Boyd v. National Collegiate Athletic Association

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

NASHVILLE DIVISION

DERRIN BOYD, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) NO. 3:25-cv-00729

v. )

) JUDGE CAMPBELL

NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ) MAGISTRATE JUDGE HOLMES

ASSOCIATION, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Pending before the Court is a Motion for Preliminary Injunction filed by Darrin Boyd.1

(Doc. No. 10). Plaintiff seeks a preliminary injunction that will allow him to play college basketball

during the 2025-26 season. Specifically, Boyd seeks an order that: (1) enjoins Defendant National

Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”) from enforcing certain bylaws governing eligibility to

preclude him from playing NCAA Division I college basketball during the 2025-26 season; (2)

orders the NCAA to immediately grant a waiver of any eligibility rule that would preclude him

from competing; and (3) orders the NCAA to declare him eligible to play. (Id.).

In support of the motion, Plaintiff filed a memorandum and a declaration by Plaintiff. (See

Doc. Nos. 10, 11-1). The NCAA filed a response in opposition and seven exhibits, including the

Declaration of Jerry Vaughn, Director of Academic and Membership Affairs at the NCAA,

documents pertaining to NCAA blanket waivers, and filings and an opinion from cases challenging

the NCAA eligibility requirements. (Doc. No. 23, Exs. 1-7). Plaintiff filed a reply and additional

exhibits: (1) a transcript of the July 16, 2025 preliminary injunction hearing in Bellamy v. NCAA,

1 The request for an ex parte temporary restraining order was previously denied. (See Order, Doc.

No. 16).

Case No. 3:25-cv-00750; (2) a declaration of Dr. Joel Maxcy; (3) the NCAA denial of Boyd’s

request for extension of eligibility waiver; (4) a declaration of Derrin Boyd; and (5) a declaration

of Clay Mallory. (Doc. No. 28, Exs. 1-5).

Defendant moves to strike or for the Court to decline to consider the Declaration of Dr.

Maxcy, or in the alternative, for leave to file a declaration in sur-reply. (Doc. No. 31). Defendant

argues the Maxcy Declaration was improperly included with the reply to substantiate Plaintiff’s

underlying burden of proof rather than to address arguments in Defendant’s response. (Id.).

Plaintiff responds that the Maxcy Declaration was filed in response to Defendant’s argument that

he cannot prevail without producing detailed economic modeling. (Doc. No. 34).

The Court agrees with Defendant that the Court may not consider new arguments and

evidence raised in a reply brief. See McGruder v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cty., No.

3:17-cv-01547, 2020 WL 4586171, at *2 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 10, 2020). Because consideration of

the Maxcy Declaration does not affect the Court’s decision on the pending motion for preliminary

injunction, the motion to strike or for leave to file a sur-reply (Doc. No. 31) is DENIED as MOOT.

For the reasons stated herein, Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction (Doc. No. 10)

is DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND2

Plaintiff Derrin Boyd has been a college student since 2019. He attended Georgetown

College for three years from 2019-2022, Lipscomb University for two years from 2022-2024, and

the College of Charleston for one year from 2024-2025. These colleges are members of different

athletic associations. Georgetown College is a member of the National Association of

2 A more extensive discussion of the NCAA, eligibility rules, and student-athlete compensation is

included in the Court’s December 16, 2024, decision in Diego Pavia v. NCAA, 760 F. Supp. 3d 527, 544

(M.D. Tenn. 2024), which is currently on appeal.

Intercollegiate Athletics (“NAIA”). Lipscomb University and the College of Charleston are

members of Division I of the National Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”), which is the

highest level in collegiate athletics. Division I student-athletes generally have superior training,

facilities, media coverage, and other benefits as compared to student-athletes at lower levels of

competition, including NAIA. Although all student-athletes are eligible to earn compensation from

revenue sharing and name, image, and likeness (“NIL”), virtually all revenue sharing and NIL

funds go to Division I athletes.

NCAA Division I schools have adopted regulations that govern all aspects of collegiate

athletics. The Bylaws at issue in this case are those pertaining to time-limits on eligibility.

