Naysha Oquendo v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue

RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)

File Name: 25a0237p.06

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

┐

NAYSHA Y. OQUENDO,

│

Petitioner-Appellant, │

> No. 24-1205

│

v. │

│

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, │

Respondent-Appellee. │

┘

Appeal from the United States Tax Court.

No. 17249-23—Kathleen M. Kerrigan, Judge.

Argued: May 7, 2025

Decided and Filed: August 25, 2025

Before: CLAY, READLER, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.

_________________

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Eric J. Konopka, LATHAM & WATKINS LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellant.

Isaac B. Rosenberg, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for

Appellee. ON BRIEF: Eric J. Konopka, LATHAM & WATKINS LLP, Washington, D.C.,

Christopher L. Bourell, UNIVERSITY OF TOLEDO, Toledo, Ohio, for Appellant. Isaac B.

Rosenberg, Ellen Page DelSole, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington,

D.C., for Appellee. Audrey Patten, HARVARD UNIVERSITY, Jamaica Plain, Massachusetts,

for Amicus Curiae.

No. 24-1205 Oquendo v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue Page 2

_________________

OPINION

_________________

CLAY, Circuit Judge. Petitioner Naysha Y. Oquendo appeals from an order of the

United States Tax Court dismissing for lack of jurisdiction her petition for redetermination of a

tax deficiency pursuant to Internal Revenue Code (“I.R.C.”) § 6213(a). Oquendo petitioned the

tax court for a redetermination approximately five months after the Internal Revenue Service

(“IRS”) mailed her a notice of deficiency. Oquendo argues that the tax court erred by treating

§ 6213(a)’s ninety-day petition-filing deadline as a jurisdictional requirement and not exercising

its equitable authority to excuse her noncompliance with the deadline. For the reasons set forth

below, we REVERSE the judgment of the tax court and REMAND for consideration of

Oquendo’s entitlement to equitable tolling.

I. BACKGROUND

The I.R.C. requires taxpayers like Oquendo to report their income by annually filing tax

returns covering the prior fiscal year so that the federal government may accurately levy income

taxes. Richardson v. Comm’r, 509 F.3d 736, 740 (6th Cir. 2007); Manning v. Seeley Tube & Box

Co., 338 U.S. 561, 565 (1950). “The filing of a return not only subjects the individual to tax

liability, but also to both civil and criminal penalties for reporting incorrect information.”

Jabbar v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 855 F.2d 295, 298 (6th Cir. 1988) (per curiam). The

IRS is responsible for determining taxpayers’ tax liability. United States v. Baggot, 463 U.S.

476, 478 (1983). After receiving a tax return, the IRS typically “evaluates the return for

accuracy” before entering an assessment of taxes owed for taxpayers who file returns that it

deems satisfactory. O’Bryant v. United States, 49 F.3d 340, 342 (7th Cir. 1995). For tax returns

that it considers inaccurate, the IRS “may assess a deficiency,” which is “the difference between

the tax imposed by law and the tax shown upon the return.” Manning, 338 U.S. at 565. “Section

6501(a) of the I.R.C. generally requires the IRS to assess any deficiency in tax within three years

after the return for the year in question has been filed.” Hubbard v. Comm’r, 872 F.2d 183, 184

(6th Cir. 1989) (per curiam). “[I]f an assessment is not timely made, the government cannot

No. 24-1205 Oquendo v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue Page 3

maintain an action to collect the tax after the three years have expired.” United States v. Berman,

884 F.2d 916, 920 (6th Cir. 1989). When “a tax is properly assessed within three years,

however, the statute of limitations for the collection of the tax is extended by 10 years from the

date of assessment.” United States v. Galletti, 541 U.S. 114, 116 (2004).

Before assessing a deficiency, the IRS must provide taxpayers notice and an opportunity

to contest the impending assessment. Golden v. Comm’r, 548 F.3d 487, 489 n.1 (6th Cir. 2008).

I.R.C. § 6212(a) “provides that upon determination that there is a deficiency, the Secretary [of

the Treasury] is authorized to send notice of the deficiency to the taxpayer by certified or

registered mail” to the taxpayer’s last known address.1 Wiley v. United States, 20 F.3d 222, 223

(6th Cir. 1994). Notices of deficiency are meant “to give the taxpayer notice that the

Commissioner means to assess a deficiency tax against him and to give him an opportunity to

have such ruling reviewed by the Tax Court before it becomes effective.” Comm’r v. Stewart,

186 F.2d 239, 241 (6th Cir. 1951). Accordingly, notices of deficiency must “identify the

taxpayer, show that a deficiency was determined, state the taxable year involved, and set forth

the amount of the deficiency.” Pasternak v. Comm’r, 990 F.2d 893, 897 (6th Cir. 1993).

