ruling shall issue herewith.
THUS DONE AND SIGNED, in Shreveport, Louisiana, this 25th day of August,
2025.
“ a“
as Le DISTRICT a JUDGE
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