The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
FOUNDATION BUILDING )
MATERIALS, LLC, )
)
Plaintiff, ) NO. 3:24-cv-01434
)
v. ) JUDGE CAMPBELL
) MAGISTRATE JUDGE HOLMES
IRONLINE METALS, LLC, )
)
Defendant. )
MEMORANDUM
Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Foundation Building Materials, LLC’s Motion to
Remand (Doc. No. 7) to which Defendant Ironline Metals, LLC responded in opposition (Doc.
No. 13).
Defendant’s response was filed approximately two weeks after the deadline and is
accompanied by a motion to extend the deadline and consider the response timely filed. (Doc. No.
11). Defendant explains that the missed deadline was the result of inadvertently missing the notice
of the motion while preoccupied with other personal and professional matters (closing on a new
home and a trial). Plaintiff opposes the request for extension. (See Doc. No. 21). But the opposition
to the extension says nothing about the propriety of the requested extension; it speaks only to the
removal and request for remand. (Id.). Accordingly, the motion for extension (Doc. No. 11) is
GRANTED. The Court has considered Defendant’s response. (Doc. No. 13).
For the reasons stated herein, the motion to remand will be GRANTED.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Foundation Building Materials, LLC (“FBM”) initiated this case by filing a filing
a complaint in the Davidson County Chancery Court for the State of Tennessee on November 21,
2024, against Defendant is Ironline Metals, LLC (“Ironline”). (See Doc. No. 1-2). On December
3, 2024, in anticipation of serving Ironline with a summons and copy of the complaint, FBM’s
attorney asked Ironline’s attorney if he would be willing to accept service of process on Ironline’s
behalf. (Horton Decl. ¶ 4). Before Ironline’s counsel responded, and before Ironline was served,
Ironline removed the case to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction. (Horton Decl. ¶ 5; Doc.
No. 1).
As limited liability corporations, FBM and Ironline are citizens of every state where a
member is a citizen. According to the business entity disclosure statements filed by the parties,
FBM is a citizen of Delaware and California and Ironline is a citizen of Georgia, Kentucky,
Alabama, and Tennessee. (See Doc. Nos. 31, 34). FBM argues removal was improper under the
forum defendant rule because jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship and Ironline is a
citizen of Tennessee.
II. ANALYSIS
Removal of actions is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1441, which provides that a civil case
brought in a state court of which the federal district court has original jurisdiction may be removed
to federal court by the defendant or defendants. If the case is removable solely on the basis of
diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), the case “may not be removed if any of the parties
in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action
is brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2). This is often referred to as the “forum defendant rule.” In
summary, the forum defendant rule prohibits a Tennessee defendant from removing a case from
Tennessee state court. Whether removal was proper here depends on whether the removal statute
allows removal by a home state defendant before it has been “properly joined and served.”
Defendant argues that the Court need only look at the language of Section 1141(b)(2) and
because Defendant was not “properly joined and served” at the time of removal, the analysis ends
there. The Court disagrees.
Because “courts must give effect to the clear meaning of statutes as written,” the Court
begins with the language of Section 1141(b)(2). Then Chief Judge Crenshaw provided a detailed
analysis of the statutory language at issue in Little v. Wyndham Worldwide Operations, Inc., 251
F. Supp. 3d 1215 (M.D. Tenn. 2017). The case “may not be removed if any of the parties in interest
properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is brought.”
28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2). Importantly, “the statute speaks of when an action cannot be removed, not
when it can be removed.” Little, 251 F. Supp. 3d at 1221 (emphasis added). To determine when a
case can be removed, “the words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their
place in the overall statutory scheme.” Id. (quoting Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000)). “Interpretations of a statute which would produce
absurd results are to be avoided if alternative interpretations consistent with the legislative purpose
are available.” Id. (quoting Guzman v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 679 F.3d 425, 432 (6th Cir.
2012)).