The Supreme Court has described the options for taxpayers who receive notices of

deficiency as follows:

Upon receiving a notice of deficiency, the taxpayer has, broadly speaking, four

options: (1) he can accept the IRS’s ruling and pay the amount of the deficiency;

(2) he can petition the Tax Court for a redetermination of the deficiency; (3) he

can pay the amount of the deficiency and, after exhausting an administrative

claim, bring suit for a refund in the Claims Court or in district court; or (4) he can

do nothing and await steps by the IRS or the Government to collect the tax.

Baggot, 463 U.S. at 478–79. For individuals choosing the second option, the I.R.C. allows

taxpayers “ninety days after the notice of deficiency to petition the Tax Court for a

redetermination of the deficiency.” In re Hindenlang, 164 F.3d 1029, 1031 n.1 (6th Cir. 1999).

During those ninety days, “the IRS may not assess the deficiency.” Id.

1The Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Secretary of the Treasury share responsibility for

administering and enforcing the I.R.C. United States v. LaSalle Nat’l Bank, 437 U.S. 298, 308 (1978).

No. 24-1205 Oquendo v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue Page 4

Congress created the tax court to “provide[] a forum in which taxpayers could obtain an

‘independent review of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue’s determination of additional

income . . . taxes . . . in advance of their paying the tax found by the Commissioner to be due.’”

United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 307 (1960) (quoting Old Colony Tr. Co. v. Comm’r, 279

U.S. 716, 721 (1929)); Flora v. United States, 357 U.S. 63, 75 (1958). Accordingly, deficiency

proceedings, which are only available to individuals who have been formally issued a notice of

deficiency, Sampson v. Comm’r, 710 F.2d 262, 264 (6th Cir. 1983) (per curiam), allow

individuals to dispute their tax liability, Desmet v. Comm’r, 581 F.3d 297, 302 (6th Cir. 2009).

Taxpayers embroiled in those deficiency disputes before the tax court face steep odds because

“deficiency determination[s] [are] presumed correct, and the taxpayer has the burden of proof to

demonstrate error.” Boggs v. Comm’r, 569 F.3d 235, 237 (6th Cir. 2009).

The notice of deficiency at issue in the instant case is dated May 30, 2023, and concerns

Oquendo’s 2022 tax returns. After auditing those returns, the IRS determined that Oquendo was

not entitled to head-of-household status and rejected Oquendo’s claims for the Earned Income

Tax Credit and the Child Tax Credit.2 In the resultant notice of deficiency, the IRS asserted that

Oquendo owed taxes and penalties pursuant to I.R.C. §§ 6662(a) and 6676.3 In addition to

listing the amount of taxes and penalties which Oquendo purportedly owed, the notice explained

that Oquendo could contest those determinations by filing a petition with the tax court by August

28, 2023.

Oquendo ultimately filed a petition for redetermination with the tax court on November

1, 2023. In her petition, Oquendo asserted that she was wrongly (i) denied earned income and

child tax credits; (ii) rejected for head of household filing status; and (iii) penalized pursuant to

2The child tax credit “provides a $1,000 credit for every qualifying child,” which can be “used to offset tax

liability.” In re Zingale, 693 F.3d 704, 706–07 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing I.R.C. § 24(a)). A portion of the child tax

credit may be refundable if it exceeds a taxpayer’s federal income tax liability. Id. (citing I.R.C. § 24(b)(3)(A), (B)).

The earned income tax credit is “a refundable credit for low-income working individuals and families. When the

earned income tax credit exceeds the amount of taxes owed, the taxpayer receives a refund for the excess amount.”

United States v. Allen, 242 F. App’x 303, 305 (6th Cir. 2007); I.R.C. § 32.

3Section 6662 imposes a mandatory twenty percent tax penalty for certain tax underpayments. See

Vincentini v. Comm’r, 429 F. App’x 560, 565 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing I.R.C. § 6662(a), (b)(2)). Section 6676

similarly imposes a “penalty for erroneously claiming refunds.” Thomas Moore L. Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529,

539 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing I.R.C. § 6676).

No. 24-1205 Oquendo v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue Page 5

§§ 6662(a) and 6676. Oquendo also disputed the facts underlying the deficiency notice, stating

that she “had three qualifying children for the Child Tax Credit, Earned Income Credit, and Head

of Household filing status,” “solely maintained her own home” while “supporting the three

qualifying children,” and “resided with the three qualifying children for more than 6 months of

the tax year.” Pet. for Redetermination, ECF No. 7-2, 3. In addition, Oquendo argued that she

was entitled to equitable tolling of the petition for redetermination filing deadline. According to

Oquendo, because the notice was sent to her former address, she did not receive “actual notice

that the Notice of Deficiency was sent until sometime after October 10, 2023,” when her

“designated representative received a collection notice . . . dated October 9, 2023.” Id.

On December 18, 2023, Respondent, the Commissioner for Internal Revenue, moved to

dismiss Oquendo’s petition for lack of jurisdiction. The Commissioner argued that the tax court

lacked jurisdiction to review Oquendo’s petition because the petition “was not filed within the

time prescribed by I.R.C. § 6213(a) or § 7502.” Id. at 30.4 In support of its argument, the

Commissioner explained that the notice of deficiency was mailed to Oquendo’s last known

address on May 30, 2023, the ninety-day period for filing a petition for redetermination expired

on August 28, 2023, and Oquendo’s petition was untimely because it was filed 155 days after the

notice of deficiency was mailed.

On December 19, 2023, Oquendo filed an objection to the Commissioner’s motion to

dismiss. Oquendo argued that § 6213(a)’s petition-filing deadline is subject to equitable tolling

and that she was entitled to equitable tolling of the filing deadline because (i) she did not receive

the notice of deficiency; (ii) she did not have constructive knowledge of the filing requirement

because the Commissioner did not send the notice of deficiency to her designated representative;

(iii) she filed a petition for redetermination twenty days after learning of the notice of deficiency;

(iv) the Commissioner would not be prejudiced by the tax court considering her petition for

redetermination because she was “entitled to review of the underlying proposed deficiency

during a Collection Due Process hearing,” which may yield a decision reviewable by the tax

4 Section 7502 sets forth the I.R.C.’s rules governing the treatment, for timeliness purposes, of items

mailed to the IRS. It “was enacted as a remedial provision to alleviate inequities arising from differences in mail

delivery from one part of the country to another.” Miller v. United States, 784 F.2d 728, 730 (6th Cir. 1986) (per

curiam).

No. 24-1205 Oquendo v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue Page 6

court;5 and (v) she was reasonably unaware of the petition-filing requirement “because the only

method to determine that the Notice of Deficiency had been issued would be for [her] or her

representative to blindly contact” the Commissioner. Obj., ECF No. 7-2, 52–53.

On February 1, 2024, the tax court granted the Commissioner’s motion and dismissed

Oquendo’s petition for lack of jurisdiction. The tax court held that its jurisdiction to review

petitions for redetermination “depends on the issuance of a valid notice of deficiency and the

timely filing of a petition.” Order, ECF No. 7-2, 56. The tax court further explained that

petitions for redetermination are “generally” timely if “filed within 90 days of the date on which

the Commissioner mails a valid notice of deficiency.” Id. The tax court stated that it had “no

authority to extend this 90-day period.” Id. Because Oquendo’s “Petition was not filed within

the period prescribed in the Internal Revenue Code,” the tax court held that “this case must be

dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.” Id. at 57. In doing so, the tax court rejected Oquendo’s

equitable tolling argument. The tax court reasoned that “[t]he Sixth Circuit has held that the

timely filing deadline in deficiency cases is jurisdictional.” Id. (citing Patmon & Young Pro.

Corp. v. Comm’r, 55 F.3d 216 (6th Cir. 1995)). The tax court concluded by noting that Oquendo

could still dispute the deficiency assessment by “continu[ing] to pursue administrative resolution

of the 2022 tax liability directly with the Internal Revenue Service” or “pay[ing] the determined

amounts and thereafter fil[ing] a claim for refund with the IRS.” Id. at 58.

Oquendo filed a timely notice of appeal on March 11, 2024.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

This Court has jurisdiction to review tax court decisions pursuant to I.R.C. § 7482(a).

Schrader v. Comm’r, 916 F.2d 361, 362 (6th Cir. 1990) (per curiam). We review those decisions

5“The Internal Revenue Service can seize taxpayer property to collect tax debts. Before it does so,

however, the taxpayer is typically entitled to a ‘collection due process hearing’—a proceeding at which the taxpayer

can challenge the levy or offer collection alternatives like payment by installment.” Boechler, P.C. v. Comm’r, 596

U.S. 199, 202 (2015). Taxpayers are typically only entitled to a collection due process hearing if they “did not

receive any statutory notice of deficiency for such tax liability or did not otherwise have an opportunity to dispute

such tax liability.” Living Care Alts. v. United States, 411 F.3d 621, 624 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting I.R.C.

§ 6330(c)(2)(B)).

No. 24-1205 Oquendo v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue Page 7

“in the same manner and to the same extent as decisions of the district courts in civil actions tried

without a jury.” Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 891 (1991) (quoting I.R.C. § 7482(a)).

Accordingly, the tax court’s factual findings are reviewed “for clear error and its legal

conclusions de novo.” Greer v. Comm’r, 557 F.3d 688, 690 (6th Cir. 2009). Because the tax

court’s determination that it lacked jurisdiction to consider Oquendo’s petition is necessarily a

legal conclusion, it is subject to de novo review. Desmet, 581 F.3d at 301; Downs v. Comm’r,

307 F.3d 423, 425 (6th Cir. 2002).

B. Analysis

Oquendo argues on appeal that the tax court erred by treating § 6213(a)’s petition-filing

deadline as jurisdictional, not equitably tolling the deadline, and dismissing her petition for lack

of jurisdiction. In contrast, the Commissioner urges us to affirm the judgment of the tax court in

all respects because, in its view, Oquendo’s untimely filing divested the tax court of jurisdiction

to review her petition. Before addressing their competing arguments, we first briefly review the

significance of the tax court’s jurisdictional determination.