Boyd is no longer eligible to compete. At issue here are NCAA Bylaws that restrict the

duration of a student-athlete’s eligibility to compete to four seasons of competition within a five-

year period. In relevant part, these Bylaws state:

12.8 Seasons of Competition: Five-Year Rule. A student-athlete shall not

engage in more than four seasons of intercollegiate competition in any one

sport (see Bylaws 12.02.6 and 14.3.3). An institution shall not permit a

student-athlete to represent it in intercollegiate competition unless the

individual completes all seasons of participation in all sports within the time

periods specified below:

12.8.1 Five-Year Rule. A student-athlete shall complete the student-

athlete’s seasons of participation within five calendar years from the

beginning of the semester or quarter in which the student-athlete first

registered for a minimum full-time program of studies in a collegiate

institution, with time spent in the armed services, on official religious

missions or with recognized foreign aid services of the U.S. government

being excepted. For international students, service in the armed forces or on

an official religious mission of the student’s home country is considered

equivalent to such service in the United States.

12.8.1.1 Determining the Start of the Five-Year Period. For

purposes of starting the count of time under the five-year rule, a

student-athlete shall be considered registered at a collegiate institution

(domestic or foreign; see Bylaw 14.02.4) when the student-athlete

initially registers in a regular term (semester or quarter) of an academic

year for a minimum full-time program of studies, as determined by the

institution, and attends the student’s first day of classes for that term

(see Bylaw 12.8.2).

The NCAA Bylaws define “intercollegiate competition” as follows:

12.02.6 Intercollegiate Competition. Intercollegiate competition is

considered to have occurred when a student-athlete in either a two-year or a

four-year collegiate institution does any of the following:

(a) Represents the institution in any contest against outside

competition, regardless of how the competition is classified (e.g.,

scrimmage, exhibition or joint practice session with another

institution’s team) or whether the student is enrolled in a

minimum full-time program of studies;

(b) Competes in the uniform of the institution, or, during the

academic year, uses any apparel (excluding apparel no longer

used by the institution) received from the institution that includes

institutional identification; or

(c) Competes and receives expenses (e.g., transportation, meals,

housing, entry fees) from the institution for the competition.

Finally, a “Collegiate Institution” is defined as follows:

14.02.4 Collegiate Institution. A collegiate institution (for purposes of

NCAA legislation) is an institution of higher education that:

(a) Is accredited at the college level by an agency or association

recognized by the secretary of the Department of Education and

legally authorized to offer at least a one-year program of study

creditable toward a degree;

(b) Conducts an intercollegiate athletics program, even though the

institution is not accredited at the college level and authorized to

offer at least a one-year program of study creditable toward a

degree; or

(c) Is located in a foreign country.

Taken together, these NCAA Bylaws allow a student-athlete to engage in intercollegiate

athletic competition for four seasons within five consecutive calendar years. Effectively, there are

two “clocks” on a student-athlete’s eligibility: (1) the intercollegiate competition clock

(hereinafter, “seasons of intercollegiate competition”) allows four years of intercollegiate

competition at a “collegiate institution”; and (2) the eligibility clock or “period of eligibility”

allows student-athletes to compete within a five-year period which begins when the student-athlete

begins full-time study at a “collegiate institution.” Seasons of intercollegiate competition accrue

when a student engages in competition at a collegiate institution. If a student does not compete

during a season, that season does not “count” for purposes of the four-year intercollegiate

competition clock. The period of eligibility, however, begins to run when a student-athlete begins

full-time study at a collegiate institution whether or not they engage in intercollegiate competition,

and continues to run, with limited exceptions, for five calendar years.

On December 23, 2024, following this Court’s grant of preliminary injunction in Pavia v.

NCAA, 760 F. Supp. 3d 527 (M.D. Tenn. 2024), the NCAA issued a blanket waiver to “permit

student-athletes who attended and competed at a non-NCAA school for one or more years to

remain eligible to compete in 2025-26 if those students would have otherwise used their final

season of competition during the 2024-25 academic year, and meet all other eligibility

requirements (e.g., progress toward degree, five-year period of eligibility).”3 (See Report of the

NCAA Division I Board of Directors, Dec. 23, 2024, Doc. No. 23-5; NCAA Division I Board of

Directors Waiver Guidance, Doc. No. 23-6). This blanket waiver which has been referred to as the

“Pavia Waiver,” provided relief from the four seasons of intercollegiate competition portion of the

Bylaws, but not the five-year eligibility clock. The blanket waiver does not apply to Boyd who has

exhausted his seasons of competition and period of eligibility.

