The opinion
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
RAYMOND SERIO, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) Case No. 3:23-cv-2874-DWD
)
DAVID MITCHELL, BRANDON )
RIDGEWAY, DIANE SKORCH, )
BROCK MORGENSTERN, JOSH )
MCDONALD, and SYDELLE FULK )
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
DUGAN, District Judge:
Before the Court is the Application for Relief from Assignment of Mr. Jerald D.
Dehne. (Doc. 62). Mr. Dehne was assigned as counsel for Plaintiff on August 12, 2025.
(Doc. 58). At this time, however, Mr. Dehne informs the Court that he has a conflict of
interest with the Office of the Attorney General, which is defending Defendants in this
action. Accordingly, for good cause shown therein, Mr. Dehne’s Application for Relief
from Assignment is GRANTED. See L.R. 83.11(a)(1). As explained below, Mr. L. Douglas
Gill of the Gill Law Firm is ASSIGNED as counsel for Plaintiff. The matter remains
REFERRED for a mandatory mediation with Court Attorney Megan Arvola.
I. Plaintiff’s Motion for the Appointment of Counsel (Doc. 56)
The Court designated the four following claims to proceed in this case:
Count 1: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against
Sydelle Fulk and Christine Brown for failing to ensure that
Plaintiff’s medications were continued;
Count 2: Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment claim
house Plaintiff in a cell that met his needs;
Count 3: First Amendment retaliation claim against Defendants
Skorch, Ridgeway, and Brock Morgenstern for allowing
Plaintiff to be disciplined over his requests for single-cell
housing;
Count 4: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress against all
Defendants.
(Doc. 34, pgs. 5, 11; 50, pgs. 3-4).
On February 24, 2025, the Court ruled as follows on the issue of exhaustion of
administrative remedies:
The Motion for Summary Judgment on the issue of exhaustion (Doc. 43) is
GRANTED in PART as to Claim 1 against Defendant Brown, and it is
DENIED in PART as to Claims 2 and 3 against Defendants Mitchell and
Morgenstern. The Court relinquishes supplemental jurisdiction over Claim
4 against Defendant Brown, but Claim 4 may proceed against all other
remaining Defendants. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to TERMINATE
Defendant Brown, and to enter judgment in her favor at the close of this
case. The remaining Claims shall proceed to merits discovery against
Defendants Fulk, Mitchell, McDonald, Morgenstern, Ridgeway, and
Skorch. A merits discovery schedule shall follow.
(Doc. 50, pgs. 14-15).1
Plaintiff, who is proceeding in forma pauperis, was afforded additional time to
respond to the Motion for Summary Judgment, but he failed to do so. (Docs. 5; 50, pg. 1).
Plaintiff states he “simply could not understand the things in the law library [that] he
read on the issue of exhaustion[,] [so] he was unable to form a response to the summary
judgment motion.” (Doc. 56, pg. 2). Nevertheless, the Court ruled in the above manner.
Plaintiff argued the appointment of counsel is warranted because he has always
1The Motion for Summary Judgment was filed by Defendants Brown, Mitchell, and Morgenstern.
(Doc. 43). Defendants Ridgeway, Skorch, and McDonald did not file such a motion, and Defendant Fulk
(Doc. 56, pgs. 1-3, 6). In this case, Defendant Fulk served discovery requests that Plaintiff
“does not understand enough…to turn over adequate responses and [to] protect his
rights.” (Doc. 56, pg. 2). Plaintiff made “multiple attempts to find a prisoner to help him
with discovery[,] but everyone has turned him down.” (Doc. 56, pg. 2). One prisoner
helped Plaintiff with the instant Motion for the Appointment of Counsel, but he “would
go no further and [was] transferred to another prison.” (Doc. 56, pg. 2). Similarly, Plaintiff
claims he “has written at least twenty-five (25) attorneys and asked that they take the
case.” (Doc. 56, pg. 2). To show his efforts, Plaintiff attached the only two responses that
he received to his inquiries about securing counsel in this case. (Doc. 56, pgs. 9-11).