Jurisdiction

“Jurisdictional” statutory provisions are those which “describe the classes of cases a court

may entertain (subject-matter jurisdiction) or the persons over whom a court may exercise

adjudicatory authority (personal jurisdiction).” Fort Bend Cnty. v. Davis, 587 U.S. 541, 543

(2019). As a general matter, “Congress decides what cases the federal courts have jurisdiction to

consider.” Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 212 (2007); see also Maxwell v. Dodd, 662 F.3d

418, 421 (6th Cir. 2011) (“Article III generally gives Congress authority to decide if, when, and

under what conditions federal courts may resolve cases and controversies.”). In doing so, it

“‘mark[s] the bounds’ of a court’s power.” Harrow v. Dep’t of Defense, 601 U.S. 480, 484

(2024) (alteration in original) (quoting Boechler, P.C. v. Comm’r, 596 U.S. 199, 203 (2022)).

Federal courts, in turn, “have an independent obligation to ensure that they do not exceed the

scope of their jurisdiction.” Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 434 (2011).

In performing that obligation, “the absence of subject-matter jurisdiction” requires dismissing a

lawsuit “no matter how far along the litigation has progressed,” Herr v. U.S. Forest Serv.,

No. 24-1205 Oquendo v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue Page 8

803 F.3d 809, 813 (6th Cir. 2015), because subject matter jurisdiction “can never be forfeited or

waived,” Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006) (quoting United States v. Cotton,

535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002)). Therefore, “[t]he ‘jurisdictional’ label is significant because it carries

with it unique and sometimes severe consequences.” MOAC Mall Holdings LLC v. Transform

Holdco LLC, 598 U.S. 288, 297 (2023). Those consequences may not be abated even in the case

of “special considerations or circumstances.” Kentucky v. United States, 759 F.3d 588, 598 (6th

Cir. 2014). However, dismissals for lack of subject matter jurisdiction are “without prejudice

and leave[] the parties free to seek relief in another forum (subject to any rules of preclusion).”

Taylor v. Owens, 990 F.3d 493, 496 (6th Cir. 2021).

In recent years, the Supreme Court has “endeavored ‘to bring some discipline’ to this

area” by refraining from “loose[ly]” using the word “jurisdiction.” MOAC Mall Holdings LLC,

598 U.S. at 298 (quoting Henderson, 562 U.S. at 435). Its more recent cases “impose[] a ‘high

bar’ on any claim that Congress has deprived the federal courts of subject-matter jurisdiction

over a dispute.” New Heights Farm I, LLC v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 119 F.4th 455, 462 (6th Cir.

2024) (quoting United States v. Kwai Fun Wong, 575 U.S. 402, 409 (2015)). Accordingly, “a

rule should not be referred to as jurisdictional unless it governs a court’s adjudicatory capacity.”

Henderson, 562 U.S. at 435. In the instant case, the tax court determined that § 6213(a) is a

jurisdictional rule and that it would exceed its jurisdiction by entertaining Oquendo’s petition for

redetermination because Oquendo failed to comply with § 6213(a)’s ninety-day petition-filing

requirement.

In contrast to jurisdictional rules, nonjurisdictional claims-processing rules “seek to

promote the orderly progress of litigation by requiring that the parties take certain procedural

steps at certain specified times.” Id. “These commands are rigid and must be applied whenever

invoked by a party.” Taylor, 990 F.3d at 497. Claims-processing rules do not, however,

“eliminate or expand ‘the classes of cases a court may entertain.’” United States v. Marshall,

954 F.3d 823, 826 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Fort Bend Cnty., 587 U.S. at 548). These rules

“generally include[] a range of ‘threshold requirements that claimants must complete, or exhaust,

before filing a lawsuit.’” Wilkins v. United States, 598 U.S. 152, 157 (2023) (quoting Reed

Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 166 (2010)). Importantly, claims-processing rules “are

No. 24-1205 Oquendo v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue Page 9

less stern” than jurisdictional requirements and “may be waived or forfeited,” unlike

jurisdictional rules. Hamer v. Neighborhood Hous. Servs., 583 U.S. 17, 20 (2017).

The merits of the parties’ arguments may be considered against this background.

Precedent

As an initial matter, we must determine whether our case law definitively resolves the

issue at hand. In general, “one panel of this circuit cannot overrule a prior panel.” Barr v. Lafon,

538 F.3d 554, 571 (6th Cir. 2008). However, “[w]e are not bound by published circuit precedent

if intervening Supreme Court caselaw requires modification.” Smith v. Cook, 956 F.3d 377, 391

n.3 (6th Cir. 2020). Importantly, that “intervening Supreme Court authority need not be

precisely on point, if the legal reasoning is directly applicable.” Ne. Ohio Coal. for the Homeless

v. Husted, 831 F.3d 686, 720–21 (6th Cir. 2016).

