United States of America upon the relation and for the use of the Tennessee Valley Authority v. An Easement and Right -of-Way over 0.98 Acre of Land, More or Less, in Knox County Tennessee

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, upon relation )

and for the use of the TENNESSEE VALLEY )

AUTHORITY, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 3:24-CV-00037-DCLC-DCP

)

AN EASEMENT AND RIGHT-OF-WAY OVER )

0.98 ACRES OF LAND, MORE OR LESS, IN )

KNOX COUNTY, TENNESSEE, and JOYCE )

FRITTS, Trustee of the Joyce Fritts Family Trust, )

a Revocable Living Trust, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on United States Magistrate Judge Debra C. Poplin’s

Memorandum and Order [Mem. & Order, Doc. 130] and Defendant Joyce Fritts’s Objections

[Def.’s Objs., Doc. 146]. For the reasons herein, the Court will overrule Ms. Fritts’s objections.

I. BACKGROUND

Last year, Plaintiff Tennessee Valley Authority initiated this action for the taking of

property under the power of eminent domain. [Compl., Doc. 1]. Specifically, it condemned a

permanent easement and right-of-way over Ms. Fritts’s property—0.98 acres in Knox County—

for “the erection, operation, and maintenance of electric power transmission circuits and

communication circuits,” [id. at 1], and it filed a declaration of taking and a deposit of $112,100.00

as its estimation of just compensation under the Declaration of Taking Act, 40 U.S.C.

§§ 3114−3118, [Pl.’s Decl. of Taking, Doc. 1-3, at 1]. The TVA’s condemnation of Ms. Fritts’s

property is part of the Hardin Valley Transmission Project, which affects seventy-nine other

properties. The easement on the condemned portion of Ms. Fritts’s property essentially bisects

her property, so that remnants of her property abut either side of the easement:

a Certetine [[_] Parce:

□□□

nd

=

rf

Qi

letiare| □

The sole dispute between the parties is whether the TVA’s compensation is just. See Brown v.

Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 233 (2003) (“When the government physically takes

possession of an interest in property for some public purpose, it has a categorical duty to

compensate the former owner[.]” (quotation omitted)).

On April 16, 2025, Magistrate Judge Poplin entered a protective order under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 26(c) to ensure that “confidential information”—the home addresses

of the TVA’s employees—“be disclosed only in designated ways.” [Protective Order, Doc. 45, at

1].1 Under paragraph eleven of the protective order, a party may “request a change in the

designation of any Document designated ‘Confidential.’” [Id. at 5]. It further provides that the

“Producing Party or the Party asserting that the material is Confidential shall have the burden of

proving that the information in question is within the scope of protection afforded by Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 26(c).” [Id.].

The TVA moved for an order “authorizing the continued designation of the home addresses

of TVA employees as confidential information.” [Pl.’s Mot., Doc. 80, at 1]. In support of its

motion, the TVA asked the Court to take judicial notice of its prior briefing on “Privacy Act issues”

because the TVA’s position is that the home addresses of its employees are protected under this

Act. [Id.; see Pl.’s Position Statement, Doc. 41-1, at 11 (stating that the TVA, as a federal agency,

is subject to the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, which prohibits the TVA from disclosing its

employees’ “records,” including their employees’ home addresses)].

Ms. Fritts opposed the TVA’s motion because the TVA’s “argument that the home

addresses and phone numbers are PII [personally identifiably information],” protected under the

Privacy Act, “lacked an analysis of statutes” that “trump[]” the TVA’s “Privacy Act argument.”

