Thomas v. East Carroll Parish

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

MONROE DIVISION

GERMANY GERMAINE THOMAS CIVIL ACTION NO. 25-0574

SECTION P

VS.

JUDGE JERRY EDWARDS, JR.

EAST CARROLL PARISH SHERIFF'S MAG. JUDGE KAYLA D. MCCLUSKY

OFFICE, ET AL.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff Germany Germaine Thomas, a prisoner at East Carroll Detention Center

("ECDC") proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this proceeding on approximately April

28, 2025, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He names the following Defendants: East Carroll Parish

Sheriff's Office, "East Carroll Det. Ctr./Medical Staff," and “everybody that works on the chow

line.”1 For reasons that follow, the Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s claims.

Background

Plaintiff was incarcerated at ECDC beginning March or April 2025. [doc. # 1, p. 3]. He

is diabetic and claims that as of the filing of his initial pleading in April 2025, he is (1) "being

refused diabetic snacks" when his sugar level is low and (2) forced to eat "regular inmate diet

trays and [is] not receiving a diabetic tray" because the facility lacks a dietician. Id.

1 This matter has been referred to the undersigned for review, report, and recommendation under

28 U.S.C. § 636, and the standing orders of the Court.

In an amended pleading, Plaintiff faults “everybody that works on the chow line” because

they “don’t have diabetic trays” and obtain the food they serve “from Unit 3.” [doc. # 8, p. 1].

For relief, Plaintiff seeks $500,000.00. [doc. # 1, p. 4].

Law and Analysis

1. Preliminary Screening

Plaintiff is a prisoner who has been permitted to proceed in forma pauperis. As a

prisoner seeking redress from an officer or employee of a governmental entity, his complaint is

subject to preliminary screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.2 See Martin v. Scott, 156 F.3d

578, 579-80 (5th Cir. 1998) (per curiam). Because he is proceeding in forma pauperis, his

Complaint is also subject to screening under § 1915(e)(2). Both § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b)

provide for sua sponte dismissal of the complaint, or any portion thereof, if the Court finds it is

frivolous or malicious, if it fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or if it seeks

monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.

A complaint is frivolous when it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.”

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A claim lacks an arguable basis in law when it is

“based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.” Id. at 327. Courts are also afforded the

unusual power to pierce the veil of the factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual

contentions are clearly baseless. Id.

A complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted when it fails to plead

“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

2 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h), “‘prisoner’ means any person incarcerated or detained in any

facility who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations

of criminal law or the terms and conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary

program.”

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); accord Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A claim is

facially plausible when it contains sufficient factual content for the court “to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Plausibility does not equate to possibility or probability; it lies

somewhere in between. Id. Plausibility simply calls for enough factual allegations to raise a

reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence to support the elements of the claim.

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.

Assessing whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a “context-specific

task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”

Iqbal, supra. A well-pled complaint may proceed even if it strikes the court that actual proof of

the asserted facts is improbable and that recovery is unlikely. Twombly, supra.

In making this determination, the court must assume that all the plaintiff’s factual

allegations are true. Bradley v. Puckett, 157 F.3d 1022, 1025 (5th Cir. 1998). However, the

same presumption does not extend to legal conclusions. Iqbal, supra. A pleading comprised of

“labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” does not

satisfy Rule 8. Id. A complaint fails to state a claim where its factual allegations do not “raise a

right to relief above the speculative level.” Montoya v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 614

F.3d 145, 148 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “[U]nadorned, the-defendant

unlawfully-harmed-me accusation[s]” will not suffice. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677.

“[P]laintiffs must allege facts that support the elements of the cause of action in order to

make out a valid claim.” City of Clinton, Ark. v. Pilgrim’s Pride Corp, 632 F.3d 148, 152-53

(5th Cir. 2010). Courts are “not free to speculate that the plaintiff ‘might’ be able to state a claim

if given yet another opportunity to add more facts to the complaint.” Macias v. Raul A.

(Unknown) Badge No. 153, 23 F.3d 94, 97 (5th Cir. 1994).

A hearing need not be conducted for every pro se complaint. Wilson v. Barrientos, 926

F.2d 480, 483 n.4 (5th Cir. 1991). A district court may dismiss a prisoner’s civil rights

complaint as frivolous based upon the complaint and exhibits alone. Green v. McKaskle, 788

F.2d 1116, 1120 (5th Cir. 1986).