The Commissioner argues that this court’s precedent interpreting § 6213(a)’s petition-

filing deadline requires us to affirm the judgment of the tax court. To be sure, for decades this

court and the Supreme Court have referred to compliance with § 6213(a)’s petition-filing

deadline as a jurisdictional prerequisite. See, e.g., Laing v. United States, 423 U.S. 161, 165 n.4

(1976) (“A deficiency notice is of import primarily because it is a jurisdictional prerequisite to a

taxpayer’s suit in the Tax Court for redetermination of his tax liability.”); Patmon & Young Pro.

Corp., 55 F.3d at 217 (“In order to invoke the jurisdiction of the Tax Court, a taxpayer must file

a petition within 90 days after the mailing of the notice of deficiency.”); Koulizos v. Comm’r,

920 F.2d 933, at *1 (6th Cir. 1990) (order) (“The time restraint on the filing of a tax court

petition is jurisdictional and the tax court has no authority to extend it.”); Rice v. Comm’r, 572

F.2d 555, 555–56 (6th Cir. 1978) (order) (affirming tax court’s dismissal of a petition for

redetermination of deficiency because the tax court “was without jurisdiction”); Rambo v. United

States, 492 F.2d 1060, 1062 (6th Cir. 1974) (“The issuance of a deficiency notice is of

substantial importance to the taxpayer. The receipt of the notice is a jurisdictional prerequisite to

litigation in the Tax Court . . . to contest the validity of the tax before it is paid.” (citations

omitted)); Gradsky v. Comm’r, 218 F.2d 703, 704 (6th Cir. 1954) (per curiam) (“The filing of the

petition for redetermination within ninety days after the mailing of the notice of deficiency is

No. 24-1205 Oquendo v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue Page 10

jurisdictional.”); Worthington v. Comm’r, 211 F.2d 131, 132 (6th Cir. 1954) (per curiam) (“The

Tax Court properly held that it had no jurisdiction, for the reason that the required petitions for

redetermination to be filed by the taxpayers were not filed within ninety days after the mailing of

the notices of deficiency . . . .”).

However, this court has “yet to look at the question” of whether § 6213(a)’s petition-

filing deadline is a jurisdictional rule “in the light cast by the Supreme Court’s recent guidance

about jurisdictional requirements.” In re Tennial, 978 F.3d 1022, 1025 (6th Cir. 2020). That

guidance makes clear that the “jurisdictional” language in this court’s cases interpreting §

6213(a) “is a characterization left over from days when [courts] were ‘less than meticulous’ in

[their] use of the term ‘jurisdictional.’” Hamer, 583 U.S. at 27 (quoting Kontrick v. Ryan, 540

U.S. 443, 454 (2004)); see also Gunter v. Bemis Co., 906 F.3d 484, 493 (6th Cir. 2018) (“Over

the last twenty years, one Supreme Court decision after another instructs the lower courts to be

more judicious about labeling deadlines jurisdictional.”). Indeed, the Supreme Court has

cautioned that “unrefined dispositions” of jurisdictional matters “should be accorded ‘no

precedential effect’ on the question whether the federal court had authority to adjudicate the

claim in suit.” Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 511 (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523

U.S. 83, 91 (1998)). We have accordingly endeavored to “re-assess[] the line between

jurisdictional and claims-processing requirements in several settings.” Hoogerhide v. IRS, 637

F.3d 634, 636 (6th Cir. 2011) (collecting cases); Emswiller v. CSX Transp., Inc., 691 F.3d 782,

789 (6th Cir. 2012) (same). Thus, given our past cases’ extraneous or passing references to

jurisdiction with respect to § 6213(a), we do not accord those holdings controlling weight and

proceed to consider the jurisdictional nature of § 6213(a) consistent with the modern approach

taken by the Supreme Court. Cf. Taylor, 990 F.3d at 497 (approaching “anew” question of

whether 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) is jurisdictional despite “suggest[ion] in the past that it is a

jurisdictional rule”).

No. 24-1205 Oquendo v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue Page 11

Statutory Text

To delineate between jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional rules, the Supreme Court has

fashioned a “clear statement” rule by which it “will ‘treat a procedural requirement as

jurisdictional only if Congress “clearly states” that it is.’” Harrow, 601 U.S. at 484 (quoting

Boechler, 596 U.S. at 203). The clear statement rule thus serves as a “presumption against

reading statutory requirements as jurisdictional” absent clear congressional expression otherwise.

Quickway Transp., Inc. v. NLRB, 117 F.4th 789, 818 (6th Cir. 2024). This rule is intended “to

capture Congress’ likely intent,” Henderson, 562 U.S. at 436, because “[l]oosely treating

procedural requirements as jurisdictional risks undermining the very reason Congress enacted

them,” Wilkins, 598 U.S. at 157. But “Congress may nevertheless make a clear statement even if

it does not use ‘magic words.’” Shweika v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 723 F.3d 710, 715 (6th Cir.

2013) (quoting Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 568 U.S. 145, 153 (2013)). Still, “the

statement must indeed be clear; it is insufficient that a jurisdictional reading is ‘plausible,’ or

even ‘better,’ than nonjurisdictional alternatives.” MOAC Mall Holdings LLC, 598 U.S. at 298

(quoting Boechler, 596 U.S. at 206). As such, when a statute is susceptible to “multiple

plausible interpretations . . . only one of which is jurisdictional—it is difficult to make the case

that the jurisdictional reading is clear.” Boechler, 596 U.S. at 205.

Oquendo argues that § 6213(a)’s ninety-day petition-filing deadline lacks a clear

statement and is merely a nonjurisdictional “ordinary filing deadline.” Appellant’s Br., ECF No.

18, 12. In support of that argument, Oquendo notes that the portion of § 6213(a) discussing the

ninety-day requirement “does not mention jurisdiction at all.” Id. at 19–21. According to the

Commissioner, the text of § 6213(a) supports the conclusion that the petition-filing deadline is

jurisdictional because that language appears in the same sentence as “the mailing of a deficiency

notice and the filing of a petition,” both of which the Commissioner describes as “predicates to

jurisdiction.” Appellee’s Br., ECF No. 29, 20.

No. 24-1205 Oquendo v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue Page 12

To assess these arguments, we must look to § 6213(a)’s text.6 See MOAC Mall Holdings,

598 U.S. at 298 (“Traditional tools of statutory construction can reveal a clear statement.”).

The provision provides, in relevant part, that “[w]ithin 90 days[] . . . after the notice of deficiency

. . . is mailed . . . , the taxpayer may file a petition with the Tax Court for a redetermination of the

deficiency.” I.R.C. § 6213(a). Notably absent from this language is a “directive[] to courts,” a

“reference to jurisdiction,” and “language ‘demarcat[ing] a court’s power.’” Riley v. Bondi, 606

U.S. ----, 145 S. Ct. 2190, 2202 (2025) (emphasis and second alteration in original).

Consequently, § 6213(a)’s petition-filing language lacks “the classic markers” which indicate a

limit on subject matter jurisdiction. Marshall, 954 F.3d at 827. Instead, the provision “speaks to

what [taxpayers], not courts, must do.” Id. The dearth of jurisdictional language and indicators

compels the conclusion that § 6213(a)’s petition-filing deadline is not a jurisdictional

requirement.

This conclusion is bolstered by the Supreme Court’s decision in Boechler, where the

Court considered whether the thirty-day deadline in I.R.C. § 6330(d)(1) to petition the tax court

for review of a collection due process determination is a jurisdictional rule. 596 U.S. at 204.

Section 6330(d)(1) provides that “[t]he person may, within 30 days of a determination under this

6Section 6213(a) provides, in full, as follows:

(a) Time for filing petition and restriction on assessment.

Within 90 days, or 150 days if the notice is addressed to a person outside the United States, after

the notice of deficiency authorized in section 6212 is mailed (not counting Saturday, Sunday, or a

legal holiday in the District of Columbia as the last day), the taxpayer may file a petition with the

Tax Court for a redetermination of the deficiency. Except as otherwise provided in section 6851,

6852, or 6861 no assessment of a deficiency in respect of any tax imposed by subtitle A, or B,

chapter 41, 42, 43, or 44 and no levy or proceeding in court for its collection shall be made, begun,

or prosecuted until such notice has been mailed to the taxpayer, nor until the expiration of such 90-

day or 150-day period, as the case may be, nor, if a petition has been filed with the Tax Court,

until the decision of the Tax Court has become final. Notwithstanding the provisions of section

7421(a), the making of such assessment or the beginning of such proceeding or levy during the

time such prohibition is in force may be enjoined by a proceeding in the proper court, including

the Tax Court, and a refund may be ordered by such court of any amount collected within the

period during which the Secretary is prohibited from collecting by levy or through a proceeding in

court under the provision of this subsection. The Tax Court shall have no jurisdiction to enjoin

any action or proceeding or order any refund under this subsection unless a timely petition for a

redetermination of the deficiency has been filed and then only in respect of the deficiency that is

the subject of such petition. Any petition filed with the Tax Court on or before the last date

specified for filing such petition by the Secretary in the notice of deficiency shall be treated as

timely filed.

No. 24-1205 Oquendo v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue Page 13

section, petition the Tax Court for review of such determination (and the Tax Court shall have

jurisdiction with respect to such matter).” The Supreme Court determined that this text did not

amount to a clear statement of a jurisdictional rule. Boechler, 596 U.S. at 204. In reaching this

conclusion, the Court noted that “‘such matter’ lacks a clear antecedent,” “‘matter’ does not

appear elsewhere in § 6330(d)(1), and no other ‘noun or noun phrase’ serves as the obvious

antecedent.” Id. (citation omitted). Thus, § 6330(d)(1) was susceptible to multiple

interpretations and therefore not jurisdictional. Id.