Then Chief Judge Crenshaw persuasively set forth the reasons why a narrow focus on the
phrase “properly joined and served” would frustrate the language and purpose of Section 1441. Id.
at 1221-1223. First, the forum defendant rule confines removal on the basis of diversity jurisdiction
to instances where no defendant lives in the forum state. Id. at 1221. When at least one defendant
is a citizen of the forum state, the rationale for diversity jurisdiction – protecting out-of-state
defendants from the presumed bias of local courts – is not an issue. Id. at 1222 (citing Morris v.
Nuzzo, 718 F.3d 660, 665 (7th Cir. 2013)). The “properly joined and served” language prevents
the plaintiff from engaging in gamesmanship by naming forum defendants that it never intends to
serve. Id. at 1221. Allowing defendants to thwart the forum defendant rule through snap removal
would encourage gamesmanship by defendants and “eviscerate the purpose of the forum defendant
rule.” Id. at 1222 (quoting Fields v Organon USA Inc., No. 07-2922(SRC), 2007 WL 4365312, at
* 5 (D.N.J. Dec. 12, 2007)). Finally, “the removal statutes ‘are to be strictly construed.’” Id. at
1223 (citing Syngenta Crop Protection, Inc. v. Hensen, 537 U.S. 28, 32 (2002)). “[A]ny doubt
about the propriety of removal must be resolved in favor of remand.” Id. (citing Smith v.
Nationwide Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 505 F.3d 401, 405 (6th Cir. 2007).
Defendant’s response to Little is simply the obvious statement that one district judge’s
ruling does not bind another district judge. But tellingly absent from Defendant’s Response is a
meaningful explanation of why Little was incorrectly decided and should not be persuasive for this
Court’s analysis of the instant motion.1 Far from venturing into some amorphous conjecture of
Congressional intent that ignores the plain language of the statute, Little is rooted in the statutory
language and, while at odds with other district court decisions that involved different procedural
postures, provides sound reasoning why “snap removal” deviates from the language of Section
1441.
The parties also discuss at length McCall v. Scott, 239 F.3d 808 (6th Cir. 2001), specifically
footnote 2. McCall did not involve adjudication of removal or “snap removal.” The language cited
1 Defendant discusses at length that Plaintiff used “snap removal” in a related case in California.
This Court was not asked to rule on anything related to that removal, nor could it, so the “they did it too”
argument finds no purchase. The Court also notes that Plaintiff did not move to remand in the California
case. See Bowser v. Foundation Building Materials, LLC, Case No. 8:24-cv-1643 (C.D. Cal.). The
California case was eventually transferred to this district and has since settled.
by both parties from footnote 2 is clearly dicta and simply addresses in passing an issue not decided
by that Court. Accordingly, the footnote in McCall is far from binding precedent on the issue
presented in the instant motion.
Tronline’s conduct here suggests gamesmanship. Ironline does not dispute that it is a citizen
of Tennessee. It presumably knew of its ownership and that its indirect members include two
Tennessee residents. (See Doc. No. 31). Ironline is the only defendant, so this is not a case where
a non-forum defendant elected to remove a case before a forum defendant was served. Ironline is
the forum defendant. Plaintiffs counsel, who was involved in related cases that also involved
Defendant’s counsel, made the common and reasonable request of Ironline’s counsel to accept
service on December 3, 2024, twelve days after the case was filed in state court. Under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1446(b), Ironline would have had 30 days to remove the case. Instead of responding to Plaintiff's
counsel’s request and using the time allowed under the statute, Defendant removed the case
knowing it would not be removable once service occurred.
Based upon the statutory scheme, the Court finds that permitting snap removals frustrates
the purpose of the forum defendant rule and is not the result Congress could have intended. This
particularly evident under the circumstances here where the only defendant is a forum defendant.
I. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, Plaintiff's Motion to Remand (Doc. No. 7) will be GRANTED and
this case will be REMANDED. An appropriate Order will enter.
hl X. Cody
MX
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE