affirming district court's dismissal of a Section 2241 petition 3 under Habeas Rules 1(b) and 4
How later courts described this case
- affirming district court's dismissal of a Section 2241 petition 3 under Habeas Rules 1(b) and 4
- “A jurisdictional dismissal is not 23 a judgment on the merits.”
- dismissal without prejudice “was proper because the district 25 court lacked jurisdiction”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10 WESTERN DIVISION
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12 JAMES V. FRANIZER,
No. 2:25-cv-06955-MRA-BFM
13 Petitioner,
v. ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
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B. BIRKHOLZ.
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Respondent.
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18 SUMMARY
19 This Order concerns a habeas petition filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
20 Petitioner James V. Franizer is currently serving a sentence in federal custody.
21 He alleges he is actually innocent of one of the counts of conviction, a firearms
22 offense, and that he is actually innocent of the career-offender guidelines
23 enhancement that increased his sentence significantly. The Supreme Court has
24 recently narrowed the range of cases that can be brought pursuant to § 2241’s
25 “escape hatch,” such that it would appear Petitioner’s claims cannot be brought
26 via § 2241 petition. The Court therefore orders Petitioner to show cause—to
27 explain in writing—why his Petition should not be dismissed without prejudice
28 to Petitioner raising his claims in a different kind of suit.
1 FACTUAL BACKGROUND
2 Petitioner James V. Franizer, currently in federal custody, filed a Petition
3 for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (ECF 1.) In his Petition,
4 he alleges that he is actually innocent of the career-offender sentencing
5 enhancement applied in his case. Imposition of that enhancement requires,
6 among other things, proof of two qualifying predicate prior offenses. U.S.S.G. §
7 4B1.1(a). Petitioner argues that his prior convictions are not qualifying
8 predicates for two reasons: (1) because his state drug conviction is not a
9 qualifying controlled substance offense, and (2) because he is innocent of the
10 underlying drug offense. (ECF 1 at 2.) Petitioner further alleges that his firearm
11 conviction should be vacated under New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v.
12 Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022).1 (ECF 1 at 2.)
13 Plaintiff alleges that he may bring these claims pursuant to § 2241
14 because he did not have an unobstructed procedural shot at bringing those
15 claims in the Southern District of Iowa, where he was convicted, and that § 2255
16 is therefore ineffective to test the legality of his conviction. (ECF 1 at 2.) In other
17 words, he seeks to proceed under the “escape hatch” provision of § 2255. (ECF 1
18 at 4.)
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20 ANALYSIS
21 The court is required to screen all habeas petitions upon filing, and to
22 summarily dismiss “[i]f it plainly appears from the petition and any attached
23 exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court.” Rule 4,
24 Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. Petitions brought pursuant to Section
25 2241 are subject to the same screening requirements. See Rule 1(b), Rules
26 Governing Section 2254 Cases (a district court may “apply any or all of these
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1 The Petition erroneously refers to this case as “U.S. v. Bruen.” (ECF 1 at
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1 rules” to any habeas petition); see also Bostic v. Carlson, 884 F.2d 1267, 1269-
2 70 (9th Cir. 1989) (affirming district court's dismissal of a Section 2241 petition
3 under Habeas Rules 1(b) and 4).
4 When reviewing a petition filed pursuant to § 2241, the Court must first
5 consider whether the claims are properly brought via § 2241 petition or whether
6 the claims would be more properly brought in a motion filed pursuant to § 2255.
7 This question is “critical to the determination of district court jurisdiction,”
8 because “the proper district for filing a habeas petition depends upon whether
9 the petition is filed pursuant to § 2241 or § 2255.” Hernandez v. Campbell, 204
10 F.3d 861, 865 (9th Cir. 2000). Challenges to the legality of a sentence must be
11 brought via § 2255 motion and must be filed in the court that imposed sentence.
12 Id. at 864. By contrast, challenges to the manner, location, or conditions of a
13 sentence’s execution must be brought in a § 2241 petition, which must be filed
14 in the district in which the individual is incarcerated. Id. Generally speaking,
15 all challenges to the lawfulness of a conviction must be channeled into a motion
16 brought under § 2255; section 2255 “provides the exclusive procedural
17 mechanism by which a federal prisoner may test the legality of detention.”
18 Lorentsen v. Hood, 223 F.3d 950, 953 (9th Cir. 2000) (emphasis added).
19 Notwithstanding that general rule, § 2255(e) describes a narrow sliver of
20 challenges to a conviction that can be brought via § 2241: it permits an
21 application for a writ of habeas corpus where the “remedy by motion is
22 inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of [petitioner’s] detention.” 28
23 U.S.C. § 2255(e). It is this provision, often called the “escape hatch” provision,
24 to which Petitioner attempts to lay claim. He argues that a motion brought
25 pursuant to § 2255 is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his
26 detention, and that he should therefore be permitted to proceed under § 2241.
