Jacobs Engineering Group Inc v. United States

In the United States Court of Federal Claims

No. 24-2053

Filed: August 8, 2025

Reissued: August 26, 2025 †

JACOBS ENGINEERING GROUP, INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

THE UNITED STATES,

Defendant.

Robert J. Symon, with Nathaniel J. Greeson and Owen E. Salyers, Bradley Arant Boult

Cummings LLP, Washington, D.C., for Plaintiff.

Elinor J. Kim, Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, U.S. Department of

Justice, Steven J. Gillingham, Assistant Director, Patricia M. McCarthy, Director, Yaakov M.

Roth, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Washington, D.C., with Joshua Fix, Major, Judge

Advocate, Trial Attorney, Contract Litigation & Intellectual Property Division, U.S. Army Legal

Services Agency, Fort Belvoir, VA, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

TAPP, Judge.

In procurement law, as with life’s missteps, a stumble is not always a fall. Based on this

premise, establishing prejudice is essential in bid protests because even if an agency erred, a

protester must show that it mattered. In this case, Jacobs Engineering Group, Inc. (“Jacobs”),

challenges its exclusion from further negotiations for architect-engineer services meant to

support National Guard facilities nationwide. Jacobs argues that the agency unreasonably

evaluated its submission under multiple criteria, resulting in its non-selection despite being rated

“highly qualified.” On review, Jacobs has not demonstrated sufficient grounds to disturb the

agency’s determination. Accordingly, Jacobs’s Motion for Judgment on the Administrative

Record, (Pl.’s MJAR, ECF No. 20), is DENIED. The United States’ Cross-Motion for Judgment

on the Administrative Record, (Def.’s xMJAR, ECF No. 21), is GRANTED.

†

This Opinion was originally issued under seal, (ECF No. 30), and the parties were directed to

file a notice of redactions consistent with the Court’s instructions. The Court accepts all jointly

proposed redactions, (ECF No. 32). The sealed and public versions of this Opinion differ only to

the extent of those redactions, offeror names, the publication date, and this footnote.

I. Background

The National Guard Bureau (“NGB”) issued this underlying procurement under the

Brooks Act, 40 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq., see Pub. L. No. 107-217, § 1, 116 Stat. 1062 (2002). The

Brooks Act governs how the federal government procures architect-engineer (“A-E”) services,

emphasizing the importance of qualifications over cost. 40 U.S.C. § 1101. The statute requires

agencies to select firms based on demonstrated competence, technical expertise, and relevant

experience, rather than based on the lowest price. Id. The process involves first identifying the

most qualified firms and then negotiating a fair and reasonable price with the top-ranked firm. §

1103. If an agreement cannot be reached, the agency moves to the next firm in the ranking. §

1104(b). This approach is designed to ensure that critical engineering and design work is

entrusted to professionals whose expertise meets the project’s needs, rather than risking subpar

performance through low bids. See Weston Sols., Inc. v. United States, 95 Fed. Cl. 311, 316

(2010) (discussing regulatory framework of the Brooks Act), aff’d, 440 F. App’x 926 (Fed. Cir.

2011).

Federal Acquisition Regulation (“FAR”) subpart 36.6 implements the Brooks Act,

establishing the procedures for acquiring A-E services, including public announcements of

contract opportunities, evaluation of technical qualifications, and negotiation protocols. 48

C.F.R. (FAR) § 36.602-1(a) (2025). Synopses under FAR 36.6 are reserved exclusively for A-E

services—including facility design, engineering analyses, mapping, and surveying—and require

that firms be evaluated on merit before cost considerations are addressed. FAR 36.600, 36.601-4,

36.602-1. In a FAR 36.6 synopsis, firms typically respond by detailing their qualifications,

relevant experience, and professional capabilities. FAR 36.603(b). Agencies then evaluate

submissions based on criteria such as specialized experience, past performance, capacity to

perform the work, geographic location, and other project-specific factors. FAR 36.602-1(a).

Once those evaluations are complete, the agency enters price negotiations only with the most

highly qualified firms, in line with the Act’s emphasis on quality and professional integrity. See

FAR 36.605.

In this bid protest, Jacobs is an incumbent contractor on a nationwide contract under

which NGB previously obtained horizontal and vertical A-E services from 2015 to 2022. 1

(Administrative Record (“AR”) 1312). 2 On November 9, 2023, the NGB issued this Synopsis for

a $255 million, multiple-award, indefinite-delivery, indefinite-quantity (“IDIQ”) contract

covering vertical A-E services across eight geographic regions and Guam. 3 (AR 2542). The

Synopsis sought A-E investigative and design services, including construction documentation,

1

Vertical A-E services pertain to facility design, including buildings and similar structures,

whereas horizontal A-E services encompass infrastructure planning, such as roads and highways.

(AR 1312–13).

2

The Administrative Record was uploaded to Justice Enterprise File Sharing System (“JEFS”)

and the parties later submitted a Joint Appendix with cited portions of the record, (ECF No. 26).

3

Synopsis No. W9133L24R6100 (“the Synopsis”). In contrast to other FAR Parts, A-E contracts

under FAR 36.6 are solicited via a text-based synopsis rather than standard solicitation forms.

2

engineering standards, interior design, and various technical and planning studies. (AR 2545,

2547). The Synopsis indicated NGB’s intent to award up to ten IDIQ contracts, including three

awards under the unrestricted category at issue in this protest. 4 (AR 2542). Task orders were

expected to range from $100 thousand to $15 million. (AR 2542–45). The Synopsis underwent

four amendments, with the final amendment issued on December 8, 2023. (AR 2542). NGB

received fifteen proposals under the unrestricted category; eleven proposals were deemed

“highly qualified,” including Jacobs. (AR 8805).

Following the factors established in FAR Subpart 36.6, the Synopsis iterated five primary

evaluation criteria and respective sub-criteria:

Primary Criteria Sub-criteria 5

A. Professional Qualifications necessary 1) Project Manager

for satisfactory performance of required 2) Architect

services 3) Civil Engineer

(“Professional Qualifications”) 4) Structural Engineer

5) Mechanical Engineer

6) Electrical Engineer

7) Fire Protection Engineer

8) Cost Estimator 6

9) Geotechnical Engineer

10) Security/Cyber Security Specialist

11) Environmental Engineer

B. Specialized Experience and Technical 1) Design experience for aircraft maintenance

Competence in the type of work required, facilities, including plans, specifications, cost

including, as appropriate, experience in estimates, and adherence to Unified Facilities

sustainable design, energy conservation, Criteria (“UFC”) and Guide Specifications.

pollution prevention, waste reduction, 2) Design of aircraft operations facilities (e.g.,

and the use of recovered materials squadron operations, simulators, control

(“Specialized Experience and Technical towers), with full documentation and

Competence”) integration of UFC standards.

3) Development of design plans for entry control

points, ranges, and support facilities,

incorporating UFC and Guide Specifications.

4) Master planning and related government

programming and planning documents.

4

Seven awards were reserved for small businesses; “unrestricted” awards refer to awards to

companies “Other than Small Businesses.” (AR 2542–43).

5

For brevity, the listed sub-criteria are summarized from, but do not replicate verbatim, those set

forth in the Synopsis. (See AR 2545–50). Relevant sub-criteria will be quoted directly from the

applicable section of the Synopsis as needed for the analysis.

6

The evaluations indicate that NGB placed more weight on the top eight sub-criteria. (See AR

6236 (bolded)).

3

5) Preparation of design-build bridging

documents for military, government, or

commercial use.

6) Submission of five project cost estimates for

design-bid-build efforts; comparison with

awarded construction costs; explanation of cost

management practices and variances exceeding

10%.

7) Experience designing and surveying for

environmental abatement, including asbestos,

lead-based paint, and other hazardous

substances.