[Def.’s Resp., Doc. 86, at 11; id. at 8 (stating that Rule 26 “trumps” the Privacy Act under “28

U.S.C. § 2072”)]. She argued, specifically, that this information is otherwise subject to the Act’s

1 The parties were unable to agree on a protective order, which prompted the TVA to move for one. [Pl’s

Mot., Doc. 38]. Magistrate Judge Poplin held a hearing to resolve the TVA’s motion, in addition to various discovery

disputes between the parties. One of the discovery disputes, which is relevant to the objection that is now before the

Court, involves the TVA’s initial disclosures of its employees’ home addresses, which the TVA originally agreed to

provide to Ms. Fritts. See [Scheduling Order, Doc. 33, at 2]; Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(i) (requiring the parties to

disclose “the name and, if known, the address and telephone number of each individual likely to have discoverable

information”). During the hearing before Magistrate Judge Poplin, the TVA agreed, subject to a protective order, to

produce those home addresses, but the parties still could not agree on the scope of the protective order. [Mem. &

Order, Doc. 43, at 10‒12 (explaining Ms. Fritts’s “concerns with [the TVA]’s proposed protective order”)]. Magistrate

Judge Poplin ordered the parties to submit either an agreed protective order or competing protective orders. [Id. at 12].

The parties submitted the latter, and Magistrate Judge Poplin modified and incorporated provisions of the parties’

competing protective orders “to fit the needs of this case.” [Doc. 46, at 1].

“Routine Use” exception, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(7) and § 552(b)(3), and the “Court Order Exception,”

§ 552a(b)(11). [Id.].2 At the time of her opposition, Ms. Fritts also indicated that the TVA was in

violation of Rule 26 because it provided Ms. Fritts with the home addresses of only four out of the

six witnesses under the protective order. [Id. at 3].

In reply, the TVA argued that Ms. Fritts’s contention that the routine-use exception under

the Privacy Act applies in this case is “wrong” for a few reasons. [Pl.’s Reply, Doc. 87, at 1].

According to the TVA, the routine-use exception only applies if the agency (1) “designated the

routine use in the Federal Register” and (2) “the use” is “compatible with the purpose for which

the information was collected.” [Id. at 2 (citing Anderson v. U.S.P.S., No. 1:17-CV-00125-GNS,

2018 WL 10761923, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Jan. 5, 2018))].

The TVA argued that neither prong was met here. As to the first prong, the TVA

acknowledged that it did file a notice in the Federal Register “of the existence and character of

TVA’s systems of records.” [Id.]. The TVA explained that the notice “lists the systems (categories)

of records maintained by” it “and routine uses for each system (category) of records.” [Id.]. It

further explained that personnel records are designated as “SytemsTVA-2,” which includes

“information related to education; qualifications; work history; interests and skills; test results;

performance evaluation; career counseling; personnel actions; job description; salary and benefit

information; service dates, including other Federal and military service; replies to congressional

inquiries, medical data; and security investigation data.” [Id. (citing 80 F.R. 24013)]. But,

according to the TVA, employees’ home addresses are not listed as information collected or

maintained in its personnel files, and this information was therefore not disclosed in its notice.

[Id.].

2 Ms. Fritts cites § 552a(b)(12) as the “Court Order Exception” [Doc. 86 at 8; Doc. 146 at 11], but she appears

to miscite this subsection because any reference to that exception is in § 552a(b)(11) of the Privacy Act.

Under the second prong, the TVA argued that, even if this information was “incidentally

contained in” those records, the routine-use exception would not apply if the disclosure would not

be compatible with the purpose of the information’s collection” because “the stated purpose for

the TVA’s system of personnel records is not to establish a contact information database.” [Id. at

2–3 (citation omitted)]. The stated purpose for the TVA’s system, rather, “is to provide a repository

of personnel records, performance reports, events, developments, contract arrangements and other

significant matters relating to an employee’s employment with TVA.” [Id. at 3 (emphasis in

original) (citing 80 F.R. at 24013)]

Magistrate Judge Poplin, in her memorandum and order granting the TVA’s motion,

characterized the “only issue before” her as whether the TVA’s “designation of TVA Employee

PII is appropriate under” her protective order [Doc. 130]. Ms. Fritts has timely objected to her

ruling. Having carefully reviewed and considered Ms. Fritts’s objections, the Court is now

prepared to rule on them.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A federal magistrate judge has “broad discretion to regulate nondispositive matters.”