27 Plaintiff cites cases that permitted certain challenges to federal sentences
28 to proceed through the escape hatch if they were claims that sounded in actual
1 innocence and could not be brought in a § 2255 motion. (See ECF 1 at 4 (citing
2 Courtright v. Von Blanckensee, No. 20-15473, 2022 WL 522106 (9th Cir. Feb. 22,
3 2022) (finding that claim that petitioner was actually innocent of mandatory life
4 sentence imposed pursuant to § 3559(e) could be brought via § 2241 petition
5 where claim could not be brought under § 2255)).) Courts like Courtright
6 reasoned that § 2255 was inadequate to test the legality of detention—and thus
7 the escape hatch was available—as to claims of actual innocence of an offense
8 or a mandatory sentencing enhancement where § 2255’s rules against
9 successive petitions would close off any other means of bringing the challenge.
10 See, e.g., Allen v. Ives, 950 F.3d 1184, 1191 (9th Cir. 2020).
11 Even at its broadest reading, however, the scope of § 2241’s escape hatch
12 always excluded challenges to career-offender enhancements, so long as the
13 petitioner was sentenced at a time when the Sentencing Guidelines were
14 advisory. See Marrero v. Ives, 682 F.3d 1190, 1193-95 (9th Cir. 2012); see also
15 Allen, 950 F.3d at 1189-90 (limiting Marrero to claims concerning career-
16 offender challenges to sentences imposed under the advisory guidelines, and not
17 to those sentences imposed before 2005 under the mandatory guidelines).
18 Moreover, even the narrow opening through which claims like Courtright
19 and Allen passed has since been closed. In 2023, the Supreme Court held that §
20 2255 was not inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of detention simply
21 because the rules against second or successive § 2255 motions foreclosed a
22 challenge. Jones v. Hendrix, 599 U.S. 465, 477-78 (2023). Instead, § 2241’s
23 escape hatch “preserves recourse to § 2241 in cases where unusual
24 circumstances make it impossible or impracticable to seek relief in the
25 sentencing court . . . .” Id. at 478; see also id. at 475 (identifying, as examples of
26 such cases, situations where a court no longer exists). Jones v. Hendrix thus
27 forecloses “escape hatch” challenges to federal sentences—if not entirely, at
28 least of the kind presented in this Petition.
1 As to Petitioner’s Bruen challenge to his firearm conviction, he is wrong
2 that that challenge cannot be brought via § 2255. Such claims are routinely
3 brought via § 2255. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 720 F. Supp. 3d 1020 (D.
4 Ore. 2024) (evaluating Second Amendment claim brought via § 2255 motion). In
5 any event, Jones v. Hendrix is fatal to that claim as well.
6 In short, it appears that neither of Petitioner’s claims are ones that can
7 be brought under § 2241. The Court thus believes it lacks jurisdiction over the
8 Petition.
9 Where an action is filed in a district that lacks jurisdiction, a court must
10 either dismiss, or, “if it be in the interest of justice,” may transfer the case “to
11 any district or division in which it could have been brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a).
12 The Court has thus considered whether the construed § 2255 Motion should be
13 transferred to the Southern District of Iowa. It is inclined not to make that
14 recommendation. It appears Petitioner may still be within the one-year period
15 for filing a § 2255 motion in the Southern District of Iowa. And, because strict
16 limitations apply to all but the first § 2255 motion, see 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h),
17 converting this Petition to a § 2255 motion might make it more difficult for
18 Petitioner to present other claims he might want to bring.
19 For these reasons, the Court believes it is appropriate to recommend
20 dismissal of this Petition. Such dismissal should be without prejudice to
21 Petitioner raising his claims using a proper vehicle in the proper forum. Wages
22 v. I.R.S., 915 F.2d 1230, 1234 (9th Cir. 1990) (“A jurisdictional dismissal is not
23 a judgment on the merits.”); Manant v. United States, 498 F. App’x 752, at *1
24 (9th Cir. 2012) (dismissal without prejudice “was proper because the district
25 court lacked jurisdiction”). Petitioner could then decide whether he wishes to
26 raise any version of these claims—and any other he might have—via § 2255
27 motion filed before the sentencing judge. Before the Court makes that
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1 || recommendation to the District Judge presiding in his case, however, the Court
2 || will give Petitioner an opportunity to address these concerns.
3 Accordingly, by no later that September 19, 2025, Petitioner shall file
4 || aresponse addressing the concerns raised in this Order and explaining why his
5 || Petition should not be dismissed. If Petitioner no longer wishes to pursue
6 || this action, he may request a voluntary dismissal of the action pursuant
7 || to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a). Doing so will not prejudice him
8 || raising his claims in a properly filed suit.
9 Plaintiff is warned that, if he does not respond to this Order within the
10 || deadline set by the Court (or seek an extension of that deadline, if he has a good
11 || reason to do so), the Court will reeommend to the assigned District Judge
12 || that the action be dismissed without further leave to amend.
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14 || DATED: August 21, 2025 Teun
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BRIANNA FULLER MIRCHEFF
16 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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