8) Familiarity with National Environmental

Policy Act (“NEPA”) processes and

documentation requirements under relevant

statutes, Council on Environmental Quality

(“CEQ”) regulations, Air Force guidelines, and

environmental analysis procedures.

9) Experience applying Federal Aviation

Administration (“FAA”) regulations, Air

Installations Compatible Use Zones

(“AICUZ”) criteria, and Unified Facilities

Criteria (“UFC”) 3-260-01 design constraints.

10) Demonstrated capability in conducting facility

condition assessments.

C. Capacity to accomplish multiple task 1) Outline the quality management plan,

orders in the required time including quality assurance tools, processes,

personnel, and relevance to team composition.

2) Summarize prior collaboration between prime

and key sub-consultants, highlighting

coordination methods.

3) Provide the firm’s current capacity to execute

multiple Air National Guard (“ANG”) and the

Army National Guard (“ARNG”) task orders

nationwide.

D. Past Performance None

E. Location in the general geographical 1) Describe the team’s familiarity with design

area of the project and knowledge of the requirements applicable to these locations.

locality of the project areas 2) Provide your method for assessing

(“Location”) environmental and regulatory factors—

including hydrology, geology, seismic risks,

climate, building codes, and industry

standards.

3) Describe measures you take to adapt standard

design details to local industry/construction

trades standard practice.

4

(See AR 2545–50). Criteria A, B, C, and E were assessed using a color-coded scale ranging from

“Unacceptable” to “Outstanding.” (AR 6239). In relevant part, the color-coding indicated:

BLUE (Outstanding) – . . . Proposal meets requirements and indicates an

exceptional approach and understanding of the requirements and contains

multiple strengths, and the risk of unsuccessful performance is low.

PURPLE (Good) – . . . Proposal indicates a thorough approach and

understanding of the requirements and contains at least one strength, and the

risk of unsuccessful performance is low to moderate.

(Id.). 7 Criteria D, Past Performance, was evaluated on relevance and confidence. (AR 6240).

Each offeror received a rating of “Very Relevant,” meaning that “[p]resent/past performance

effort involved essentially the same scope and magnitude of effort and complexities this

solicitation requires[,]” and “Satisfactory Confidence,” meaning that “based on the offeror’s

recent/relevant performance record, the Government has a reasonable expectation that the offeror

will successfully perform the required effort.” (Id.).

Criteria were ranked by importance, along with their respective sub-criteria. (AR 2549).

Evaluation was intended to be conducted in two phases with two boards—the Pre-Selection

Board and the Final Selection Board. (AR 6237); see FAR 36.602-2. In the first phase, the Pre-

Selection Board relied on individual Pre-Selection Worksheets as working documents in the

development and finalization of the Pre-Selection Report. (AR 9730–31). In the second phase,

the Final Selection Board engaged in discussions and drafted the Final Selection Report, which

included proposal rankings and detailed ratings per the criterion. (AR 9731). The Final Selection

Report sets forth the Final Selection Board’s ultimate ratings and recommendations, including

each offeror’s overall ranking, detailed ratings under each primary evaluation criterion, and a

corresponding summary of the rationale for those ratings. (AR 9731; see AR 6317–19)

For the Final Selection Report, the Final Selection Board also compiled a table presenting

the adjectival ratings assigned to each offeror and ranked the eleven most qualified firms. (AR

6236, 6238). The concluding section summarized the rankings and highlighted the “Outstanding”

ratings and notable strengths of the top three most highly qualified offerors. (AR 6380–81).

Below is a breakdown of the top five rankings and their respective scores 8:

7

Because the top five offerors did not receive a rating lower than Purple (Good), the Court will

not discuss the remainder of the scale.

8

Information in this chart was compiled from the Selection Authority’s “Unrestricted Final

Selection Report for Vertical Multiple Region National Guard IDIQ for A-E Services” located at

Tab 114 of the Administrative Record. The offerors are listed in order of ranking. Although the

Synopsis includes Criteria F as a tie-breaking mechanism, there is no indication it was invoked;

accordingly, it is not reflected in the chart.

5

(1) Offeror (2) Offeror (3) Offeror (4) Offeror (5) Jacobs

#1 #2 #3 #4

A. Professional Blue Blue Purple Purple Purple

Qualifications (Outstanding) (Outstanding) (Good) (Good) (Good)

B. Specialized Blue Blue Blue Blue Blue

Experience and (Outstanding) (Outstanding) (Outstanding) (Outstanding) (Outstanding)

Technical

Competence

C. Capacity to Purple Purple Blue Blue Blue

accomplish (Good) (Good) (Outstanding) (Outstanding) (Outstanding)

multiple task

orders in the

required time

D. Past Very Relevant Very Relevant Very Relevant Very Relevant Very Relevant

Performance

Satisfactory Satisfactory Satisfactory Satisfactory Satisfactory

Confidence Confidence Confidence Confidence Confidence

E. Location Blue Blue Blue Blue Purple

(Outstanding) (Outstanding) (Outstanding) (Outstanding) (Good)

(See AR Tab 114). As Jacobs was not among the top three offerors, NGB notified Jacobs on

August 7, 2024, that it was not selected for further negotiations. (AR 6391).

Jacobs filed an initial protest with the Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) the

following week, contesting each rating it received below the highest level. (AR 8234–68). On

November 26, 2024, GAO denied all but one of Jacobs’s protest grounds and found no

competitive prejudice. (AR 10116–38). Specifically, GAO concluded that even with an

“Outstanding” rating under Criterion E, Jacobs would not surpass Offeror #3 in overall

qualification. (AR 10121–25). This protest followed. (Compl., ECF No. 1).

II. Analysis

Jacobs maintains that the Administrative Record reveals a range of shortcomings in

NGB’s evaluation process. According to Jacobs, NGB overlooked the importance of prioritizing

disciplines under Criterion A, failed to conduct a substantive assessment of that criterion, and

introduced unspoken factors into the evaluation. (Pl.’s MJAR at 1). Jacobs views the evaluation

of its proposal under Criterion A as inconsistent, unreasonable, and disparate. (Id.). Jacobs also

challenges the fairness of how its proposal was assessed under Criteria D and E. (Id.).

Furthermore, Jacobs argues that NGB did not follow the Synopsis requirements when ranking

offerors and that Jacobs was improperly placed as only the fifth most qualified candidate. (Id.).

The United States counters that Jacobs’s argument merely attempts to supplant the agency’s

discretion in distinguishing between “Good” and “Outstanding” ratings with its own subjective

views. (Def.’s xMJAR at 3). The Court agrees with the United States and concludes that Jacobs

has failed to carry its burden to disturb NGB’s decision.

6

A. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review

The Tucker Act provides that an interested party may file an action in the Court of

Federal Claims “objecting [(1)] to a solicitation by a Federal agency for bids or proposals for a

proposed contract or [(2)] to a proposed award or [(3)] the award of a contract or [(4)] any

alleged violation of statute or regulation in connection with a procurement or a proposed

procurement.” 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(1); see Aero Spray, Inc. v. United States, 156 Fed. Cl. 548,

559 n.18 (2021). 9 According to 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(4), the Court typically reviews agency

procurement decisions under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 706. Under

the APA standard, “[i]n a bid protest case, the inquiry is whether the agency’s action was

arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law and, if so,

whether the error is prejudicial.” Glenn Def. Marine (ASIA), PTE Ltd. v. United States, 720 F.3d

901, 907 (Fed. Cir. 2013).

Judicial review of agency action under the APA typically proceeds on two tracks; the

Court could find: (1) the agency’s decision lacked either a rational basis or support from the

administrative record or was arbitrary and capricious; and/or (2) the agency’s procurement

procedure involved a violation of regulation or statute. Weeks Marine, Inc. v. United States, 575

F.3d 1352, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2009). To obtain relief, after showing that the procuring agency

violated the law or acted arbitrarily and capriciously, the protester must also show that the

agency’s violation was prejudicial. Glenn Def. Marine (ASIA), 720 F.3d at 907. This standard is

“highly deferential.” CHE Consulting, Inc. v. United States, 552 F.3d 1351, 1354 (Fed. Cir.

