In re Haines and In re Campoamor-Sanchez

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DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS

No. 23-BG-0637

IN RE AMANDA HAINES,

An Attorney Licensed to Practice in the State of New York, &

FERNANDO CAMPOAMOR-SÁNCHEZ,

A Member of the Bar of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals

(Bar Registration No. 451210), RESPONDENTS.

On Report and Recommendation of

the Board on Professional Responsibility

(20-BD-041; DDN: 261-16, et al.)

(Argued January 29, 2025 Decided August 21, 2025)

Sarah R. Fink, with whom Justin Dillon was on the brief, for Respondent

Haines.

Daniel G. Randolph, with whom Mark H. Lynch and Molly J. Daggett was on

the brief, for Respondent Campoamor-Sánchez.

Hamilton P. Fox, III, Disciplinary Counsel, with whom Theodore

Metzler, Senior Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, was on the brief, for the

Office of Disciplinary Counsel.

Before BLACKBURNE-RIGSBY, Chief Judge, HOWARD, Associate Judge, and

GLICKMAN, Senior Judge.

2

PER CURIAM: In this appeal we are asked to review the Board on Professional

Responsibility’s (the Board) determination that respondent Amanda Haines failed to

disclose exculpatory information in contravention of her ethical duties as a

prosecutor, as well as the Board’s determination that respondent Fernando

Campoamor-Sánchez did not violate his ethical duties for related conduct. 1

Resolution of these questions requires us to assess the Board’s finding that the

existence of a key witness’s prior “debrief” with law enforcement constituted

exculpatory information and, if so, whether Ms. Haines was ethically obligated to

disclose the fact of the debrief to a criminal defendant. We are also tasked with

reviewing the Board’s finding that withholding exculpatory information constitutes

unethical interference with the administration of justice. 2 Finally, we assess what

1

Ms. Haines and Mr. Campoamor-Sánchez were charged with failure to

disclose exculpatory information under D.C. Rule of Professional Conduct 3.8(e).

See D.C. R. Pro. Conduct 3.8(e) (2007). Rule 3.8(e) prohibits prosecutors from

intentionally failing to disclose information that they know or reasonably should

know tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigate the offense for which they

are charged. Id. On May 6, 2025, the text of this prohibition was amended, and the

provision was redesignated as Rule 3.8(d). See D.C. R. Pro. Conduct 3.8(d) (2025).

As discussed below, this amendment does not alter the substance of the rule, nor

does it compel us to modify our analysis. Because Ms. Haines and

Mr. Campoamor-Sánchez were charged under the pre-amendment rules regime, we

refer to Rule 3.8(e) throughout this opinion.

2

See id. at 8.4(d). Rule 8.4(d) prohibits attorneys from engaging in conduct

that seriously interferes with the administration of justice. Id.

3

sanction is merited for withholding exculpatory information and seriously

interfering with the administration of justice.

The disappearance and murder of Chandra Levy in 2001 attracted national

attention. The case went cold, but around 2008 investigators began to focus their

attention on Ingmar Guandique. While watching television in prison, Armando

Morales saw a report naming Mr. Guandique as the prime suspect in the Levy

murder. Mr. Morales and Mr. Guandique had previously been incarcerated together,

during which time—according to Mr. Morales—Mr. Guandique privately confessed

to the Levy murder. After seeing the television report, Mr. Morales submitted a

letter to law enforcement detailing Mr. Guandique’s confession. In the introduction

of the letter, Mr. Morales revealed that he had previously “debriefed to law

enforcement about his gang involvement.”

Mr. Guandique was subsequently indicted for the Levy murder and went to

trial in 2010. The lead prosecutor was Amanda Haines, while Fernando

Campoamor-Sánchez was another prosecutor on the government’s trial team. At

trial, Mr. Morales was the sole witness to testify that Mr. Guandique confessed to

the murder of Ms. Levy. During his testimony, Mr. Morales was portrayed as a

formerly hardened criminal whose reformed values compelled him to come forward

to testify. The fact that Mr. Morales previously debriefed with law enforcement was

4

not disclosed prior to or during trial. At the end of trial, Mr. Guandique was

convicted and sentenced to sixty years in prison.

Approximately two years later, the Fresno, California police department

contacted the Levy prosecution team to reveal that Mr. Morales had an extensive

history of cooperation with law enforcement. This information was passed along to

Mr. Guandique’s counsel, who moved for a new trial on the grounds that

Mr. Morales’s debrief was impeachment evidence that should have been disclosed

prior to trial. Following multiple post-conviction hearings concerning the motion

for a new trial, the government withdrew its opposition to the motion and moved to

dismiss the indictment against Mr. Guandique with prejudice.

Thereafter, Disciplinary Counsel charged Ms. Haines and

Mr. Campoamor-Sánchez with failing to disclose information that tended to

discredit a key government witness in violation of D.C. Rules of Professional

Conduct 3.8(e) and 8.4(d). Ms. Haines was also charged with violating Rule 1.6(a)

by impermissibly disclosing client confidences (namely, internal U.S. Attorney’s

Office email communications concerning the prosecution of Mr. Guandique) in a

personal email to her boyfriend. The Ad Hoc Committee of the Board on

Professional Responsibility (the Hearing Committee) recommended that the charges

against Mr. Campoamor-Sánchez be dropped, but found that Ms. Haines violated

5

Rules 3.8(e), 8.4(d), and 1.6(a), and recommended that she be suspended from the

practice of law for ninety days. The Board on Professional Responsibility (the

Board) substantially adopted the Hearing Committee’s findings, recommending that

Ms. Haines be suspended from the practice of law for sixty days and the charges

against Mr. Campoamor-Sánchez be dropped.

On appeal, Ms. Haines argues that she did not violate Rule 3.8(e), contending

that the fact of Mr. Morales’s debrief was not exculpatory. Disciplinary Counsel

counters that the fact of the debrief was impeachment information subject to

disclosure. Ms. Haines also argues that she did not know, nor should she reasonably

have known, of the debrief’s exculpatory value. Disciplinary Counsel contends that

Ms. Haines reasonably should have known of the information’s exculpatory nature

and that the Board erred in finding that she lacked actual knowledge of this fact.

Ms. Haines further asserts that her conduct was insufficiently egregious to have

violated Rule 8.4(d), while Disciplinary Counsel argues that Ms. Haines’s conduct

was sufficient to violate that rule. Finally, Ms. Haines argues that she should not be

sanctioned for violating Rules 3.8(e) and 8.4(d), and that, at most, she should receive

an informal admonition for violating Rule 1.6. Disciplinary Counsel counters that

precedent compels a suspension of no less than six months for Ms. Haines’s

violation of Rules 3.8(e), 8.4(d), and 1.6.

6

Also on appeal is the Board’s recommendation to dismiss the charges against

Mr. Campoamor-Sánchez. Disciplinary Counsel argues that because

Mr. Campoamor-Sánchez had knowledge of the exculpatory information and

responsibility for presenting Mr. Morales at trial, his failure to disclose constitutes a

violation of Rules 3.8(e) and 8.4(d). 3 Mr. Campoamor-Sánchez contends that he

was not responsible for disclosing Giglio material and thus not responsible for

disclosing the fact of the debrief. He further asserts that if he did violate Rules 3.8(e)

and 8.4(d), In re Kline, 113 A.3d 202 (D.C. 2015), precludes imposition of a

sanction.

Upon review of the record, we conclude that the Board’s findings of fact are

supported by substantial evidence. We also conclude that the Board’s recommended

disposition as to Ms. Haines fails to account for the totality of the circumstances and

merits a downward variance, while its recommended disposition as to

Mr. Campoamor-Sánchez is warranted. Accordingly, Ms. Haines is suspended from

the practice of law in the District of Columbia for sixty days, stayed as to all in favor

of one year of probation. Additionally, we hold that Mr. Campoamor-Sánchez did

not violate the Rules of Professional Conduct.

3

This is despite the fact that Ms. Haines ultimately presented Mr. Morales at

trial.

7

I. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The Murder of Chandra Levy and the Zaldivar Letter

Sometime during the early afternoon of May 1, 2001, congressional intern

Chandra Levy left her apartment, never to be seen alive again. In the summer of

2001, Ingmar Guandique was charged with assaulting two separate women in Rock

Creek Park, but those attacks were, at the time, not connected to Ms. Levy’s

disappearance. In September of that year, Mr. Guandique pleaded guilty to the

assaults and received a ten-year prison sentence. Then, in the morning hours of May

22, 2002, a man walking his dog in Rock Creek Park stumbled across the remains of

the murdered Ms. Levy.

The Levy case went cold, as Ms. Levy’s death and Mr. Guandique’s attacks

were not initially connected. In 2007, Amanda Haines, an Assistant United States

Attorney for the District of Columbia working primarily on unsolved homicide cases

involving female victims, became the lead investigator on the Levy case. She was

joined on the case by Fernando Campoamor-Sánchez, another Assistant United

States Attorney for the District of Columbia, in September of that year. By 2008,

there were media reports that Ms. Haines’s team had identified Mr. Guandique as

the prime suspect in Ms. Levy’s murder.