3 The NCAA appealed the preliminary injunction order. See Pavia v. NCAA, Case No. 24-6153 (6th

Cir.). The appeal remains pending.

Separate from the Pavia Waiver, the NCAA Division I Bylaws include provisions under

which a student-athlete may be granted a waiver of time limits on eligibility. See NCAA Bylaw

12.8.1.7 (setting forth circumstances under which a waiver may be deemed appropriate due to

circumstances beyond the control of the student-athlete or institution).

During Boyd’s six years as a college student, he succeeded academically and athletically.

He earned a bachelor’s degree in May 2023 and a Master of Business Administration in May 2024

from Lipscomb University, and a graduate certificate in urban and regional planning from the

College of Charleston in May 2025. (See Second Boyd Decl., Doc. No. 28-4 at ¶¶ 1-2).

Except for the 2019-20 season when he “redshirted” (i.e., did not compete), he played

basketball for each of the colleges he attended and earned accolades for his performance. (See First

Boyd Decl., Doc. No. 10-1). During the 2020-21 season, he earned First Team All-Mid-South

Conference honors and was named Mid-South Freshman of the Year. (Id. at ¶ 4). The next season,

he was named Mid-South Conference Outstanding Player of the Tournament and received NAIA

All-America Honorable Mention recognition. (Id. ¶ 5). During his two years at Lipscomb

University, he was the second leading scorer both years and was named to the All-ASUN Second

Team in 2023-24, but suffered a season-ending injury after 22 games.4 (Id. at ¶¶ 6-7). As a graduate

student at College of Charleston in 2024-25, Boyd earned All-CAA Third Team Honors. (Id. at ¶

8).

During the 2024-25 season at College of Charleston, Boyd earned Name, Image, and

Likeness (“NIL”) Compensation in the amount of $120,000. (Id. at ¶ 9). Unsurprisingly, he wants

to continue his career as a student-athlete. Vanderbilt University offered him $350,000 to join its

4 In comparison, Boyd played 24 games in 2020-21; 33 games in 2021-22; 33 games in 2022-23;

and 31 games in 2024-25. (First Boyd Decl., Doc. No. 10-1, at ¶¶ 4, 5, 6, 8).

basketball program for the 2025-26 season. The only problem is that under the NCAA Bylaws,

Boyd has no remaining eligibility – he has exhausted both his four years of competition and five

years of eligibility. He sought a waiver from the NCAA, but it was denied. (See Doc. No. 1-1).

Due to uncertainty regarding his eligibility, Vanderbilt gave the roster spot they offered to Boyd

to someone else, but other NCAA Division I basketball teams have offered for him to join their

programs, contingent on his eligibility. (First Boyd Decl., Doc. No. 10-1 at ¶¶ 10-11). Boyd

estimates he can earn $350,000 in NIL Compensation if eligible to play in 2025-26. (Id. at ¶ 12;

see also, Mallory Decl., Doc. No. 28-5).

Boyd challenges the application of the Bylaws concerning seasons of competition and

seasons of eligibility to his enrollment and competition at Georgetown College as an unreasonable

restraint on trade in violation of the Sherman Act. He also challenges the Bylaw allowing for

waiver of the eligibility time limits on the same basis.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“To secure a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff ‘must establish that he is likely to succeed

on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that

the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” EOG

Resources, Inc. v. Lucky Land Mgmt., LLC, 134 F.4th 868, 874 (6th Cir. 2025) (citing Winter v

Nat. Rs. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)). The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to

“preserve the relative positions of the parties until a trial on the merits can be held.” Id. at 883.

(citing Starbucks Corp. v. McKinney, 602 U.S. 339, 345-46 (2024)). The relief is preliminary – “it

does not conclusively resolve anything – that’s what final judgment is for.” Id. “The preliminary

injunction simply puts the case in a holding pattern and ‘balance[s] the equities as the litigation

moves forward.’” Id. (citing Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 582 U.S. 571, 580 (2017)).

“Because a preliminary injunction is an ‘extraordinary’ equitable remedy that is ‘never

awarded as of right,’ the plaintiff must make a ‘clear showing’ that these factors favor him.” Id.

(citing Starbucks Corp. v. McKinney, 602 U.S. 339, 345-46 (2024)). The movant “faces a burden

of proof ‘more stringent than the proof required to survive a summary judgment motion.’” Enchant

Christmas Light Maze & Market Ltd. v. Glowco, LLC, 958 F.3d 532, 539 (6th Cir. 2020).

