Zapeta v. Executive Director of the Florida Division of Emergency Management (Collier County)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

FORT MYERS DIVISION

MANUEL YAX ZAPETA,

Petitioner,

v. Case No.: 2:25-cv-00697-JLB-KCD

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE

FLORIDA DIVISION OF EMERGENCY

MANAGEMENT; ENFORCEMENT AND

REMOVAL OFFICE, MIRIMAR, FLORIDA;

ACTING DIRECTOR, IMMIGRATION AND

CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT; and ACTING

DIRECTOR OF THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE

FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW,

Respondents.

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ORDER

This cause is before the Court on Petitioner Manuel Yax Zapeta’s Amended

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (the “Amended Petition”) (Doc. 4), Amended

Emergency Request for Temporary Restraining Order (the “Amended Motion for

TRO”) (Doc. 12), and Emergency Motion for Order Directing Return of Petitioner to

the United States (the “Emergency Motion for Return”) (Doc. 25). For the reasons

set forth below, the Court finds that the Amended Petition (Doc. 4), Amended

Motion for TRO (Doc. 12), and the Emergency Motion for Return (Doc. 25) are due

to be DENIED as moot.

BACKGROUND

Petitioner is a Guatemalan citizen who entered the United States without

inspection on January 12, 1995. (Doc. 4 at ¶ 5). He has no additional criminal

history. (Id. at ¶ 23). On January 29, 1996, Petitioner filed a timely I-589

Application for Asylum and Withholding of Removal. (Id. at ¶ 14; see Doc. 4-1). In

April 1997, an immigration judge issued an order denying Petitioner’s asylum

claim. (Doc. 4 at ¶ 16). Pursuant to that order, Petitioner accepted Voluntary

Departure by late May 1997 with an alternative deportation order to Guatemala.

(Id. at ¶¶ 15–16; see Doc. 4-3). Petitioner appealed the immigration court’s decision

to the Board of Immigration Appeals, which affirmed the immigration court’s

decision on July 13, 1998. (Doc. 4 at ¶ 17; see Doc. 4-4). The Board of Immigration

Appeals permitted Petitioner to depart from the United States voluntarily on or

before August 12, 1998––thirty days from the date of the appellate order. (Doc. 4-4

at 3). Petitioner did not voluntarily depart, making his removal order final on

August 13, 1998.1 There is no dispute that Petitioner has remained subject to the

final removal order for the past 27 years.

In all events, on March 15, 2020, Immigration and Customs Enforcement

(“ICE”) served Petitioner with a Warrant for Arrest of Alien. (Doc. 4 at ¶ 19;

see Doc. 4-6). Rather than execute his arrest, ICE placed Petitioner on an Order of

1 In cases such as this, where a timely appeal was filed with the Board of Immigration Appeals

(see Doc. 4 at ¶ 17; Doc. 4-4), “[a]n order of removal made by the immigration judge . . . become[s]

final . . . upon overstay of the voluntary departure period granted . . . by the Board[.]” 8 C.F.R. §

1241.1(f).

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Supervision (“OSUP”). (Doc. 4 at ¶ 18; see Doc. 4-5). Petitioner complied with

OSUP’s reporting requirements and lawfully obtained employment authorization.

(Doc. 4 at ¶ 20). Petitioner later legally married and filed an I-130 Petition for

Alien Relative (“Form I-130”) through his spouse on September 3, 2024. (Id. at ¶

21; see Doc. 4-7). The Form I-130 remains pending. (Doc. 4 at ¶ 21).