8

On March 24, 2009, the investigation team received a three-page letter, dated

February 23, 2009, written by federal inmate Miguel Zaldivar on behalf of another

federal inmate, Armando Morales (the Zaldivar letter). Mr. Zaldivar wrote that

Mr. Morales knew who killed Mr. Levy and was willing to assist the government in

bringing the killer to justice. The letter presented a narrative delivered by

Mr. Morales and was intended to “capture the essence” of his knowledge of the Levy

case.

According to Mr. Morales, he and Mr. Guandique were cellmates for four

months in 2006, during which time Mr. Guandique revealed to Mr. Morales that he

had attacked Ms. Levy and “was worried about being charged with [her] murder.”

Mr. Morales did not report Mr. Guandique’s admission at this time, but,

approximately three years later, in 2009, divulged the confession to Mr. Zaldivar

after seeing a report about Ms. Levy’s murder on CNN. The first page of the letter

also revealed that Mr. Morales was a founder of the Fresno Bulldogs gang, although

he had dropped out of the gang and—critically to this proceeding—“debriefed to

law enforcement about his gang involvement.” 4 The letter did not indicate whether

It is unclear from the Zaldivar letter itself what the scope of the so-called

4

debrief was. As discussed below, post-trial developments revealed that Mr. Morales

cooperated with Fresno, California law enforcement in the 1990s by providing

information about two murders. His cooperation included several interviews and a

written statement about his gang activities.

9

Mr. Morales’s debriefing was limited to his own conduct, whether he refused to

implicate others, or whether he asked for or received any benefit for cooperating.

B. Mr. Guandique’s Indictment and Pre-Trial Preparations

Ms. Haines’s team verified that Mr. Morales had been imprisoned with

Mr. Guandique in 2006 and arranged to bring Mr. Morales to Washington, D.C. to

testify before a grand jury. On April 20, 2009, Mr. Campoamor-Sánchez examined

Mr. Morales before the grand jury. Mr. Morales testified that he “didn’t try to do

things right” at the time Mr. Guandique confessed to him but had subsequently

“chang[ed his] value system” and was “trying to become a better man.” Mr. Morales

further testified that, when Mr. Zaldivar asked whether he would “do something”

with his knowledge about Mr. Guandique, he “got nervous” because he had “never

done that before” and did not trust the police. Mr. Campoamor-Sánchez questioned

Mr. Morales about various impeachment information, including his convictions,

prison sentence, and gang involvement. He also asked Mr. Morales to verify the

contents of the Zaldivar letter. 5 Mr. Campoamor-Sánchez cited to specific passages

on the second and third pages of the Zaldivar letter, but he did not question

Mr. Morales about his statement that he had previously “debriefed to law

5

Mr. Campoamor-Sánchez offered the entire Zaldivar letter as a grand jury

exhibit.

10

enforcement about his gang involvement.” Consequently, the grand jury transcript

does not include any indication that Mr. Morales had cooperated with law

enforcement prior to coming forward with information about Mr. Guandique.

Shortly after Mr. Morales delivered his testimony, on May 19, 2009,

Mr. Guandique was indicted for Ms. Levy’s murder.

As preparation for Mr. Guandique’s trial commenced, the defense moved for

disclosure of the identities of any prisoner witnesses the government might call

against the defendant. In its notice to the defense, the government referred to these

witnesses as “confession witnesses.” 6 Ms. Haines and Mr. Campoamor-Sánchez

represented to the trial court that there was no need for the court to order production

of potentially exculpatory information concerning the confession witnesses because

the prosecution would voluntarily make such disclosures. In a written opposition to

the defense’s motion for a pre-trial Brady order dated June 24, 2010, Ms. Haines and

Mr. Campoamor-Sánchez argued that “solely impeaching” evidence need not be

produced until two weeks prior to trial. Notwithstanding this position, Ms. Haines

and Mr. Campoamor-Sánchez represented that if such evidence “require[d]

investigation,” the government would “turn that information over in advance or

6

These witnesses were presumably referred to as confession witnesses

because they were intended to testify to Mr. Guandique’s confession. At trial, only

Mr. Morales testified that Mr. Guandique confessed to the killing of Ms. Levy.

11

explain why it cannot or under what conditions it proposes to disclose the

information.” A few weeks later, on July 16, 2010, the trial court ordered that no

later than two weeks prior to trial, the government was to disclose impeachment

information, including prior convictions, materially inconsistent statements, and

issues concerning capacity (the Giglio letter). 7

On September 21, 2010, Mr. Campoamor-Sánchez emailed Ms. Haines a first

draft of the Giglio letter discussing information related to the government’s five

incarcerated witnesses, including Mr. Morales. The draft disclosed Mr. Morales’s

prior convictions but did not disclose his prior debrief with law enforcement. The

next day, Mr. Campoamor-Sánchez sent Ms. Haines an updated draft of the Giglio

letter that added the identity of three further witnesses and a passage indicating

Mr. Morales did not have mental health issues. This second draft did not mention

Mr. Morales’s prior debrief.

The day that Mr. Campoamor-Sánchez sent the second draft, Ms. Haines

assumed responsibility for finalizing and sending the Giglio letter. In so doing,

7

So-called Giglio information includes evidence that could be used to

impeach the credibility of a government witness because such evidence is

exculpatory or has the potential to be exculpatory. See Giglio v. United States, 405

U.S. 150, 154-55 (1972) (holding due process required disclosure of evidence of

alleged promise by government to not prosecute witness in exchange for testimony

as it was “relevant to [the witness’s] credibility and the jury was entitled to know of

it”).

12

Ms. Haines indicated that Mr. Campoamor-Sánchez would not need to work on the

Giglio letter any further. Afterwards, Ms. Haines revised

Mr. Campoamor-Sánchez’s draft by adding a statement that Mr. Morales had

received no benefit in exchange for testifying. The final draft prepared by

Ms. Haines did not disclose Mr. Morales’s prior debrief.

The Giglio letter was sent to Mr. Guandique’s counsel on October 4, 2010.

This was the first time that the defense learned of Mr. Morales’s identity. From the

time that he sent his second draft to Ms. Haines to the time that the Giglio letter was

submitted to the defense, Mr. Campoamor-Sánchez had no further responsibility for

the letter nor input into its drafting or submission.

The day after Ms. Haines submitted the Giglio letter, and thirteen days prior

to trial, she met with Mr. Morales for the first time to prepare his trial testimony.

Ms. Haines asked Mr. Morales whether he had ever testified before, to which he

responded, “[n]o.” She then asked him whether he had “ever worked with the

government or cooperated or done anything like this before.” Mr. Morales again

indicated that he had not. Ms. Haines confronted Mr. Morales with the Zaldivar

letter, noting it said that he had debriefed with law enforcement. Mr. Morales

responded, “[t]hat’s not—that’s not the same thing. That was nothing.” He further

explained that he had debriefed with a gang unit from California while he was

13

incarcerated in Atlanta, although he “refused to tell about other people.” Ms. Haines

then questioned Mr. Morales on how he felt about testifying. Mr. Morales indicated

that “[h]e was afraid of the repercussions” because “[b]eing a snitch, testifying is a

death sentence.” However, Mr. Morales maintained that “he was trying to become

a better man,” which motivated him to testify. By this point in her trial preparation,

Ms. Haines intended to present Mr. Morales’s “changed value system” as an

explanation for his delay in coming forward with information about

Mr. Guandique’s confession.

After this initial meeting, Ms. Haines worked with members of the U.S.

Attorney’s Office to verify details of Mr. Morales’s story, including the veracity of

his claim that he had not previously requested or received any benefit in exchange

for cooperating with law enforcement. According to Ms. Haines, this search did not

reveal “anything more . . . to investigate.”

Ms. Haines met with Mr. Morales again on October 30, 2010. During this

meeting, Mr. Morales reiterated that his earlier debriefing concerned only his own

conduct, he had not implicated others, and he did not receive any benefit for

cooperating. Ms. Haines later testified that she questioned Mr. Morales about his

debriefing because she may need to “take the sting out” of the issue at trial. She

“wasn’t . . .intending” to ask Mr. Morales about the debriefing at trial, but she “felt

14

the defense might.” At this point, Ms. Haines believed that the Zaldivar letter’s

reference to a debriefing meant “not much more than it says, that [Mr. Morales] met

with law enforcement.”

C. Mr. Guandique’s Trial

Mr. Guandique’s trial took place in October and November 2010. The second

and third pages of the Zaldivar letter were produced to the defense as Jencks Act

material approximately two days prior to Mr. Morales taking the stand. 8 The first

page, which was not produced, contained the reference to Mr. Morales’s debrief with

law enforcement and also provided a brief explanation of how Mr. Zaldivar and

Mr. Morales met.