Regarding the evidentiary burden, “Plaintiffs seeking a preliminary injunction may not merely rely

on unsupported allegations, but rather must come forward with more than ‘scant evidence’ to

substantiate their allegations.” Doe #11 v. Lee, 609 F. Supp. 3d 578, 592 (M.D. Tenn. 2022) (citing

Libertarian Party of Ohio v. Husten, 751 F.3d 403, 417 (6th Cir. 2014) and collecting cases).

A failure to establish a likelihood of success on the merits “‘is usually fatal’ to a plaintiff’s

request for preliminary injunction.” Enchant, 958 F.3d at 539 (quoting Gonzalez v. Nat’l Bd. of

Med. Exam’rs, 225 F.3d 620, 625 (6th Cir. 2000)). But even if the plaintiff shows a likelihood of

success on the merits, “a preliminary injunction does not issue as a matter of course.” EOG

Resources, 134 F.4th at 883 (citing Benisek v. Lamone, 585 U.S. 155, 158 (2018)). “The plaintiff

must also show that some irreparable harm will take place without the court’s immediate

intervention.” Id. (“While the extent of an injury can be balanced against other factors, the

existence of an irreparable injury is mandatory.”). In considering the balance of equities, the Court

“balance[s] the competing claims of injury[,] … consider[ing] the effect on each party of the

granting or withholding of the requested relief.” EOC Resources, 134 F.4th at 886 (citing Winter,

555 U.S. at 24).

“As a general rule, the law requires that ‘losses should remain where they fall until an

adequate legal or equitable justification for shifting them has been demonstrated.’” EOG

Resources, 134 F.4th at 884 (citing Higuchi Int’ Corp. v. Autoliv ASP, Inc., 103 F.4th 400, 404

(6th Cir. 2024)).

“[A] hearing is only required when there are disputed factual issues, and not when the

issues are primarily questions of law.” Certified Restoration Dry Cleaning Network, LLC v. Tenke

Corp., 511 F.3d 535, 552 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Lexington–Fayette Urban County Gov't v.

BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 14 Fed. Appx. 636, 639 (6th Cir. 2001) (Rule 65 “does not require the

presentation of oral testimony ... particularly ... when the issues litigated are primarily questions

of law.”)). The parties have not requested a hearing and, having reviewed the record, the Court

finds there are no disputes of material fact that necessitate a hearing.5

III. ANALYSIS

Boyd seeks a preliminary injunction to (1) enjoin the NCAA from enforcing Bylaws 12.8

(allowing four seasons of intercollegiate competition within five calendar years) as it applies to his

time spent at Georgetown College, an NAIA institution; (2) order the NCAA to immediately grant

a waiver of any eligibility rule that would preclude him from engaging in intercollegiate

competition in the 2025-26 season based on his time spent at Georgetown College; and (3) order

the NCAA to declare him eligible to play during the 2025-26 season.

A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

Boyd argues that the Bylaws counting his time attending and competing at an NAIA

college toward the eligibility time limits and the Bylaw allowing for waiver of those time limits

constitute an unreasonable restraint on trade in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act of 1890

(“the Sherman Act”).6 The Sherman Act provides that “[e]very contract, combination in the form

5 See Doc. Nos. 10, 11, 23, 28, 41.

6 Plaintiff also brings claims under the Tennessee Trade Practices Act (“TPPA”), Tenn. Code Ann.

§ 47-25-101. (See Complaint, Doc. No. 1). The motion for preliminary injunction, however, gives the

of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or

with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.” 15 U.S.C. § 1. To succeed under Section 1 of the

Sherman Act, Plaintiff must show that the NCAA “(1) participated in an agreement that (2)

unreasonably restrain[s] trade in the relevant market.” Nat’l Hockey League Players’ Ass’n v.

Plymouth Whalers Hockey Club, 325 F.3d 712, 718 (6th Cir. 2003).

The parties agree that the rule of reason presumptively applies. (Pl. Mem., Doc. No. 11 at

11; Def. Resp., Doc. No. 23 at 14). Under the rule of reason, the plaintiff has the initial burden to

prove that the challenged restraint has a substantial anticompetitive effect. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic

Ass’n v. Alston, 594 U.S. 69, 97 (2021). Plaintiff can demonstrate a substantial anticompetitive

effect directly or indirectly. American Express, 585 U.S. at 542. Direct evidence of anticompetitive

effect is “‘proof of actual detrimental effects [on competition],’ such as reduced output, increased

prices, or decreased quality in the relevant market.” Id. (citations omitted). Indirect evidence is

“proof of market power plus some evidence that the challenged restraint harms competition.” Id.

(citations omitted).

If the plaintiff carries his burden to show a substantial anticompetitive effect, the burden

then shifts to the defendant to show a procompetitive rationale for the restraint. Alston, 594 U.S.

at 97. If the defendant can make that showing, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate

that the procompetitive efficiencies could be reasonably achieved through less anticompetitive

means. Id. The Supreme Court has cautioned, however, that “antitrust law does not require

businesses to use anything like the least restrictive means of achieving a legitimate business

purpose” and that courts should not “second-guess ‘degrees of reasonable necessity.’” Id. at 98.

TPPA only passing mention, so the Court considers only the Sherman Act claim. (See Pl. Motion for

Preliminary Injunction, Doc. No. 10 at 1; Pl. Mem., Doc. No. 11 at 1).

For the most part, Boyd’s arguments parallel the Court’s analysis in this Court’s Order

granting a preliminary injunction in Pavia v. NCAA, 760 F. Supp. 3d 527 (M.D. Tenn. 2024). The

major differences are: (1) Boyd has exhausted both the four years of intercollegiate competition

and the five-year period of eligibility, whereas Pavia had one year remaining on the eligibility

clock; (2) Boyd challenges the “counting” of his years of attendance and competition at

Georgetown College, a four-year degree granting institution that is a member of the NAIA whereas

Pavia challenged the “counting” of his years of competition at New Mexico Military Academy, a

two-year junior college from which he could not earn a four-year degree; (3) Boyd challenges the

Bylaw allowing waiver of the time-limits to eligibility; Pavia did not challenge that Bylaw.

Here, Boyd identifies the relevant market as the labor market for NCAA Division I

basketball athletes. He barely eeks out an argument that counting time at an NAIA institution has

an anticompetitive effect on the labor market for NCAA Division I basketball athletes. He argues

that “denial of eligibility” based on counting his attendance at a non-NCAA institution

“unreasonably restrains him from participating in the competitive and economic opportunities of

playing Division I basketball and earning significant NIL income.” (Doc. No. 11 at 12). But

allegations of personal harm are insufficient to show harm to the market for NCAA Division I

basketball athletes. His next argument is more plausibly tied to the market. He argues that counting

attendance at NAIA schools toward the five-year period of eligibility “creates a disincentive for

high school athletes to choose NAIA institutions,” seemingly over other post-high school paths

(Id. at 13 (arguing that NAIA attendance reduces future NCAA eligibility while certain other paths

do not)).

What is missing is any evidence or analysis concerning how this advantage results in harm

to the labor market. The arguments asserted in the reply memorandum are more developed. There,

Boyd argues that counting NAIA enrollment and competition toward the eligibility time limits

suppresses competition among student-athletes by “limit[ing] athlete mobility and earning

potential by categorically disqualifying players from a fourth year of Division I eligibility,

precisely when their NIL value is often at its peak.” (Doc. No. 28 at 9). Boyd also argues that the

Bylaws pressure student-athletes to enroll at NCAA institutions solely to preserve eligibility, even

where non-NCAA schools like junior colleges or NAIA institutions may offer stronger academic

or athletic fits. (Id. (citing Pavia, 760 F. Supp. 3d at 539)). Boyd also argues that counting time a

NAIA colleges against NCAA eligibility makes it “nearly impossible” for NAIA schools to

compete for elite recruits. (Id. at 10).

Presumably in support of his position that counting NAIA time toward NCAA Division I

eligibility has a substantial anticompetitive effect on the market for Division I basketball players,

Plaintiff filed the Declaration of economist Dr. Joel Maxcy with his reply. (See Doc. No. 28-2).

