Price v. ProMedica Employment Services II, LLC.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MARY RUTH PRICE, : No. 3:24cv1575

Plaintiff :

: (Judge Munley)

Vv. ;

PROMEDICA EMPLOYMENT □

SERVICES, Il, LLC; and

CURO HEALTH SERVICES d/b/a

GENTIVA SERVICES, INC., :

Defendant :

MEMORANDUM

Plaintiff Mary Ruth Price asserts claims against Defendants ProMedica

Employment Services, I!, LLC (“ProMedica”) and Curo Health Services, LLC

d/b/a Gentiva Services, Inc. (“Gentiva”) pursuant to the Americans with

Disabilities Act, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, ef seg. (“ADA”) and the Family

and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2601, ef seq. (“FMLA”). Before the

court is a motion to dismiss filed by Defendant Gentiva pursuant to Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Gentiva’s motion is ripe for disposition.

Background

According to the complaint, Defendant ProMedica hired Price in 2015 to

serve as a corporate regional hospice consultant. ' (Doc. 1, Compl. 9] 12). Price

1 These brief background facts are derived from plaintiff's complaint and the exhibits attached

thereto. At this stage of the proceedings, the court must accept all factual allegations in the

worked in ProMedica’s home health, palliative, and hospice business, which was

known as Heartland Hospice and Home Care (“Heartland”). Id. ff] 12, 13. □□□□□□□

usual duties included travel to twelve (12) hospice locations in Pennsylvania and

Maryland. (Doc. 1, Compl. J] 15).

In February 2023, ProMedica and Defendant Gentiva announced that they

signed a definitive agreement under which Gentiva would acquire Heartland, the

portion of ProMedica’s business applicable to plaintiff's employment. Id. □□ 47. As

this acquisition process proceeded, Price experienced health issues. Specifically,

on May 31, 2023, Price required hospitalization for infections and respiratory

failure. Id. 18. Due to the hospitalization, Price requested and received leave

from work pursuant to the FMLA. See id. JJ 20.

Price remained on leave for several months. Price’s providers diagnosed

her with Common Variable Immunodeficiency Disease (“CVID”).? Id. If] 21, 23,

24. On August 8, 2023, Price’s treating immunologist advised her that “four-six

weekly” intravenous immunoglobin (“VIG”) treatments were necessary prior to

the plaintiff's return to work. Id. | 25. According to the timeline presented in the

amended complaint as true. Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008).

The court makes no determination, however, as to the ultimate veracity of these assertions.

2 Price alleges that CVID is an immune disorder that causes frequent bacterial and viral

infections of a person's airways. (Doc. 1 J] 22-23).

complaint, plaintiff's FMLA-protected leave expired on or around August 22,

2023. Id. J 32.

Prior to that date, on August 11, 2023, Price notified her supervisor, Gina

Klein, a registered nurse, about her CVID diagnosis and IVIG treatment plan. Id.

26. One week later, on August 18, 2023, Klein told Price that she was making

plaintiffs position a hybrid position. Id. During that conversation, Klein also

advised that Price would now be responsible for covering two hospice locations

in Carlisle and Chambersburg, Pennsylvania and would work remotely

performing audits. Id. f[ 27. The supervisor also told Price that a regional directo

of operations was informed of this plan and “was okay with it.” Id. J 28.

Nevertheless, two weeks after that conversation, on September 1, 2023,

Klein informed Price that ProMedica posted plaintiff's position because her FMLA

return date had passed. Id. ] 29. Price relayed that she intended to return to

work as soon as she completed |V!G treatments. Id. {[ 30. Price also asked if

anyone had been hired for her position. Id. 4] 31. According to the plaintiff, the

supervisor then stated in this conversation: “our goal is for you to return to your

position but there cannot be any restrictions to your return.” Id. {[ 31. Price later

received a letter from ProMedica’s human resources (“HR") department

indicating that plaintiff's position would be filled because her FMLA leave expired

as of August 22, 2023. Id. J 32.

On September 19, 2023, Price spoke with Klein again, asking if her positior

had been filled. Id. ] 35. Price’s supervisor responded by again stating that

plaintiff's position had not been filled and that her return to work must be without

any restrictions. ld. J] 35, 37. During this conversation, Price also informed the

supervisor that her physician would be releasing her to return to work as of

October 9, 2023. Id. ] 36. Price’s doctor’s office then faxed plaintiff's return-to-

work documents to ProMedica on September 21, 2023. Id. J 39.

On October 5, 2023, Price sent Klein an email regarding arrangements for

her return to work. Id. 940. Plaintiff alleges that she had received no

communications from HR prior to that point about a return to work or any policy

to follow otherwise. Id. The next day, on October 6, 2023, the supervisor called

Price to tell her that her previous position had been filled and that she no longer

had a job. Id. 741. The supervisor told Price: “Your FMLA date was up August

21, 2023, and ProMedica did not have to hold the position.” Id. J 42.

Price then made numerous requests for a phone call from the HR

department. Id. 9 43. On October 12, 2023, plaintiff received a phone call from

Tiffany Gall, identified as the Director of Corporate Human Resources and

Workforce Utilization (hereinafter “HR director”). Id. 7 43. During that call, Gall

told Price that ProMedica did not receive the return-to-work documents. Id. J 44.

Gall also told Price that she could apply to two positions in Brunswick, Georgia o1

Jacksonville, Florida. Id. 45. However, those positions were removed from

ProMedica’s career website two days later. Id. 46.

As indicated above, Gentiva had earlier announced its acquisition of

ProMedica’s home health, palliative, and hospice care business. Id. 49.

On October 17, 2023, five (5) days after speaking with the HR director, Price

received an email from the executive vice president of Gentiva offering plaintiff

employment upon closing of ProMedica’s asset sale to Gentiva. ld. 48. This

email provided, in part:

You have until October 22, 2023 to consider your

Employment Offer. To accept the Employment Offer,

there's nothing you need to do. By accepting, you'll be

subject to Gentiva's policies for its employees.

To decline this Employment Offer, then please send an

email, before October 22, 2023...to let us know. Of course,

if you don't perform your position's duties following the

Closing, you will be deemed to have declined your

Employment Offer. Either way, your employment with

ProMedica will be deemed to have terminated on the date

of the Closing and you will not be treated as a Gentiva

employee.

We are confident that your knowledge, skills, and

dedication are well suited for our needs and that you will

make significant contributions and caring for our patients

and families. We are looking forward to you joining us and

making a difference in the lives of those who need us most.

Welcome to Gentiva!

(Doc. 1-1, Compl. Ex. A).

On November 1, 2023, Gentiva announced through a press release that it

had completed the acquisition of the home heath, palliative, and hospice assets

from ProMedica. (Doc. 1-2, Compl. Ex. B). The ProMedica employees

mentioned above became Gentiva employees, including Klein, the supervisor,

and Gall, the HR director. (Doc. 1, Compl. JJ 50-52). Price, however, was not

permitted to return to work either by ProMedica or Gentiva. Id. {J 53.

Based on the above allegations, Price asserts four (4) claims against the

defendants: Count | — disability discrimination in violation of the ADA; Count II —

retaliation in violation of the ADA; Count III — failure to accommodate in violation

of the ADA; and Count IV — violation of the FMLA. Id. Jf 66-100. Price alleges

that defendants unreasonably refused to grant an ADA reasonable

accommodation beyond the 12-week period protected by the FMLA in the form o

a limited amount of extended leave and/or the ability to work remotely for a short

period. Id. 4 59. By terminating her and/or failing to hire her, Price contends that

defendants retaliated against her due to her disability and because she exercisec

FMLA rights. Id. | 60.

As for her claims against Gentiva, Price asserts that Gentiva is the

successor to ProMedica’s home health, palliative, and hospice care business an

is thus also responsible for ProMedica’s actions. Id. FJ 55-56, 77, 83, 91, 99. In

response to being named as a defendant in this action, Gentiva filed a motion to

dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6). (Doc. 15). Gentiva challenges allegations seeking to hold it liable for

the alleged ADA and FMLA violations under a successor liability theory.

