In re Butler (Amended)

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DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS

No. 24-BG-0090

IN RE CRAIG A. BUTLER, RESPONDENT.

A Suspended Member of the Bar

of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals

(Bar Registration No. 451320)

On Report and Recommendation

of the Board on Professional Responsibility

(BDN: 22-BD-003; DDN: 2018-D024, etc.)

(Argued January 7, 2025 Decided August 7, 2025)

(Amended August 25, 2025*) *

Johnny M. Howard for respondent.

Theodore (Jack) Metzler, Senior Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, with whom

Hamilton P. Fox, III, Disciplinary Counsel, Julia L. Porter, Deputy Disciplinary

Counsel, and Sean O’Brien, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, were on the brief, for

the Office of Disciplinary Counsel.

Before BECKWITH, EASTERLY, and MCLEESE, Associate Judges.

*

This amended opinion grants Petitioner Disciplinary Counsel’s Motion to

Amend the Court’s opinion issued on August 7, 2025. The change noted is regarding

the date that respondent’s suspension will begin to run for reinstatement purposes.

No further changes were made to the original opinion.

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PER CURIAM: The Board on Professional Responsibility has concluded that

respondent Craig M. Butler committed numerous violations of the rules of

professional conduct and recommends that Mr. Butler be suspended from the

practice of law for six months with reinstatement conditioned upon a showing of

fitness. We agree with the Board’s conclusions and adopt the Board’s recommended

sanction.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Charges

The Office of Disciplinary Counsel (ODC) charged Mr. Butler in three counts.

Count I involved a bankruptcy matter in which his client, Mr. Robinson, hired Mr.

Butler to assist with saving Mr. Robinson’s house from foreclosure. ODC charged

that Mr. Butler violated D.C. R. Pro. Conduct 1.1(a) (competence), 1.1(b) (skill and

care), 1.3(a) (diligence and zeal), 1.3(c) (reasonable promptness), and 1.4(a)

(communication), by knowingly ignoring his client’s bankruptcy deficiency; failing

to respond to the opposing party’s motion to terminate his client’s bankruptcy stay;

failing to tell his client about the motion despite several calls, texts, and emails from

his client; and purposely withholding information from his client.

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Count II involved six additional bankruptcy cases for five clients. In pertinent

part, ODC charged that Mr. Butler violated D.C. R. Pro. Conduct 1.1(a), 1.1(b),

1.3(c), and 8.4(d) (serious interference with the administration of justice) by, among

other things, failing to address multiple dispositive motions, including motions for

summary judgment and for dismissal; failing to file motions to extend bankruptcy

stays; failing to respond to multiple court orders and notices; and failing to appear

at multiple court-ordered hearings.

Count III involved a personal-injury case Mr. Butler filed in Maryland on

behalf of his client, Mr. Clayton. ODC charged that Mr. Butler violated Maryland

Rules 19-301.1 (competence), 19-301.3 (diligence), and 19-308.4(d) (conduct

prejudicial to the administration of justice). See D.C. R. Pro. Conduct 8.5(b)(1) (for

conduct in connection with matter pending before tribunal, rules of jurisdiction in

which tribunal sits are applied, unless rules of tribunal provide otherwise).

Specifically, ODC alleged that, over the course of almost a year, Mr. Butler “never

obtained a proper summons from the clerk; failed to comply with the court’s rules

and procedures; failed to keep his court contact information updated; failed to appear

for at least three show[-]cause hearings; and failed to respond to many court orders

and warnings, causing the court to dismiss the case.”

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B. The Hearing Committee’s Report and Recommendation

After an evidentiary hearing, the Hearing Committee made detailed factual

findings, under a clear-and-convincing evidence standard, that included the

following.

1. Count I

Mr. Robinson hired Mr. Butler to help Mr. Robinson save his home from

foreclosure by filing for bankruptcy. Mr. Butler thereafter filed a bankruptcy

petition on behalf of Mr. Robinson, which triggered an automatic stay that prevented

the mortgage-holding bank from foreclosing on Mr. Robinson’s home. During the

period of the stay, Mr. Robinson was required to make monthly payments to the

bank. Due to a misunderstanding, Mr. Robinson initially failed to make such

payments. Mr. Butler assured Mr. Robinson that the late payments would likely not

be a problem but then submitted an amended bankruptcy plan that did not address

the overdue payments. Mr. Robinson started making payments to the bank going

forward, but Mr. Butler did not follow up about the overdue payments and had

minimal communication with Mr. Robinson.

The bank subsequently moved to lift the stay, arguing among other things that

Mr. Robinson had missed payments for five months. In fact, Mr. Robinson had made

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payments in four of those five months. Also, although the bank argued that the

house’s value was less than $300,000, Mr. Butler was aware of information

suggesting that the house’s value was over $400,000.

Although Mr. Butler received the bank’s motion and a number of other related

filing notices, Mr. Butler did not timely inform Mr. Robinson about the motion or

file an opposition by the filing deadline. The court granted the bank’s motion, and

Mr. Robinson’s home was sold at a foreclosure auction. Throughout this process,

Mr. Butler repeatedly ignored Mr. Robinson’s calls and did not keep him informed

of the matter, even though Mr. Butler had specifically agreed to do so given that Mr.

Robinson was unfamiliar with bankruptcy law.

Mr. Butler had arguments he could have raised in response to the motion to

lift the stay, and Mr. Butler’s failure to file an opposition to that motion deprived

Mr. Robinson of the opportunity to negotiate with the bank or seek an order from

the court preventing the lifting of the bankruptcy stay.

The Hearing Committee concluded that Mr. Butler’s handling of Mr.

Robinson’s matter lacked competence and skill, in violation of D.C. R. Pro.

Conduct 1.1(a) and (b); lacked diligence and zeal, in violation of D.C. R. Pro.

Conduct 1.3(a); lacked reasonable promptness, in violation of D.C. R. Pro.

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Conduct 1.3(c); and reflected inadequate communication with his client, in violation

of D.C. R. Pro. Conduct 1.4(a).

2. Count II

The Hearing Committee described Mr. Butler’s behavior in the six cases

underlying Count II as follows. At various times, Mr. Butler failed to respond, or

timely respond, to electronically received motions for summary judgment and

motions to dismiss; failed to comply with filing requirements and local rules; and

failed to comply with court notices and orders. In addition, Mr. Butler repeatedly

delayed filing motions and repeatedly failed to appear at court-ordered hearings.

To illustrate in somewhat greater detail with respect to the foreclosure case of

Mr. Butler’s client, Mr. Jones, Mr. Butler failed to oppose the foreclosing party’s

motion for summary judgment, leaving the court to grant the motion for summary

judgment by default. Mr. Jones only learned of this by checking the case docket

himself; Mr. Butler had never informed Mr. Jones of the motion for summary

judgment or Mr. Butler’s failure to respond. Mr. Jones filed pro se motions to vacate

default and an opposition to the motion for summary judgment and appeared pro se

at a post-judgment hearing to defend his case. Mr. Butler then appeared in court at

a subsequent hearing and claimed that an imposter, not Mr. Jones, had been the one

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to file and appear; the court expressed skepticism about Mr. Butler’s assertion.

Although the court vacated the summary-judgment order following Mr. Jones’s pro

se filings and appearance, Mr. Butler did not supplement Mr. Jones’s pro se

opposition, even though the court had warned Mr. Butler that the opposition did not

present any cognizable defenses. As a result, the court granted summary judgment

a second time.

The Hearing Committee determined that the evidence before it showed that in

Mr. Jones’s case, Mr. Butler (1) failed to oppose the creditor’s motion for summary

judgment, (2) failed to appear for a hearing in Mr. Jones’s case, (3) failed to make

any attempt to avoid the entry of summary judgment against his client, and (4) was

wholly unprepared when appearing at a subsequent hearing. As a result, the Hearing

Committee concluded in pertinent part that Mr. Butler did not represent Mr. Jones

with competence, zeal, or diligence.