Diorio v. TMI Hosp., No. 4:15-cv-1710, 2017 WL 1399869, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 19, 2017)

(quotation omitted). When reviewing a magistrate judge’s recommendation on a non-dispositive

issue, the Court must accept it unless it is clearly erroneous or contrary to law. 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1)(A); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a). This standard of review is “highly deferential” to the

magistrate judge’s decision-making authority, Diorio, 2017 WL 1399869 at *2 (quotation

omitted), and “[t]his standard requires the District Court to review findings of fact for clear error

and to review matters of law de novo,” Bisig v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., 940 F.3d 205, 219 (6th

Cir. 2019) (quotation omitted).

A magistrate judge’s findings of fact are “clearly erroneous when the reviewing court on

the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed,”

Heights Cmty. Congress v. Hilltop Realty, Inc., 774 F.2d 135, 140 (6th Cir. 1985), and a magistrate

judge’s legal rulings are contrary to law when she either “fails to apply or misapplies relevant

statutes, case law, or rules of procedure,” Bisig, 940 F.3d at 219 (internal quotation marks and

quotation omitted). The Court may “modify or set aside any part of the order that is clearly

erroneous or is contrary to law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Objection 1: Enforceability of Rule 26(a)

Ms. Fritts argues that Magistrate Judge Poplin “creates a loophole in Rule 26(a)(1) & (a)(2)

allowing TVA or any governmental agency to disregard Rule 26 under its rulings (Docs 129 and

130) until they procure a protective order.” [Doc. 146, at 6]. For this reason, she claims that

Magistrate Judge Poplin erred “by holding that Rule 26(a) is now unenforceable against

government and quasi governmental agencies (TVA) due to the Privacy Act” [Id.].

In this portion of her objection, Ms. Fritts, however, does not provide pinpoint citations to

Magistrate Judge Poplin’s decision or address specific concerns in her analysis. [Id.]. Ms. Fritts’s

objection, therefore, reads as a mere disagreement with Magistrate Judge Poplin’s decision. See

Howard v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 932 F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 1991) (“A general

objection to the entirety of the magistrate’s report has the same effects as would a failure to

object.”); see McPherson v. Kelsey, 125 F.3d 989, 995 (6th Cir. 1997) (“[I]ssues adverted to in a

perfunctory matter, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed

waived. It is not sufficient for a party to mention a possible argument in the most skeletal way[.]”).

Her objection, therefore, is overruled as improper.3

B. Objection 2: Whether the Privacy Act “Trumps” Rule 26

Ms. Fritts claims that Magistrate Judge Poplin erred in her ruling because she “apparently

allow[ed] the Privacy Act to trump Rule 26.” [Doc. 146 at 6]. In her opposition to the TVA’s

motion, Ms. Fritts cited 28 U.S.C. § 2072 as authority for her position that Rule 26(a) “trumps

other statutes and laws,” including the Privacy Act. [Doc. 86 at 11]. She also insisted that she is

entitled to the TVA employees’ home addresses under Rule 26(a), and she cited In re National

Prescription Opiate Litigation, 956 F.3d 838, 844 (6th Cir. 2020), in support of her position that

Rule 26 has the force of law. See [id. (“‘Promulgated pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C.

§ 2072, those Rules [the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] are binding upon courts and parties

alike, with fully the force of law.’” (quoting In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., 956 F.3d at

844))].

Magistrate Judge Poplin determined that Ms. Fritts’s argument “misse[d] the mark”

because the TVA did “not seek to withhold any discoverable information.” [Doc. 130 at 5]. Rather,

the TVA, Magistrate Judge Poplin wrote, requested that the information that it has already

produced to Ms. Fritts “be maintained as confidential” pursuant to her protective order. [Id.].

Magistrate Judge Poplin cited Mannon v. VAMC Ann Arbor, No. 23-CV-12612, 2025 WL 1439579

at *2 (E.D. Mich. May 16, 2025), to show that district courts have authority to fashion a protective

order when, as here, information, subject to Rule 26(a) is protected under the Privacy Act. [Id.

