Wedgeworth v. McDonough

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

JUANICCA WEDGEWORTH, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 2:22-cv-00266-SGC

)

DOUGLAS A. COLLINS, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER1

This is an employment discrimination case brought against the Secretary of

Veterans Affairs (“the defendant”) by Juanicca Wedgeworth (“the plaintiff”).

Following summary judgment, one claim remained for trial by the court: the

plaintiff’s claim the defendant failed to accommodate her disability in violation of

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. (the “Rehabilitation Act”).

(Doc. 50).2 The court commenced the bench trial on August 25, 2025. After the

plaintiff rested her case in chief that same morning, the defendant moved in open

court for judgment on partial findings under Rule 52(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. The court orally granted the motion. The court sets out below the

1 The parties have consented to the exercise of dispositive jurisdiction by a magistrate judge

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (Doc. 14).

2 Citations to the record refer to the document and page numbers assigned by the court’s CM/ECF

electronic document system and appear in the following format: (Doc. __ at __).

findings of fact and conclusions of law on which the grant of the Rule 52(c) motion

rests after addressing the relevant procedural history.

I. Relevant Procedural History

The plaintiff commenced this action on March 1, 2022. (Doc. 1). After the

plaintiff’s failure to accommodate claim survived summary judgment and the parties

were unable to resolve that claim through mediation, the court entered an order on

May 23, 2025, setting the claim for a bench trial on August 25, 2025. (Doc. 56).

On August 18, 2025, at the prompting of the court, the plaintiff belatedly filed

an exhibit list, a witness list, and a computation of damages. (Docs. 62, 64, 65, 66).

The plaintiff also filed a motion for appointment of counsel. (Doc. 63). The court

denied the motion. (Doc. 68). The reasons for denial were two-fold. First, being

neither novel nor complex, this case did not meet the substantive standard for

appointment of counsel. Second, the plaintiff was not diligent in attempting to

obtain counsel on her own or with the court’s assistance. The plaintiff represented

in her motion for appointment of counsel that she had done nothing to secure an

attorney herself since contacting one law firm around the time she commenced this

action, and she waited until approximately one week before trial to file the motion

asking the court to appoint counsel for her. (Doc. 63 at 3-4).

After denying the motion for appointment of counsel, the court set a telephone

status conference because the court was concerned the motion suggested the plaintiff

was not prepared for trial. During the status conference, held on August 20, 2025,

the plaintiff satisfied the court the concern was misplaced. The plaintiff confirmed

multiple times that she would be present in court on August 25, 2025, and was

prepared to proceed with the trial.

However, when the court instructed the plaintiff to call her first witness on the

morning of August 25, 2025, the plaintiff requested a continuance. The court denied

the request for a variety of reasons, including the fact that this uncomplicated case

was more than three years old. The court did pause the proceedings to afford the

plaintiff an opportunity to secure the presence of Lynda Wilson as a potential lay

witness.3

Wilson, the only witness the plaintiff identified on her witness list other than

herself, provided counseling services to the plaintiff during the relevant period.

(Doc. 43-10; Doc. 65). The plaintiff indicated on her witness list that Wilson would

offer testimony as an expert witness. (Doc. 65). In the week before trial, the

defendant moved to preclude Wilson from testifying as an expert witness on the

grounds the plaintiff did not disclose Wilson as an expert witness in a timely manner

and that the disclosure was incomplete. (Doc. 70). The court orally granted the

motion on the morning of trial after the plaintiff stated she had no objection.

However, the court suggested Wilson might be able to offer testimony as a lay

3 Wilson was known as Lynda Price when she treated the plaintiff. (Doc. 43-10).

witness based on her treatment of the plaintiff and the defendant’s knowledge of

Wilson and the treatment she provided. Although the defendant objected to the

suggestion, the plaintiff was unable to reach Wilson within the time allotted by the

court, thereby mooting the issue.

The trial resumed with the plaintiff testifying as her first and only witness.

The plaintiff provided a narrative statement in lieu of traditional direct examination.

The defendant then cross-examined the plaintiff. After cross-examination, the

defendant’s counsel moved in open court for judgment on partial findings under Rule

52(c).