Jurisdiction

Because Price asserts claims pursuant to the ADA and FMLA, the court

has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Standard of Review

Gentiva has filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure tc

state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The court tests the sufficiency of

the complaint's allegations when considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.

To survive a motion to dismiss, “a complaint must provide ‘a short and plair

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.’ ° Doe v.

Princeton Univ., 30 F.4th 335, 341-42 (3d Cir. 2022) (quoting FED. R. Civ. P.

8(a)(2)). This means that a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v.

igbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl_ Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

570 (2007)). Aclaim has facial plausibility when factual content is pled which

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for

the misconduct alleged. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “Threadbare

recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

statements, do not suffice.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

The court evaluates motions to dismiss using a three-step process. The

first step involves identifying the elements of each claim. Oldham v. Pennsylvania

State Univ., 138 F.4th 731, 743 (3d Cir. 2025) (citation omitted). The second

step involves reviewing the operative pleading and disregarding any formulaic

recitation of the elements of a claim or other legal conclusion, as well as

allegations that are so threadbare or speculative that they fail to cross the line

between the conclusory and factual. See Lutz v. Portfolio Recovery ASSOGs.,

LLC, 49 F.4th 323, 328 (3d Cir. 2022) (citations and quotation marks omitted).

The third step evaluates the plausibility of the remaining allegations. Id.

In evaluating plausibility of the plaintiff's allegations, the court accepts all factual

allegations as true, construes the complaint in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff, and draws all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. !d. (citations

omitted).

Analysis

Gentiva seeks dismissal of Price’s ADA and FMLA claims, which are

premised on allegations that Gentiva is responsible for ProMedica’s employment

decisions as its successor. For ease of disposition, the court will first address

Gentiva’s arguments against successor liability as applied to Price’s FMLA

retaliation claim.

1. Successor Liability Under the FMLA

In enacting the FMLA, Congress determined that “there is inadequate job

security for employees who have serious health conditions that prevent them

from working for temporary periodsf.]” 29 U.S.C. § 2601. Under the FMLA, an

eligible employee is “entitled to a total of 12 workweeks of leave during any 12-

month period” for qualifying reasons. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 2612(a)(1)(A)-{F). When

an employee returns from FMLA leave, “the employer must restore the employee

to the same or equivalent position held by the employee when the leave

commenced, as well as restore the employee with equivalent benefits and

conditions of employment.” Capps v. Mondelez Glob., LLC, 847 F.3d 144, 151

(3d Cir. 2017) (citing Ross v. Gilhuly, 755 F.3d 185, 191 (3d Cir. 2014); 29 U.S.C

§ 2614(a)).

Under the statute, employers may not “interfere with, restrain, or deny the

exercise of or attempt to exercise” FMLA rights. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1).

Likewise, it is “unlawful for any employer to discharge or in any other manner

discriminate against any individual for opposing any practice made unlawful” by

the FMLA. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2).

Price’s complaint advances an FMLA retaliation claim. (Doc. 1, Compl. J]

97). Because the text of the FMLA “does not specifically provide for a retaliation

claim,” such claims are rooted in regulations promulgated by the United States

Department of Labor (“DOL”). See Egan v. Delaware River Port Auth., 851 F.3d

263, 269 (3d Cir. 2017) (citation omitted); see also Budhun v. Reading Hosp. &

Med. Ctr., 765 F.3d 245, 256 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing Erdman v. Nationwide

Insurance Co., 582 F.3d 500, 508 (3d Cir. 2009)). Specifically, these regulations

prohibit employers “from discriminating or retaliating against an employee...

having exercised or attempted to exercise FMLA rights.” 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(c).

To succeed on an FMLA retaliation claim, a plaintiff must establish that: 1;

she invoked her right to FMLA-qualifying leave, i.e., engaged in protected

activity; 2) she suffered an adverse employment decision; and 3) the adverse

action was causally related to her invocation of rights. See Canada v. Samuel

Grossi & Sons, Inc., 49 F.4th 340, 346 (3d Cir. 2022); Budhun, 765 F.3d at 256

(citing Lichtenstein v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr., 691 F.3d 294, 302 (3d Cir.

2012), Ross, 755 F.3d at 192-93). To demonstrate a causal connection, a

plaintiff must generally show: (1) an unusually suggestive temporal proximity

between the protected activity and the allegedly retaliatory action, or (2) a patterr

of antagonism following the protected conduct coupled with timing. See Budhun,

765 F.3d at 258 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing Lauren W. ex rel. Jean W. v. DeFlaminis,

10

480 F.3d 259, 267 (3d Cir. 2007)). Based on the language of 29 C.F.R. §

825.220(c), plaintiffs must show “only that the use of FMLA leave was a ‘negative

factor’ in the adverse employment decision.” DiFiore v. CSL Behring, LLC, 879

F.3d 71, 78 (3d Cir. 2018) (discussing Egan, 851 F.3d at 266-67, 273). °

As for the elements of her FMLA retaliation claim, Price advances that she

invoked her right of FMLA leave following the announcement that Gentiva was

acquiring the home health, palliative, and hospice care side of ProMedica’s

business. (Doc. 1, Compl. FJ 20, 47). Regarding the adverse employment

action and causation elements, Price further alleges that, prior to her termination,

there were various back-and-forth communications between the plaintiff and her

supervisor about job duties, in-person requirements, and restrictions on her

return to work beginning while plaintiff was within the FMLA-protected period. Id.

1] 26-32, 35-46, 48, 53. Subsequently, Price’s employer posted her position,

but plaintiff's supervisor continued to engage in a dialogue with plaintiff about her

return to work. Id. 9] 29-31, 35-37. Price provided her employer with a return

date and supplied paperwork completed by her doctor. Id. ff] 37-39. Yet after

doing so, Price did not hear back from her employer. Id. {| 40. Instead, the

3 In a non-precedentia! opinion, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has indicated that this

“motivating factor” causation standard is open to question based upon the United States

Supreme Court's decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024).

Coleman v. Children's Hosp. of Philadelphia, No. 23-3064, 2024 WL 4490602, at *3, n. 4 (3d

Cir. Oct. 15, 2024).

11

employer decided to fill Price’s prior position and communicate to plaintiff,

through her supervisor, that she no longer had a job. Id. {f] 41-42.

Subsequently, however, the employer's HR director advised Price that she

could apply for two out-of-town positions. Id. 45. Then, ostensibly as part of

the acquisition process, Gentiva emailed Price with an employment offer that

required no action to accept. (Doc. 1-1, Compl. Ex. A). Despite this email,

ProMedica and Gentiva did not provide plaintiff with her prior position or any

position. (Doc. 1, Compl. 41-43, 53).

As presented in the complaint, these communications are inconsistent and

provided the plaintiff with mixed messages as to whether she actually had a job

upon return from medical leave, which appears to have started under the FMLA

and was then extended under the ADA. Such allegations are thus sufficient to

show a pattern of antagonism coupled with timing to support the causation

element, i.e., that the plaintiff was terminated because she used FMLA leave.

Thus, Price’s complaint plausibly states a prima facie FMLA retaliation claim.

Gentiva uses the above timeline to assert that ProMedica definitively

terminated Price before Gentiva’s acquisition of ProMedica. Thus, per Gentiva,

the plaintiff, “a non-employee, cannot state a claim under FMLA that is available

only to eligible employees.” (Doc. 16 at 13-14).

12

To qualify as an “eligible employee” under the FMLA, an individual must

satisfy three criteria. First, the employee must have been employed by the

employer for at least 12 months. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2611(2)(A){i). Second, the

employee must have completed at least 1,250 hours of service with the □□□□□□□

during the previous 12-month period immediately preceding the commencement

of leave. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2611(2)(A)(ii). Third, the employee must be employed by

the employer at a worksite where 50 or more employees are employed within 75

miles. See 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(B){ii). Each component of the term “eligible

employee’ refers to an “employer,” which is itself separately defined.