Applying Boechler’s approach to § 6213(a)’s petition-filing deadline, we reach the same

nonjurisdictional determination. If anything, § 6213(a)’s petition-filing deadline text is even

further removed from the realm of jurisdictional certainty than the petition-filing deadline in

§ 6330(d)(1). Unlike § 6330(d)(1), § 6213(a) does not contain an explicit reference to

jurisdiction within the same sentence containing the petition-filing deadline. Instead, § 6213(a)’s

jurisdictional language is separated by multiple sentences from its petition deadline language.

And like § 6330(d)(1), § 6213(a)’s jurisdictional language “speaks to what the Tax Court shall

do,” while the petition-filing deadline “explains what the taxpayer may do.” Id. at 205. That

dichotomy, which the Supreme Court highlighted in Boechler, merely emphasizes the difference

in approach to the petition-filing and jurisdictional provisions in § 6213(a) and the resulting

ambiguity surrounding any potential tethering of tax court jurisdiction to § 6213(a)’s petition-

filing deadline. Given that difference, just as the Supreme Court determined in Boechler, “it is

difficult to make the case that the jurisdictional reading” of § 6213(a) “is clear.” Id.

The Commissioner resists this conclusion, contending that the context of § 6213(a)’s

petition-filing deadline demonstrates Congress’ jurisdictional intent. While the terms of a

provision may “clearly indicate” Congress’ jurisdictional intent, the Supreme Court has noted

that courts considering jurisdiction “may also look to factors like a provision’s ‘placement within

the’ statute and ‘the singular characteristics of the review scheme that Congress created.’”

Williams v. United States, 927 F.3d 427, 436–37 (6th Cir. 2019) (quoting Henderson, 562 U.S. at

438–40). However, neither factor convinces us that § 6213(a)’s petition-filing deadline marks a

jurisdictional threshold.

No. 24-1205 Oquendo v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue Page 14

The Commissioner, for example, points to I.R.C. § 7459(d) as a provision that would

purportedly be warped if we hold that § 6213(a)’s petition-filing deadline is nonjurisdictional.

Section 7459(d) provides that “a decision . . . dismissing [a redetermination] proceeding shall be

considered [the Tax Court’s] decision that the deficiency is the amount determined by the

Secretary.” However, § 7459(d) contains an exception to this deficiency determination when

“the dismissal is for lack of jurisdiction.” In the Commissioner’s view, this exception, under

Oquendo’s nonjurisdictional interpretation of § 6213(a)’s petition-filing deadline, would bar

taxpayers petitioning the tax court for redetermination after their filing deadline has passed from

other avenues of tax deficiency relief unless the tax court equitably tolls the § 6213(a) deadline.

We are not convinced that such an outcome presents a quagmire either unconsidered by

Congress or incompatible with its statutory scheme. In any event, despite the Commissioner’s

“sensible” policy argument for construing § 6213(a)’s petition-filing deadline as jurisdictional

for purposes of blunting § 7459(d)’s consequences, the Commissioner’s contentions in this

regard only serve to further convince us that “Congress did not make that point clear.” Abraitis

v. United States, 709 F.3d 641, 645 (6th Cir. 2013). The Commissioner’s additional contextual

arguments similarly demonstrate the lack of clear congressional intent to render § 6213(a)’s

petition-filing deadline jurisdictional.

We therefore reject the tax court’s holding that § 6213(a)’s petition-filing deadline is a

jurisdictional rule. In reaching this conclusion, we acknowledge that our sister circuits are not

always aligned in their consideration of this issue. Most recently, the Second Circuit and Third

Circuit held that § 6213(a)’s petition-filing deadline is not jurisdictional. Buller v. Comm’r, No.

24-1557, --- F.4th ----, 2025 WL 2348969, at *3 (2d Cir. Aug. 14, 2025); Culp v. Comm’r, 75

F.4th 196, 202 (3d Cir. 2023). In contrast, the Seventh Circuit and Ninth Circuit have held that

§ 6213(a)’s petition-filing deadline is jurisdictional. See Organic Cannabis Found., LLC v.

Comm’r, 962 F.3d 1082, 1094 (9th Cir. 2020); Tilden v. Comm’r, 846 F.3d 882, 886 (7th Cir.

2017). Notably, the latter two opinions were issued prior to the Supreme Court’s opinion in

Boechler. The Seventh Circuit reasoned that it would be “imprudent to reject [the] body of

precedent”—including our decision in Patmon and Young Professional Corp.—holding that

§ 6213(a)’s petition-filing deadline is jurisdictional. Tilden, 846 F.3d at 886–87. The Ninth

No. 24-1205 Oquendo v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue Page 15

Circuit similarly considered itself bound by controlling precedent. Organic Cannabis Found.,

962 F.3d at 1092. However, as explained above, past cases interpreting § 6213(a)’s petition-

filing deadline as jurisdictional are better viewed as vestiges of a bygone era. The Supreme

Court’s instruction to accord those cases no precedential weight effectively mandates that view.