Plaintiff explained his “serious comprehension problems when it comes to legal
pleadings and such documents.” (Doc. 56, pg. 3). He also noted the U.S. Constitution,
Illinois Constitution, legal theory, and civil and criminal rights are “much too
complicated to comprehend.” (Doc. 56, pg. 3). Plaintiff described his education as follows:
“Plaintiff strugled [sic] in grammar school and stopped going completely in the sixth (6th)
grade…. [H]e attended one day of high school.” (Doc. 56, pg. 3). During his incarceration,
Plaintiff “barely passed” the GED examination “after several attempts.” (Doc. 56, pg. 3).
Finally, Plaintiff described his “multiple serious mental illnesses,” which “effect
his daily life in 2 very negative way[s].” (Doc. 56, pg. 3). First, Plaintiff “can suffer from
psychossis [sic] and horrible depression.” (Doc. 56, pg. 3). Although he is prescribed
medication, “it leaves him sleepy” and unable to concentrate, read, or comprehend. (Doc.
56, pgs. 3, 6). Second, due to his “serious mental illnesses[,] he can go days sometimes
weeks unable to even get out of bed [to] perform normal daily activities.” (Doc. 56, pgs.
Notably, Plaintiff was appointed counsel in three other federal cases. See Serio v. Rauner
et al., No. 15-cv-6262, Doc. 11, pg. 7 (N.D. Ill. July 29, 2015) (“Given the nature of Plaintiff’s
claims and that Plaintiff’s medical issues appear to be ongoing, the Court recruits
[counsel] to represent Plaintiff in accordance with counsel’s trial bar obligations.”); Serio
v. Westerman et al., No. 16-cv-763, Doc. 73, pg. 2 (S.D. Ill. Oct. 23, 2018) (“To date, the Court
has considered Plaintiff capable of representing himself and perceives that Plaintiff
would do an adequate job representing himself at trial. Nevertheless, for the benefit of
the Court and in appreciation for the Court’s trial calendar, the recruitment of counsel
will likely ensure that the final pretrial conference and trial run more efficiently.”); Serio
v. Williams et al., No. 17-cv-6949, Doc. 53 (N.D. Ill. July 12, 2019) (“In light of Plaintiff’s
recent pleadings and his averment of mental illness, Plaintiff’s renewed motion for
attorney representation is granted. The Court recruits [counsel] to represent Plaintiff in
accordance with counsel’s trial bar obligations.”); (Doc. 56, pg. 6).
On August 12, 2025, the Court found, based on the representation that he has
“written at least twenty-five (25) attorneys,” but only received the two responses attached
to the Motion for the Appointment of Counsel, Plaintiff satisfied the threshold burden of
demonstrating a reasonable attempt to obtain counsel under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). (Doc.
58, pgs. 4-5) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1); Walker v. Price, 900 F.3d 933, 938 (7th Cir. 2018);
Santiago v. Walls, 599 F.3d 749, 760-61 (7th Cir. 2010); Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 655 (7th
Cir. 2007); Perry v. Sims, 990 F.3d 505, 513 (7th Cir. 2021); (Doc. 56, pgs. 2, 9-11)). Moreover,
in consideration of Plaintiff’s representations about his “serious [legal] comprehension
problems,” limited primary education, and “multiple serious mental illnesses,” together
motion practice, and trial preparation, the Court further found he could not competently
litigate the case. (Doc. 58, pgs. 4-5) (citing Walker, 900 F.3d at 938; Santiago, 599 F.3d at
760-61; Watts v. Kidman, 42 F.4th 755, 760 (7th Cir. 2022); (Doc. 56, pgs. 3-4, 6)).
