GOODLIN v. ROSE

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

HERBERT SETH GOODLIN,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil No. 23-2304

ALEX ROSE et al,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM

COSTELLO, J. August 21, 2025

Plaintiff Herbert Seth Goodlin sued the Borough of Folcroft (“Folcroft”) and Detective

Daniel White under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and various state laws, claiming that he was falsely

arrested by Detective White. The arrest arose from a home improvement dispute. A pair of

Folcroft residents hired Goodlin for a home improvement project that Goodlin failed to

complete. The residents paid Goodlin for the project, but after doing some demolition, Goodlin

absconded with their money and left them with a mess. The residents contacted Folcroft police,

which assigned Detective White to investigate. After his investigation, Detective White obtained

a warrant for Goodlin’s arrest for theft and fraud. The charges against Goodlin were ultimately

dismissed at the preliminary hearing phase. Goodlin then brought this suit alleging, among other

things, that he was maliciously prosecuted and falsely imprisoned. Detective White and Folcroft

have moved for summary judgment. For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant the

Defendants’ motion.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Facts

Dianetta Jones and Forkpa Subah, Folcroft residents, hired Goodlin to work on their

home. ECF No. 62 ¶ 1. On February 29, 2022, they paid Goodlin $2,000. Id. ¶ 2. On March 9,

2022, they paid him an additional $3,000. Id. While Goodlin performed some demolition at the

home, Goodlin stopped coming to the property and stopped answering and returning phone calls

after the March 9, 2022, payment. Id.; ECF 62-1 at 10 (Transcript of Detective White’s

December 12, 2024 Deposition). Not only did Goodlin fail to complete the project, but he left

trash and debris at the property, causing Jones and Subah to receive a citation from Folcroft for a

code violation. ECF No. 62 ¶ 9.

Jones and Subah contacted the Folcroft Police Department. Detective White, who had

previously investigated about a dozen contractor fraud cases, was assigned to the case. Id. ¶ 7.

Among other things, Detective White gathered receipts from Subah, took written statements, and

reviewed photographs. Id. ¶¶ 8-9. In addition, Detective White tried contacting Goodlin

multiple times but received no response. Id. ¶ 3. During the investigation, Detective White

learned that Goodlin was working in Folcroft without a permit. Id. ¶ 10.

Based on his investigation, Detective White attested to an affidavit of probable cause and

sought a warrant for Goodlin’s arrest for theft by deception and home improvement fraud. Id. ¶¶

4-5. An Assistant District Attorney for Delaware County reviewed and approved Detective

White’s affidavit and warrant application. Id. ¶ 6. Detective White then submitted the affidavit

and application to a magistrate judge. Id. The magistrate judge approved the charges and

authorized Goodlin’s arrest. Id. ¶ 4.

B. Procedural History

The warrant was not executed for nearly a year—until March 8, 2023—when Goodlin

was arrested in another township on unrelated charges. Id. ¶ 11. Goodlin gave a fake name to

the arresting officers because he knew about the outstanding warrant in Folcroft. Id. Goodlin

was arraigned on the Folcroft warrant and released on an unsecured bond the next day. Id. ¶ 13.

A preliminary hearing was held on May 9, 2023. Id. After the preliminary hearing, the

magistrate judge dismissed the case stating that the dispute appeared to be more of a civil matter.

Id. ¶ 14. At the direction of the District Attorney’s Office, Goodlin was re-arrested. Id. ¶ 15. At

the second preliminary hearing, Goodlin testified that the home improvement contract was for

$15,000, and he spent the $5,000 he received on demolition and materials that he claimed were

delivered to the residence.1 Id. ¶ 17. The magistrate again dismissed the case. Id. ¶ 16.

Detective White did not testify at either hearing. Id. ¶ 18.

On June 16, 2023, Goodlin brought this suit against Alex Rose, a Delaware County Daily

Times journalist who had reported on the case, Jones and Subah, Detective White in his official

and individual capacities, and Folcroft. With leave of Court, Goodlin filed an amended

complaint on May 29, 2024. Eventually, Defendants Delaware County Daily Times and Alex

Rose were dismissed from the case with prejudice. In addition, the parties stipulated to the

dismissal of all claims against Jones and Subah. The parties further stipulated to the dismissal of

Goodlin’s claims for economic and earnings capacity damages. Detective White and Folcroft are

the only remaining defendants.

1 There is no evidence in the record that Goodlin purchased materials for the project or left

any materials at the residence.

Goodlin’s § 1983 claims are as follows: (1) malicious prosecution against Detective

White, (2) false imprisonment against Detective White and Folcroft, (3) conspiracy for malicious

prosecution and false imprisonment against Detective White and Folcroft, and (4) failure to train

and supervise against Folcroft. Goodlin also presents state law claims for intentional and

negligent infliction of emotional distress against both Detective White and Folcroft.2

Detective White and Folcroft have moved for summary judgment, arguing there is no

evidence to support Goodlin’s claims, and he cannot establish a genuine issue for trial.

Additionally, they suggest Detective White is entitled to qualified immunity. The Court held oral

argument on June 5, 2025. Goodlin has responded to the motion for summary judgment mainly

by repeating allegations from his amended complaint and relying on sweeping conclusions,

unsupported by any record evidence.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to

any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P.

56(a). A dispute is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict

for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A fact is

material if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law[.]” Id. The movant

bears the initial responsibility of informing the Court of the basis for its motion and identifying

2 The amended complaint suggests that the Folcroft Police Department is separately liable.

ECF No. 45 ¶¶ 16, 20, 24, 26-27. However, the Police Department is not a proper defendant in

this case. To start, the Police Department does not appear as a defendant on the docket.

Moreover, a police department is not a proper defendant in an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,

because it is a sub-division of its municipality. Johnson v. City of Erie, Pa., 834 F. Supp. 873,

878-79 (W.D. Pa. 1993) (finding “police department an improper and unnecessary party” in

Section 1983 action). A police department is merely the “vehicle through which the municipality

fulfills its policing functions.” Phillips v. Weinman, No. 25-0171, 2025 WL 1436012, at *2 (E.D.

Pa. May 19, 2025).

the portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). Then, the nonmovant must “set forth

specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. In ruling on

a summary judgment motion, a court “must view the facts in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party and draw all inferences in that party’s favor.” Prowel v. Wise Bus. Forms, 579

F.3d 285, 286 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation and quotation marks omitted). The court does not make

credibility determinations or weigh the evidence. See Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 323 (3d

Cir. 2016).

Where a defendant moves for summary judgment based on a lack of proof of a material

fact, the court must ask “whether a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff on the

evidence presented.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence

in support of the plaintiff’s position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the

jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Id.

Bare assertions, conclusory allegations, or suspicions are insufficient to defeat summary

judgment. See Fireman’s Ins. Co. v. DuFresne, 676 F.2d 965, 969 (3d Cir. 1982). The non-

moving party “cannot rely on unsupported allegations, but must go beyond pleadings and

provide some evidence that would show that there exists a genuine issue for trial.” Jones v.

United Parcel Serv., 214 F.3d 402, 407 (3d Cir. 2000). It is not enough to simply restate the

allegations in the complaint; rather, the non-moving party must “point to concrete evidence in the

record that supports each and every essential element of his case.” Jones v. Beard, 145 F. App’x

743, 745–46 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Section 1983 Claims

Section 1983 “does not create substantive rights, but provides a remedy for the violation

of rights created by federal law.” Groman v. Township of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 633 (3d Cir.

1995) (citation omitted). To establish a prima facie case under Section 1983, a plaintiff must

demonstrate that a person acting under color of state or territorial law deprived him of a federal

right. Id. (citation omitted).