Pursuant to the FMLA, “[t]he term ‘employer’ ... means any person*

engaged in commerce or in any industry or activity affecting commerce who

employs 50 or more employees for each working day during each of 20 or more

calendar workweeks in the current or preceding calendar year[.]”’ 29 U.S.C. §

2611(4)(A)(i). The term “employer” also includes “any successor in interest of an

employer[.]” 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A)(i)(II). The term “successor in interest” is not

expressly defined by the FMLA statute.

4“Person’ is defined as “an individual, partnership, association, corporation, business trust,

legal representative, or any organized group of persons.” 29 U.S.C. § 203(a) (as referenced by

29 U.S.C. § 2611(8)).

13

Courts normally interpret a statute “in accord with the ordinary public

meaning of its terms at the time of its enactment.” Bostock v. Clayton Cnty.,

Georgia, 590 U.S. 644, 654 (2020). Moreover, every statute has a single best

meaning, which is fixed at the time of enactment. See Loper Bright, 603 U.S. at

400 (quoting Wisconsin Central Ltd. v. United States, 585 U.S. 274 (2018)).

Congress enacted the FMLA in 1993. By that time, “the ‘successor in

interest’ inquiry [had] arisen in many contexts” and had a “long history” in labor

law disputes. Sullivan v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 623 F.3d 770, 781 (9th Cir.

2010). Specifically, federal labor-law cases had “appi[ied] an equitable, policy

driven approach to successor liability [with] very little connection to the concept o

successor liability in corporate law.” Cobb v. Cont. Transp., Inc., 452 F.3d 543,

551 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168,

184-85 (1973), NLRB v. Burns Int'l Security Servs., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 279-87,

(1972), John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 549 (1964)). The

inclusion of “successor in interest” under the definition of “employer” in the FMLA

thus reflects a congressional intent to adopt the doctrine of successor liability

developed in federal labor law cases. See id. at 550-51.

Moreover, since the enactment of the FMLA, the Third Circuit Court of

Appeals has applied the federal common law successorship doctrine in the

employment discrimination, wage-and-hour, and employee benefit plan contexts.

14

See Brzozowski v. Corr. Physician Servs., Inc., 360 F.3d 173, 178 (3d Cir. 2004)

(Title VII of the Civil Rights Act); Rego v. ARC Water Treatment Co. of

Pennsylvania, 181 F.3d 396 at 401-02 (same); Thompson v. Real Est. Mortg.

Network, 748 F.3d 142, 152 (3d Cir. 2014) (Fair Labor Standards Act); Einhorn v.

M.L. Ruberton Const. Co., 632 F.3d 89, 94 (3d Cir. 2011) (Employee Retirement

Income Security Act). This doctrine has also been applied when a party “has

acquired substantial assets of its predecessor and continued, without interruption

or substantial change, the predecessor's business operations[.]" Golden State,

414 U.S. at 184; see also Rego, 181 F.3d at 401. Consequently, the court will

apply the federal common law standard to Price’s FMLA retaliation claim against

Gentiva based on the acquisition alleged, the inclusion of “successor in interest”

in the definition of an “employer” at the time the FMLA was enacted, and as a

logical extension of the above case law. °

5 Both parties’ arguments rely upon the federal successor liability standard in recognition of

this body of law. (Doc. 16, Def. Br. in Supp. at 17-20; Doc. 18, Pl. Br. in Opp. at 12-13). In he

brief in opposition, plaintiff also argues that a multi-factor test promulgated in the DOL

regulations should be considered when evaluating whether an employer is a “successor in

interest” under the FMLA. (See Doc. 18, at 15—16 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 825.107(a)-{b)). This

specific argument, however, has recently been rejected by the Honorable Harvey Bartle Il in

the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Easterling v. Cnty. of Delaware, No. CV 23-5016, 2025

WL 489859, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 13, 2025), reconsideration denied, No. CV 23-5016, 2025 WI

623651 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 25, 2025). In Easterling, Judge Bartle determined that the meaning of

“successor in interest” was Clearly a matter of legal interpretation for the court alone to decide

and that reference to DOL regulations was no longer appropriate in determining the meaning

of this statutory term. 2025 WL 489859, at *2 (discussing Loper Bright). The court will not rely

upon 29 C.F.R. § 825.107 in this analysis.