2008). “Under the ‘arbitrary and capricious’ standard[,] the scope of review is a narrow one. A

reviewing court must consider whether the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant

factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment[.]” Bowman Transp., Inc. v.

Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 285 (1974) (internal quotations omitted). The

Court may not substitute its own judgment for that of the agency. Id. But the agency must

articulate a “rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.” Burlington Truck

Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962). Even so, a “protestor’s burden is

particularly great in negotiated procurements because the contracting officer is entrusted with a

relatively high degree of discretion[.]” Banknote Corp. of Am., v. United States, 56 Fed. Cl. 377,

380 (2003), aff’d, 365 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2004).

When reviewing an agency’s procurement decisions, the Court is expected to apply a

“presumption of regularity” and avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the agency. See

Cleveland Assets, LLC v. United States, 883 F.3d 1378, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2018); R & W Flammann

GmbH v. United States, 339 F.3d 1320, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Additionally, “[i]f the court finds a

reasonable basis for the agency’s action, the court should stay its hand even though it might, as

an original proposition, have reached a different conclusion as to the proper administration and

application of the procurement regulations.” Honeywell, Inc. v. United States, 870 F.2d 644, 648

(Fed. Cir. 1989) (quoting M. Steinthal & Co. v. Seamans, 455 F.2d 1289, 1301 (D.C. Cir. 1971)).

9

Standing is an integral part of jurisdiction. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).

It is not contested in this case. Because of this, and because Jacobs is an incumbent A-E awardee,

the Court finds that Jacobs has standing for purposes of this protest.

7

officer and board chair to justify Jacobs’s “Good” rating under Criterion A. 12 (Id. at 17). The

contracting officer explained that each discipline was assessed based on qualifications rather than

individual résumés, and while Jacobs’s proposal exceeded requirements, it did not do so

significantly. (Id. (citing AR 8808–09)). As the United States characterizes it, the board chair

added that the rating was not determined by tallying scores, noting Jacobs received seven

“Good” and four “Outstanding” sub-criteria ratings, emphasizing that no discipline dominated in

importance and the mixed results did not support an upgrade to “Outstanding.” (Id. (citing AR

8816)).

Ultimately, the Court disagrees with Jacobs’s proposition that a proper sequencing of

disciplines by NGB, in accordance with the stated prioritization, would have warranted an

“Outstanding” rating under Criterion A. While the Synopsis indicated that disciplines were listed

by relative importance with a focus on the top eight disciplines, it did not provide a specific

weighting scheme. (See AR 2547). In such cases, the Court affords deference to the agency’s

interpretation and evaluative methodology, particularly where the procurement’s framework

lacks prescribed metrics. CHE Consulting, 552 F.3d at 1354. Consequently, the argument that

Jacobs would have received a higher rating had NGB assigned concrete weight to the sub-criteria

is speculative and unsupported by the record.

The Court therefore relies on the evaluation criteria NGB employed. According to the

Synopsis, Criterion A was evaluated as follows:

Evaluation of each discipline will consider education, registration,

demonstrated experience, certifications, and longevity with the firm.

Evaluation will be based on an assessment by the board of the firm’s ability

to effectively address the professional qualifications as described above. A

firm that provides resumes for key personnel with greater levels of discipline

specific education, experience, and certifications as well as longevity with

the firm will be considered more highly qualified than one that provides less

qualified personnel, with less discipline specific education and experience as

well as a shorter duration with the firm. Professional disciplines are listed in

priority order based on anticipated workload and benefit to project success.

12

These documents are part of the Administrative Record based on the record before the GAO.

(AR 10130 (citing AR 8810, AR 8816–19)). Except in limited circumstances, courts generally

deem post hoc declarations inadmissible when evaluating claims based solely on the

administrative record. See Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 140 S.

Ct. 1891, 1908–09 (2020) (directing that “judicial review of agency action is limited to the

grounds that the agency invoked when it took the action” and concluding that “[a]n agency must

defend its actions based on the reasons it gave when it acted,” while post hoc rationalizations for

agency action are “impermissible” (internal quotations omitted)); see Superior Waste Mgmt. LLC

v. United States, 169 Fed. Cl. 239, 277 (2024). As the Court determines that the record supports a

reasonable inference regarding Jacobs’s rating under this criterion, it finds no need to consider

the submitted declarations.

13

(AR 2547). The information relayed in the chart above evinces that the Final Selection Board

took each of the relevant factors into account when assigning an adjectival rating. (AR 6317–19).

The details NGB lists for each rating consider each proposed individual’s level of education,

certifications, tenure at the firm, and project experience. This is exactly what the Synopsis

dictates.

However, Jacobs also takes issue with the methodology underlying these calculations,

referring to it as a “mechanical tabulation” not warranted by the Synopsis. (Pl.’s MJAR at 8). A

harsh truth of government procurements is that numerical factors inevitably play a role due to the

structured nature of evaluation protocols. While the evaluation may have employed a numerical

scoring methodology when determining adjectival ratings, such an approach does not contravene

the terms of the Synopsis. Although Jacobs may view this methodology as being mechanically

tabulated, the Synopsis expressly provides that qualifications will be assessed and weighted

according to discipline-specific factors and prioritized by anticipated workload and project

relevance. Thus, the evaluator’s assigned scores based on personnel résumés was consistent with

the Synopsis’s stated criteria and further demonstrates that the evaluation process reflected the

required considerations. Accordingly, even if the scores were “mechanically applied,” the

resulting scores are consistent with the Synopsis and demonstrate that NGB considered the

appropriate factors in its assessment.

ii. Failure to Make Qualitative Analysis

A recurring theme in Jacobs’s briefing, like its objection to NGB’s tabulation method, is

that NGB evaluators employed a mechanical rating approach without conducting the required

qualitative assessment. (Pl.’s MJAR at 10). In other words, Jacobs contends that NGB’s

methodology treated offerors as figures on a score sheet, rather than as professional entities with

distinct capabilities. In support of this argument, Jacobs points to the Evaluation Summary Table,

which it claims reflects a superficial emphasis on the numerical distribution of ratings,

particularly in the top eight disciplines designated as priority areas. (Id. (citing AR 6236)).

According to Jacobs, the discipline-level assessments consist primarily of checkbox-style lists

describing résumé attributes and do not document comparative or qualitative discussion of the

résumés’ relative strength or merit. (Id. (citing AR 6317–20; 6254–56; 6241–43; 6329–30)).

Jacobs argues that the lack of deeper reasoning reflects a departure from the criteria prescribed in

the Synopsis and materially undermines Jacobs’s rating and competitiveness. (Id.). This

argument gives short shrift to the agency’s evaluation; Jacobs’s characterization of NGB’s

analysis as solely quantitative fails to account for the qualitative assessment it also generated.

In government contracting, qualitative and quantitative analyses represent two

complementary methods for evaluating the merits of proposals. See Myriddian, LLC v. United

States, 168 Fed. Cl. 353, 359 (2023) (discussing significance of source selection authority’s

comparison of qualitative and quantitative assessments). That said, the methodologies tend to

overlap in practice to provide a holistic picture of a proposal’s merits. The interplay between

qualitative and quantitative factors is inherent in all rating and balancing assessments, with each

informing and reinforcing the other. See e.g., TRW, Inc. v. Unisys Corp., 98 F.3d 1325, 1327–28

(Fed. Cir. 1996) (stating that source selection authority may consider both quantitative and

qualitative factors); Commonwealth Sci. & Indus. Rsch. Organisation v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 809

F.3d 1295, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (finding evidence of qualitative assessments unreasonable

14

when they are not anchored to a quantitative valuation for apportionment principles in patent

law); Save Domestic Oil, Inc. v. United States, 357 F.3d 1278, 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (discussion

of quantitative ratios being used as part of overall qualitative analysis in a non-contracting

context). Stated differently, numbers give shape to a narrative, while the narrative gives meaning

to the numbers. For instance, an evaluator might assess the adequacy of a project schedule

qualitatively, but that assessment is grounded in the measurable duration of tasks or resource

allocation. Similarly, and relevant here, the strength of proposed personnel may be judged based

on degrees held, years of experience, or specific certifications. These aspects are clearly

quantitative in nature but ultimately inform a qualitative assessment.

It must be true that, to be effective, evaluations should rely on the relationship between

quantitative and qualitative assessments to ensure that decisions are rational and balance data-

driven objectivity with informed professional judgment. See AcmeSolv, LLC v. United States,

174 Fed. Cl. 748, 756 (2025) (finding that quantitative analysis informed overall confidence

rating). In this case, the record reflects that the NGB’s evaluators reviewed proposed personnel

credentials using a structured framework that included both quantitative benchmarks and

discipline-specific assessments. (See AR Tab 114). Although the Evaluation Summary Table

organized adjectival ratings by discipline and priority level, that format does not, on its own,

establish that the evaluators failed to conduct the substantive analysis required under the

Synopsis. The record contains narrative annotations and résumé-specific evaluations addressing

qualifications cited in the Synopsis, including education, experience, certifications, and tenure.

Although concise, the assessments do not constitute procedural error. (AR 9957–10101).

FAR Subpart 36.6 allows for professional judgment without exhaustive justification,

provided the methodology remains transparent and internally consistent. That Jacobs disagrees

with the depth of analysis NGB implemented does not engage with this Court’s standard of

review. As the Federal Circuit has recognized, challenges to the technical scoring involve the

“minutiae of the procurement process,” “discretionary determinations of procurement officials

that a court will not second guess.” COMINT Sys. Corp. v. United States, 700 F.3d 1377, 1384

(Fed. Cir. 2012) (quotation marks omitted) (quoting E.W. Bliss Co. v. United States, 77 F.3d 445,

449 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (citations omitted)). Agencies “are entrusted with a good deal of discretion

in determining which bid is the most advantageous to the Government.” Lockheed Missiles &

Space Co. v. Bentsen, 4 F.3d 955, 959 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (quoting Tidewater Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v.

United States, 216 Ct. Cl. 69, 83, 573 F.2d 65 (1978)). Accordingly, the Court concludes that

NGB’s approach to evaluating Criterion A was consistent with the Synopsis, compliant with

FAR 36.602-3, and within the bounds of reasonable discretion. Jacobs has not demonstrated that

the evaluation was arbitrary, capricious, or procedurally defective.

iii. Evaluation of Criterion B Participation by Criterion A Disciplines

Jacobs contends that NGB’s evaluation under Criterion A was procedurally flawed and

inconsistent with the express terms of the Synopsis. (Pl.’s MJAR at 10). Contrary to the

Synopsis, Jacobs argues that NGB improperly focused on the number of projects associated with

each labor discipline, referencing information submitted under Primary Criterion B. (Pl.’s MJAR

at 10–12 (citing AR 6240–42; 6241–43; 6254–56; 6329–30)). Criterion B was specific to

“Specialized Experience and Technical Competence in the type of work required, including, as

appropriate, experience in sustainable design, energy conservation, pollution prevention, waste

15

reduction, and the use of recovered materials[.]” (AR 2547). As Jacobs sees it, this cross-

criterion analysis constitutes the application of unstated evaluation criteria because the Synopsis

did not require that personnel have experience with specific projects, nor did it indicate that such

experience would be weighted more favorably. (Id. at 11). The United States contends that

Jacobs’s allegation is unsupported by the record. (Def.’s xMJAR at 18). Citing the previous

GAO decision, it argues that NGB’s correlation of personnel between Criteria A and B did not

affect the rating assigned under Criterion A. (Id. (citing AR 10130–31)). The Court agrees that

Jacobs’s argument is without merit.

It is well established that an agency cannot evaluate proposals on unstated criteria. See

Banknote, 56 Fed. Cl. at 386 (stating that “agencies must evaluate proposals and make awards

based on the criteria stated in the solicitation”). To prevail on a claim that an agency improperly

utilized unstated evaluation criteria, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) “the procuring agency

used a significantly different basis in evaluating the proposals than was disclosed;” and (2) “the

protester was prejudiced as a result—that it had a substantial chance to receive the contract

award but for that error.” NEQ, LLC v. United States, 88 Fed. Cl. 38, 48 (2009) (quoting

Banknote, 56 Fed. Cl. at 387). Jacobs fails on both elements.

First, Jacobs suggests a significant reliance on the correlation of projects submitted under

Criterion B. The relationship between Criteria A and B is mentioned for some individual

disciplines, but it is not stated as a basis for a rating. However, even if NGB did cross-reference

Criterion A personnel with Criterion B projects, the Court finds that it would not matter and

could not cause prejudicial error. Courts have found that while agencies may not consider

unstated criteria per se, “a solicitation need not identify criteria intrinsic to the stated evaluation

factors, and agencies retain great discretion in determining the scope of a given evaluation

factor.” Summit Techs., LLC v. United States, 151 Fed. Cl. 171, 180 (2020) (quoting

PlanetSpace, Inc. v. United States, 92 Fed. Cl. 520, 536 (2010)); see Sys. Implementers, Inc. v.

United States, 162 Fed. Cl. 754, 769 (2022). It is nonsensical, and there is no case law to support

the proposition, that agencies cannot account for the interaction of factors across a solicitation.

The Synopsis required that ratings of “Good” and “Outstanding” reflect proposals that exceeded

qualification requirements, emphasizing discipline-specific education, experience, certifications,

and longevity with the firm. (AR 2547, 2551). The Synopsis specifies that experience is

considered, though it does not detail to what capacity. Because Criterion B relates to experience,

it cannot be said that NGB relied on unstated criteria when considering relevance to Criterion A.

iv. Internal Consistency

Jacobs also argues that if Criterion B was properly considered, it renders NGB’s Criterion

A evaluation internally inconsistent. (Pl.’s MJAR at 12–24). Jacobs first supports this argument

iterating that it received an “Outstanding” rating under Criterion B for its proposed projects,

therefore it should have also received an “Outstanding” rating on Criterion A due to employing

personnel involved with Criterion B projects. (Id. (citing AR 6319; AR 6237–82)). The Court is

not convinced. This argument fails to consider extraneous factors such as the personnel’s level of

involvement in the prior project, the overall success of the project, and other external factors that

may affect how experience is considered when assessing a rating. The Court interprets Jacobs’s

argument as a disagreement with NGB’s evaluation process—the minutiae of procurement. The

Court will not intervene in such matters unless there is evidence that NGB’s actions were

16

arbitrary or capricious. Mortg. Contracting Servs. v. United States, 153 Fed. Cl. 89, 126 (2021)

(“The court must especially defer to the agency’s technical evaluations, past performance

ratings, and other minutiae of the procurement process . . . which involve discretionary

determinations of procurement officials.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).

This Court consistently recognizes that contracting officers enjoy “broad discretion with

respect to evaluation of technical proposals[,]” and the Court typically does not “second guess

the technical ratings that the source selection committee gave to each offeror.” Info. Scis. Corp.

v. United States, 73 Fed. Cl. 70, 104 (2006) (quoting Omega World Travel, Inc. v. United States,

54 Fed. Cl. 570, 578 (2002)). Even so, the Court has cautioned that “unsuccessful offerors

repeatedly ignore this.” AccelGov, LLC v. United States, 170 Fed. Cl. 508, 518 (2024). “The goal

of bid protests is to ensure fairness and transparency in the procurement process, not to provide a

forum for bidders to challenge every minor disagreement with an agency’s evaluation.” Warrior

Focused Sols., LLC v. United States, 175 Fed. Cl. 416, 427 (2025). These restrictions enhance

efficiency while ensuring a clear separation between the judiciary and routine government

contracting oversight. As a result, agencies maintain broad discretion in defining the scope of an

evaluation factor. See Summit Techs., 151 Fed. Cl. at 180; PlanetSpace, 92 Fed. Cl. at 536. As

the disappointed offeror, Jacobs bears the heavy burden of showing that NGB’s evaluation

lacked a rational basis. See Galen Med. Assocs., 369 F.3d at 1330 (addressing burden of proof in

negotiated procurements). “[T]he test for reviewing courts is to determine whether the

contracting agency provided a coherent and reasonable explanation of its exercise of discretion, .