For these reasons, the Motion for the Appointment of Counsel was granted. In
light of Mr. Dehne’s relief from assignment, and in accordance with § 1915(e)(1) and Local
Rules 83.1(j) and 83.9(b), Mr. L. Douglas Gill is ASSIGNED to represent Plaintiff in this
civil rights case. See L.Rs. 83.1(j) (“Unless expressly exempted, every member of the bar
of this Court, as defined in subparagraph (a) of this Rule, shall be available for assignment
by the Court to represent or assist in the representation of those who cannot afford to hire
an attorney. SDIL-LR 83.8-83.14 set forth the district’s Pro Bono Program and applicable
procedures.”); 83.9(b) (eff. Oct. 30, 2023) (“Counsel shall be assigned by Order of the
Court, which shall be immediately sent to all parties to the action and the assigned
attorney. The order shall include the name, address, and, if available, telephone number
of the party to be represented. Information regarding how to contact a prisoner-party is
available on the Court’s website.”). On or before September 9, 2025, Mr. Gill shall enter
his appearance in this case. Mr. Gill is free to share his responsibilities with an associate
who is also admitted to practice in this District Court. However, Mr. Gill must enter the
case and make first contact with Plaintiff, explaining that an associate may also work on
the case. Plaintiff should wait for his attorney to contact him in order to allow counsel an
opportunity to review the record.
The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to transmit this Memorandum & Order, as
well as copies of the docket sheet, to Mr. L. Douglas Gill of the Gill Law Firm, 239 S. Lewis
CM-ECF system. Mr. Gill is ADVISED of the need to consult Local Rules 83.8 to 83.14
regarding pro bono case procedures.
Now that counsel has been assigned, Plaintiff shall not personally file anything in
this case, except, if necessary, a pleading requesting for Mr. Gill to withdraw his
representation. If Mr. Gill is allowed to withdraw at the request of Plaintiff, there is no
guarantee that the Court will appoint other counsel for Plaintiff in this case.
Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis. However, if Plaintiff should recover
damages in this action (by verdict or settlement), then Plaintiff and Mr. Gill are
ADVISED that Plaintiff will be obligated to pay the filing fee from that recovery.
Section 2.6 of this Court’s Plan for the Administration of the District Court Fund
provides for a degree of reimbursement of pro bono counsel’s out-of-pocket expenses, as
funds are available. The Plan can be found on the Court’s website, as well as the form
motion for out-of-pocket expenses and an Authorization/Certification for
Reimbursement. Any motion for reimbursement must be made within 30 days from the
entry of judgment, or reimbursement will be waived. See SDIL-LR 83.13. The funds
available for this purpose are limited, however, and counsel should use the utmost care
when incurring out-of-pocket costs. In no event will funds be reimbursed if the
expenditure is found to be without a proper basis. The Court has no authority to pay
attorney fees in this case. No portion of a partial filing fee assessed pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915 will be reimbursed. Counsel may be reimbursed for PACER fees for this case.
The District Court has entered into an agreement with attorney Alan Mills and the
Uptown People’s Law Center to consult with lawyers in these cases,
with clients. Mr. Mills can be reached by email at alan@uplcchicago.org. He can also be
reached by phone at 773-769-1411, but email is his preferred means of contact. His
services are available to counsel free of charge, as long as counsel is representing a
prisoner pro bono in this Court. Further, the Court’s website, www.ilsd.uscourts.gov,
includes a guide for attorneys which is available as a resource. To access the guide, click
on the “Attorney Information” tab at the top of the Court’s website and select the “Guide
for Attorneys Recruited to Represent Plaintiffs in Section 1983 Cases.” The Court
encourages appointed counsel to consult it and Mr. Mills, as needed.
As of this date, Plaintiff’s contact information is:
Raymond Serio, No. B70625
Lawrence Correctional Center
10930 Lawrence Road
Sumner, IL 62466
II. Mandatory Mediation Referral and Appointment of Mediator
This prisoner civil rights case has survived a threshold review, the exhaustion of
administrative remedies is no longer at issue, and the deadlines for merits discovery and
the filing of dispositive motions have not yet lapsed. (Docs. 50 & 51). Therefore, on
August 12, 2025, the Court found it was appropriate to refer the case for a mandatory
mediation under the Mandatory Mediation Plan, as provided in § 2.1(A)(2) n. 1, to
promote “a more efficient and less expensive alternative to continuing litigation, without
impairing the quality of justice or the right to trial.” See Admin. Order No. 301, §§ 1.2(A),
2.1(A)(2) n. 1 (eff. Oct. 8, 2021).
The Court recognized each case is unique. In some cases, “the parties may have
See id. § 3.1A. In other cases, a “mediation may not be appropriate until much later.”
See id. When referring this case for a mandatory mediation, it was the Court’s intention
for the mandatory mediation to occur when the case evolved to the point where the
negotiations would be meaningful and productive. Thus, the Court ordered:
1. The parties, counsel, and the parties’ representatives, if any, shall engage in
a single mandatory mediation session. The Mandatory Mediation Plan and related
information can be found at https://www.ilsd.uscourts.gov/mandatory-mediation-
program. The Mandatory Mediation Plan is also attached to this Memorandum & Order.
2. Court Attorney and ADR Coordinator Megan Arvola is appointed as the
Mediator in this matter. Ms. Arvola is an attorney and trained mediator. She previously
served as a term law clerk to a former district judge in this District for three years. After
serving as a term law clerk, she represented clients in private civil practice for over eight
years before returning to the Court. As she is an employee of the Court, her appointment
is without charge to the parties. Ms. Arvola serves as a neutral in this matter and is not a
decision maker. Ms. Arvola is bound by the confidentiality provisions of the Mandatory
Mediation Plan, as are the parties, counsel, and the parties’ representatives. Participants
in the mediation session are directed to review the confidentiality provisions of § 3.8, as
well as the entire Mandatory Mediation Plan.
3. Within 30 days, any party could file a “Motion to Opt Out of Mandatory
Mediation.” Defendant Fulk filed such a motion on August 20, 2025. (Doc. 20). Mr. Gill is
DIRECTED to file a Response to that Motion to Opt Out of Mandatory Mediation, and
any other such motion that is hereafter filed by Defendants, on or before October 10, 2025.
previously noted, such Motions are only granted for “good cause.” They must set forth
specific reasons why the mandatory mediation has no reasonable chance of being
productive and identify when the case may be in a better posture to explore settlement.
4. If the above-contemplated Motion is denied, the Court will enter an Order
directing the mediator to set a single mandatory mediation session no later than 30 days
before the close of discovery.
5. Absent a motion from the parties, the referral of this case for a mandatory
mediation will not delay or defer other dates established in the Scheduling Order (Doc.
51) and has no effect on the scheduled progress of the case toward trial.
6. If the parties agree that it would be beneficial to set the mandatory
mediation session at an earlier date, then they may file a motion with the Court. The
parties may also request a stay of the proceedings if they believe that would allow for a
more productive mandatory mediation session.
7. Participants in the mandatory mediation session may discuss the case in
confidence and ex parte with Ms. Arvola. Both sides are encouraged to engage in
communication with Ms. Arvola prior to the mandatory mediation session in order to
discuss the case, her role, the general process, and the importance of confidentiality.
8. In the event a settlement in principle is reached, Ms. Arvola may make a
record of the material terms, but there will be no other recordings of the mandatory
mediation session. Any recording of the material terms will remain confidential unless a
dispute arises regarding the settlement.
9. At the conclusion of the single mandatory mediation session, Ms. Arvola
mandatory mediation session but does not disclose confidential communications.
10. The parties shall participate in the mandatory mediation with Ms. Arvola
in conformance with the Mandatory Mediation Plan. Any failure to conform to its
provisions or to this Memorandum & Order may be deemed sanctionable by the Court.
III. Conclusion
As explained above, the Application for Relief from Assignment is GRANTED.
Mr. L. Douglas Gill of the Gill Law Firm is ASSIGNED as counsel for Plaintiff. The matter
remains REFERRED for a mandatory mediation with Court Attorney Megan Arvola.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: August 26, 2025
s/ David W. Dugan
__________________________
DAVID W. DUGAN
United States District Judge