On July 23, 2025, Petitioner was detained by ICE agents when he reported

for his standard supervision appointment pursuant to his OSUP. (Id. at 2). Two

weeks later, on August 7, 2025, Petitioner filed his Amended Petition (id.), arguing

that Respondents violated his Fifth Amendment right to due process by revoking

Petitioner’s release from immigration custody pursuant to his OSUP without

following the procedures required by applicable statutes and regulations.2 (Id. at 5–

8). This Court promptly ordered Respondents to file a response to the Amended

Petition by 11:59 P.M. on August 8, 2025. (Doc. 11). On Friday, August 8,

Petitioner filed an Amended Motion for TRO, notifying the Court that Petitioner

had been transferred to the Alexandra Staging Facility in Alexandra, Louisiana, a

known last-stop staging site for deportation flights. (Doc. 12 at 2, 5–6).3 The same

day, Respondents filed their Response to the Amended Petition and opposition to

2 Petitioner filed an initial Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Emergency Injunctive Relief (the

“Initial Petition”) (Doc. 1) on August 6, 2025, which was rendered moot by the filing of Petitioner’s

Amended Petition (Doc. 4) on August 7, 2025. The Amended Petition included information and

exhibits that were not available to Petitioner when he filed the Initial Petition. (See generally Docs.

4-1, 4-2, 4-3, 4-4, 4-5, 4-6, 4-7).

3 Petitioner filed an initial Emergency Request for Temporary Restraining Order (the “Initial Motion

for TRO”) (Doc. 5) on August 7, 2025, which was denied without prejudice for failure to comply with

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b)(1)(B). (See Doc. 9).

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the TRO, raising several threshold jurisdictional arguments. (Doc. 13). Petitioner

filed his reply the next day, Saturday, August 9. (Doc. 15).

The Court maintained close contact with the parties. It was clear to the

Court that counsel for Petitioner and Respondents were also in close contact. The

basis of the Court’s inquiries with the parties was discerning the location and

custodial status of Petitioner during this fast-moving litigation while the Court

addressed Respondents’ myriad subject matter jurisdiction arguments.

On Monday, August 11, Respondents’ counsel attempted to get clarity from

ICE on Petitioner’s location and custodial status but was unable to receive complete

information from ICE.4 Shortly after Respondents’ counsel represented to the Court

that he was unable to discern when Petitioner would be removed from the

Louisiana facility, Petitioner’s counsel advised the Court that ICE had already

effectuated Petitioner’s removal via a flight from Louisiana to Guatemala at some

point in the early afternoon that day. (Doc. 28 at 4; Doc. 28-1 at ¶ 15).

Petitioner then filed his Emergency Motion for Return on August 13, 2025.

(Doc. 25). At the Court’s direction (Doc. 26), Respondents filed an expedited

Response (Doc. 28), and Petitioner filed a Reply (Doc. 30).

4 This case presented a challenging array of quickly evolving factual circumstances and myriad

jurisdictional issues to navigate in a very short period of time. The Court does not doubt that

Respondents’ counsel representations to the Court were in good faith and that Respondents’ counsel

made great efforts to ascertain information from ICE. The Court also appreciates the civility and

professionalism exhibited by counsel for Petitioner and Respondents throughout this litigation.

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LEGAL STANDARD

Federal courts are “courts of limited jurisdiction,” possessing “only that power

authorized by Constitution and statute.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of

Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). “The burden for establishing federal subject matter

jurisdiction rests with the party bringing the claim.” Sweet Pea Marine, Ltd. v.

APJ Marine, Inc., 411 F.3d 1242, 1247 (11th Cir. 2005). “[O]nce a federal court

determines that it is without subject matter jurisdiction, the court is powerless to

continue.” Univ. of S. Ala. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 410 (11th Cir. 1999).

Indeed, “[i]n the federal tandem[,] jurisdiction takes precedence over the merits.

Unless and until jurisdiction is found, both appellate and trial courts should eschew

substantive adjudication.” Belleri v. United States, 712 F.3d 543, 547 (11th Cir.

2013) (internal quotations and citation omitted) (alterations in original).

Article III of the U.S. Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to

“cases” and “controversies.” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. An action runs afoul of

this jurisdictional limitation “when it no longer presents a live controversy with

respect to which the court can give meaningful relief.” Fla. Ass’n of Rehab.

Facilities, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Health and Rehab. Servs., 225 F.3d 1208, 1216–17

(11th Cir. 2000) (quoting Ethredge v. Hail, 996 F.2d 1173, 1175 (11th Cir. 1993)).