“To state a section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must (1) allege a violation of a right secured by

the Constitution or laws of the United States and (2) demonstrate that the alleged deprivation was

committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Whitley v. Hanna, 726 F.3d 631, 638

(5th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). Consistent with the standard above, a

“[S]ection 1983 complaint must state specific facts, not simply legal and constitutional

conclusions.” Fee v. Herndon, 900 F.2d 804, 807 (5th Cir. 1990).

2. Defendants Unamenable to Suit

As above, Plaintiff names the following entities as Defendants: East Carroll Parish

Sheriff's Office, "East Carroll Det. Ctr./Medical Staff," and “everybody that works on the chow

line.”

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(b)(3) provides that the “[c]apacity to sue or be sued is

determined . . . by the law of the state where the court is located . . . .” Under Louisiana law, an

entity must qualify as a “juridical person,” which is an “entity to which the law attributes

personality, such as a corporation or a partnership.” LA. CIV. CODE art. 24.

Here, the Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against these Defendants because they

do not qualify as juridical persons. See Henderson v. Mid States Servs., Inc., 67 F. App’x 247

(5th Cir. 2003) (finding that the plaintiff did not show “that the Medical Department is a legal

entity amenable to suit . . . .”); Cozzo v. Tangipahoa Parish Council-President Government, 279

F.3d 273, 283 (5th Cir. 2002) (“[A] sheriff’s office is not a legal entity capable of being sued . . .

.”); Aucoin v. Terrebonne Par. Sheriff's Off., 2022 WL 16657429, at *1 (5th Cir. Nov. 3, 2022).

If by “staff” or “workers” Plaintiff refers not to singular entities but to groups of

individuals, he does not identify these persons and does not address how the unidentified persons

were personally involved in depriving him of a constitutional right.

As above, a complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted when it fails

to plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S.

at 570. A civil rights plaintiff must support his claims with specific facts demonstrating a

constitutional deprivation and may not simply rely on conclusory allegations. Ashcroft, 556 U.S.

at 662.

Further, Section 1983 provides in relevant part: “Every person who . . . subjects, or

causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights,

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured

. . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (emphasis added). If a person is not personally involved, then, a

fortiori, he cannot subject another to, or cause, a deprivation of constitutional rights. See

Thompson v. Steele, 709 F.2d 381, 382 (5th Cir. 1983) (“Personal involvement is an essential

element of a civil rights cause of action.”).

Here, the undersigned instructed Plaintiff to “provide the name of each defendant who

allegedly violated his constitutional rights and from whom he seeks relief.” [doc. # 7, p. 2]. He

filed an amended pleading, but he did not identify the “staff” or “workers.” Moreover, he does

not sufficiently identify “any particular defendant’s personal involvement in conduct that caused

constitutional deprivation.” See Alderson v. Concordia Par. Corr. Facility, 848 F.3d 415, 421

(5th Cir. 2017) (dismissing a claim that supervisory officials failed to correctly house the

plaintiff because despite the magistrate judge’s instruction to “state what each defendant did[,]”

the plaintiff did not identify a responsible defendant). The Court disregards bare assertions of

collective responsibility unsupported by concrete factual allegations. See Martinez v. City of N.

Richland Hills, 846 F. App’x 238, 243 (5th Cir. 2021); Jones v. Hosemann, 812 F. App’x 235,

238-39 (5th Cir. 2020) (“It is not enough for a plaintiff to simply allege that something

unconstitutional happened to him. The plaintiff must plead that each defendant individually

engaged in actions that caused the unconstitutional harm.”).

Here, to the extent Plaintiff names “staff” or “workers” as unidentified persons, the Court

should dismiss Plaintiff's claims against them.

Recommendation

For the reasons above, IT IS RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff Germany Germaine

Thomas’s claims be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as legally frivolous and for failing to

state claims on which relief may be granted.

Under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) and Rule 72(b), parties aggrieved by

this recommendation have fourteen (14) days from service of this Report and Recommendation

to file specific, written objections with the Clerk of Court. A party may respond to another

party’s objections within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of any objections or

response to the district judge at the time of filing.

Failure to file written objections to the proposed factual findings and/or the

proposed legal conclusions reflected in this Report and Recommendation within fourteen

(14) days following the date of its service, or within the time frame authorized by Fed. R.

Civ. P. 6(b), shall bar an aggrieved party from attacking either the factual findings or the

legal conclusions accepted by the District Court, except upon grounds of plain error. See

Douglass v. United Services Automobile Association, 79 F.3d 1415 (Sth Cir. 1996).

In Chambers, Monroe, Louisiana, this 24" day of July, 2025.

Kesfbs Oy. Me Ouse

□□ $$$

Kayla‘“ye McClusicy

United States Magistrate Judge