(stating that “‘[a]lthough the Privacy Act does not exempt relevant materials from production

3 Ms. Fritts also mischaracterizes Magistrate Judge Poplin’s ruling. Magistrate Judge Poplin did not “hold[]

that Rule 26(a) is now enforceable against government and quasi governmental agencies.” [Doc. 146 at 6]. For the

reasons discussed in this Opinion, her reasoning for granting the TVA’s motion has support in case law.

under Rule 26, courts have ample discretion to fashion appropriate protective orders upon a

showing of good cause’” (quoting Mannon 2025 WL 1439579 at *2 (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted)))].

Ms. Fritts neither cites any case law that undermines Magistrate Judge Poplin’s legal

conclusion nor argues that Magistrate Judge Poplin, in citing Mannon, reached a conclusion that

is clearly erroneous or contrary to law. In addition, Ms. Fritts’s objection—which is one sentence

in length—reads as a retread of the same argument that Ms. Fritts previously raised before

Magistrate Judge Poplin in her opposition to the TVA’s motion. Compare [Doc. 86, at 11 (stating

that “Rule 26 trumps other statues and laws which would include Plaintiff’s Privacy Act

argument”), with Doc. 146 at 6 (“The magistrate errs in its decision to apparently allow the Privacy

act to Trump Rule 26[.]”]. Her objection is therefore improper. See Brown v. City of Grand Rapids,

No. 16-2433, 2017 WL 4712064, at *2 (6th Cir. June 16, 2017) (“[A]n objection that does nothing

more than state a disagreement with a magistrate’s suggested resolution, or simply summarizes

what has been presented before, is not an ‘objection’ as that term is used in the context of Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 72.” (citing Howard, 932 F.2d at 509)).

In any case, the Court will endeavor to address the legal authority—28 U.S.C. § 2072 and

In re National Prescription Opiate Litigation—that Ms. Fritts did cite in her opposition. Section

2702(a) states that “[t]he Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general rules of practice

and procedure and rules of evidence for cases in the United States district courts.” The statute’s

language does not even hint that Rule 26(a)’s initial-disclosures requirement “trumps” the

nondisclosure requirements under the Privacy Act. In addition, the Court finds that In re National

Prescription Opiate Litigation is not “on point in” her case, as she claims. [Doc. 86, at 10]. Stated

another way, it is not an example of a case in which a district court “apparently allow[ed] the

Privacy Act to trump Rule 26,” as Ms. Fritts asserts that Magistrate Judge Poplin did here. [Doc.

146, at 6].

In In re National Prescription Opiate Litigation, the Sixth Circuit determined that the

district court “disregard[ed]” the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for reasons that do not apply

here. 956 F.3d at 844. The petitioners—twelve retail pharmacy chains—sought a writ of

mandamus from the Sixth Circuit, arguing that the district court “disregarded or acted in flat

contradiction to” the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when it allowed the respondents, two Ohio

counties, to amend their complaint “almost 19 months after the court’s deadline for amendments.”

Id. at 841. The district court, nonetheless, granted the respondents’ motion to amend without even

considering whether they were diligent in attempting to meet the original deadline under Rule

16(b). Id. at 843 (“The district court could grant the Counties [respondents’] leave to amend their

complaints only if the Counties showed ‘good cause for their failure to make the amendments 19

months earlier.” (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4)); id. at 844 (“[T]he district court’s stated basis for

finding ‘good cause’ . . . is simply no substitute for the showing of diligence required by the

Rule.”). In its reasoning, the Sixth Circuit explained that pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2072, the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure “are binding upon the court and parties alike[.]” Id. The Sixth Circuit

held that the district court erred in its “mistake [] to think it had authority to disregard the Rules’

requirements[.]”

To the extent that Ms. Fritts, in citing National Prescription Opiate Litigation, claims that

Magistrate Judge Poplin “disregarded or acted in flat contradiction” to Rule 26, the Court

disagrees. 956 F.3d at 841. Magistrate Judge Poplin ordered the TVA to provide the home

addresses of its employees to Ms. Fritts—disclosures that Ms. Fritts is entitled to under Rule

26(a)(1)(A)(i)—albeit subject to a protective order under Rule 26(c). See [Doc. 43 at 9 (“Given

Plaintiff’s agreement to produce the home addresses, the Court ORDERS it to do [so] within five

days of entry of a protective order.”); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)((A) (“[A] party must,

without waiting a discovery request provide to the other parties: (i) the name and, if know, the

address and telephone number of each individual likely to have discoverable information[.]”