But Dr. Maxcy does not address whether the Bylaws affect competition between NAIA schools

and NCAA Division I schools for college basketball players. (Id.). Dr. Maxcy argues the

anticompetitive effect is something else – that by imposing time limits on eligibility and

“systematically remov[ing] the most productive and valuable participants from the market,”

NCAA member institutions prematurely remove a “meaningful segment of top earners from the

labor market” and “effectively cap the upper end of the compensation scale.” (Id. at ¶ 41). In other

words, Dr. Maxcy asserts an anticompetitive effect of all time-limits, arguing that by “cutting off

labor market access after five years, the [Bylaws] prevent NCAA athletes … from realizing the

full market value of their personal brands during their most valuable year.” (Id. ¶ 39). In fact, Dr.

Maxcy says almost nothing about the effect of “counting” time at NAIA colleges on the market or

NCAA Division I basketball players. (Id.).

Boyd has not provided any logical argument or evidence to suggest that the Bylaw allowing

waiver of the time-limits on eligibility has a substantial anticompetitive effect on the labor market

or anything else. His argument is limited to the effect of the denial of a waiver as to him, which

does not show harm to the market as a whole. See Forqurean v. NCAA, 143 F.4th 859 (7th Cir.

2025) (plaintiff’s “reli[ance] solely on his own exclusion from participating in college football as

proof of anticompetitive effects” insufficient to show policy has anticompetitive effects on the

market). Accordingly, the Court does not find a likelihood of success on the merits of an antitrust

challenge based on the Bylaw allowing waiver of the time-limits on eligibility.

Even if the Court assumes Boyd has identified a relevant market (the labor market for

NCAA Division I basketball athletes) and that he has shown the time-limits on eligibility have a

substantial anticompetitive effect on the labor market, see Pavia, 760 F. Supp. 3d at 540

(“restrictions on who can compete (and earn NIL compensation) and for how long necessarily have

anticompetitive effects”), his arguments fail the next steps in the rule of reason analysis.

The NCAA asserts several procompetitive rationales for the challenged rules. First,

limiting the amount of time college athletes can compete in collegiate athletics to four years within

a five-year period ensures that a class of college students exits so that high school senior student-

athletes have an opportunity to enter. Second, the time-limits are necessary for Division I collegiate

athletics to exist as a product distinct from professional athletics. Third, the time limits foster better

alignment between Division I athletics and academics.

The NCAA contends that the eligibility Bylaws are necessary to create the product of

college athletics as distinct from professional sports and that part of this product is that college

sports are played by college students and that college students do not remain in college forever.

Instead, the Bylaws limit their eligibility to a time roughly tied to standard degree progression.

The NCAA argues that the eligibility restrictions are of particular importance now that revenue

sharing and NIL compensation incentivize student-athletes to remain in college as long as

economically lucrative. If allowed to do so, not only will this lead to the crowding out of

prospective DI athletes from high school, it will dramatically reduce the natural cycle of student-

athletes, and eliminate an important distinction between college sports and professional sports.

Boyd contends that these asserted justifications are not valid.7 He points to the NCAA’s

exemption of “certain post-secondary activities such as prep schools, military academies, and

professional participation in other sports, from triggering the eligibility clock,” and argues the

same exemptions should apply to student-athletes who attend NAIA institutions because

“[a]thletes in these exempt categories often compete at comparable or higher levels than NAIA

schools, but only NAIA athletes lose eligibility time for similar participation.” (Doc. No. 28 at 11).

Boyd also argues that NCAA Division I programs recruit players other than high school athletes

and notes that when Vanderbilt University decided to fill the roster sport it had offered to Boyd,

that spot did not go to a graduating high school student, it went to George Kimball III, a rising

junior from Eastern Kentucky University, a NCAA Division II institution. (Id. at 12 (citing Doc.

No. 28-4)). Finally, Boyd argues that the NCAA’s assertion that the eligibility rules align athletics

with education is “plainly pretextual” because college admissions are “already competitive” and

“meritorious student-athletes such as Boyd [should have] the same opportunity to compete for a

roster spot, particularly when those positions come with substantial commercial and educational

benefits.” (Id.).

7 Plaintiff’s memorandum in support of the motion for preliminary injunction anticipates three

procompetitive rationales not asserted by the NCAA in this case: (1) promoting academic progress; (2)

facilitating timely graduation; (3) preserving amateurism; and (4) maintaining competitive balance. (See

Doc. No. 11 at 15-16).