. . and the disappointed bidder bears a heavy burden of showing that the award decision had no

rational basis.” Impresa Construzioni Geom. Domenico Garufi v. United States, 238 F.3d 1324,

1332–33 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Although Jacobs

broadly invites the Court to improperly second-guess NGB’s evaluation, the Court declines to do

so. Nevertheless, it analyzes Jacobs’s arguments solely to assess whether the decisions were

reasonable.

Jacobs’s more specific arguments relate to positions ultimately evaluated as “Good” but

were overshadowed and filled with personnel that had prior experience with Criterion B

projects—its Civil, Mechanical, Electrical, and Geotechnical engineers as well as its Fire

Protection of Engineer and Security/Cyber Security Specialist. (Pl.’s MJAR at 14). Each of these

personnel were in the top eight positions that NGB deemed to be “heavy hitters,” so to speak.

According to the protest, Jacobs’s personnel possessed superior discipline-specific education,

experience, certifications, and tenure with the firm, yet received “Good” ratings while other

offerors with comparable or lesser qualifications were rated “Outstanding.” (Id. at 15–17).

Jacobs contends that NGP failed to adequately document or properly assess whether Jacobs’s

proposed personnel exceeded the required qualifications, instead relying on superficial

summaries. (Id. at 16). For Jacobs, this alleged failure resulted in unfair and disparate treatment

across several disciplines and violated the terms of the Synopsis. (Id.).

As to its proposed civil engineers, Jacobs believes NGB failed to properly evaluate them

by disregarding the extent to which their qualifications exceeded the Synopsis’s criteria. (Pl.’s

MJAR at 16). Despite Jacobs’s team demonstrating substantial experience, it believes that NGB

rated them “Good” without adequately weighing these strengths. (Id.). In contrast, Offeror #1’s

Civil Engineers, possessing nearly identical qualifications and slightly more firm tenure, were

rated “Outstanding,” suggesting disparate treatment. (Id. at 17 (citing AR 6318, 6236, 8816–17)).

17

The Court finds this unavailing because, although the proposed engineers demonstrated

substantial experience and firm tenure, NGB concluded that their education and

registrations/certifications merely satisfied—but did not notably surpass—the requirements set

forth in the Synopsis. This is squarely within their discretion. See Info. Scis. Corp., 73 Fed. Cl. at

104. Additionally, the United States notes that Jacobs’s claim that Offeror #1 received an

“Outstanding” rating is incorrect; Offeror #1’s Civil Engineers were also rated “Good.” (Def.’s

xMJAR at 20 (citing AR 6318, 6254–55)). Accordingly, Jacobs’s disparate treatment argument

fails.

Jacobs contends that its proposed Mechanical Engineers significantly exceeded the

Synopsis requirements, with thirty-eight and eighteen years of experience, including over fifteen

years at the firm and several years of NGB-specific work. (Pl.’s MJAR at 18 (citing AR 4132,

4149–50, 2546)). Jacobs argues these qualifications warranted a higher rating and that NGB’s

failure to holistically evaluate these strengths was inconsistent with the Synopsis’s stated criteria.

However, as the United States points out, Jacobs only focuses on levels of experience and

longevity with the firm but fails to account for levels of discipline-specific education,

registrations, and certifications sufficient to receive an “Outstanding” rating. (Def.’s xMJAR at

20; see AR 6318, 6236, 8817).

Jacobs goes on to argue that NGB failed to properly evaluate its proposed Electrical

Engineers by disregarding extensive qualifications, including a combined sixty-three years of

experience, over fifteen years with the firm, substantial NGB-specific experience, and LEED

certification. (Pl.’s MJAR at 19 (citing AR 4132, 4151–52, 8817)). As Jacobs puts it, NGB

focused narrowly on education and failed to assess supplemental factors. (Id.). Jacobs contends

that such an evaluation was disparate, as Offeror #2’s Electrical Engineers were rated

“Outstanding” with fewer years of experience and less tenure while Jacobs’s personnel were

rated “Good.” (Id. at 19–20 (citing AR 2819–22, 6242, 6318)). Again, there is nothing in the

record that supports this theory. As the United States notes, educational qualifications

contributed to Offeror #2’s higher rating, as one of its proposed Electrical Engineers held a

master’s degree, whereas Jacobs’s proposed engineers held only bachelor’s degrees. (Def.’s

xMJAR at 21 (citing AR 6242, 6318, 8817)). Educational qualifications significantly influence

outcomes in the procurement process. Accordingly, Jacobs has not shown that these ratings were

unreasonable.

As to Jacobs’s Fire Protection Engineers, Jacobs insists that the evaluation did not show

how Jacobs’s team exceeded the Synopsis’s five-year relevant experience requirement, nor did it

address the significance of their tenure or certifications, despite their qualifications. (Pl.’s MJAR

at 20). However, agencies are not obligated to explain unless the presumption of regularity is

challenged by evidence indicating the decision was arbitrary or capricious. Impresa

Construzioni, 238 F.3d at 1338. The record reflects that Jacobs’s Fire Protection Engineers were

acknowledged for their experience, firm tenure, and certifications. (AR 6318, 6236, 8818).

However, NGB determined these qualifications did not justify an “Outstanding” rating, as the

collective résumés failed to exceed the standards for discipline-specific education or

certification. Without additional evidence, it cannot be said that this finding was not arbitrary or

capricious.

18

Jacobs characterizes NGB’s evaluation of its proposed Geotechnical Engineer as arbitrary

and based on undefined, post-hoc criteria. (Pl.’s MJAR at 20–23). According to Jacobs, NGB

improperly invoked an “industry standard” not included in the Synopsis, which only required

professional registration. (Id. at 21). Jacobs argues NGB failed to support this standard with

objective references and instead relied on vague, informal interpretations. (Id.). Jacobs maintains

that its candidate—who holds multiple registrations, specialized software training, a master’s

degree in Geotechnical Engineering, and twenty-eight years of experience—exceeded the

Synopsis requirements. (Id.). Nevertheless, Jacobs asserts NGB rated its engineer as merely

“Good” while awarding an “Outstanding” rating to a similarly qualified competitor. (Id. at 22).

Further, Jacobs argues its Environmental Engineer was rated lower than an equally qualified

candidate from Offeror #1, despite similar experience, education, and certifications. (Id. at 24).

Jacobs’s disparate treatment claims concerning its Geotechnical and Environmental

Engineer proposals do not meet the threshold of substantial indistinguishability required to

support such claims. It is not unreasonable for agencies to evaluate differing proposals

differently. Allicent Tech., LLC v. United States, 166 Fed. Cl. 77, 110 (2023); Off. Design Grp. v.

United States, 951 F.3d 1366, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2020). Jacobs contends that its Geotechnical

Engineer’s qualifications were comparable to Offeror #1’s, yet the record shows the latter held

professional registrations in twice as many states, which would be desirable in a multi-region

contract. (AR 3043, 4156). NGB reasonably concluded this distinction warranted differing

ratings. (See AR 8108). Per E.W. Bliss, such discretionary judgments are not for courts to

second-guess. 77 F.3d at 449. Likewise, for the Environmental Engineer discipline, Jacobs’s

candidate held limited certifications compared to Offeror #1’s proposed candidate, whose team

included an Industrial Hygienist certified in four states. (AR 3045, 4159). The Court finds that

the record supports NGB’s rating decision, and that Jacobs fails to show the proposals were

substantially indistinguishable. (AR 8819–20).