1. Malicious Prosecution

To succeed on his malicious prosecution claim, Goodlin must show: “(1) the defendants

initiated a criminal proceeding; (2) the criminal proceeding ended in plaintiff’s favor; (3) the

proceeding was initiated without probable cause; (4) the defendants acted maliciously or for a

purpose other than bringing the plaintiff to justice; and (5) the plaintiff suffered deprivation of

liberty consistent with the concept of seizure as a consequence of a legal proceeding.” Waters v.

Cheltenham Twp., 700 F. App’x 149, 152 (3d Cir. 2017). The failure to satisfy any of the

elements is fatal to the claim. Kossler v. Crisanti, 564 F.3d 181, 186 (3d Cir. 2009). Goodlin has

not identified record evidence to support a number of these essential elements.

As an initial matter, Goodlin has not identified evidence that Detective White initiated a

criminal proceeding. A prosecutor, not a police officer, typically initiates criminal proceedings.

See Romero v. Tobyhanna Twp., No. 19-1038, 2021 WL 4149189, at *9 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 13,

2021). An officer may be considered to have initiated a criminal proceeding if the officer

“knowingly provided false information to the prosecutor or otherwise interfered with the

prosecutor’s informed discretion.” Merrero v. Micewski, No. 96–8534, 1998 WL 414724, at *6–

7 (E.D. Pa. July 22, 1998). However, the amended complaint does not allege that Detective

White knowingly provided false information to the prosecutor, and Goodlin has not identified

any allegedly false information in the affidavit. At oral argument, counsel for Goodlin argued

that Detective White’s affidavit was knowingly false because it did not reflect that the total home

improvement contract was for $15,000 and that, in addition to performing demolition, Goodlin

bought certain materials for the project and delivered them to the residence. As a result, Goodlin

supposedly wanted even more up-front money to continue the project, and the residents allegedly

refused. Goodlin argues that the omission of this information somehow rendered the affidavit

false. However, there is no evidence in the record that Goodlin purchased any such materials,

much less that he delivered them to the residence. Thus, there was no basis to include any such

information in the affidavit. It is worth noting that Detective White made multiple attempts to

speak with Goodlin during the investigation, but Goodlin never responded. Detective White

based his affidavit on the information he was able to obtain during his investigation. The

investigation showed that Goodlin made a mess of the home, absconded after the residents paid

him $5,000, and failed to respond to their attempts to contact him. Goodlin has failed to identify

any falsehoods in Detective White’s affidavit and therefore Goodlin has failed to show that

Detective White initiated the criminal proceeding against him.

In addition, while it is true that the criminal proceeding ended in Goodlin’s favor, see,

e.g., Harvard v. Cesnalis, 973 F.3d 190, 203 (3d Cir. 2020), Goodlin has not identified any

evidence that Defendants acted maliciously or for a purpose other than bringing Goodlin to

justice. There is no dispute that Goodlin received two payments totaling $5,000. There is no

dispute that after he received payment, Goodlin never returned to the residence and never

completed the work. After the residents complained to the police department, Detective White

investigated the complaint, including by, among other things, reviewing documents and

photographs, obtaining witness statements, and attempting to contact Goodlin with no success.

Once Detective White completed his investigation, he submitted his proposed affidavit and

warrant application to a prosecutor who reviewed and approved the charges. Detective White

then presented the warrant to a neutral magistrate who signed the warrant. On this record, there

is no evidence of malicious intent and therefore no support for Goodlin’s malicious prosecution

claim. Summary judgment is therefore appropriate.

2. False Imprisonment

To succeed on a false imprisonment claim, “a plaintiff must establish: (1) that [he] was

detained; and (2) that the detention was unlawful.” Harvard, 973 F.3d at 202 (alteration in

original) (quoting James v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 700 F.3d 675, 682-83 (3d Cir. 2012)). A false

imprisonment claim under Pennsylvania law has the same elements. See Renk v. City of

Pittsburgh, 641 A.2d 289, 293 (Pa. 1994).