(emphasis added)). Again, Magistrate Judge Poplin cited case law recognizing that “the Privacy

Act does not exempt relevant material from production” and that “courts have ‘ample discretion

to fashion appropriate protective orders.” [Doc. 130 at 5 (citing Mannon, 2025 WL 1439579 at *2

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted))].

Also, Rule 26(c) permits a court to issue a protective order “if justice requires and to protect

individuals from ‘annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.’” Nix v.

Sword, 11 F. App’x 498, 500 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)). Magistrate Judge

Poplin demonstrated that she was mindful of Rule 26(c) because she explained the implications

that could arise if the TVA disclosed records protected under the Privacy Act—implications that

are grounded in law See [Doc. 130, at 5 (“‘This prohibition [against disclosure under the Privacy

Act] is not toothless, and disclosure of records in violation of this provision can be met with civil

and criminal penalties.’” (quoting BNSF Ry. Co. on behalf of United States v. Ctr. for Asbestos

Related Disease, Inc., No. CV 19-40, 2022 WL 20358299, at *1 (D. Mont. Aug. 16, 2020)).

Magistrate Judge Poplin also cited an additional decision in support of her finding that a federal

employee’s home address also “appear[ed] to fall within” information protected from

nondisclosure under the Privacy Act. [Id. (citing U.S. Dep’t of Def. v. Fed. Lab. Rels. Auth., 510

U.S. 487, 494 (1994))].

In sum, Ms. Fritts’s contention that Magistrate Judge Poplin “apparently allow[ed] the

Privacy Act to trump Rule 26” is meritless. [Doc. 146, at 6]. She also fails to cite any case law in

this portion of her objection that undermines Magistrate Judge Poplin’s ruling. She therefore has

not met her burden of showing that Magistrate Judge Poplin clearly erred or that her decision was

contrary to law in grating the TVA’s motion “authorizing the continued designation of the home

addresses of TVA employees as confidential information.” [Doc. 80, at 1].

C. Objection 3: The TVA’s Burden of Proof and Its “Good Faith” Requirement

Ms. Fritts claims that Magistrate Judge Poplin erred in failing to hold the TVA to its

“burden of proof” and “good faith” requirement “in seeking the continued designation” of the

TVA employees’ home addresses as confidential. [Doc. 146, at 2‒3, 6‒7]. Ms. Fritts argues that

the TVA, to show good faith, had to ask its employees for “written consent” to release their home

addresses, [id. at 7 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b))], “which would avoid this entire discovery dispute,”

[Doc. 40, at 3]. The statute provides, in relevant part, that:

No agency shall disclose any record which is contained in a system

of records by any means of communication to any person, or to

another agency, except pursuant to a written request by, or with the

prior written consent of, the individual to whom the record

pertains[.]

5 U.S.C. § 552a(b). Ms. Fritts directs the Court to a footnote in Magistrate Judge Poplin’s decision,

in which she wrote:

Defendant Fritts also states that Plaintiff fails to contend it sought

waiver of the Privacy concerns it raises from the individual pursuant

to 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b). But this statute does not appear to require

Plaintiff to do so.

[Doc. 146, at 7 (quoting Doc 130, at 6 n.4)].

Magistrate Judge Poplin mentions good faith and the burden of proof in paragraphs three

and eleven of her protective order, respectively:

By identifying a Document or portion of a Document as

“Confidential,” a Producing Party may designate any Document

(including interrogatory responses, other discovery responses, or

transcripts) that it in good faith contends to constitute or contain

Confidential information . . . . The Producing Party or the Party

asserting that the material is Confidential shall have the burden of

proving that the information in question is within the scope of

protection afforded by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c).

[Doc. 45 ¶¶ 3, 11].