II. Standard of Review

A district court presiding over a bench trial decides the facts, which involves

determining the credibility of witnesses and weighing the evidence, and then makes

conclusions of law based on those facts. See Sidman v. Travelers Cas. & Sur., 841

F.3d 1197, 1201 (11th Cir. 2016) (discussing standard of review applicable to district

court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law following bench trial). The party

prosecuting a claim bears the burden of proving each element of the claim to the

court by a preponderance of the evidence. Fire Ins. Exch. v. McCoy, 637 F. Supp.

2d 991, 992 (M.D. Ala. 2009); see also Aponte v. Brown & Brown of Fla., Inc., 806

F. App’x 824, 831 (11th Cir. 2020) (holding district court presiding over bench trial

did not err in basing its conclusions on preponderance standard).

The court must “find the facts specially and state its conclusions of law

separately,” either “on the record after the close of the evidence” or “in an opinion

or a memorandum of decision.” FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(1). Although the court must

find the facts “with enough specificity for a reviewing court to identify the factual

findings upon which the court’s legal conclusions are based,” the court “need not

state the evidence or any of the reasoning upon the evidence nor assert the negative

of rejected propositions.” Stock Equip. Co., a Unit of Gen. Signal Corp. v. Tenn.

Valley Auth., 906 F.2d 583, 592 (11th Cir. 1990) (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted). A reviewing court “presume[s] that the judge considers all of the

evidence, and relies on so much of it as supports the finding and rejects what does

not support the finding, unless the judge states otherwise.” Western Pacific

Fisheries, Inc. v. SS President Grant, 730 F.2d 1280, 1285 (9th Cir. 1984) (quoted

favorably in Stock Equip. Co.). In sum, “ ‘the judge need only make brief, definite,

pertinent findings and conclusions upon the contested matters; there is no necessity

for over-elaboration of detail or particularization of facts.’” Stock Equip. Co., 906

F.2d at 592 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 52 advisory committee’s note).

A reviewing court will not set aside a district court’s findings of fact –

including its determinations of the credibility of witnesses and weight of the

evidence – unless they are clearly erroneous. Sidman, 841 F.3d at 1201. “ ‘In a case

in which the evidence is largely testimonial . . . the district court has the advantage

of observing the witnesses and evaluating their credibility firsthand, and the standard

of review imposes an especially heavy burden on an appellant.’” Id. (quoting

Fischer v. S/Y NERAIDA, 508 F.3d 586, 592 (11th Cir. 2007)).

Rule 52(c) provides a mechanism for a court presiding over a bench trial to

conclude the proceedings before the close of all evidence if a party fails to establish

a crucial element of her case after having been fully heard on an issue. See FED. R.

CIV. P. 52(c) (“If a party has been fully heard on an issue during a nonjury trial and

the court finds against the party on that issue, the court may enter judgment against

the party on a claim or defense that, under the controlling law, can be maintained or

defeated only with a favorable finding on that issue.”); Morales Feliciano v. Rullan,

378 F.3d 42, 59 (1st Cir. 2004) (“When a party has finished presenting evidence and

that evidence is deemed by the trier insufficient to sustain the party’s position, the

court need not waste time, but, rather, may call a halt to the proceedings and enter

judgment accordingly.”). The procedure and standards governing a Rule 52(c)

motion are the same as those governing the decision made by a court at the

conclusion of a bench trial. See 9C WRIGHT & MILLER’S FEDERAL PRACTICE &

PROCEDURE § 2573.1 (3d ed.). In ruling on a Rule 52(c) motion, a court assesses

witness credibility, weighs the evidence, and then applies a preponderance of the

evidence standard to make findings of fact and conclusions of law, without drawing

any special inference in favor of the non-moving party. Emerson Elec. Co. v.

Farmer, 427 F.2d 1082, 1086 (5th Cir. 1970) (addressing predecessor version of

Rule 52(c), which was found in Rule 41(b)); Caro-Galvan v. Curtis Richardson,

Inc., 993 F.2d 1500, 1504 (11th Cir. 1993) (same); Denson v. United States, 574

F.3d 1318, 1334 n.48 (11th Cir. 2009).

III. Findings of Fact

1. The plaintiff worked as a social worker in an emergency department

operated by the Veterans Administration (“VA”) from September 15, 2019, to

September 10, 2020.

2. At some point during that year-long period, the plaintiff requested

permission to telework for the duration of the COVID-19 pandemic due to mental

health challenges she was experiencing.

3. The plaintiff testified some social workers were granted permission to

telework during the pandemic and that, although she understood VA emergency

department social workers could not telework, she decided to ask anyway because

she did not see the difference between working from her office and working from

home.

4. The defendant did not grant the accommodation requested by the

plaintiff, and the plaintiff did not request any other type of accommodation.

IV. Conclusions of Law

The Rehabilitation Act prohibits federal executive branch agencies and

recipients of federal financial assistance from discriminating against disabled

employees. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). A plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of

disability discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act by showing (1) she has a

disability, (2) she is a “qualified individual,” meaning she can perform the “essential

functions” of her job without accommodation or, failing that, with a reasonable

accommodation, and (3) her employer discriminated against her “solely by reason

of her [] disability.” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a); 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8); Boyle v. City of Pell

City, 866 F.3d 1280, 1288 (11th Cir. 2017); Ellis v. England, 432 F.3d 1321, 1326

(11th Cir. 2005); Davis v. Florida Power & Light Co., 205 F.3d 1301, 1305 (11th

Cir. 2000).

A plaintiff may satisfy the third prong of a prima facie case of disability

discrimination by showing that her employer failed to provide a reasonable

accommodation for her disability. Boyle, 866 F.3d at 1289. The employee has the

burden of identifying an accommodation and showing it is reasonable. Holbrook v.

City of Alpharetta, Georgia, 112 F.3d 1522, 1526 (11th Cir. 1997). An

accommodation is reasonable only if it enables an employee to perform the essential

functions of her job. Holly, 492 F.3d at 1256. This is another way of saying the

Rehabilitation Act does not require an employer to eliminate an essential function

of an employee’s job to accommodate the employee’s disability. Id.

“Determining whether a particular job duty is an essential function involves a

factual inquiry to be conducted on a case-by-case basis.” Lucas v. W.W. Grainger,

Inc., 257 F.3d 1249, 1258 (11th Cir. 2001). A court may consider an employer’s

judgment as to whether a function is essential, a written description of the job, the

amount of time spent on the job performing the function, the consequences of not

requiring the employee to perform the function, the terms of a collective bargaining

agreement, the work experience of past employees in the position, and the current

work experience of employees in similar positions. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8); 29 C.F.R.

§ 1630.2(n)(3); Bagwell v. Morgan Cnty. Comm’n, 676 F. App’x 863, 865-66 (11th

Cir. 2017).

The court afforded the plaintiff an opportunity to be fully heard on her sole

remaining claim: that the defendant did not accommodate her disability as required

by the Rehabilitation Act. Having been afforded the opportunity, the plaintiff failed

to introduce evidence that would preponderate in favor of a conclusion that working

remotely as a VA emergency department social worker for the duration of the

pandemic would have been a reasonable accommodation.4 A pro se plaintiff is

afforded some leniency at certain stages of a civil proceeding. See Tannenbaum v.

United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir.1998) (“Pro se pleadings are held to a

less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be

4 The court makes no conclusion as to whether the plaintiff was under a disability within the

meaning of the Rehabilitation Act during the relevant period.

liberally construed.”). However, this leniency does not relieve a pro se plaintiff of

the ultimate burden of proving each element of a claim. Cf Thomas v. Pentagon

Fed. Credit Union, 393 F. App’x 635, 637 (11th Cir. 2010) (holding leniency

afforded pro se pleadings “does not require or allow courts to rewrite an otherwise

deficient pleading in order to sustain an action’). Because the plaintiff here failed

to prove an essential element of her failure to accommodate claim after a full and

fair opportunity to be heard, the court will grant the defendant’s Rule 52(c) motion.

Vv. Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, the court GRANTS the defendant’s Rule 52(c)

motion and will enter judgment in the defendant’s favor under Rule 58 of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure by separate final order.

DONE this 26th day of August, 2025.

STACI G. CORNELIUS

U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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