A false imprisonment claim will “necessarily fail if probable cause existed for any one of

the crimes charged against the arrestee.” Harvard, 973 F.3d at 199 (quoting Dempsey v. Bucknell

Univ., 834 F.3d 457, 477 (3d Cir. 2016)). “Probable cause exists if there is a ‘fair probability’

that the person committed the crime at issue.” Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 789 (3d Cir. 2000)

(citation omitted). An officer has probable cause “when the facts and circumstances within the

arresting officer’s knowledge are sufficient in themselves to warrant a reasonable person to

believe that an offense has been or is being committed by the person to be arrested.” Orsatti v.

N.J. State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 483 (3d Cir. 1995).

Where the plaintiff is arrested pursuant to a warrant, an officer can only be liable for false

imprisonment under § 1983 if the officer “knowingly and deliberately, or with a reckless

disregard for the truth, made false statements or omissions that create a falsehood in applying for

a warrant,” and that “such statements or omissions [were] material, or necessary, to the finding of

probable cause.” Wilson, 212 F.3d at 786-87 (internal quotation omitted).

Detective White drafted an affidavit of probable cause that was reviewed and approved

by an Assistant District Attorney. A judge then signed the warrant, necessarily finding probable

cause for the charges against Goodlin. As is discussed above, Goodlin has presented no evidence

that Detective White made false statements or omissions in applying for the warrant. As a result,

Goodlin has failed to support his claims of false imprisonment against Detective White.

As to Folcroft, liability under Section 1983 cannot be based solely on a theory of

respondeat superior and Goodlin presents no other theory of liability. See Rode v. Dellarciprete,

845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988) (“A defendant in a civil rights action must have personal

involvement in the alleged wrongs; liability cannot be predicated solely on the operation of

respondeat superior.”). Accordingly, summary judgment is appropriate on Goodlin’s false

imprisonment claims.

3. Conspiracy – Malicious Prosecution and False Imprisonment

“To prevail on a conspiracy claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove that persons acting

under color of state law ‘reached an understanding’ to deprive him of his constitutional rights.”

Jutrowski v. Twp. of Riverdale, 904 F.3d 280, 293–94 (3d Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). A § 1983

conspiracy claim “must show an understanding or ‘meeting of the minds’ with facts

demonstrating agreement and concerted action.” Murphy v. Middlesex Cnty., 361 F. Supp. 3d

376, 389 (D.N.J. 2019) (citing Startzell v. City of Phila., 533 F.3d 183, 205 (3d Cir. 2008)).

The amended complaint alleges that Detective White, Folcroft, and the Police

Department conspired with the home improvement fraud victims to maliciously prosecute and

falsely imprison Goodlin. Goodlin’s conspiracy claim is meritless. As an initial matter, there is

no evidence of any constitutional deprivation as both Goodlin’s malicious prosecution and false

imprisonment claims fail, as discussed above. Moreover, Goodlin has failed to point to any

evidence that any defendants reached an understanding to deprive Goodlin of his constitutional

rights.

4. Failure to Train and Supervise

To establish liability on a failure to train claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff “must

identify a failure to provide specific training that has a causal nexus with [his] injuries and must

demonstrate that the absence of that specific training can reasonably be said to reflect a

deliberate indifference to whether the alleged constitutional deprivations occurred.” Reitz v.

County of Bucks, 125 F.3d 139, 145 (3d Cir. 1997).

In support of this claim, Goodlin notes that Detective White investigated about a dozen

contractor fraud causes and suggests -- without citing any portion of the record -- that there “may

have been a pattern of treating civil contract disputes as criminal matters” and Folcroft “may

have failed to properly train officers on distinguishing civil contract disputes from criminal

fraud.” ECF No. 63 at 4-5. Simply concluding that there “may” have been a pattern or failure to

train is insufficient to establish a genuine issue or dispute of material fact for trial. There is no

evidence to support Goodlin’s failure to train and supervise claim, and no reasonable jury could

find in his favor.