When it came time for Mr. Morales to testify, he said that he “didn’t have it

in [himself]” to come forward to the authorities in 2006 when Mr. Guandique had

confessed to committing the Levy murder. Mr. Morales testified that he did not

come forward with the confession sooner because he had “a thug mentality,”

including the “false philosoph[y] of you don’t tell” because “[t]hat’s not something

8

Jencks material must be produced no later than after a witness testifies on

direct examination. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(b). Such material includes “written

statement[s] made by [the] witness and signed or otherwise adopted or approved by

him” or “transcription[s]” that are “a substantially verbatim recital of an oral

statement made by [the] witness and recorded contemporaneously.” Id. at

§ 3500(e)(1)-(2).

15

you are supposed to do.” Mr. Morales explained that, upon transferring to a new

facility and entering a skills program, he changed “[d]rastically” and learned “to

make better . . . choices.” While at this new facility, Mr. Morales received a visit

from his family that “gave [him] a lot of confidence.” According to Mr. Morales,

these circumstances led him to “no longer subscribe to those prison philosophies,”

which made it easier for him to decide to report Mr. Guandique’s confession.

According to Mr. Morales, around the time he had a change in values, he also

met Mr. Zaldivar. Mr. Morales testified that Mr. Zaldivar was a mentor figure who

helped him decide to come forward with the story that Mr. Guandique had shared in

2006. Mr. Morales testified that he “didn’t know how” to come forward with the

story and was “nervous” to do so as he had “no trust in law enforcement.”

Accordingly, Mr. Morales asked Mr. Zaldivar “Do you know what to do?” because

Mr. Morales felt that Mr. Zaldivar “knew what to do.”

On cross-examination, Mr. Morales testified that he “trusted [Mr. Zaldivar] to

know what to do” regarding sharing his story about Mr. Guandique. Mr. Morales

also testified that he had never “come forward with respect to anyone other than

Mr. Guandique.” During Mr. Morales’s testimony, the government did not ask him

about the debriefing referenced in the Zaldivar letter.

16

On November 8 and November 14, 2010, during Mr. Guandique’s trial,

Ms. Haines forwarded internal government emails containing confidential and secret

information related to the prosecution of the case to her then-boyfriend. Ms. Haines

did not have permission to do so.

Later that month, on November 22, 2010, Mr. Guandique was found guilty

of first-degree murder. On February 11, 2011, Mr. Guandique was sentenced to

sixty years in prison.

D. Post-Trial Developments

In January 2012, Fresno, California police contacted the Department of

Justice seeking to interview Mr. Morales about an unsolved murder committed in

the 1990s. This led to a post-trial investigation by the U.S. Attorney’s Office (the

USAO investigation), in which the government determined that, in 1998,

Mr. Morales had volunteered to provide Fresno law enforcement with information

about two murders. Mr. Morales’s cooperation included eight to ten interviews, a

written statement about his gang activities, and efforts by his attorney to negotiate a

cooperation agreement for Mr. Morales to provide testimony about murders and a

police shooting. The investigation also revealed that Mr. Morales had sent a letter

to a prosecutor in 1996 claiming that he had previously worked with a local law

enforcement entity, and that local law enforcement had approached a federal

17

prosecutor about the possibility of a sentence reduction for Mr. Morales. It is unclear

which of these interactions was the debrief referenced in the Zaldivar letter.

However, Mr. Morales testified at trial that he was incarcerated for distribution of

methamphetamine and cocaine, in addition to gun crimes. 9

The USAO investigation determined that Mr. Guandique would be unable to

show that the failure to disclose this information to the defense prior to trial

constituted a Brady violation because the prosecution was not in possession of the

information at the time of trial and it was not material to the outcome of the trial.

The investigation also concluded that the prosecution team believed the entire

Zaldivar letter—including the reference to Mr. Morales’s debrief—had been

produced to the defense, although there was no written documentation of such

disclosure.

On November 13, 2012, Mr. Campoamor-Sánchez reported the revelations

about Mr. Morales’s past to the trial court, which then ordered disclosure to

Mr. Guandique’s defense team. Mr. Campoamor-Sánchez submitted the newfound

information in a November 21, 2012 letter to Mr. Guandique’s attorneys, in which

he noted that information about Mr. Morales’s debriefing was contained in the

9

During his grand jury testimony, Mr. Morales also indicated that he had

previously been convicted of robbery using a firearm, assault with a firearm, and

felon in possession of a firearm.

18

Zaldivar letter “previously provided” to the defense. After reviewing their files,

Mr. Guandique’s attorneys informed the U.S. Attorney’s Office that they did not

have a complete copy of the Zaldivar letter. The complete Zaldivar letter was

subsequently produced to Mr. Guandique.

Thereafter, Mr. Guandique moved for a new trial—“largely based on [the

newfound] information” contained in the Zaldivar letter—arguing that the

information should have been disclosed prior to his trial. Following multiple post-

conviction hearings, the government withdrew its opposition to the motion.

Consequently, the trial court did not rule on whether the government’s alleged

failure to disclose the entire Zaldivar letter violated Brady. The government

subsequently moved to dismiss with prejudice the indictment against

Mr. Guandique.

After the indictment was dismissed, the Department of Justice’s Office of

Professional Responsibility (OPR) conducted an investigation into the conduct of

Ms. Haines and Mr. Campoamor-Sánchez. According to OPR, “[s]ome evidence

supports a conclusion that page one [of the Zaldivar letter] was disclosed; other

evidence supports a conclusion that [it] was not disclosed.” As a result, OPR could

not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the trial team failed to disclose

the entirety of the Zaldivar letter.

19

E. Disciplinary Proceedings

Disciplinary Counsel charged Ms. Haines and Mr. Campoamor-Sánchez with

failing to produce information that tended to discredit a key government witness in

violation of D.C. Rules of Professional Conduct 3.8(e) and 8.4(d). Ms. Haines was

also charged with disclosing client confidences in violation of Rule 1.6(a). On

February 24, 2022, the Hearing Committee found that Ms. Haines violated Rules

3.8(e), 8.4(d), and 1.6(a), while also recommending that the charges against

Mr. Campoamor-Sánchez be dropped. The Hearing Committee recommended that

Ms. Haines be suspended from the practice of law for ninety days.

The Board largely adopted the Hearing Committee’s findings of fact. 10 The

Board determined that Mr. Morales testified so “well” and “credibly” at the

Guandique trial that the prosecution “determined they would call none of the other

potential, alleged ‘confession’ witnesses.” It found that the government “relied

heavily” on Mr. Morales’s “conversion narrative to frame and explain” his

testimony. It also found that Mr. Guandique’s defense counsel “challenged

10

“The Board ‘has the power to make its own factual findings’ but ‘must

accept the Hearing Committee’s evidentiary findings, including credibility findings,

if they are supported by substantial evidence in the record.’” In re Klayman, 228

A.3d 713, 717 (D.C. 2020) (quoting In re Bradley, 70 A.3d 1189, 1193 (D.C. 2013)).

Here, the Board reviewed the Hearing Committee’s findings of fact to reach its own

findings.

20

[Mr. ]Morales about his failure to report the confession until after” the television

report and “contested [Mr. Morales’s] tale of an epiphany.” The Board found that

the defense was unable to reference the fact of the debrief during this confrontation

because “defense counsel did not know about it.” The Board further found that

Mr. Morales’s testimony “was undeniably central” to Mr. Guandique’s conviction,

meaning the witness’s “credibility was crucial to the success of the prosecution.”

Critically, Mr. Morales’s credibility “depended on the believability of his

explanation” for the delay in reporting Mr. Guandique’s confession. Furthermore,

the Board found that Disciplinary Counsel met its burden of establishing that

Mr. Guandique’s defense did not know about Mr. Morales’s debrief at the time of

their client’s trial. It also found that Ms. Haines should have recognized the fact of

the debrief as exculpatory and therefore should have disclosed it, but that there was

insufficient evidence to support a finding that she actually did recognize the

evidence’s exculpatory nature. Finally, the Board recommended that a suspension

of sixty days was an appropriate sanction for Ms. Haines.

II. Discussion

A. Standard of Review

Disciplinary Counsel bears the burden of proving attorney misconduct by

clear and convincing evidence. In re Lattimer, 223 A.3d 437, 439 (D.C. 2020). We

21

accept the Board’s findings of fact unless they are unsupported by substantial

evidence, and we review questions of law and ultimate fact de novo. In re Schuman,

251 A.3d 1044, 1049 (D.C. 2021). A hearing committee’s “credibility findings must

be accepted and can have a foreclosing impact on ultimate facts and legal

conclusions [if] they are supported by substantial evidence and uninfected by legal

error.” In re Krame, 284 A.3d 745, 754-55 (D.C. 2022).

We adopt the sanctions recommendation of the Board unless doing so would

foster a tendency toward inconsistent resolution of comparable conduct or is

otherwise unwarranted. In re Kennedy, 281 A.3d 36, 41 (D.C. 2022); D.C. Bar R.

XI § 9(h)(1). “The Board’s recommended sanction ‘comes before us with a strong

presumption in favor of its imposition.’” In re Tun, 286 A.3d 538, 543 (D.C. 2022)

(quoting In re McClure, 144 A.3d 570, 572 (D.C. 2016) (per curiam)). Generally,

“if the Board’s recommended sanction falls within a wide range of acceptable

outcomes, it will be adopted and imposed.” In re Baber, 106 A.3d 1072, 1076 (D.C.