More generally, in the remaining five cases involved in Count II, the Hearing

Committee concluded in pertinent part that Mr. Butler in various respects failed to

serve his clients with competence, skill, zeal, and diligence when he (1) failed to

oppose motions to dismiss a client’s bankruptcy case and the stay protecting the

client’s property, (2) filed a delayed motion to extend a bankruptcy stay, (3) failed

to appear at court-ordered hearings, (4) filed a defective motion to extend a client’s

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bankruptcy stay and failed to cure the defect before the stay’s expiration, (5) filed a

defective bankruptcy petition and then failed to respond to the court’s order to show

cause why the petition should not be dismissed due to the defect, and (6) failed to

file mandatory notices or to cure his error despite a court order. The Hearing

Committee further concluded that Mr. Butler seriously interfered with the

administration of justice while representing three of the clients at issue by failing to

respond to filings and court orders and failing to appear at court hearings.

During the hearing before the Hearing Committee, Mr. Butler claimed that his

omissions could be excused as “inadvertent” or blamed on his staff’s failures.

3. Count III

Regarding Mr. Butler’s actions during his client Mr. Clayton’s personal-injury

case, the Hearing Committee found that Mr. Butler (1) failed to file required

documents with the complaint despite repeated extensions and reminders from the

court; (2) failed to serve a required summons on the defendant in the case; (3) failed

to correct both of these errors despite a court order instructing him to do so; (4) failed

to respond to two show-cause orders from the court; and (5) failed to appear at four

court-ordered show-cause hearings.

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Mr. Butler claimed that these problems were inadvertent and the result of his

staff’s errors, an incorrect address listed in PACER, a hacking incident, and an email

virus, although this last only occurred after the first show-cause order. Mr. Butler

repeatedly informed the court he had corrected his contact information, but he had

not, and he continued to miss hearings and failed to respond to orders as a result.

Mr. Clayton’s case was ultimately dismissed, and because Mr. Butler had not filed

the case until the last day of the statute of limitations period, Mr. Clayton was left

with no recourse.

The Hearing Committee concluded that Mr. Butler’s handling of Mr.

Clayton’s matter lacked competence and diligence and interfered with the

administration of justice.

4. Sanction

On the issue of sanction, the Hearing Committee concluded that Mr. Butler’s

conduct (1) was serious and often jeopardized his clients’ ability to keep their homes

or properties during bankruptcy; (2) was very prejudicial to his clients; (3) was not

knowingly dishonest, nor was Mr. Butler’s testimony knowingly dishonest; and

(4) violated many rules in several matters for different clients over the course of

several years. In addition, the Hearing Committee noted that Mr. Butler’s consistent

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provision of excuses, lack of accountability, and inability to correct mistakes

weighed against imposing a short suspension. The Hearing Committee noted that

Mr. Butler had no previous disciplinary history and explained that it saw no other

mitigating or aggravating circumstances.

The Hearing Committee recommended that Mr. Butler be suspended for six

months with ninety days stayed in favor of a one-year period of probation with

conditions. If Mr. Butler violated those conditions, the Hearing Committee

recommended a showing of fitness before he could resume the practice of law. The

Hearing Committee did not otherwise recommend a fitness requirement.

C. The Board’s Report and Recommendation

The Board adopted all of the Hearing Committee’s findings of fact and

concluded that the Rule violations discussed above were supported by clear and

convincing evidence.

On the issue of sanction, the Board agreed with the Hearing Committee that

Mr. Butler’s repeated misconduct involving multiple clients “over a period of three

years warrants a lengthy suspension.” The Board recommended against a stay of the

suspension, however, explaining that Mr. Butler’s conduct did not appear to be a

deviation from his typical legal practice. The Board further found several

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aggravating factors: Mr. Butler neglected his clients and responsibilities to the court

for an extended period of three years; Mr. Butler’s conduct did not improve despite

being aware of Disciplinary Counsel’s investigation; and Mr. Butler’s clients had

“known vulnerabilities.” The Board found no mitigating circumstances other than

Mr. Butler’s lack of prior disciplinary history.

Finally, regarding the fitness requirement, the Board expressed serious doubt

about Mr. Butler’s ability to follow the ethical rules. The Board noted Mr. Butler’s

repeated misrepresentations that he had taken remedial actions to improve his

responsiveness to the courts. The Board also emphasized the gravity and pervasive

nature of Mr. Butler’s conduct. Considering all of the circumstances, the Board

recommended that Mr. Butler be suspended for six months with a requirement that

he demonstrate fitness before being reinstated.

II. Analysis

A. Standard of Review

In considering a recommendation of the Board, this court will defer to the

Board’s findings of fact if those findings are supported by substantial evidence. In

re Haar, 270 A.3d 286, 294 (D.C. 2022). “The burden of proving disciplinary

charges rests with Bar Counsel, and the Board’s factual findings must be supported

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by clear and convincing evidence.” In re Johnson, 275 A.3d 268, 280 (D.C. 2022)

(per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Board must defer to the

findings of fact made by a Hearing Committee, unless the Hearing Committee’s

findings are not supported by substantial evidence. Id. at 275. We owe no deference

to the determination of legal issues by either the Board or the Hearing Committee.

In re Krame, 284 A.3d 745, 752-55 (D.C. 2022).

In determining what sanction to impose for violations of the Rules of

Professional Conduct, this court “shall adopt the recommended disposition of the

Board unless to do so would foster a tendency toward inconsistent dispositions for

comparable conduct or would otherwise be unwarranted.” D.C. Bar R. XI, § 9(h)(1).

“[A] sanction recommendation from the Board comes to us with a strong

presumption in favor of its imposition.” In re Baber, 106 A.3d 1072, 1076 (D.C.

2015) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). “In general, if the Board’s

recommended sanction falls within a wide range of acceptable outcomes, it will be

adopted and imposed.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “Ultimately,

however, the system of attorney discipline, including the imposition of sanctions, is

the responsibility and duty of this court.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

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B. Procedural Objections

Mr. Butler raises three procedural objections. First, he argues that the Hearing

Committee was required to conduct separate hearings with respect to Counts I and

II. We disagree. This court has regularly permitted the consolidation of separately

docketed matters involving different incidents for decision by a single hearing

committee. See, e.g., In re Hines, 482 A.2d 378, 383 (D.C. 1984) (per curiam)

(“[T]he simultaneous consideration by one hearing committee of all the charges

brought against respondent was well within the committee’s power. . . . It is not

unusual for a single committee to weigh at one time charges against an attorney

stemming from his dealings with more than one client; indeed, such cases are almost

routine.”). Moreover, Mr. Butler has made no plausible claim of prejudice.

Second, Mr. Butler suggests that the testimony of an expert was required to

demonstrate that his handling of some of his clients’ matters lacked competence.

We disagree. Rather, we hold that no special expertise was required to permit the

Hearing Committee and the Board to determine whether Mr. Butler’s conduct was

lacking in competence. Cf., e.g., In re Winstead, 69 A.3d 390, 397 n.9 (D.C. 2013)

(Bar Counsel was not required to call expert witness because whether respondent’s

communications were false or misleading did not “require[] technical or specialized

knowledge”); Liu v. Allen, 894 A.2d 453, 460 (D.C. 2006) (“[A]n attorney’s

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negligence sometimes may be so clear, even if an explanation is attempted, that

expert testimony is superfluous and the attorney even may be found negligent as a

matter of law.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Third, Mr. Butler suggests in passing that an opinion rendered by one of the

bankruptcy judges was hearsay. Mr. Butler does not actually present an argument

as to why the evidence at issue was inadmissible in a disciplinary proceeding. See

generally, e.g., In re Kennedy, 605 A.2d 600, 603 (D.C. 1992) (per curiam)

(“Disciplinary hearings are not governed by strict rules of evidence.”). Because Mr.

Butler has not presented an argument on this point, we decline to consider the point.

See generally, e.g., Miller v. United States, 209 A.3d 75, 80 (D.C. 2019) (declining

to address issue that was not adequately briefed on appeal).

C. Violations

Essentially for the reasons stated in the thorough and careful reports of the

Hearing Committee and the Board, we accept the Board’s findings of fact and

conclusions with respect to the violations that the Board concluded had been

established. We are not persuaded by Mr. Butler’s arguments to the contrary.

First, Mr. Butler argues that some of his clients would have eventually lost

their cases no matter what Mr. Butler did or failed to do. A lawyer’s obligation to

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provide competent representation, however, is not contingent on whether the client

will ultimately win the case. Rather, we have held that a lawyer’s incompetent

performance is sanctionable under D.C. R. Pro. Conduct 1.1 if the incompetence

“prejudices or could have prejudiced” a client. In re Yelverton, 105 A.3d 413, 422

(D.C. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, as described above, the

reports of the Hearing Committee and the Board in this case carefully explained how

numerous of Mr. Butler’s omissions did prejudice or could have prejudiced his

clients.

Second, Mr. Butler also argues that he had a duty not to file frivolous

pleadings, which restricted his ability to represent his clients. That concern does not

justify many of Mr. Butler’s omissions. Moreover, as described above, the reports

of the Hearing Committee and the Board in this case detail numerous steps Mr.

Butler could appropriately have taken to protect his clients’ interests but failed to

take.

Third, Mr. Butler argues that his omissions were inadvertent. That is not a

defense to a charge of failure to act with the requisite competence. See, e.g., In re

Yelverton, 105 A.3d at 422 (D.C. R. Pro. Conduct 1.1 reaches conduct that is

negligent and prejudices or could have prejudiced a client).

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D. Sanction

Essentially for the reasons stated by the Board, we adopt the Board’s

recommended sanction of a six-month suspension with a requirement of fitness

before reinstatement.

When determining the appropriate disciplinary

sanction, we evaluate (1) the seriousness of the conduct,

(2) prejudice to the client, (3) whether the conduct

involved dishonesty, (4) violation of other disciplinary

rules, (5) the attorney’s disciplinary history, (6) whether

the attorney has acknowledged his or her wrongful

conduct, and (7) mitigating circumstances . . . .

In re Blackwell, 299 A.3d 561, 573 (D.C. 2023) (internal quotation marks omitted).

We agree with the Board that Mr. Butler’s repeated misconduct, involving

eight matters over a period of three years, warrants an unstayed six-month

suspension. See, e.g., In re Lyles, 680 A.2d 408, 408-09 (D.C. 1996) (per curiam)

(imposing unstayed six-month suspension with fitness requirement based on

attorney’s lack of competence and neglect in four bankruptcy matters as reflected in

attached report and recommendation).

We also agree with the Board’s recommendation of a fitness requirement. “To

require proof of fitness as a condition of reinstatement after suspension, the record

in the disciplinary proceeding must contain clear and convincing evidence that casts

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a serious doubt upon the attorney’s continuing fitness to practice law.” In re Peters,

149 A.3d 253, 260 (D.C. 2016) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). In

determining whether to impose a fitness requirement, we consider:

(1) the nature and circumstances of the misconduct;

(2) whether the attorney recognizes the seriousness of the

misconduct; (3) the attorney’s conduct since discipline

was imposed, including the steps taken to remedy past

wrongs and prevent future ones; (4) the attorney’s present

character; and (5) the attorney’s present qualifications and

competence to practice law.

In re Bailey, 283 A.3d 1199, 1211 (D.C. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Essentially for the reasons stated by the Board, we agree that those factors

support imposition of a fitness requirement in this case. Over a period of several

years, Mr. Butler repeatedly failed to keep his clients informed, respond to court

notices, file timely and proper documents, cure deficient filings, and attend

court-ordered appearances. That pattern of conduct prejudiced multiple clients and

leaves us with a serious doubt as to Mr. Butler’s fitness to continue practicing law.

See, e.g., In re Mintz, 626 A.2d 926, 927 (D.C. 1993) (per curiam) (citing cases in

which court imposed fitness requirement in cases involving “gross and persistent

negligence of client matters”).

Accordingly, respondent Craig Butler is hereby suspended from the practice

of law for six months, with reinstatement conditioned on a showing of fitness. The

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period of suspension will begin to run when Mr. Butler files an affidavit that fully

complies with the requirements of D.C. Bar R. XI, § 14, governing the

responsibilities of suspended attorneys. E.g., In re Keller, 308 A.3d 201, 202 (D.C.

2024) (per curiam).

So ordered.