In her decision, Magistrate Judge Poplin cited these paragraphs of the protective order as

well as case law showing that a federal employees’ home address is a “record” protected under the

Privacy Act. See [Doc. 130, at 5 (“A federal employee’s home address appears to fall within this

category.” (citing U.S. Dep’t of Def., 510 U.S. at 494 (“The employee addresses sought by the

unions are ‘records’ covered by the broad terms of the Privacy Act.”)). In addition, she cited case

law indicating that “other courts have entered protective orders to maintain the confidentially of

discovery protected under the Privacy Act.” [Id. at 6 (citing United States v. Rhodes, No. CV 21-

110, 2023 WL 4275494, at *1 (D. Mont. Apr. 24, 2023) (finding entry of a protective order

“appropriate” under Rule 26(c) because the “[d]iscovery materials may also contain information

and evidence protected by the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a”) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted))].

So, as is apparent from Magistrate Judge Poplin’s reasoning, she did determine that the

TVA made a “good faith” showing that its employees’ home addresses “constitute[d] or

contain[ed] Confidential information,” and that the TVA met its burden of proving “that the

information in question is within the scope of protection afforded by” Rule 26(c). [Doc. 45]; see

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c) (“The court may, for good cause, issue an order to protect a party or person

from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense[.]”); see also Kyle v.

Fed. Trade Comm’n, No. 21-MC-9004, 2021 WL 1407960, at *3, *5 (W.D. Mo. Apr. 14, 2021)

(determining that “the individuals’ privacy interests,” protected under the Privacy Act, “do not

outweigh the need for discovery[,]” and “any concerns can be adequately addressed by a protective

order”). Ms. Fritts’s contention that Magistrate Judge Poplin, in granting the TVA’s motion, erred

in failing to hold the TVA to its “burden of proof” and “good faith” requirement is therefore

without merit.

In addition, Ms. Fritts has not shown that Magistrate Judge Poplin erred in her reasoning

that the Privacy Act does not “appear” to mandate that the TVA ask its employees for written

consent to release their home addresses before it seeks a protective order. [Doc. 130 at 6 n. 4]. The

Court can glean nothing from 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)’s language that even hints that a federal agency

must make such a showing, and Ms. Fritts does nothing even to suggest otherwise. And although

Ms. Fritts insists “it is bad faith not to request [written consent],” she does not cite any case law to

support that assertion. [Doc. 146 at 7]. Magistrate Judge Poplin therefore did not clearly err or

act contrary to law.

D. Objection 4: “Distinguishable Cases”

Next, Ms. Fritts argues that Magistrate Judge Poplin erred because she relied on

“distinguishable cases to corrupt Rule 26(a).” [Doc. 146 at 10]. According to Ms. Fritts, four

opinions that Magistrate Judge Poplin cited are inapposite to this case because “[t]here is no

indication in any of the cases cited . . . related to the Privacy Act that they dealt with Rule 26(a)1)

[sic] & (a)(2) disclosures.” [Id. at 9 (citing “Gary, Laxalt, Mehrrafiee, Rhodes”)]. She states that

“[t]here is a huge difference between disclosures mandated by 26(a)(1) and (a)(2) for all litigants

and case by case discovery.” [Id. at 10]. And four cases that Magistrate Judge Poplin cited in a

footnote, Ms. Fritts argues, are not relevant because they involved “much broader discovery

requests than here.” [Id.].

Magistrate Judge Poplin cited Gary to show that “even when courts order production of

information subject to the Privacy Act, this does not mean a protective order is not appropriate.”

[Doc. 130, at 6 (“‘The fact that a document is subject to the Privacy Act is not, however, irrelevant

to the manner is which discovery should proceed.’” (quoting Gary, 1998 WL 834853 at *4))]. She

also cited Mehrrafiee and Rhodes as examples of “other courts [that] ha[d] entered protective

orders to maintain the confidentiality of discovery protected under the Privacy Act.” [Id. (citing

United States v. Mehrrafiee, No. 2:25-CR-00126-CV, 2025 WL 1639409, at *1 (C.D. Cal. June 9,

2025); Rhodes, 2023 WL 4275494 at *1)].4

The parties in Gary and Mehrrafiee, admittedly, did not involve discovery disputes under