15

Under the law, successor liability relies upon three principal factors: (1)

continuity in operations and work force of the successor and predecessor

employers; (2) notice to the successor-employer of its predecessor's legal

obligation; and (3) ability of the predecessor to provide adequate relief directly.

Brzozowski, 360 F.3d at 178 (quoting Rego, 181 F.3d at 401). The court’s

assessment of such claims may consider the procedural posture of this litigation

and the absence of discovery into defendants’ payroll documents, disciplinary

records, internal corporate communications, or ownership and leadership

structures. See Thompson, 748 F.3d at 149.

As for continuity in operations and work force, Price has alleged that 4000

individuals became employees of Gentiva upon the acquisition of ProMedica’s

home health, palliative, and hospice care business, including the supervisor and

HR directors overseeing her return to work. (Doc. 1, Compl. ff] 49-52, 54; Doc.

1-2, Comp!. Ex. B, Press Release). Additionally, it may be reasonably inferred

that Gentiva took over operations at the hospice facilities where Price had

worked prior to taking leave. (Doc. 1, Compl. J 15).

Regarding notice, Price alleges that Gall, the HR director, was aware that

Price had taken FMLA leave and was in the process of being cleared to return-to

work. Gall advised Price that she could apply for other positions. Id. Shortly

thereafter, Gentiva sent Price an email about an employment offer. Id. 41-48.

16

This email from Gentiva may be evidence of an error, as the moving defendant

argues. (Doc. 16 at 16). In context, this email may also be the product of Gentive

having notice of Price’s potential ADA and/or FMLA claims, particularly as it is

alleged that Gall became a Gentiva employee in the acquisition. Based on this

email, it is possible that a subsequent decision was made regarding Price’s

employment status. At this stage and absent discovery into ProMedica and

Gentiva’s internal communications about Price or her potential legal claims, the

court must apply the inference that favors the plaintiff.

Finally, as to ProMedica’s ability to provide Price with relief, plaintiff has

only alleged that Gentiva acquired ProMedica’s home health and hospice

business. This is not an allegation asserting that ProMedica is insolvent or woulc

have difficulties paying a judgment. After careful consideration, however, it

cannot be expected that Price would possess detailed facts about the financial

health of ProMedica at this stage just as she would not have information relative

to a full consideration of the other successor liability factors.

After all, prior to “imposing a duty on a successor employer, a court must

consider the particular facts of each case.” Shaffer v. Mitchell Transp., !nc., 635

F.2d 261, 266 (3d Cir. 1980). That process is impossible on a motion to dismiss.

At this stage, the court only has Price's version of the facts without the benefit of

details that would be obtained in discovery. Based on the allegations, Price has

17

raised an expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of a FMLA retaliation

claim against Gentiva under a theory of successor liability. Gentiva’s motion to

dismiss Price’s FMLA retaliation claim will thus be denied.

2. Successor Liability Under the ADA

In contrast to the FMLA, the ADA does not contain “successor in interest”

provisions within the statutory definition of “employer.” See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5).

Nonetheless, as noted above, the Third Circuit has authorized successor liability

claims in employment discrimination cases. See Rego, 181 F.3d at 401;

Brzozowski, 360 F.3d at 178. Having detailed whether Gentiva may qualify as a

“successor in interest” for the purposes of Price’s FMLA retaliation claim, the

analysis of plaintiffs ADA claims against Gentiva would cover the same ground.

Consequently, Gentiva’s motion to dismiss Price’s ADA claims will also be

denied.

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, Gentiva’s motion to dismiss will be denied.

An appropriate order follows.

18

Date: sl; ole.

| 0 □

JUDGE/JULIA K. MUNKEY

U dW States □ urt

19