“If events that occur subsequent to the filing of a lawsuit or an appeal deprive the

court of the ability to give the plaintiff or appellant meaningful relief, then the case

is moot,” and “dismissal is required because mootness is jurisdictional.” Al Najjar v.

Ashcroft, 273 F.3d 1330, 1336 (11th Cir. 2001). Unlike standing, mootness requires

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the Court to “look at the events at the present time, not at the time the complaint

was filed. . . .” Dow Jones & Co. v. Kaye, 256 F.3d 1251, 1254 (11th Cir. 2001).

DISCUSSION

The Court concludes that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction because this

action “no longer presents a live controversy with respect to which the court can

give meaningful relief.” Fla. Ass’n of Rehab. Facilities, Inc., 225 F.3d at 1216–17

(quoting Ethredge, 996 F.2d at 1175)). “As a general rule, a habeas petition

presents a live case or controversy only when a petitioner is in custody.”5 Salmeron-

Salmeron v. Spivey, 926 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2019); see also 28 U.S.C. §

2241(c)(3)).

In the immigration context, a petitioner’s section 2241 habeas claim is moot

when the petitioner challenges only the legality of his detention, and he is

subsequently removed pursuant to a final removal order and released from the

custody of the United States. Compare Moore v. Ashcroft, 251 F.3d 919, 922 (11th

Cir. 2001) (finding that a petitioner’s removal from the United States did not render

her case moot where the petitioner also challenged her final order of removal), with

Soliman v. United States ex rel. INS, 296 F.3d 1237, 1243 n.2 (11th Cir. 2002)

5 While this general rule does not govern when a detention has a tangible “collateral consequence,”

“the burden remains on the petitioner to . . . demonstrat[e] that a collateral consequence of his

imprisonment persists after his release.” Djadju v. Vega, 32 F.4th 1102, 1107 (11th Cir. 2022)

(internal citations omitted); accord Salmeron-Salmeron v. Spivey, 926 F.3d 1283, 1290 (11th Cir.

2019). Petitioner did not raise a challenge to a collateral consequence of his removal in any of his

filings. (See generally Docs. 25, 30).

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(distinguishing Moore, and finding the case moot, on the ground that Soliman,

unlike Moore, did not challenge his final order of removal).

Here, Petitioner’s sole challenge is the legality of his detention. Specifically,

in his Amended Petition, Petitioner claims that his detention is illegal because ICE

revoked his release pursuant to an OSUP without following procedures required by

law or regulation. (Doc. 4 at 5–9). Since the initiation of this litigation, Petitioner

was removed from the United States to Guatemala pursuant to his final removal

order. (See Doc. 25 at 2; see also Doc. 28 at 4). Petitioner did not challenge his final

removal order in this litigation. He was subsequently released from the custody of

the United States at some point after his flight landed in Guatemala on August 12,

2025. (Doc. 28 at 4; Doc. 28-1 at ¶ 15). Accordingly, the case or controversy––the

legality of his detention––presented in this section 2241 litigation is moot, and this

Court therefore lacks subject matter jurisdiction to reach the merits of Petitioner’s

arguments. See Soliman, 296 F.3d at 1244.

Lastly, there are no facts to support that ICE will again place Petitioner in

custody. It is clear from ICE’s swift pace from Petitioner’s arrest and detention on

July 23, 2025, to his arrival and release from the custody of the United States in

Guatemala on August 12, 2025, that the United States has no intention to seek

Petitioner out and again place him in custody. As such, the narrow exception to the

mootness doctrine that his case was “capable of repetition yet evading review does

not apply.” See id. at 1243 (“Furthermore, since Soliman has been removed from

the United States and there is absolutely no reason to believe that he will again be

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detained or force-fed under the same circumstances, the narrow exception for cases

that are capable of repetition yet evading review does not apply.”).

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Amended Petition (Doc. 4), Amended

Motion for TRO (Doc. 12), and Emergency Motion for Return (Doc. 25) are

DISMISSED as moot. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to terminate all

deadlines, deny any pending motions as moot, and close the case.

ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida, on August 22, 2025.

| Zo ,

JOHN L. BADALAMENTI

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE