The opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CHAMBERS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING COURTHOUSE
SUSAN D. WIGENTON 50 WALNUT ST.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE NEW 97 A 3 R -6 K 45 , - N 5 J 9 0 0 3 7 101
August 22, 2025
Donell L. Prince
P.O. Box 1024
Hackensack, NJ 07602-1024
Pro se Plaintiff
Thomas W. Griffin
Trifiolis & Griffin, P.C
79 Sunset Strip
Suite 2A
Succasunna, NJ 07876
Counsel for Defendant
Victoria M. Brown
Victoria M. Brown, LLC
342 Grand Avenue
Englewood, NJ 07631
Counsel for Defendant
LETTER OPINION FILED WITH THE CLERK OF THE COURT
Re: Donell Prince v. Priscilla Pajela, et al.
Civil Action No. 22-1939 (SDW) (JRA)
Litigants:
Before this Court are Defendant Priscilla Pajela’s motions for summary judgment
concerning pro se Plaintiff Donell Prince’s claims (D.E. 109) and Defendant’s own counterclaims
(D.E. 110). Jurisdiction is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367(a). Venue is proper
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391. This opinion is issued without oral argument pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 78. For the reasons stated herein, Defendant’s motion for summary
judgment as to Plaintiff’s claims is GRANTED, and Defendant’s motion for summary judgment
as to her counterclaims is DENIED.
BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The parties are presumed to be familiar with this matter and may refer to the various prior
opinions and orders for a summary of the factual background. (D.E. 23; D.E. 64; D.E. 74; D.E.
94; D.E. 102.) Plaintiff sued Defendant, who is his former landlord, and several fictitious
defendants, alleging that toxic fumes were intentionally injected into his room. (D.E. 20 at 6–7,
8.1) Defendant seeks dismissal of the amended complaint, summary judgment in her favor on
Plaintiff’s claims and her own counterclaims, and back rent, charges, and attorneys’ fees. (D.E.
109-1; D.E. 110-1.)
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as
to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). The “mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an
otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no
genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48 (1986). A
fact is only “material” for purposes of summary judgment if a dispute over that fact “might affect
the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Id. at 248. A dispute about a material fact is
“genuine” if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party.” Id. The dispute is not genuine if it merely involves “some metaphysical doubt as to the
material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).
The moving party must show that if the evidentiary material of record were reduced to
admissible evidence in court, it would be insufficient to permit the nonmoving party to carry its
burden of proof. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986). If the moving party
meets this initial burden, the burden then shifts to the nonmovant who “must set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Bare assertions, conclusory allegations, or
suspicions will not suffice.” Jutrowski v. Twp. of Riverdale, 904 F.3d 280, 288–89 (3d Cir. 2018)
(quoting D.E. v. Cent. Dauphin Sch. Dist., 765 F.3d 260, 268–69 (3d Cir. 2014)).
If the nonmoving party “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an
element essential to that party’s case, and on which … [it has] the burden of proof[,]” then the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322–23. In
considering a motion for summary judgment, this Court may not make credibility determinations
or weigh the evidence; instead, the nonmoving party’s evidence “is to be believed, and all
justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 651 (2014) (per
curiam) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255).
DISCUSSION
a. Plaintiff’s Claims
Plaintiff alleges violations of various federal and state laws, including the Fair Housing
Act and New Jersey’s Rooming and Boarding House Act. (D.E. 20 at 4–5.) While Plaintiff’s
filings are difficult to follow, all of his claims appear to be based on the allegation that someone
“intentional[ly] expos[ed]” him to “toxic fumes/chemicals/drugs … to stop [him] from pursuing
[his] civil [and] legal rights.” (Id. at 5.) Even after discovery, Plaintiff has failed to put forth any
1 Because the filing containing the amended complaint (D.E. 20) also contains several other documents, page numbers
of the amended complaint refer to the page number in the Electronic Case Filing header.
evidence connecting Defendant to that allegation. For example, when asked in a deposition who
put the fumes in his room, Plaintiff responded “I have no idea who was doing it. But … it was
coming from the basement. Now the basement is a common area. She has an obligation and duty
to secure the common areas of the house.” (D.E. 109-10 at 55:2–6; D.E. 109-1 at 3.) Because of
this lack of evidence, Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendant was intentionally exposing him to
fumes cannot withstand summary judgment. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322–23.
To the extent Plaintiff alleges that Defendant is liable for failing to maintain the premises
or stop an unknown party from putting fumes in Plaintiff’s room, his claims also fail. He does not
coherently point to any record evidence establishing that the fumes were in fact being pumped into
his room. He submitted various photographs of his housing and what appear to be the results from
an air quality monitor. (See, e.g. D.E. 114-1 at 3–61.) The results from the air quality monitor are
frequently illegible, and regardless, Plaintiff does not explain what they mean or connect them to
his claims. He also attaches several pages of illegible handwritten notes. (D.E. 114-2 at 3–50.)
To support his claim of uninhabitability, Plaintiff cites his answer to Defendant’s counterclaims,
the amended complaint, several more pages of illegible notes and air quality results, and deposition
testimony in a separate case unrelated to habitability. (D.E. 113-2 at ¶ 4 (citing D.E. 20 at 4–163;
D.E. 20-1 at 1–137; D.E. 27 at 3–6).) None of this evidence supports Plaintiff’s claims that
Defendant violated the law by failing to act on his complaints, and it is insufficient to create a
genuine issue of material fact. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; see Hackman v. InductEV, No. 24-
3223, 2025 WL 1806850, at *2 n.3 (3d Cir. July 1, 2025) (“declin[ing] to comb through the record
and make [plaintiff’s] argument for her” when her cited evidence was insufficient to support her
claim). Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on the claims in the amended complaint.
Finally, discovery is complete and Plaintiff has not identified the fictitious defendants. See
Blakeslee v. Clinton Cnty., 336 F. App’x 248, 250 (3d Cir. 2009) (“If reasonable discovery does
not unveil the proper identities, ... the John Doe defendants must be dismissed.”). Therefore, all
claims against the fictitious defendants must be dismissed.
b. Defendant’s Counterclaims
Defendant’s three counterclaims are breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing, and frivolous lawsuit. (D.E. 25 at 13–19.) Her brief presumes that she is
entitled to summary judgment on each counterclaim primarily because of a separate proceeding in
the Superior Court of New Jersey (Bergen County). (D.E. 110-1 at 2–8.) Defendant states that
the Superior Court issued a judgment in June 2023 for Plaintiff’s eviction after determining that
Plaintiff owed back rent and charges due in the amount of $32,856.31. (Id. at 2.) Relying on that
judgment for liability, Defendant’s argument for summary judgment on her counterclaims in this
matter focuses primarily on remedies.
The first section of argument in Defendant’s moving brief essentially states that because
Plaintiff does not allege having paid rent during the period in question, and the Superior Court has
determined that Plaintiff owed back rent and charges, this Court should award Defendant the
amount awarded by the Superior Court as well as additional rent, additional charges, and attorney’s
fees, for a total of $58,033.54. (Id. at 5–6.) Defendant fails to acknowledge, however, that Plaintiff
has not been found liable for breach of contract in this Court. This Court will not award damages
without first making a determination on liability, an aspect of Defendant’s counterclaims she only
briefly addresses. In support of breach of contract, she cites the Superior Court judgment and her
own affidavit setting forth additional rent. (Id. at 5.) That is insufficient to establish liability, let
alone damages. This Court will not, as Defendant suggests, summarily “accept[] … the Superior
Court’s determination” of liability and its damages calculation for breach of contract. (Id.) Even
if Defendant were liable for breach of contract, the Superior Court’s judgment in a separate matter
would not be relevant evidence for calculating damages. A summary judgment motion in a
separate court is not a method for enforcing a state court judgment. Defendant is also not entitled
to summary judgment on the additional rent and charges, as she cites only a “self-serving affidavit”
on that point. Blair v. Scott Specialty Gases, 283 F.3d 595, 608 (3d Cir. 2002). Because Defendant
has failed to properly put forth evidence supporting her breach of contract counterclaim, she is not
entitled to summary judgment thereon, and this Court will not award the damages requested.
Defendant’s counterclaim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing suffers
from the same issue. Defendant focuses on her perceived entitlement to attorney’s fees rather than
Plaintiff’s liability. To establish liability for a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
Defendant must “show[] … ‘bad motive or intention.’” Alin v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Civ. No.
08-4825, 2010 WL 1372308, at *11 (D.N.J. Mar. 31, 2010) (quoting Wilson v. Amerada Hess
Corp., 773 A.2d 1121, 1130 (N.J. 2001)). The only record evidence Defendant cites to support
Plaintiff’s bad motive or intention in bringing this lawsuit is his deposition testimony that he did
not know who was causing the fumes to enter his room. (D.E. 110-1 at 7.) While that evidence
certainly shows that Plaintiff had a weak case, it is insufficient to establish that he acted with a bad
motive or intention.
Finally, Defendant fails to cite sufficient record evidence to support that this lawsuit was
frivolous under New Jersey’s Frivolous Litigation Act, N.J.S.A. § 2A:15-59.1. To establish that
this lawsuit was frivolous, Defendant must show that the complaint was “commenced, used or
continued in bad faith, solely for the purpose of harassment, delay or malicious injury” or that
Plaintiff “knew, or should have known, that the complaint … was without any reasonable basis in
law or equity and could not be supported by a good faith argument for an extension, modification
or reversal of existing law.” Id. § 2A:15-59.1.b(1)–(2). Defendant’s support for the frivolous
lawsuit counterclaim is only Plaintiff’s admission that he did not know who was putting the fumes
in his apartment. (D.E. 110-1 at 8.) As established above, that is insufficient to establish bad faith
at this stage. It is also insufficient to establish that Plaintiff understood that his case lacked a basis
in law or equity. While it seems that Plaintiff is a frequent litigant, that his case is fraught with a
lack of evidence, and that he has a contentious history with Defendant, given his pro se status, this
Court will not find that his lawsuit is frivolous and declines to impose sanctions.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s
claims in the amended complaint is GRANTED, and Defendant’s motion for summary judgment
as to her counterclaims is DENIED. The amended complaint is DISMISSED. An appropriate
order follows.
/s/ Susan D. Wigenton x
SUSAN D. WIGENTON, U.S.D.J.
Orig: Clerk
cc: Parties
José R. Almonte, U.S.M.J.