Although the parties address the time-limits on eligibility in toto, the Court finds it

appropriate to distinguish between the Bylaws restricting intercollegiate competition to four years

(Bylaw 12.8) and the Bylaws requiring that “[a] student-athlete shall complete the student-athlete’s

seasons of participation within five calendar years from the beginning of the semester or quarter

in which the student-athlete first registered for a minimum full-time program of studies in a

collegiate institution.” (NCAA Division I Bylaw 12.8.1).8 For purposes of the instant motion, the

Court focuses on the five-year requirement, specifically the “counting” of time enrolled at an

NAIA institution. (Bylaw 14.02.4). For the most part, Boyd does not challenge the NCAA’s

asserted justification as to this aspect of the eligibility rules. He argues only that the NCAA’s

decision to start the five-year eligibility clock upon enrollment at an NAIA institution is

“inconsistent” with the exclusion of certain other post-secondary activities. The Court disagrees.

Unlike both NCAA Division I and NAIA institutions, both of which confer four-year bachelor’s

degrees, the activities excluded from “counting” (military service, professional participation in

other sports, and prep schools) do not confer degrees, and only the prep school is an educational

institution, albeit not one educationally comparable to a four-year college.

Boyd notes that the Court has previously observed the logical inconsistencies of the rules

excluding competition at prep schools while counting competition at two-year junior colleges,

especially when those athletes compete against one another. The same concerns do not apply here,

in part, because that analysis focused on the application of the Bylaws allowing only four years of

competition, rather than the five-year requirement which pertains to status as a student irrespective

of athletic competition. Moreover, unlike junior colleges which do not award four-year bachelor’s

8 Boyd also challenges the Bylaws limiting intercollegiate competition to four-years and counting

competition at NAIA institutions, but because he is not eligible to compete unless none of these rules restrict

his eligibility.

degrees, NAIA and NCAA Division I institutions are both four-year degree granting institutions.

For purposes of deciding who is a college student, there is no inconsistency in “counting”

enrollment at an NAIA college.

The Court finds the NCAA has shown a procompetitive rationale for the time-limits on

eligibility and for applying those time limits, particularly the five-year period of eligibility, to

students attending NAIA colleges. Therefore, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate

that the procompetitive efficiencies could be reasonably achieved through less anticompetitive

means.

Boyd argues the NCAA can achieve any legitimate procompetitive justifications “without

imposing undue harm on NAIA transfer athletes” by tying eligibility to an athletes’ initial

enrollment at an NCAA member institution or could adopt new bylaws that “promote academic

advancement without imposing unnecessarily restrictive eligibility limitations on transfer

athletes.” (Doc. No. 11 at 17). Boyd proposes these new bylaws would include “an individualized

waiver process” or “clear and consistent policies for athletes affected by injuries or natural

disasters.” (Id.).

At this juncture, Boyd has not shown that the NCAA can achieve its procompetitive

justifications by starting the five-year eligibility period only upon enrollment at an NCAA member

institution, which would have the potential to extend the “career” of a student-athlete far beyond

that of a typical student. Boyd himself seeks only one more year of eligibility; but the antitrust

inquiry is not specific to Boyd, it concerns the market as a whole. Boyd’s proposal potentially

opens up an additional four years of NCAA Division I eligibility. Without further evidence and

analysis, the Court is not persuaded that the NCAA’s asserted procompetitive efficiencies can be

achieved with Boyd’s proposed modifications to the eligibility rules.

At this juncture, Boyd has not shown he is likely to succeed on the merits of his antitrust

challenge. Accordingly, this factor does not support the grant of a preliminary injunction. See

Enchant, 958 F.3d at 539 (“A finding that there is simply no likelihood of success on the merits is

usually fatal to a plaintiff’s quest for a preliminary injunction.”) (internal quotations omitted).

B. Irreparable Injury

Even if a plaintiff has shown a likelihood of success on the merits, which Boyd has not, “a

preliminary injunction does not follow as a matter of course.” EOG Resources, 134 F.4th at 883

(citing Benisek v. Lamone, 585 U.S. 155, 158 (2018)). “A plaintiff must also show that some

irreparable harm will take place without the court's immediate intervention.” Id.

Boyd argues that he will be irreparably harmed if unable to play another year of college

basketball. (Doc. No. 11 at 17). The Court accepts that the experience of playing college sports is

not one that can be readily compensated with monetary damages. In fact, the Court has previously

concluded, as many other courts have, that the denial of the ability to play sports is irreparable

harm. Pavia, 760 F. Supp. 3d 527, 544 (M.D. Tenn. 2024) (citing Ohio, 706 F. Supp. 3d at 597

(“Courts have repeatedly found that ‘[c]ollege students suffer irreparable harm when they are

denied the opportunity to play sports.’”) (collecting cases)). Boyd points to lost opportunities to

form lasting relationships with teammates, for personal growth, exposure, building a personal

brand, and potentially creating additional career avenues. It bears mentioning, however, that much

of the harm on which Boyd appears to be focused is the lost financial opportunity – the chance to

pursue a graduate degree and the opportunity for “life-changing” NIL compensation. (See Doc.

No. 11 at 19-20).

Defendant argues Boyd cannot claim irreparable harm because he unreasonably delayed

seeking the instant relief. (Doc. No. 23 at 36). Defendant argues that Boyd has known for years –

since at least 2022-23 season when he arrived at Lipscomb University – that his time at

Georgetown College counted toward his NCAA Division I eligibility and that he would, therefore,

exhaust his eligibility following the 2024-25 academic year. The NCAA points to Bylaw 12.7.2.1,

which requires student-athletes to submit a signed statement that provides information related to

eligibility and to acknowledge that they are “responsible for knowing and understanding the

application of all NCAA Division I regulations related to [their] eligibility.”9 Defendant argues

that the three-year delay shows any urgency to Boyd’s request for preliminary injunction is of his

own making and that his assertion of lost opportunity to play professionally is speculative, at best.

The Court agrees Boyd has shown irreparable harm, but finds this showing is tempered by

the delay in seeking relief. To be sure, his perception of the value of a season of play may have

evolved since he began his Division I career, but the failure to seek redress until now suggests a

lack of urgency for relief. See 11A Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller, et al., Federal Practice

and Procedure § 2948.1 (3d ed. 2018) (“A long delay by plaintiff after learning of the threatened

harm also may be taken as an indication that the harm would not be serious enough to justify a

preliminary injunction.”).

C. Balance of Equities & Public Interest

Boyd argues granting the requested relief will not impose a significant burden on the

NCAA, as it applies only to a single NAIA transfer student, not a broad class of athletes, and does

not undermine the NCAA’s regulatory framework. He also asserts the relief will not harm any

other individual or entity and that enforcing the antitrust laws is in the public interest.

9 See NCAA Student Athlete Statement – Division I,

https://ncaaorg.s3.amazonaws.com/compliance/d1/2025-26/2025-26D1Comp_Form25-1a-

StudentAthleteStatement.pdf (last visited Aug. 5, 2025).

The NCAA urges the Court to consider that granting a preliminary injunction to even one

athlete results in sweeping new challenges to the eligibility rules, which impact opportunities

available to almost 200,000 Division I student-athletes. The NCAA also argues that, given the

fixed number of roster spots for Division I basketball teams, granting eligibility to Boyd allows

him to play another year at the expense of another eligible player.

Under the circumstances here, the balance of equities weighs against granting a preliminary

injunction. Importantly, Boyd has not shown a likelihood of success on the merits. In addition,

although he has shown irreparable harm, the bulk of the asserted harm is loss of access to the

substantial NIL opportunities, which is monetary harm that can be redressed at a later stage.

Allowing Boyd another season of eligibility will almost certainly come at the expense of another

eligible player. See e.g., Zeigler v. NCAA, Case No. 3:25-cv-226, 2025 WL 1671952, at * 5 (E.D.

Tenn. Jun. 12, 2025) (“given the fixed number of roster spots available for each Division I

basketball team, an injunction would run the risk of harming (1) currently-enrolled Division I

basketball players who have already committed to a member institution and (2) current high school

seniors who might have their college recruitment disrupted”). Finally, although the Court has

recognized that “the public interest is served by promoting free and fair competition in the labor

markets” see Pavia, 760 F. Supp. 3d at 544, as the requested relief affects only Boyd, this factor

does not weigh heavily in the Court’s consideration.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, Plaintiff has not shown that immediate relief is warranted.

Accordingly, the motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. No. 10) is DENIED. The motion to

strike the Declaration of Joel Maxcy (Doc. No. 31) is DENIED as MOOT.

It is so ORDERED.

WILLIAM L. CAMPBELL, J /

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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