Rule 26(a). In Gary, the plaintiff sought documents that were “relevant . . . to the discovery of

admissible evidence under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).” Gary, 1998 WL 834853 at *2 (emphasis

added). The plaintiff, specifically, sought the defendant’s employee’s personnel file, and the

defendant claimed, in relevant part, that these documents were “prohibited from disclosure under

the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b).” Id. And in Mehrrafiee, the government moved for a

protective order to safeguard personally identifying information under Federal Rules of Criminal

Procedure 16(d)(1) and (2)—information that, it argued, “may contain information within the

4 Magistrate Judge Poplin, in a footnote, cited additional cases as examples of “other courts

[that] ha[d] entered protective orders to maintain the confidentially of discovery protected under

the Privacy Act.” [Doc. 130 at 6; id. at 6 n. 5 (citing Kyle, v. Fed. Trad Comm’n, No. 21-MC-9004,

Doc. 22, at 7, 10 (W.D. Mo. Apr. 29, 2021) (determining that the disclosure of individuals’ phone

numbers are protected under the Privacy Act but that “any potential harm” from that disclosure

“will be adequately protected by a protective order”); Pearlstein v. BlackBerry Ltd., No. CV 19-

MC-91091, 2019 WL 6117145, at *1 (D. Mass. Nov. 18, 2019) (involving a discovery dispute

about documents that the FBI claimed were protected under the Privacy Act); Alabama & Gulf

Coast Ry., LLC v. United States, No. CA 10-0352, 2011 WL 1838882, at *5 (S.D. Ala. May 13,

2011) (ordering the government to produce an employee’s personnel file over Privacy Act

objections but pursuant to a protective order); Hernandez v. United States, No. CIV. A. 97-3367,

1998 WL 230200, at *3 (E.D. La. May 6, 1998) (overruling the government’s Privacy Act

objection to producing personnel files but finding that they were subject to a protective order)].

scope of the Privacy Act.” United States v. Mehrrafiee, No. 2:25-CR-00126-CV, 2025 WL

1639409, at *1 (C.D. Cal. May 9, 2025).

Although Gary and Mehrrafiee are not necessarily on point, Rhodes is. In Rhodes, the

parties, like the TVA and Ms. Fritts, agreed to exchange initial disclosures under Rule 26(a)(1).

See Rhodes, No. 9:21-cv-00110-DLC, Doc. 40, at 2 (D. Mont. Mar. 14, 2023) (“The parties shall

exchange initial disclosures[.]”) see id. Doc. 33 at 2 (“[T]he parties agreed to complete initial

disclosures[.]” The government subsequently moved for a protective order under Rule 26(c) on

the grounds that “[d]iscovery materials may [] contain information and evidence protected by the

Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. 552(a).” Rhodes, No. 9:21-cv-00110-DLC, Doc. 48-2, at 3 (D. Mont. Apr.

14, 2023). And some of the information subject to that protective order included personally

identifiable information such as the “home street address[es]” of non-parties—information subject

to initial disclosures under Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(i). Id. at 5. The district court determined that a

protective order was “appropriate.” Rhodes, No. 9:21-cv-00110-DLC, Doc. 52, at 2 (D. Mont. Apr.

24, 2023); Rhodes, 2023 WL 4275494 at *1. Rhodes, therefore, especially lends support for

Magistrate Judge Poplin’s legal conclusion, and Ms. Fritts points to no case law showing that

Magistrate Judge Poplin’s ruling is clearly erroneous or contrary to law. The Court therefore has

no basis to disturb her ruling.

E. Objection 5: Alleged “Ethics Violation” and Whether the TVA’s Employees are

Third Parties

Ms. Fritts argues that the TVA “should have to meet a burden of proof to show that

employees are Third Parties.” [Doc. 146 at 10]. She also references the TVA’s alleged “threat[]”

against her attorney to file an ethics violation if he contacts the TVA’s employees. [Id.].