We therefore respectfully disagree with the analyses of the Seventh and Ninth Circuits and join

the Second and Third Circuits in holding that § 6213(a)’s petition-filing deadline is not

jurisdictional.

Equitable Tolling

Oquendo also argues that she is entitled to equitable tolling of § 6213(a)’s petition-filing

deadline. “Equitable tolling is a traditional feature of American jurisprudence and a background

principle against which Congress drafts limitations periods.” Boechler, 596 U.S. at 208–09. It

“allows courts to toll a statute of limitations when ‘a litigant’s failure to meet a legally-mandated

deadline unavoidably arose from circumstances beyond that litigant’s control.’” Robertson v.

Simpson, 624 F.3d 781, 783 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Graham-Humphreys v. Memphis Brooks

Museum of Art, Inc., 209 F.3d 552, 560–61 (6th Cir. 2000)). The tax court held that § 6213(a) is

not subject to equitable tolling because its petition-filing deadline is a jurisdictional rule. If the

tax court’s conclusion about § 6213(a)’s status as a jurisdictional rule had been correct, it

similarly would have correctly denied Oquendo’s request to equitably toll § 6213(a)’s petition-

filing deadline. See Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, 598 U.S. 411, 416 (2023) (“[B]ecause courts are

not able to exceed limits on their adjudicative authority, they cannot grant equitable exceptions

to jurisdictional rules.”). However, as explained above, § 6213(a)’s petition-filing deadline is

not a jurisdictional rule. The deadline is therefore “presumptively subject to equitable tolling.”

Boechler, 596 U.S. at 209; Wershe v. City of Detroit, 112 F.4th 357, 366 (6th Cir. 2024); see

Culp, 75 F.4th at 203–05 (“[T]here is insufficient textual evidence to persuade us that Congress

sought to bar § 6213(a)’s deadline from being equitably tolled.”).

Although available, equitable tolling is not automatically applicable. The decision of

whether to toll a limitations period must be made on a case-by-case basis. Seay v. Tenn. Valley

Auth., 339 F.3d 454, 469 (6th Cir. 2003). That analysis “is a fact-intensive inquiry best left to

No. 24-1205 Oquendo v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue Page 16

the [lower] courts” to undertake in the first instance. Robertson, 624 F.3d at 785. The tax court,

however, did not conduct that analysis because it believed equitable relief to be foreclosed by

this court’s precedent. We therefore remand for the tax court to undertake this analysis. See

Boechler, 596 U.S. at 211 (remanding for determination of taxpayer’s entitlement to equitable

tolling of tax court deadline); Hawver v. United States, 808 F.3d 693, 693 (6th Cir. 2015)

(remanding case, “as a matter of discretion,” for consideration of applicability of equitable

tolling to dismissed Federal Torts Claims Act claim following intervening Supreme Court

opinion establishing that statute of limitations requirements in 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) were

nonjurisdictional).

In doing so, we are mindful that Oquendo has the affirmative duty to establish her

entitlement to equitable tolling. Jackson v. United States, 751 F.3d 712, 718–19 (6th Cir. 2014).

Federal courts sparingly toll federal statutes and only in circumstances involving no fault of the

requesting litigant. Graham-Humphreys, 209 F.3d at 560–61. Oquendo contends that her

dilatory petition for redetermination filing should be excused because, inter alia, the notice of

deficiency was sent to her former address, she did not become aware of the notice until after the

petition-filing deadline had passed, and she diligently filed the petition after becoming aware.

Remand is warranted for the tax court to determine in the first instance whether these contentions

constitute “appropriate circumstances” for it to exercise its equitable tolling authority with

respect to § 6213(a)’s petition-filing deadline. Hayes v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 895 F.3d 449, 453

(6th Cir. 2018). In making that determination, the tax court must consider this court’s traditional

five-factor test: 1) Oquendo’s lack of notice of the petition-filing requirement; 2) her lack of

constructive knowledge of the petition-filing requirement; 3) her diligence in pursing her rights

under § 6213(a); 4) the absence of prejudice to the Commissioner; and 5) Oquendo’s

reasonableness in remaining ignorant of § 6213(a)’s petition-filing deadline. Zappone v. United

States, 870 F.3d 551, 556 (6th Cir. 2017). These factors are neither exclusive nor individually

relevant in every equitable tolling analysis. Amini v. Oberlin Coll., 259 F.3d 493, 500 (6th Cir.

2001). Rather, the tax court must conduct a particularized inquiry to assess Oquendo’s equitable

tolling eligibility. Steiner v. Henderson, 354 F.3d 432, 435 (6th Cir. 2003).

No. 24-1205 Oquendo v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue Page 17

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, we REVERSE the judgment of the tax court and

REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.