2015) (per curiam). Notwithstanding this deference, the system of attorney

discipline—including the imposition of sanctions—is ultimately the responsibility

and duty of this court. In re Haar, 270 A.3d 286, 294 (D.C. 2022).

22

B. Whether Ms. Haines Violated Rule 3.8

Under the Rules of Professional Conduct in effect at the time of

Mr. Guandique’s prosecution for the murder of Ms. Levy, a prosecutor in a criminal

case shall not

[i]ntentionally fail to disclose to the defense, upon request

and at a time when use by the defense is reasonably

feasible, any evidence or information that the prosecutor

knows or reasonably should know tends to negate the guilt

of the accused or to mitigate the offense . . . except when

the prosecutor is relieved of this responsibility by a

protective order of the tribunal[.]

D.C. R. Pro. Conduct 3.8(e). 11 A Rule 3.8(e) violation requires (1) evidence or

information that is exculpatory; (2) the prosecutor’s awareness of this information

As previously discussed, effective May 6, 2025, the text of Rule 3.8(e) was

11

amended, and the provision was redesignated as Rule 3.8(d). See D.C. R. Pro.

Conduct 3.8(d). Under the amended rule, a prosecutor shall not

[i]ntentionally fail to disclose to the defense, upon request

and at a time when use by the defense is reasonably

feasible, any evidence or information, which can include

impeachment information or information tending to

support a motion to suppress evidence, that the prosecutor

knows or reasonably should know tends to negate the guilt

of the accused or to mitigate the offense, or in connection

with sentencing, intentionally fail to disclose to the

defense any unprivileged mitigating information known to

the prosecutor and not reasonably available to the defense,

except when the prosecutor is relieved of this

responsibility by a protective order of the tribunal[.]

23

and either (a) their knowledge that it is exculpatory or (b) the information is such

that a reasonable prosecutor would know that it was exculpatory; and (3) the

prosecutor’s intentional failure to disclose the information to the defense. In re

Dobbie, 305 A.3d 780, 793 (D.C. 2023). We have previously cited the ABA

Standards for Criminal Justice when analyzing the scope of Rule 3.8(e). See Kline,

113 A.3d at 207-08 (indicating the Standards “provide some guidance . . . for

determining what material must be disclosed”). The Standards “‘adopt[] the

definition of exculpatory material contained in the Supreme Court’s decision in

Brady v. Maryland, [373 U.S. 83 (1963),] that is, material that tends to negate guilt

or reduce punishment.’” Kline, 113 A.3d at 208 (quoting ABA STANDARDS FOR

CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-3.11 (2d ed. 1986)).

Under Brady, as clarified by Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972),

“prosecutors must disclose to the defense material information that impeaches the

prosecution’s witnesses.” Dobbie, 305 A.3d at 799; see also Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154

(“When the ‘reliability of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt or

innocence,’ nondisclosure of evidence affecting credibility” justifies a new trial.

(quoting Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959))). “Rule 3.8(e) incorporates

Id. The amended text is in line with our precedent regarding the now-defunct version

of Rule 3.8(e). Accordingly, the amended rule does not impact our analysis in this

case. In any event, Ms. Haines and Mr. Campoamor-Sánchez were charged under

the old Rule 3.8(e). We must therefore assess their culpability under that provision.

24

that principle . . . .” Dobbie, 305 A.3d at 799. Accordingly, impeachment evidence

“‘is exculpatory and thus can be material to guilt or punishment,’” Bennett v. United

States, 797 A.2d 1251, 1256 (D.C. 2002) (quoting Lewis v. United States, 408 A.2d

303, 307 (D.C. 1979)), although such information need not be material to trigger

Rule 3.8(e). See Kline, 113 A.3d at 213 (“Rule 3.8(e) requires a prosecutor to

disclose all potentially exculpatory information . . . regardless of whether that

information would meet the materiality requirements of [United States v. Bagley,

473 U.S. 667 (1985)] and [its] progeny.”).

The knowledge requirement of Rule 3.8(e) may be triggered by

“two mutually exclusive possibilities”: (1) a prosecutor either knows, or

(2) unreasonably lacks knowledge, that the information is exculpatory. Dobbie, 305

A.3d at 793.

Concerning intent, the rule “requires an element of purposefulness or

deliberateness or, at a minimum, of aggravated neglect.” Kline, 113 A.3d at 213.

“[T]o violate the rule, a prosecutor must act or fail to act with the purpose that

information not be disclosed.” Dobbie, 305 A.3d at 793. The intentionality

requirement is limited to the discrete act of nondisclosure of the information; the

requirement does not concern any intent to deprive the defendant of the information.

See id. at 794-96 (rejecting argument that “the prosecutor must intend the forbidden

25

result, so her intentionality must extend not only to the nondisclosure, but also to the

nature of the information”). The “‘entire mosaic’” of conduct should be considered

when assessing intent. Kline, 113 A.3d at 213 (quoting In re Ukwu, 926 A.2d 1106,

1117 (D.C. 2007)). Nondisclosure caused by “a genuine accident” does not trigger

Rule 3.8(e) because the “failure of disclosure was not intentional.” Dobbie, 305

A.3d at 794; see id. (suggesting if an attorney knew information was exculpatory

and attempted to share it with opposing counsel but failed to do so due to a genuine

accident, then Rule 3.8(e) was not violated as the failure to disclose was not

intentional).

1. Whether the fact of Mr. Morales’s debrief was exculpatory

If the fact of Mr. Morales’s debrief was not exculpatory, then Ms. Haines

could not have violated Rule 3.8(e). Ms. Haines argues that the debrief was not

exculpatory evidence. We disagree.

Under Giglio’s clarification of Brady, prosecutors are obliged to disclose

“information that impeaches the prosecution’s witnesses.” Dobbie, 305 A.3d at 799.

The fact of the debrief is impeachment information as it contradicts Mr. Morales’s

testimony. The story Mr. Morales told on the stand was, in short, that he reformed

and determined that he could cooperate with the authorities despite the risk of being

outed as an informant. The fact of the debrief contradicts this narrative in two ways.

26

First, Mr. Morales testified that he “didn’t know how” to come forward with the

story Mr. Guandique told him, so he asked Mr. Zaldivar “Do you know what to do?”

because Mr. Morales felt that Mr. Zaldivar “knew what to do.” If Mr. Morales had

previously debriefed with the authorities—regardless of the scope of that

interaction—he manifestly knew how to engage with law enforcement.

Accordingly, the fact of the debrief contradicts Mr. Morales’s testimony that he did

not know how to come forward with Mr. Guandique’s revelation. Second, the

existence of the debrief contradicts Mr. Morales’s asserted reform from his old “thug

mentality,” which included the “false philosoph[y] of you don’t tell.” This is

because the fact of the debrief illustrates that Mr. Morales had previously come

forward and cooperated with the authorities, be that about his own conduct or the

conduct of others. Either type of cooperation would surely be counter to the “false

philosoph[y]” Mr. Morales testified that he previously ascribed to as either type of

cooperation would risk being labeled an informant. 12 Finally, Mr. Morales’s debrief

also contradicted his testimony that he had never “come forward with respect to

12

Ms. Haines appeared to understand the significance of Mr. Morales’s

purported “thug mentality.” When she testified before the Hearing Committee, she

indicated that she believed Mr. Morales’s explanation of the debrief “[b]ecause he

told us he had not come forward, he had not been a snitch. He still had this thug

mentality that you shouldn’t tell, shouldn’t testify, shouldn’t cooperate.”

27

anyone other than Mr. Guandique.” In short, the existence of Mr. Morales’s prior

debriefing was substantively inconsistent with the story he presented to the jury.

Accordingly, the fact of the debrief is exculpatory impeachment evidence; it

is evidence sufficient to satisfy the first element of the Rule 3.8(e) test.

2. Whether Ms. Haines knew the fact of the debrief was exculpatory

The Board found that the record is devoid of clear and convincing evidence

that Ms. Haines actually understood the exculpatory nature of the debrief. This

determination differs from that of the Hearing Committee, which found there was

“ample evidence” that Ms. Haines “actually knew that the Morales debriefing tended

to negate Guandique’s guilt.”

The Hearing Committee found Ms. Haines’s efforts to “take the sting out” of

the fact of the debrief evidenced her knowledge that this information could be used

to undercut Mr. Morales’s credibility. Indeed, Ms. Haines admitted before the

Hearing Committee that she questioned Mr. Morales about the debrief prior to trial

as she was concerned defense counsel would do the same during Mr. Morales’s

testimony. This fact manifestly illustrates Ms. Haines’s awareness that the fact of

the debrief had impeachment value. However, there is substantial evidence that

Ms. Haines did not know impeachment evidence constituted exculpatory

28

information. To wit, the Hearing Committee found that Ms. Haines “viewed

‘impeachment’ and ‘exculpatory’ information as subject to different disclosure

requirements.” The Board did not reject this finding, but it did assess whether

Ms. Haines’s view of the law impacted her actual knowledge of whether the

information was exculpatory. We agree that this additional analysis is necessary.

The Board found that Ms. Haines did not understand “that the evidence to be

evaluated for purposes of determining whether it tended to negate [Mr. Guandique’s]

guilt . . . was the statement in the Zaldivar letter . . . that [Mr. Morales] had

previously ‘debriefed to law enforcement about his gang involvement.’” The Board

clarified that Ms. Haines should have understood the significance of this evidence

“without any potential later explanation or embellishment by [Mr. Morales], but

viewed in the context of [his] anticipated testimony at trial regarding his change of

heart.” Furthermore, Disciplinary Counsel did not rebut Ms. Haines’s testimony that

“she subjectively believed she did not have to turn [information concerning the

debrief] over.” Accordingly, there is substantial evidence that Ms. Haines did not

subjectively know the fact of the debrief was exculpatory.

3. Whether a reasonable prosecutor would have known the debrief was

exculpatory

As noted above, at the time the Giglio letter was submitted, the law clearly

provided that impeachment evidence was subject to disclosure under Brady. See

29

Bennett, 797 A.2d at 1256 (indicating impeachment evidence is material to guilt

under Brady). For purposes of violating Rule 3.8(e), it is of no consequence whether

this impeachment information was material to the outcome of Mr. Guandique’s trial.

Kline, 113 A.3d at 213. However, as the conduct at issue in this case occurred prior

to the case in which we announced that Rule 3.8(e) applies regardless of materiality,

we assess the materiality of the fact of the debrief to determine whether a reasonable

prosecutor would have known that information was exculpatory under Brady/Giglio

and thus subject to disclosure. 13

Under Brady and its progeny, evidence is material “‘if there is a reasonable

probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the

proceeding would have been different.’” Andrews v. United States, 179 A.3d 279,

287 (D.C. 2018) (quoting Miller v. United States, 14 A.3d 1094, 1115 (D.C. 2011)).

A “‘reasonable probability’” is “‘a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in

the outcome.’” Mackabee v. United States, 29 A.3d 952, 959 (D.C. 2011) (quoting

Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682). “‘The question is not whether the defendant would more

13

Ms. Haines’s conduct occurred prior to Kline, the case in which we first

held that Rule 3.8(e) requires disclosure of exculpatory information regardless of

whether it was material. 113 A.3d at 213. Consequently, the Board determined that

it needed to “determine whether the failure to timely disclose the evidence of

[Mr. Morales’s] debriefing was material” in order to assess the appropriate sanction.

We agree that the materiality inquiry is relevant in this case as it occurred prior to

Kline.

30

likely than not have received a different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its

absence he received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of

confidence.’” Miller, 14 A.3d at 1115 (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434

(1995)). In other words, there does not need to be a showing that it is more likely

than not the defendant would have been acquitted; instead, we probe “whether the

defendant received a fair trial and our ‘confidence’ in the outcome of the trial” has

been undermined. Vaughn v. United States, 93 A.3d 1237, 1262 (D.C. 2014)

(quoting Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434). This is not a sufficiency of the evidence test.

Andrews, 179 A.3d at 287 (citing Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434).

Here, Mr. Morales was the sole witness to testify that Mr. Guandique

confessed to the killing of Ms. Levy. “‘[T]he defendant’s own confession is

probably the most probative and damaging evidence that can be admitted against

him.’” McCoy v. United States, 890 A.2d 204, 211 (D.C. 2006) (quoting Arizona v.

Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 296 (1991)). Consequently, Mr. Morales’s testimony

regarding Mr. Guandique’s confession was critical to the outcome of the trial. As

the only witness directly tying Mr. Guandique to the Levy murder, it is unsurprising

that—in the words of Mr. Campoamor-Sánchez—in a courtroom “packed full of

people . . . you could hear a pin drop” during Mr. Morales’s testimony. It follows

that Mr. Morales’s credibility carried immense weight in balancing the scales of

justice. In closing and rebuttal closing, Ms. Haines emphasized that Mr. Morales

31

was a man whom “the system has actually affected,” causing a “change of heart”

and “redemption” after which he was “just trying to do something good” with no

“ulterior motive.” In closing, the defense told the jury that the case “essentially rises

or falls on whether you can believe Armando Morales beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Put plainly, Mr. Morales’s testimony was the fulcrum of the trial, and his

credibility was a highly contested issue on which the value of that testimony turned.

Potentially the largest problem that Mr. Morales posed as a witness was his three-

year delay in coming forward to report Mr. Guandique’s confession. Mr. Morales’s

explanation that he had never come forward in this manner due to his “thug

mentality” and did not know how to do so provided the government with a useful

riposte to their witness’s weakness. The government built up Mr. Morales’s

credibility around this narrative of his unselfish redemption. The revelation of the

debrief would have enabled the defense to undermine Mr. Morales’s “conversion”

narrative and cast doubt on the motivation for his delay in coming forward, therefore

undermining the credibility of his report of Mr. Guandique’s confession.

Additionally, the debrief would show that Mr. Morales did, in fact, “know

how” to come forward with Mr. Zaldivar’s story because he had previously

cooperated with the authorities. The fact of the debrief also contradicted

Mr. Morales’s purported adherence to a “thug mentality” as it demonstrated

32

cooperation with law enforcement in contravention of the “false philosoph[y] of you

don’t tell.” This contradiction is even more important as the prosecution presented

Mr. Morales as a redeemed criminal. If the source of his redemption—a newfound

embrace of cooperation—was revealed to be overstated, Mr. Morales’s credibility

would suffer. Finally, the debrief contradicted Mr. Morales’s testimony that he had

not come forward concerning anyone other than Mr. Guandique as he had come

forward about himself. For these reasons, it is reasonably probable that the fact

Mr. Morales debriefed with law enforcement may have vitiated his credibility with

the jury. The fact of the debrief was thus material and unquestionably subject to

disclosure under Brady/Giglio.

Nevertheless, Ms. Haines did not believe the fact of the debrief needed to be

disclosed because she investigated the debrief herself by verifying certain details and

discussing the debrief with Mr. Morales. Through work with members of the U.S.

Attorney’s Office, Ms. Haines verified when Mr. Morales was incarcerated in

Atlanta. Ms. Haines also reviewed case records to determine whether Mr. Morales

had previously received benefit in exchange for cooperating with law enforcement,

but these efforts were, in Ms. Haines’s words, “a dead end.” Finally, Ms. Haines

confronted Mr. Morales about the debrief, which he dismissed as “nothing.”

Ms. Haines mistakenly credited Mr. Morales’s explanation and concluded that she

did not need to disclose the fact of the debrief to Mr. Guandique’s defense. As the

33

Board found, while Ms. Haines’s investigation was entirely appropriate, the

information she learned and the way she assessed it was insufficient to justify

withholding the evidence under Brady, Giglio, and Rule 3.8(e).

Beyond this, Assistant U.S. Attorneys were trained to err on the side of

providing potentially exculpatory evidence, including potential impeachment

evidence. 14 And just two months before Mr. Guandique’s trial, this court issued a

decision in Zanders. There, we held the following:

[T]he guiding principle must be that the critical task of

evaluating the usefulness and exculpatory value of the

information is a matter primarily for defense counsel, who

has a different perspective and interest than the police or

prosecutor. . . . It is not for the prosecutor to decide not to

disclose information that is on its face exculpatory based

on an assessment of how that evidence might be explained

away or discredited at trial, or ultimately rejected by the

fact finder.

Zanders v. United States, 999 A.2d 149, 164 (D.C. 2010). A reasonable

prosecutor—drawing upon both longstanding and recent precedent, as well as on-

14

Mary McCord, a former Assistant U.S. Attorney, testified on behalf of

Mr. Campoamor-Sánchez that “Department of Justice policy is also to provide more

exculpatory and impeaching information to the defense than what the Constitution

requires.” Ms. McCord held various supervisory positions at times relevant to this

case, including serving as Deputy Chief of the Sex Offense and Domestic Violence

Section “around 2006,” then Deputy Chief of the Appellate Division until “early

2012,” at which point she became Chief of the Criminal Division until 2014.

34

the-job training—would thus know the fact of Mr. Morales’s debrief was

exculpatory.

Ms. Haines counters that we need not hypothesize about what a reasonable

prosecutor would have known, as we may instead look to at least three instances of

actual prosecutors determining the information was not exculpatory. First, she

argues that none of the other members of the Guandique trial team thought the

debrief was exculpatory. We are unpersuaded by this argument. The trial team was

led by Ms. Haines, meaning she bore ultimate responsibility for determining whether

the information was exculpatory.

Second, Ms. Haines describes a training where she asked a deputy chief in her

office whether a “debriefing that went nowhere” carried out by a cooperator should

be disclosed. The deputy chief said that it need not be disclosed. This court declines

to hold that a response to a hypothetical situation presented in training and devoid

of any context is sufficient to override concrete facts in the record.

Finally, Ms. Haines contends that OPR—“the proverbial ‘reasonable

prosecutor’”—did not find the debrief exculpatory. This is true but represents only

part of OPR’s findings; in fact, OPR made no explicit conclusion on the exculpatory

value of the information. Notwithstanding its explicit findings, OPR’s report

indicates that Ms. Haines did not violate any duties when she failed to “disclose that

35

Morales told her that when he debriefed with law enforcement, he ‘told them

everything.’” The investigators found that this statement was inconsistent with

Mr. Morales’s statement “that he never named names.” OPR further found that, if

the first page of the Zaldivar letter had been disclosed, the defense would have

known of the debrief, which “would have mitigated any prejudice resulting from the

decision not to disclose” Mr. Morales’s inconsistent statement. It would be

inappropriate to interpret these determinations as a concrete conclusion that the

debrief was (or was not) exculpatory.

Ms. Haines’s citation to the Kline court’s observation that it was “instructive

that all of the prosecutors who later became aware of [the information at issue]

recognized that the statement was potentially exculpatory,” Kline, 113 A.3d at 211,

is unpersuasive. Ms. Haines contends that “[t]his case is the flip side of Kline” and

that we should find it “significant” that none of the aforementioned prosecutors

recognized the debrief as exculpatory. This is not so. The acknowledgement by

prosecutors familiar with the specific context of Kline that the information in that

case was exculpatory is substantively different than the conclusions Ms. Haines

relies upon here. See id. at 205-06 (indicating prosecutors who led the case giving

rise to Kline or specifically testified to United States Attorney’s Office training

practices at the disciplinary hearing in that case believed the evidence at issue to be

potentially exculpatory). The prosecutors Ms. Haines points to became acquainted

36

with the exculpatory information in varied contexts and reached different

conclusions. We therefore reject this argument.

In sum, the views of the three sets of prosecutors proffered by Ms. Haines do

not mitigate our conclusion that a reasonable prosecutor would have known the fact

of the debrief was exculpatory.

4. Whether Ms. Haines intentionally failed to disclose the fact of the

debrief

There is no dispute that the first page of the Zaldivar letter was not disclosed

in the Giglio letter. 15 Nor is there any dispute that Ms. Haines was solely responsible

15

Indeed, there is no dispute that the Zaldivar letter was not disclosed to

defense counsel prior to the start of trial. Furthermore, two defense attorneys

testified that the first page of the Zaldivar letter was not produced as Jencks material.

The Hearing Committee found that this testimony was delivered “clearly,

unhesitatingly and from first-hand knowledge that the first page of the Zaldivar letter

was not given to” the defense as Jencks material. The Hearing Committee further

found that “[t]heir testimony was unshaken on cross-examination.” These findings

are grounded in credibility determinations and therefore must be deferred to. See In

re Tun, 195 A.3d 65, 72-73 (D.C. 2018) (“‘[W]e are required to defer to Hearing

Committee credibility findings if they are supported by substantial evidence on the

record.’” (alteration in original) (quoting In re Pye, 57 A.3d 960, 973 (D.C. 2012))).

This evidence is supported by a post-trial search of PDS files which “confirmed”

that the first page was not among the Jencks material.

Assistant U.S. Attorney Chris Kavanaugh—who was responsible for

producing the Jencks material but otherwise did not have responsibility over aspects

of litigation relevant to this appeal—testified that he could not say with certainty

whether the first page had been part of the Jencks production. The Hearing

Committee found Mr. Kavanaugh’s testimony “sincere” but “mistaken” and marred

by “hazy” recollections. Again, these are credibility determinations that are entitled

37

for the final draft of that letter. The letter was sent to Mr. Guandique’s counsel on

October 4, 2010, a day prior to Ms. Haines’s first interview with Mr. Morales.

During that interview and in a second on October 30, 2010, Ms. Haines confronted

Mr. Morales about the debrief. In both interviews, Mr. Morales downplayed the

significance of the debrief, dismissing it as “nothing.” Thereafter, Ms. Haines relied

upon Mr. Morales’s explanation of the debrief and opted to not supplement the

Giglio letter.

In Kline, the respondent failed to subjectively recognize that a victim’s

statement that he lacked knowledge concerning who shot him was exculpatory and

determined that the statement need not be produced. Kline, 113 A.3d at 204-05, 214.

We held that such withholding was made with “deliberateness” sufficient to produce

a firm belief that the respondent “intentionally withheld the statement because he

did not think it was exculpatory.” Id. at 214. This holding was bolstered in Dobbie,

where we explained via hypothetical that a prosecutor who failed to disclose

information she reasonably should have known was exculpatory—even though she

did not subjectively know it was exculpatory—has acted with intent sufficient to

to our deference. Id. While both Ms. Haines and Mr. Campoamor-Sánchez testified

that they “thought the first page of the [Zaldivar] letter was in the [Jencks] packet,

neither had any direct knowledge of that fact.” In any event, the charged violations

are in connection to disclosure of the information as Giglio material, not as Jencks

material. Even if disclosure occurred at the latter juncture, that fact would not vitiate

culpability.

38

violate Rule 3.8(e). See Dobbie, 305 A.3d at 794 (indicating prosecutor who decides

to withhold information she reasonably should know is exculpatory “has

intentionally failed to disclose exculpatory information”). Ms. Haines’s conduct

mirrors that of the respondent in Kline and the hypothetical prosecutor in Dobbie as

she failed to recognize the fact of the debrief as exculpatory and declined to include

it in the Giglio letter. The “purposeful and deliberate act” to withhold the fact of the

debrief was a “conscious[] deci[sion]” by Ms. Haines. Id. at 794 (alteration in

original) (quoting Kline, 113 A.3d at 213-14). Accordingly, we agree with the

Board’s finding that Ms. Haines consciously decided not to produce the first page of

the Zaldivar letter in the Giglio letter. Ms. Haines therefore acted with the requisite

intent to violate Rule 3.8(e).

Ms. Haines points out that the Board found that there was insufficient

evidence to prove that she intentionally failed to disclose the page as Jencks material.

It is true that the Board found that there was insufficient evidence to demonstrate

that page one’s omission from the Jencks packet was intentional. Nonetheless, this

conclusion has no bearing on whether the failure to disclose page one in the Giglio

letter was intentional as these are two separate points in time: the Giglio letter was

prior to trial and the Jencks disclosure was during trial but immediately prior to

Mr. Morales’s testimony.

39

Ms. Haines also argues that her team produced “an unprecedented amount of

discovery” that included “information that was truly damaging to the government’s

case.” Ms. Haines also cites to various efforts to uncover details about Mr.

Morales’s history of government cooperation and confirm the veracity of his story

as evidence that she “was trying to find—not bury—evidence that impeached

Morales’[s] testimony.” She argues that this conduct, placed together into a unified

“mosaic,” shows that it is implausible she would intentionally withhold page one of

the Zaldivar letter.

We acknowledge that Ms. Haines showed diligent efforts to disclose other

information. 16 We further acknowledge that there is no evidence of malicious intent

behind the failure to disclose the first page of the Zaldivar letter. Nevertheless, in

describing this mosaic of conduct, Ms. Haines fails to rebut the simple—and

dispositive—fact that the debrief was not disclosed in the Giglio letter. The record

evidence shows that Ms. Haines did not believe the fact of the debrief had to be

disclosed as exculpatory and that nondisclosure thus was not a mistake, but rather

an intentional act taken by Ms. Haines. Accordingly, Ms. Haines had the requisite

intent to withhold the fact of the debrief.

Neither the Board nor the Hearing Committee engage with this argument in

16

their respective reports.

40

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that Ms. Haines violated Rule 3.8(e).

C. Whether Ms. Haines Violated Rule 8.4(d)

Rule 8.4(d) dictates that it is professional misconduct for an attorney to

“[e]ngage in conduct that seriously interferes with the administration of justice.”

D.C. R. Pro. Conduct 8.4(d). To establish such a violation, there must be clear and

convincing evidence that (1) the attorney’s conduct was improper; (2) the conduct

itself bore directly upon the judicial process with respect to an identifiable case; and

(3) the conduct tainted the judicial process in more than a de minimis way. In re

Hopkins, 677 A.2d 55, 60-61 (D.C. 1996). For the conduct to be improper, the

attorney “must either take improper action or fail to take action when, under the

circumstances, he or she should act.” Id. at 61. Misconduct is sufficient to taint the

judicial process if it “at least potentially impact[s] the process to a serious and

adverse degree.” Id.

Here, Ms. Haines intentionally failed to disclose the fact of Mr. Morales’s

debrief, which is improper conduct in violation of both Rule 3.8(e) and Giglio. This

misconduct bore heavily upon the judicial process in this case: Mr. Guandique’s

defense was unable to draw upon material information during cross-examination of

the government’s key witness. Finally, the misconduct fundamentally tainted the

judicial process. Absent disclosure, Mr. Guandique was sentenced to sixty years in

41

prison. After numerous post-conviction hearings that are significantly attributable

to Ms. Haines’s misconduct, a new trial was granted. This chain of events led to the

dismissal of the charges against Mr. Guandique before a second trial could be held.

Ms. Haines’s conduct is similar to that in other cases where we held attorneys

violated Rule 8.4(d). See, e.g., Dobbie, 305 A.3d at 780 (respondent’s Brady

violation “resulted in a substantial and avoidable use of judicial time and resources,

ultimately resulting in the vacatur of a criminal conviction”); In re Cole, 967 A.2d

1264 (D.C. 2009) (misconduct led to “‘unnecessary expenditure of time and

resources’” by tribunal “‘to try to rectify the situation’” created by respondent

(quoting record)); In re Spikes, 881 A.2d 1118 (D.C. 2005) (frivolous actions

“‘waste[d] the time and resources of this court’” and “‘cause[d] appellees

unwarranted delay and added expense’” (quoting Slater v. Biehl, 793 A.2d 1268,

1277 (D.C. 2002)). Accordingly, Ms. Haines’s conduct seriously interfered with the

judicial process in violation of Rule 8.4(d).

Ms. Haines offers several arguments against this conclusion. Ms. Haines

contends that “[c]ourts exist to hold hearings” and thus the post-conviction

proceedings did not seriously interfere with the judicial process. In making this

argument, however, Ms. Haines fails to reckon with the significant ramifications of

her misconduct described above: Mr. Guandique served significant time for charges

42

that were ultimately dropped in large part due to her misconduct. This is a serious

outcome whether Mr. Guandique was guilty or innocent. If he did commit the crime,

he was able to walk free because of the misconduct; if he was innocent, he served

years in prison for a crime he did not commit.

Ms. Haines’s argument that for conduct to violate Rule 8.4(d), the offending

attorney must consciously or intentionally interfere with the administration of justice

is similarly unavailing 17. Neither of the cases that she cites in support of that

contention impose such a requirement to support a violation of Rule 8.4(d). The first

case Ms. Haines cites, In re Hallmark, 831 A.2d 366 (D.C. 2003), contrasts conduct

that impacts the judicial proceedings with those which are merely incidental to such

proceedings. Specifically, the Hallmark court concluded that an attorney’s untimely

filing of a reimbursement voucher containing erroneous content was negligent and

did not violate Rule 8.4(d). Id. at 368-69, 374-75. In reaching this conclusion, the

Hallmark court assessed that this conduct was less egregious than conduct that

violated Rule 8.4(d), including, inter alia, deliberate and wrongful refusal to file an

appeal and submission of fabricated evidence. Id. at 374-75. It is true, as Ms. Haines

points out, that the Hallmark court characterized these situations as exhibiting

17

We understand Ms. Haines’s argument to be that the offending attorney

must consciously or intentionally set out to interfere with the administration of

justice to violate Rule 8.4(d), not that the conduct that interfered with the

administration of justice was conscious or intentional.

43

“intentional disregard for the effect that an action may have on judicial

proceedings.” Id. at 375 (emphasis added). The court also emphasized that the

deficient voucher “placed an unnecessary burden on the administrative processes of

the Superior Court,” but did not “seriously and adversely affect the administration

of justice.” Id. at 375 (emphasis added). Contrary to Ms. Haines’s position, the

Hallmark court was focused on what aspect of the judicial process was impacted by

conduct, not whether any such impact was intentional. Ms. Haines withholding

material information directly impacted the judicial process itself, not a derivative

administrative function of the judiciary.

The second case Ms. Haines cites, In re Owusu, merely quotes the relevant

portion from Hallmark and thus does not impose an intentionality requirement. See

In re Owusu, 886 A.2d 536, 542-43 (D.C. 2005) (quoting language from Hallmark

contrasting intentional conduct from negligent conduct in the context of Rule

8.4(d)). Our caselaw thus makes clear that Rule 8.4(d) does not contain an

intentionality requirement. Ms. Haines also argues that it is relevant that there was

no finding that she “engage[d] in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or

misrepresentation.” The lack of such a finding, however, is entirely irrelevant: such

a finding is required to sustain a violation of Rule 8.4(c), not Rule 8.4(d). See D.C.

R. Pro. Conduct 8.4(c).

44

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that Ms. Haines violated Rule 8.4(d).

D. Sanctions for Ms. Haines

1. Sanctions factors

“‘In all cases, our purpose in imposing discipline is to serve the public and

professional interests . . . rather than to visit punishment upon an attorney.’” In re

Hutchinson, 534 A.2d 919, 924 (D.C. 1987) (en banc) (quoting In re Reback, 513

A.2d 226, 231 (D.C. 1986) (en banc)). Furthermore, the sanction must not foster a

tendency toward inconsistent dispositions for comparable conduct. See In re

Nwadike, 905 A.2d 221, 229 (D.C. 2006). In determining the appropriate sanction,

we consider seven non-exhaustive factors: (1) the seriousness of the conduct; (2) the

prejudice, if any, to the client; (3) whether the conduct involved dishonesty; (4)

whether the attorney violated other disciplinary rules; 18 (5) the attorney’s

disciplinary history; (6) whether the attorney acknowledged her wrongful conduct;

and (7) any mitigating circumstances. Dobbie, 305 A.3d at 811.

As discussed above, we hold that Ms. Haines violated Rules 3.8(e) and 8.4(d).

In addition to these violations, Ms. Haines concedes that she violated Rule 1.6(a) by

Under this prong, we “consider[] how many rules were violated.” Dobbie,

18

305 A.3d at 812.

45

forwarding internal prosecution emails containing confidential information to her

then-boyfriend. 19 She accepts responsibility for this violation.

1. The nature and seriousness of the misconduct: “We are obligated to

take Brady violations particularly seriously not only due to their devastating

potential consequences in any given case, but also because Brady violations are both

common and difficult to detect.” Dobbie, 305 A.3d at 811. Here, Ms. Haines failed

to disclose information that she should have known was material impeachment

evidence, leading to significant post-conviction proceedings, a new trial, and,

ultimately, the charges against Mr. Guandique being dropped. See D.C. R. Pro.

Conduct 3.8(e), 8.4(d). She also disclosed confidential information during trial, the

point in time when such information is most sensitive. See id. at 1.6(a).

Ms. Haines’s misconduct was unquestionably serious. This factor weighs in favor

of sanction.

2. Prejudice to the client: “Any action by a prosecutor that erodes the

public's trust in the criminal justice system's ability to correctly mete out justice

19

Rule 1.6(a) provides that attorneys shall not knowingly “reveal a confidence

or secret of the lawyer’s client.” D.C. R. Pro. Conduct 1.6(a)(1). “Confidence”

refers to information protected by attorney-client privilege while “secret” refers to

“other information gained in the professional relationship that the client has

requested be held inviolate, or the disclosure of which would be embarrassing, or

would be likely to be detrimental, to the client.” Id. at 1.6(b).

46

is . . . prejudicial.” Dobbie, 305 A.3d at 811. By withholding exculpatory

information, Ms. Haines undermined the credibility of law enforcement and

damaged the reputation of her office. Furthermore, Ms. Haines’s conduct was a

disservice to her client, which is to say the general public. ABA Standards for

Criminal Justice, Prosecutorial Investigations, Standard 1.2(b) (Am. Bar Ass’n 3d

ed. 2014). Her conduct led to post-conviction proceedings that resulted in avoidable

expenditure of public funds and judicial and law enforcement resources and

impugned the reputation of the criminal justice system. This factor weighs in favor

of sanction. See Dobbie, 305 A.3d at 811 (“Respondents’ conduct, which cast doubt

on the reliability of [the criminal justice] system, thus weighs in favor of a harsher

sanction.”).

3. The presence of misrepresentation or dishonesty: The Board found that

Ms. Haines did not engage in dishonesty. As discussed above, we defer to this

finding. Accordingly, this factor weighs against sanction.

4. Violation of other disciplinary rules: Ms. Haines violated three rules,

Rules 1.6(a), 3.8(e), and 8.4(d). However, the violations of Rules 3.8(e) and 8.4(d)

arose from the same conduct (i.e., the failure to disclose the fact of Mr. Morales’s

debrief). We therefore hold that this factor weighs in favor of sanction, although not

47

heavily so. See id. at 812 (holding violation of three rules arising “out of essentially

the same conduct” caused factor to weigh less heavily in favor of sanction).

5. Disciplinary history: Ms. Haines has no prior disciplinary violations.

This factor weighs against sanction.

6. Acknowledgment of Wrongdoing: Ms. Haines has consistently and

clearly accepted responsibility for her violation of Rule 1.6(a). She has not

acknowledged that she violated Rules 3.8(e) or 8.4(d). However, “an attorney has a

right to defend [her]self and we expect that most lawyers will do so vigorously, to

protect their reputation and license to practice law.” In re Yelverton, 105 A.3d 413,

430 (D.C. 2014). Furthermore, Ms. Haines has maintained that the fact of the debrief

was disclosed. Accordingly, this factor weighs slightly in favor of sanction.

7. Mitigating Circumstances: Ms. Haines argues that we should consider

the negative personal repercussions of this proceeding as mitigating circumstances.

Troubles of this nature are not what this factor contemplates. See, e.g., Dobbie, 305

A.3d at 812-13 (finding deficient conduct of supervisors to be mitigating

circumstance). However, it is appropriate to consider Ms. Haines’s lack of

dishonesty in this case as a mitigating factor. See Yelverton, 105 A.3d at 428

(holding that conduct devoid of “dishonesty towards the court” constituted

mitigating factor). This mitigating factor weighs in favor of a less onerous sanction.

48

2. Sanctions in prior cases

There have been four other cases involving Rule 3.8(e) violations before this

court. Two of those cases are inapposite. 20 The other two are the aforementioned

Kline and Dobbie.

In Kline, the respondent violated Rule 3.8(e), and the Board recommended a

thirty-day suspension. Kline, 113 A.3d at 215. Our review of cases from other

jurisdictions revealed a range of sanctions, from public reprimand to a six-month

suspension. Id. Although we determined in Kline that the recommended thirty-day

suspension was appropriate, we ultimately held there that uncertainty at the time of

the decision concerning the relationship between the scope of Brady and that of Rule

3.8(e) meant it was “not unreasonable” for the respondent to withhold immaterial

information. Id. at 206-07, 215-16. Accordingly, we imposed no sanction. Id. at

216.

In Dobbie, the respondent violated Rules 3.8(e), 8.4(c), and 8.4(d), although

these violations arose from “essentially the same conduct.” Dobbie, 305 A.3d at

20

See In re Howes, 52 A.3d 1 (D.C. 2012) (case concerning the failure to

disclose wrongful distributions of more than $42,000.00 in federal witness vouchers,

misconduct with a scope and a scale that is qualitatively different from the

misconduct here); In re Cockburn, Bar Docket No. 2009-D185 (Ltr. Of Informal

Admonition) (case that did not result in a published opinion and thus is not

considered at the sanctions stage).

49

812. The Board recommended a six-month suspension. Id. at 814. We concluded

that a six-month suspension stayed in favor of a one-year probationary period was

warranted, as the length of the suspension reflected the gravity of the violation while

the stay acknowledged that the respondents did not “shoulder full responsibility” for

the misconduct. Id.; see also id. at 812-13 (holding “the deficient conduct of

respondents’ supervisors” constituted mitigating circumstances).

3. Sanctions determination

Here, the Board recommends a sixty-day suspension, which is a reduction of

the Committee’s recommended ninety-day suspension. The Board justified the

reduction in part because Ms. Haines did not engage in dishonesty and had a clean

disciplinary record. We agree with the Board’s assessment that these considerations

merit a downward variance from the Committee’s recommended sanction.

However, the Board did not reduce Ms. Haines’s sanction by a sufficient

degree. In considering Ms. Haines’s lack of dishonesty and clean disciplinary

record, the Board only reduced the Committee’s recommended sanction by thirty

days. Furthermore, the Board did not consider the fact that Ms. Haines is not

charged with failing to disclose other exculpatory information. The Board should

have followed the path set by the court in Dobbie and stayed the suspension in favor

of one year of probation. Of course, Ms. Haines is not absolved of misconduct by

50

the actions of supervisors as was the case in Dobbie. However, her misconduct was

the result of a seemingly honest mistake. We do not think it appropriate to suspend

a career prosecutor from the practice of law for sixty days for a once-in-a-career

lapse in judgment. The imposition of the sixty-day suspension acknowledges the

impact Ms. Haines’s conduct had on the Levy case, while staying the suspension

recognizes Ms. Haines’s reduced culpability. We determine that this outcome best

serves the purposes of imposing attorney discipline: “to serve the interests of the

public and of the profession.” In re Askew, 225 A.3d 388, 397 (D.C. 2020).

The system of attorney discipline is ultimately the responsibility and duty of

this court. Haar, 270 A.3d at 294. While the Board carefully considered the conduct

of Ms. Haines and assiduously compared it to conduct in similar cases, we cannot

endorse a sixty-day suspension. We deviate from the Board’s recommendation

because the sanction it endorses is too harsh for a good faith, one-time, honest

mistake by an otherwise competent prosecutor. We are confident that Ms. Haines

will take seriously the weight of her conduct.

Accordingly, Ms. Haines is to be suspended from the practice of law for sixty

days, stayed as to all in favor of one year of probation.

51

E. Whether Mr. Campoamor-Sánchez Violated Rules 3.8(e) and 8.4(d)

Mr. Campoamor-Sánchez is charged with violating Rules 3.8(e) and 8.4(d)

for failure to disclose the fact of Mr. Morales’s debrief. The Board adopted the

recommendation of the Hearing Committee, which recommended dismissal of these

charges on grounds that Ms. Haines relieved Mr. Campoamor-Sánchez of all

responsibility for the Giglio disclosure. We adopt this recommendation because it

is supported by substantial evidence.

The evidence in the record indicates that the day after

Mr. Campoamor-Sánchez submitted his first draft of the Giglio letter to Ms. Haines,

she sent him an email saying “I need to revise [the letter] . . . I’ll take care of getting

out the [G]iglio letter.” Upon receiving this email, Mr. Campoamor-Sánchez shared

his latest draft of the Giglio letter. Thereafter, Mr. Campoamor-Sánchez had no

further responsibility for the letter: he made no edits, did not review or approve

Ms. Haines’s edits, and did not discuss the timing of its submission. In fact,

Mr. Campoamor-Sánchez did not see the final version of the Giglio letter until more

than a year after the conclusion of Mr. Guandique’s trial.

It is true that the two drafts Mr. Campoamor-Sánchez shared with Ms. Haines

did not disclose the fact of Mr. Morales’s debrief. However, these draft letters are

manifestly just that: drafts. The documents contain errors, sentence fragments,

52

notes, and questions that clearly indicate they were not finished work product ready

for submission. Furthermore, Ms. Haines explicitly assumed responsibility for

making Giglio disclosures prior to the court-imposed disclosure deadline. Although

Mr. Campoamor-Sánchez cannot be relieved of his Brady/Giglio obligations, under

these circumstances he reasonably acted in reliance upon Ms. Haines’s directives.

As Ms. Haines represented that she would make the appropriate Giglio disclosures,

Mr. Campoamor-Sánchez reasonably relied on Ms. Haines assuming the

responsibility for producing exculpatory information. Based on the record of these

circumstances, there is substantial evidence that Mr. Campoamor-Sánchez was not

in a position to intentionally fail to disclose the fact of the debrief. Accordingly, it

would be improper to hold that he violated Rule 3.8(e).

Disciplinary Counsel argues that although the trial court required Giglio

disclosures to be made no later than two weeks prior to trial, the fact of the debrief

should have been disclosed sooner. This assertion rests on Rule 3.8(e)’s directive to

produce exculpatory material “at a time when use by the defense is reasonably

feasible.” Disciplinary Counsel argues that the fact of the debrief was not a “garden-

variety” Giglio disclosure, but rather one requiring extensive investigation. This

contention fails on two grounds.

53

First, as discussed above, the mere fact of the debrief was exculpatory. While

further investigation would have led to additional information that would have

significantly increased the debrief’s impeachment value, such investigation was not

strictly necessary for the fact of the debrief to have exculpatory value. Disclosure

of the fact of the debrief would have enabled Mr. Guandique’s defense to challenge

Mr. Morales’s “conversion” narrative generally and to attack his specific assertions

that he didn’t “know how” to come forward to the authorities and adhered to the

“false philosoph[y] of you don’t tell.”

Second, the government acted in reliance upon the trial court’s requirement

that impeachment evidence be produced no later than two weeks prior to trial. As

the Board found, the trial judge “balanced a number of factors against defense

counsel’s need” for exculpatory evidence and “set a single firm deadline of two

weeks prior to trial for the Giglio disclosures.” 21 Among these factors was “serious”

witness security concerns. This consideration alone is an indisputably legitimate

reason to allow disclosure two weeks before trial. See Zanders, 999 A.2d at 164

(noting full disclosure should be made “well before the scheduled trial date, unless

there is good reason to do otherwise[,] []such as substantiated grounds to fear witness

21

While additional investigation into the debrief would likely have taken

longer than the two weeks allotted by the trial court, the trial court presumably

considered the general need for investigation into Giglio information when setting

the production deadline.

54

intimidation or risk to the safety of witnesses[]”). The government was acting in

accord with the court’s order. As such, we decline to penalize

Mr. Campoamor-Sánchez for any failure to disclose exculpatory information prior

to that deadline. It would be unreasonable to hold Mr. Campoamor-Sánchez violated

the Rules when he acted in accord with instructions from the lead trial attorney,

proper court directives, and in the absence of additional misconduct.

In the absence of conduct sufficient to sustain a Rule 3.8(e) violation, there is

no basis for holding Mr. Campoamor-Sánchez violated Rule 8.4(d).

Accordingly, we hold that Mr. Campoamor-Sánchez did not violate Rules

3.8(e) or 8.4(d).

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, respondent Amanda Haines is suspended from the

practice of law in the District of Columbia for sixty days, stayed as to all in favor of

one year of probation. The period of respondent’s probation shall run from the date

on which she files the affidavit required by D.C. Bar R. XI, § 14(g). We direct

respondent’s attention to the responsibilities of suspended attorneys set forth in D.C.

Bar R. XI, §§ 14 and 16.

So ordered.