This objection is improper because Ms. Fritts does not cite Magistrate Judge Poplin’s

decision, let alone identify specific errors in her analysis. See Twafiq v. Hines, No. 22-cv-10328,

2022 WL 17852032, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 22, 2022) (“By failing to identify any discrete issue

or present any developed factual or legal basis in support of his general ‘objection,’ Plaintiff has

waived any objection to the substantive analysis of the Magistrate Judge’s Report and

Recommendation.”). The Court, therefore, “is left to guess” which portions of Magistrate Judge

Poplin’s decision Ms. Fritts is claiming are erroneous. Hill v. Klee, No. 10-14674, 2014 WL

555197, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 12, 2014); see Miller v. Currie, 50 F.3d 373, 380 (6th Cir.1995)

(“[O]bjections must be clear enough to enable the district court to discern those issues that are

dispositive and contentious.”). Her objection, therefore, is overruled as improper.

F. Objection 6: Statutory Exceptions Under 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(1)‒(b)(13)

Next, Ms. Fritts faults Magistrate Judge Poplin for “fail[ing] to state that this case did not

consider the exceptions under the Privacy Act.” [Doc. 146 at 10]. In other words, Ms. Fritts claims

that Magistrate Judge Poplin erred because she did not address all thirteen statutory exceptions

under § 522a(b)(1)‒(13). Section (b) of this statute provides thirteen exceptions to the requirement

that an agency must, ordinarily, obtain “a written request by, or with the prior written consent of,

the individual to whom the record pertains.” Id.

But Ms. Fritts, in her opposition, did not call Magistrate Judge Poplin’s attention to every

statutory exception under § 522a(b). [Doc. 86]. She relied on the “Routine Use” exception under

§ 552a(b)(3) and the “Court Order Exception” under § 522a(b)(11). [Id. at 8‒9, 11]. To the extent

that Ms. Fritts now, for the first time in her objections, argues that all thirteen apply, her argument

is a non-starter. See Bisig, 940 F.3d at 218 (stating that “parties are precluded from raising new

arguments or issues that were not presented to the magistrate” (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted)). This objection, too, is overruled as improper.

G. Objection 7: Routine-Use Exception Under 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(7) and (b)(3)

As to Ms. Fritts’s final objection, she contends that Magistrate Judge Poplin erred in her

“Routine Use Analysis.” [Doc. 146, at 11]. Magistrate Judge Poplin agreed with the TVA’s

position that its employees’ home addresses were not subject to the routine-use exception under

§ 552a(a)(7) and (b)(3). In her decision, she explained that the routine-use exception applies when

(1) the agency’s disclosure “fall[s] within the scope of one of the routine uses published in the

Federal Register[,]” and (2) the agency’s disclosure is “compatible with the purpose for which [the

record] was collected.” Anderson v. UPS, No. 1:17-CV-00125, 2018 WL 10761923, at *2 (W.D.

Ky. Jan. 5, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:17-CV-00125, 2018 WL 10772025

(W.D. Ky. Feb. 13, 2018)). She agreed with the TVA’s position that the first prong of the routine-

use exception did not apply:

Plaintiff represents that “TVA published a notice in the Federal

Register of the existence and character of TVA’s systems of

records” [Doc. 87 p. 2 (citation omitted)]. “Personnel records are

designated as ‘System TVA-2[,]’” but Plaintiff states “an

employee’s home address is not listed as information collected or

maintained in TVA personnel file” [Id.].

[Doc. 130 at 7].

Although Ms. Fritts quotes the two-prong test that Magistrate Judge Poplin referenced in

her decision, she does not explain why Magistrate Judge Poplin’s analysis is clearly erroneous or

contrary to law. [Doc. 146 at 11‒12]. This objection, therefore, reads as a mere disagreement with

Magistrate Judge Poplin’s ruling, and so it too is not a proper objection. See Brown, 2017 WL

4712064 at *2 (“[A]n objection that does nothing more than state a disagreement with a

magistrate’s suggested resolution, or simply summarizes what has been presented before, is not

an ‘objection’ as that term is used in the context of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72.” (citing

Howard, 932 F.2d at 509)).

IV. CONCLUSION

Ms. Fritts fails to meet her burden of showing that Magistrate Judge Poplin clearly erred

or acted contrary to law. Her objections [Doc. 146] are therefore OVERRULED.

SO ORDERED:

s/ Clifton L. Corker

United States District Judge