B. Detective White’s Qualified Immunity

“The doctrine of qualified immunity shields officials from civil liability so long as their

conduct ‘does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a

reasonable person would have known.’” Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015) (per curiam)

(quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)). An officer is protected by qualified

immunity unless there is a violation of a constitutional right that was clearly established when

the officer allegedly violated it. Jefferson v. Lias, 21 F.4th 74, 80 (3d Cir. 2021).

“To be clearly established, a right must be sufficiently clear that every reasonable official

would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.” Taylor v. Barkes, 575 U.S. 822,

825 (2015) (quoting Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012)). To define a clearly

established right, a “case directly on point” is not required, but “existing precedent must have

placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” Mullenix, 577 U.S at 12 (quoting

Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011)). Accordingly, qualified immunity protects “all but

the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Id. at 12 (citation omitted).

“[A] police officer who relies in good faith on a prosecutor’s legal opinion that [an] arrest

is warranted under the law is presumptively entitled to qualified immunity from Fourth

Amendment claims premised on a lack of probable cause.” Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622

F.3d 248, 255-56 (3d Cir. 2010). Moreover, “the fact that a neutral magistrate has issued a

warrant is the clearest indication that the officers acted in an objectively reasonable manner or, as

we have sometimes put it, in ‘objective good faith.’” Messerschmidt v. Millender, 565 U.S. 535,

546 (2012). However, suit is allowed if, for example, the warrant was “based on an affidavit so

lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely

unreasonable[.]” Id. (citations omitted).

As explained above, Goodlin has presented no evidence that Detective White violated

any of Goodlin’s constitutional rights. Detective White drafted an affidavit of probable cause

that was reviewed and approved by a prosecutor. In addition, a neutral judge then signed the

warrant, necessarily finding probable cause for the charges against Goodlin. Goodlin has

presented no evidence that the affidavit was false or that Detective White acted in an

unreasonable or otherwise illegal manner. Under these circumstances, Detective White is

entitled to qualified immunity.

C. Punitive Damages are Precluded

Punitive damages are “an ‘extreme remedy’ available in only the most exceptional

matters.” Phillips v. Cricket Lighters, 883 A.2d 439, 445 (Pa. 2005) (citations omitted). In a

Section 1983 case, a plaintiff may recover punitive damages “when the defendant’s conduct is

shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous

indifference to the federally protected rights of others.” Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983).

As is discussed above, Goodlin has presented no evidence that Defendants were motivated by

evil motive or were callously indifferent to Goodlin’s federally protected rights. Therefore, there

is no basis for punitive damages. In addition, a plaintiff may not seek punitive damages against a

municipality, such as Folcroft. See Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981)

(“[W]e hold that a municipality is immune from punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”).

D. State Law Claims

Goodlin included in his Complaint state law claims for intentional and negligent

infliction of emotional distress against Folcroft and Detective White. Although the Court is

granting summary judgment on the federal claims over which it has original jurisdiction, the

Court has discretion to retain supplemental jurisdiction over Goodlin’s remaining state law

claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1376(c)(3). Judicial economy, convenience, and fairness weigh in favor

of retaining jurisdiction. The state and federal claims involve the same facts, discovery in this

case is complete, and the parties have fully briefed the state law claims. Moreover, this case was

filed more than two years ago and leaving the state law claims unresolved at this stage would be

unfair to the parties. Accordingly, the Court will retain jurisdiction for purposes of resolving

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

1. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Under Pennsylvania law, to establish a claim for intentional infliction of emotional

distress a plaintiff must show: (1) that he was subjected to extreme and outrageous conduct; (2)

the conduct was intentional or reckless; (3) the conduct caused emotional distress; and (4) the

distress was severe. Robinson v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 246 F. Supp. 2d 440, 444 (E.D. Pa. Feb.

12, 2003).

“[E]xistence of the alleged emotional distress must be supported by competent medical

evidence.” Kazatsky v. King David Mem. Park, Inc., 527 A.2d 988, 995 (Pa. 1987). As an initial

matter, Goodlin’s claim fails because he has not presented any medical evidence in support of his

claim as required.

In addition, Goodlin’s claim is barred by the immunity provisions of Pennsylvania’s

Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (“PSTCA”), 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8541, et seq

(“PSTCA”). “Under that statute, local agencies, such as townships, and their employees acting

in their official capacities are generally immune from tort liability unless the alleged misconduct

fits into one of a few narrow categories enumerated in the statute.” Walker v. North Wales

Borough, 395 F. Supp. 2d 219 (E.D. Pa. 2005). None of those exceptions to immunity applies to

intentional torts, such as intentional infliction of emotional distress. Agresta v. City of

Philadelphia, 694 F. Supp. 117, 123 (E.D. Pa. 1988). Accordingly, Goodlin’s intentional tort

claims against Folcroft and Detective White in his official capacity fail as a matter of law.

Goodlin’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claim against Detective White in his

personal capacity also fails. Individual public employees sued in their personal capacities do not

enjoy immunity under the PSTCA for acts that rise to the level of “a crime, actual fraud, actual

malice or willful misconduct.” 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8550. A police officer engages in willful

misconduct if he commits an intentional tort subjectively knowing that his or her conduct is

wrong. Walker, 395 F. Supp. 2d at 231 (citation omitted). Goodlin has presented no evidence

that Detective White engaged in willful misconduct, much less that he committed a crime or

engaged in actual fraud. Consequently, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on

Goodlin’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claim.

2. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress

The PSTCA’s willful misconduct exception does not apply to acts of negligence. See

Heckensweiler v. McLaughlin, 517 F. Supp. 2d 707, 720-21 (E.D. Pa. 2007). Instead, the PSTCA

specifies that local agencies and their employees are liable only for negligent acts that fall into

one of the following categories: (1) vehicle liability; (2) care, custody, or control of personal

property; (3) care, custody, or control of real property; (4) dangerous conditions of trees, traffic

controls, or street lights; (5) dangerous conditions of utility services facilities; (6) dangerous

conditions of streets; (7) dangerous conditions of sidewalks; (8) care, custody, or control of

animals, and (9) sexual abuse. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8542.

Goodlin’s negligent infliction of emotional distress claim does not fall within any of the

nine specified categories. Accordingly, Folcroft and Detective White are immune from liability.

The Court will therefore grant summary judgment on Goodlin’s negligent infliction of emotional

distress claim.

E. Leave to File Second Amended Complaint

In a last-ditch effort to avoid dismissal, Goodlin seeks leave to amend the complaint. A

Court should freely grant leave to amend “when justice so requires.” FED. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).

“TW |here plaintiff files a motion to amend after defendant has moved for summary judgment the

motion to amend will not be granted unless the party seeking amendment can show not only that

the proposed amendment has ‘substantial merit,’ but also come forward with ‘substantial and

convincing evidence’ supporting the newly asserted claim.” Carey v. Beans, 500 F. Supp. 580,

582 (E.D. Pa. 1980) aff'd, 659 F.2d 1065 (3d Cir. 1981) (internal citation omitted).

Goodlin has not established that any proposed amendment has substantial merit, nor has

he come forward with substantial and convincing evidence to support any such amendment. On

the contrary, during oral argument, counsel conceded that he did not have any new facts to add to

the complaint. Giving Goodlin another opportunity to amend the complaint under the

circumstances presented here would prejudice defendants.

IV. CONCLUSION

Goodlin has failed to substantiate the allegations in his amended complaint, and he has

not pointed to record evidence to allow a jury to rationally find in his favor. Accordingly, there is

no genuine dispute as to any material fact, and Detective White and Folcroft are entitled to

judgment as a matter of law. The Court will therefore grant Defendants’ motion for summary

judgment. An appropriate order follows.

BY THE COURT:

Mon ke Be

MARYKAY GOSTELLO.T

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