Finally, Jacobs contends that its Security/Cyber Security Specialist was underrated

despite exceeding Synopsis requirements, citing seventeen years of experience, advanced

certifications, and a relevant degree. (Pl.’s MJAR at 23 (citing AR 4133, 4157)). Jacobs argues

NGB overlooked key qualifications, focusing narrowly on education and firm tenure, which it

claims violates the Synopsis’s evaluation criteria. (Id.). This challenge does not render the

agency’s assessment unreasonable. The Court agrees with the United States; “[t]he record

supports the NGB’s estimation that the education level and longevity with the firm for this

discipline on balance with the other three factors (demonstrated experience, registration, and

certifications) did not merit rating Jacobs an overall [O]utstanding . . . rating.” (Def.’s xMJAR at

21 (citing AR 6318–19, 6236, 8818–19)).

The Synopsis was clear that each of the personnel were required to have “a bachelor’s

degree, professional registration in the role they are assigned in, and at least five years of

relevant experience in the role they are assigned in [and] [e]valuation of each discipline will

consider education, registration, demonstrated experience, certifications, and longevity with the

firm.” (AR 2547). Furthermore, “key personnel with greater levels of discipline specific

education, experience, and certifications as well as longevity with the firm will be considered

more highly qualified than one that provides less qualified personnel.” (Id.). The Court finds that

19

NGB’s evaluation of these seven disciplines was reasonable, consistent with the Synopsis, and

supported by the Administrative Record.

As its final, wide-ranging shot at Criterion A, Jacobs contends that NGB’s evaluation was

internally inconsistent and arbitrarily applied across disciplines. (Pl.’s MJAR at 24–25). Despite

the Synopsis requiring evaluators to consider discipline-specific qualifications such as education,

experience, certifications, and longevity, Jacobs asserts that personnel with comparable or

superior credentials were rated “Good” while others with lesser qualifications received

“Outstanding” ratings. (Id. at 24). Jacobs states that several “Good”-rated individuals

demonstrated well beyond the minimum required experience—ranging from twenty to over

forty-five years—while an “Outstanding”-rated Cost Estimator had seventeen years of

experience. (Id. (citing AR 6236)). Similarly, disciplines with master’s degrees were rated

“Good,” while Project Managers with bachelor’s degrees received “Outstanding” ratings. (Id.).

Jacobs argues this inconsistency undermines the objectivity of NGB’s evaluation and results in a

disparate assignment of strengths. (Id. at 24–25). However, NGB was not required to do a side-

by-side comparison for the résumés and each of the cited instances have other differences within

experience, certification, etc. Individual assessments must account for the entirety of a person’s

qualifications and characteristics, which naturally results in varied evaluations. Jacobs has not

carried its burden to show that NGB arbitrarily or capriciously evaluated Criterion A.

C. Criterion D | Past Performance

Next, Jacobs argues that NGB’s assignment of weaknesses under Primary Criterion D

was unreasonable and contrary to the Synopsis’s requirement that only credible, documented,

and recent past performance information be considered. (Pl.’s MJAR 25–28 (citing AR 2549)).

Specifically, Jacobs challenges NGB’s reliance on three “Marginal” Contractor Performance

Assessment Reporting System (“CPARS”) ratings—each reflecting either temporal staleness or

resolved deficiencies. 13 (Id. at 25). The United States contends that the three marginal ratings in

question had no impact on Jacobs’s evaluation; NGB excluded them, resulting in a “Satisfactory

Confidence” rating based on stronger performance across other projects. (Def.’s xMJAR at 23).

It further argues that since all top offerors received the same rating under a less significant

criterion, Jacobs cannot show competitive prejudice. (Id.). The United States is correct; Jacobs’s

Criterion D challenge fails because the NGB excluded the marginal ratings and applied a

consistent confidence assessment across top offerors.

The Synopsis required offerors to submit past performance information, including

reference contact details; it permitted the inclusion of supplemental materials such as client

commendations, descriptions of prior issues, and corrective actions taken in response to any

unfavorable CPARS evaluations. (AR 2549). In return, the evaluation board would assess

offerors’ past performance—drawing from CPARS and other sources—based on quality, cost

control, and timeliness, with consideration limited to credible, recent, and relevant information,

13

CPARS refers to a web-based platform used to collect, evaluate, and manage contractor

performance data for government contracts and agreements. Contractor Performance Assessment

Reporting System, https://www.cpars.gov/cparsweb/home [https://perma.cc/B3R5-E57Z] (last

visited July 20, 2025).

20

while neutral treatment would apply to offerors lacking such data. (Id.). The Synopsis

specifically states that “[c]redible, documented information on past performance will be

considered, except for adverse performance information to which the firm has not had an

opportunity to respond.” (Id.).

In evaluating Criterion D, Jacobs contends that NGB’s reliance on three isolated

“Marginal” CPARS ratings was procedurally flawed in light of the Synopsis’s directive to rely

on recent and credible past performance data. 14 (Pl.’s MJAR at 25). Jacobs emphasizes that each

of the cited ratings was either stale or superseded, including one that was approximately six years

old, another from five years prior, and a third that had since been upgraded to “Very Good.” (Id.

at 26–27). Further, Jacobs contends that these CPARS ratings represented only a fraction of the

1,199 evaluation factors available, while Jacobs consistently received “Very Good” or

“Exceptional” ratings in more than half of the total record. (Id. at 27). In Jacobs’s view,

assigning a lower confidence rating based on such outliers ignores its long-standing pattern of

successful performance and imposes an unwarranted penalty. (Id.).

The United States responds that Jacobs’s objections were previously rejected at the GAO

and that this Court should follow suit. (Def.’s xMJAR at 23 (citing AR 10134, 6327)). The

United States further contends that the three identified ratings were not negatively weighted in

NGB’s evaluation, as shown by the Final Selection Report’s deliberate exclusion of those ratings

from consideration. (Id. at 24). Moreover, the United States asserts that the bulk of Jacobs’s

performance ratings were satisfactory or better, and when combined with the ten projects

submitted in its proposal, NGB reasonably assigned a “Satisfactory Confidence” rating based on

the aggregate data. (Id.).

As an initial point, the Court owes no deference to GAO determinations and affords it

none here. See Assessment & Training Sols. Consulting Corp. v. United States, 173 Fed. Cl. 123,

127 (2024) (“The GAO’s earlier decision in this procurement is not binding on this Court.”);

Scott Techs., Inc. v. United States, 168 Fed. Cl. 705, 714 n.5 (2023) (“The Court is not bound by

GAO decisions, and it follows that the parties are not bound to arguments advanced before the

GAO either.”); VS2, LLC v. United States, 155 Fed. Cl. 738, 766 (2021) (“Federal Circuit

precedent does not require that this Court simply defer to GAO’s decision . . . or the Agency’s

reliance upon it.”). Based on the record before it, the Court finds in favor of the United States.

The evaluation confirms that the three “Marginal” ratings were not adversely weighted in the

evaluative process. The evaluation board compiled the Criterion D ratings in the following chart:

14

The first rating, associated with the , is nearly six years old and

represents the only “Marginal” Cost Control rating among 288 reviewed contracts. (AR 6327,

6362). Similarly, the second “Marginal” rating, from the , is five

years old and the sole “Marginal” Management rating in the dataset. (AR 6326, 6327). The third

rating, from the , was issued during an interim evaluation

but later upgraded to “Very Good” in subsequent reporting. (AR 6326).

21

(AR 6327). The Final Selection Report and associated documentation reflect that NGB

deliberately determined to exclude those ratings from consideration and instead relied on a

broader record—including 288 CPARS entries and ten proposal projects—to assign a

“Satisfactory Confidence” to Jacobs. (Id.). This approach aligns with the Synopsis’s directive to

consider credible and recent performance data and reflects a reasoned judgment within the

agency’s discretion. (See AR 2549). Given this, the Court concludes that NGB’s evaluation

methodology was procedurally sound, not arbitrary or capricious, and consistent with applicable

procurement regulations.

D. Criterion E | Location

Jacobs argues that NGB improperly rated its proposal under Criterion E by ignoring the

ranked importance of sub-criteria. (Pl.’s MJAR at 28–29). Despite receiving top ratings on the

most critical elements, its overall score was lowered, allegedly distorting the evaluation

framework and harming its competitive standing. (Id. at 28). The United States counters that the

Board used a qualitative, holistic review—not weighted averages—and that Jacobs suffered no

prejudice even if a rating error occurred. (Def.’s xMJAR at 25–26). The Court agrees that even if

NGB incorrectly evaluated Criterion E, it would have resulted in a race for fourth place. Because

there were only three crowns, Jacobs was not competitively prejudiced by the evaluation

outcome.

All contract work was to be performed across the lower forty-eight states, the District of

Columbia, and the Territory of Guam. (AR 2549–50). Offerors were meant to describe and

demonstrate the team’s familiarity with design requirements applicable to these locations. (AR

2549). The three sub-criteria included:

22

(1) In SF330 Part I, Section H, describe and demonstrate the team’s

familiarity with design requirements applicable to these locations.

(2) Submit information addressing your methodology for obtaining

knowledge of hydrology, soil conditions, seismic conditions, weather

conditions, state/local building codes, and construction industry standards.

(3) Describe measures you take to adapt standard design details to local

industry/construction trades standard practice.

(AR 2550). Evaluation would focus on how effectively the firm and its key sub-consultants

demonstrate knowledge of locality; those who did so more convincingly would be rated more

highly. (Id.).

Jacobs contends that NGB failed to reasonably evaluate its submission under Primary

Criterion E by disregarding the prioritized structure of the sub-criteria. (Pl.’s MJAR at 28).

According to Jacobs, its proposal received “Outstanding” ratings for the top two most heavily

weighted sub-criteria, and only a “Good” rating for the least important third sub-criterion. (Id.

(citing AR 6236)). Yet, NGB assigned Jacobs an overall rating of “Good” for Criterion E

without accounting for the relative significance of each component. (See AR 6236). Jacobs

maintains that this approach undermines the evaluative framework outlined in the Synopsis,

which expressly ranked sub-criteria in descending order of importance. (Pl.’s MJAR at 28). The

procedural error, Jacobs argues, led to an inaccurate overall rating and unfairly diminished the

qualitative strengths of its proposal, which prejudiced its standing in a highly competitive field.

(Id. at 29).

The United States responds that Jacobs’s position mischaracterizes the evaluation

methodology employed by the Final Selection Board. (Def.’s xMJAR at 25). While the sub-

criteria were considered in assigning ratings, the United States argues that the Board did not

apply a mathematical weighting or averaging scheme. (Id.). The government also purports that,

even if NGB erred in assigning a lower rating, Jacobs suffered no competitive prejudice. (Id. at

26 (citing AR 10123–24)).

Notably, Jacobs won this battle at GAO but ultimately lost the war. GAO found that

NGB did not evaluate Criterion E in accordance with the priority assigned in the Synopsis. (AR

10122). Despite this error, GAO concluded that Jacobs suffered no competitive prejudice, citing

NGB’s assertion that an improved adjectival rating under Criterion E would not have altered

Jacobs’s overall ranking. (AR 10124). Jacobs disputes GAO’s findings, emphasizing that the

Synopsis prioritized qualitative strengths over adjectival scores, and that the margin between the

third, fourth, and fifth-ranked offerors was narrow. (Pl.’s MJAR at 28). Jacobs maintains that,

had its strengths been properly considered under Criterion E, its proposal would have been more

favorably rated and included among those selected for negotiation. (Id. at 28–29).

The Court notes a striking reversal in the parties’ interpretive stances regarding Criterion

E. Throughout the broader dispute, Jacobs consistently advocated for a holistic review of

proposals while the United States emphasized strict adherence to the weighted structure of

evaluation criteria. Yet when addressing Criterion E, their positions invert—Jacobs now insists

23

on a weighted assessment aligned with sub-criteria rankings, while the government advocates for

a holistic judgment. At any rate, the Court finds no need to assess NGB’s methodology because

Jacobs cannot establish competitive prejudice. Such positional inconsistency is, nevertheless,

always troubling.

Even if Jacobs had received an “Outstanding” rating under Criterion E, it cannot establish

that the overall ranking would have changed. Jacobs was ranked fifth overall, with only the top

three firms selected for price negotiations. (AR 6380). Criterion A was designated the most

important evaluation factor, and Jacobs did not establish error or prejudice in that area. Both

Jacobs and Offeror #3 received “Good” ratings under Criterion A, but Offeror #3 had five sub-

criteria rated as “Outstanding” compared to Jacobs’s four. (Compare AR 6317–19 with AR

6328–30). Jacobs was not rated higher on any shared discipline, and Offeror #3 additionally

received an “Outstanding” rating for fire protection engineering (Compare AR 6317–19 with AR

6328–30). Both firms had equal overall ratings for Criteria B, C, and D. (Compare AR 6319–27

with AR 6330–41). Offeror #3 earned “Outstanding” marks across Criterion E and all sub-

criteria. (Compare AR 6327–28 with AR 6341–42). Even if Jacobs had received an

“Outstanding” under Criterion E, Offeror #3’s superior performance under Criterion A would

have made its proposal stronger overall (See AR 6317–42). A revision to Jacobs’s rating under

Criterion E could potentially move the firm into fourth position; however, only the top three are

eligible for award consideration. Because Jacobs fails to demonstrate that any error under

Criterion E materially affected its competitive standing, the Court concludes that it cannot be a

basis for disturbing NGB’s decision.

E. Ranking

Jacobs contends that NGB unreasonably ranked it as the fifth most qualified offeror,

despite being equally qualified with third-place Offeror #3 under the most important evaluation

factor, Criterion A. (Pl.’s MJAR at 33–34). Jacobs further argues that its proposal was

demonstrably stronger than Offeror #3’s under Criterion B, the second most important criterion,

and that these comparative strengths warranted a higher ranking. (Id. at 34–36). The United

States argues that the Final Selection Report met all regulatory requirements prescribed by the

FAR. (Def.’s xMJAR at 26–34). The Court agrees with the United States and finds that NGB did

not violate the terms of the Synopsis or FAR 36.6.

Jacobs argues that NGB failed to comply with FAR 36.602-3(d) and the evaluation

framework in the Synopsis by ranking offerors based solely on adjectival ratings without

conducting a meaningful qualitative comparison of proposed personnel. (Pl.’s MJAR at 29–30).

Jacobs emphasizes that the Synopsis required evaluators to consider which firms provided

résumés demonstrating “greater levels” of discipline-specific education, experience,

certifications, and longevity with the firm—particularly in higher-priority disciplines. (Id.).

According to Jacobs, NGB overlooked these substantive qualifications and instead mechanically

counted the number of disciplines that received “Outstanding” ratings, without assessing the

relative strength or priority of those ratings. (Id.). Jacobs asserts that this method failed to

distinguish between firms with similarly rated personnel and deprived its proposal of recognition

as one of the most highly qualified, thereby prejudicing its competitive standing. (Id. at 30–31).

24

The United States counters that Jacobs’s prescribed methodology is not required by FAR

Subpart 36.6 or the Synopsis. (Def.’s xMJAR at 30–31). The United States argues that the Final

Selection Report met all regulatory requirements by recommending the three most highly

qualified firms and explaining the basis for the rankings through documented strengths and

ratings. (Id.). According to the government, the Synopsis never required exhaustive textual

comparisons across offerors, and any challenge to that omission should have been made before

the close of bidding. (Id. at 32). The United States asserts that NGB’s ranking was procedurally

sound, reflecting internal consistency, discipline priorities, and qualitative strengths, while

Jacobs’s interpretation introduces evaluative obligations unsupported by law or regulation. (Id. at

31–33).

Jacobs has not demonstrated that the rankings, ratings, or documented strengths were

inconsistent or inadequately explained. Nor has it shown that the Synopsis required the level of

comparative rigor it now demands. 15 Unlike FAR Part 15’s best value procedures, the architect-

engineer selection process under FAR 36.6 calls for a ranking of the most highly qualified firms

based on professional qualifications and narrative justification, not a granular comparative

analysis of every résumé and sub-criterion. The Final Selection Report complied with FAR

36.602-3(d) by recommending the most highly qualified firms and providing a rationale for those

rankings. (AR 6237–82). Based on the record and the governing legal framework, the Court

finds in favor of the United States. Jacobs’s proposed methodology entails exhaustive textual

comparisons across all disciplines and evaluation factors and is not required by the FAR or the

Synopsis. The Court concludes that NGB’s evaluation methodology and ranking system were

reasonable, aligned with FAR 36.6 and the Synopsis, and not arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to

law.

As it applies to Jacobs’s comparison to Offeror #3, Jacobs and the United States present

fundamentally divergent interpretations of how the evaluation and ranking process should have

been conducted under Primary Criteria A and B. (Pl.’s MJAR at 32–37; Def.’s xMJAR at 33–

34). Jacobs contends that, even assuming no procedural flaws elsewhere, its proposal was

demonstrably superior to Offeror #3’s and deserved a higher ranking. (Pl.’s MJAR at 32–37).

Under Criterion A, Jacobs and Offeror #3 received nearly identical adjectival ratings, differing

only in the Fire Protection Engineer discipline. (Id. at 33). Jacobs argues that when considering

the substance of the résumés, particularly for top priority roles, it offered personnel with higher

levels of education, experience, certifications, and tenure. (Id.). It maintains that NGB was

required under the Synopsis to perform a qualitative comparison of these underlying credentials

and prioritize strengths according to discipline importance. (Id. at 34). Further, under Criterion

B, Jacobs asserts its proposal outperformed Offeror #3’s by receiving two more “Outstanding”

ratings and submitting more relevant project experience in key sub-criteria. (Id. at 35–36). Jacobs

15

Because it finds no error in NGB’s evaluation/ranking process, the Court does not analyze

whether Jacobs waived its argument by failing to challenge the terms of the Synopsis. However,

insomuch as Jacobs found the evaluation framework insufficient, its remedy likely would have

been to challenge the terms of the Synopsis before the close of bidding.

25

concludes that, taken together, its superiority in the most critical disciplines and sub-criteria

warranted a higher overall ranking than Offeror #3. (Id. at 36–37).

The United States responds that Jacobs’s argument hinges on a subjective reassessment

of the proposals and misreads both the Synopsis and the regulatory framework under FAR

Subpart 36.6. (Def.’s xMJAR at 33–34). The government emphasizes that NGB’s technical

experts applied consistent evaluative standards and that Offeror #3’s proposal reasonably

demonstrated strengths—such as more certifications and recent project experience—that justified

its ranking. (Id. at 33). The United States also rebuts Jacobs’s emphasis on Criterion B, noting

that Criterion A was accorded greater weight under the Synopsis. (Id. at 34). The United States

effectively argues that, even if Jacobs was marginally stronger under Criterion B, Offeror #3’s

superior performance in the more heavily weighted Criterion A reasonably supported its higher

ranking. (Id.). The United States concludes that Jacobs seeks to reweigh the criteria according to

its own preferences and that NGB’s judgment falls squarely within its discretion. (Id.).

Based on the record and applicable procurement regulations, the Court finds in favor of

the United States on the issue of Jacobs’s challenge to NGB’s ranking decision. Jacobs’s

contention that its proposal was demonstrably superior to Offeror #3’s under Primary Criteria A

and B rests on a selective and subjective comparison of individual credentials and evaluative

factors. While Jacobs and Offeror #3 received nearly identical adjectival ratings under Criterion

A, NGB reasonably assessed the proposals in their entirety, accounting for certifications,

demonstrated experience, tenure, and discipline-specific value. (Compare AR 6317–19 with AR

6328–30). In disciplines where Jacobs claims superiority, such as Project Manager and Architect,

NGB’s technical evaluators concluded that Offeror #3’s personnel held comparative or superior

qualifications based on the totality of factors, including more extensive professional registrations

and recent project experience. (Compare AR 6317 with AR 6329). Jacobs’s proposal included

additional personnel in certain categories, but the Synopsis did not require or reward quantity

over quality, nor did it obligate NGB to aggregate qualifications across multiple individuals.

Concerning Criterion B, although Jacobs received more “Outstanding” ratings than

Offeror #3, those ratings pertained to a lower-priority sub-criterion. The Synopsis explicitly

ranked Criterion A as more important than Criterion B, and it was within NGB’s discretion to

determine how much weight to assign each criterion and sub-criterion. (AR 2549). Jacobs’s

suggestion that its proposal should have received a “more Outstanding” rating than Offeror #3’s

disregards the evaluative scheme set forth in the Synopsis and inappropriately substitutes its own

preferred weighting for NGB’s reasoned judgment. The Court declines to second-guess technical

evaluations, particularly in a procurement governed by FAR subpart 36.6, which affords the

agency substantial discretion in subjectively selecting the most highly qualified firms. See FAR

36.603(b). Jacobs has not demonstrated that NGB’s ranking methodology was arbitrary,

capricious, or inconsistent with law, nor has it shown that NGB failed to apply the evaluation

criteria as stated. Accordingly, the Court concludes that NGB’s decision to rank Offeror #3

above Jacobs was reasonable and supported by the record.

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F. Prejudice and Injunctive Relief

Jacobs has failed to demonstrate any error in NGB’s decision and likewise cannot

establish prejudice from any alleged mistake. This equally applies to its request for injunctive

relief. Injunctions are a “drastic and extraordinary remedy, which should not be granted as a

matter of course.” Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 165 (2010) (citation

omitted). To obtain permanent injunctive relief, a party must demonstrate: (1) success on the

merits; (2) irreparable harm if an injunction does not issue; (3) the balance of harm favors the

movant; and (4) that the injunction serves the public interest. See PGBA, LLC v. United States,

389 F.3d 1219, 1228–29 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Amazon Web Servs., Inc. v. United States, 147 Fed. Cl.

146, 153 (2020). Although “[n]o one factor, taken individually, is necessarily dispositive . . . the

absence of an adequate showing with regard to any one factor may be sufficient, given the

weight or lack of it assigned the other factors, to justify the denial.” FMC Corp. v. United States,

3 F.3d 424, 427 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Because Jacobs has failed to establish success on the merits,

there is no need for further analysis. Jacobs’s request for a permanent injunction is denied.

III. Conclusion

Jacobs failed to establish that a prejudicial error occurred in this procurement for A-E

services. Accordingly, Jacobs’s Motion for Judgment on the Administrative Record, (Pl.’s

MJAR, ECF No. 20), is DENIED. The United States’ Cross-Motion for Judgment on the

Administrative Record, (Def.’s xMJAR, ECF No. 21), is GRANTED. 16

The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment accordingly. The parties shall meet and

confer and file a Joint Status Report proposing redactions to this Memorandum Opinion within

fourteen (14) days of its entry to allow the Court to file a public version of the Opinion.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/ David A. Tapp

DAVID A. TAPP, Judge

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The Court previously ruled on these motions. (ECF No. 29). This Opinion presents the Court’s

analysis and directs the entry of judgment.

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