upholding the use of deadly force against a person who was driving a car towards the officer where, “[a]t the most, [Officer] Arrugueta had only 2.72 seconds to react to what he perceived as a threat of using physical harm from Walters.”
How later courts described this case
- upholding the use of deadly force against a person who was driving a car towards the officer where, “[a]t the most, [Officer] Arrugueta had only 2.72 seconds to react to what he perceived as a threat of using physical harm from Walters.”
- finding that a conclusory allegation that a police officer acted maliciously and in bad faith was “insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss”
- “Brivik’s allegation that Officer Law acted maliciously and in bad faith is conclusory and therefore insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.”
- “Under both Alabama law and federal law, the core issue is whether a defendant violated clearly established law.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
JAMES RONALD LOGAN, }
}
Plaintiff, }
}
v. } Case No.: 2 :24-cv-01348-MHH
}
RONALD VERNARR }
HUGHES, TIM ROSS, JUSTIN }
SELF, CITY OF HOMEWOOD, }
ALABAMA, }
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
On October 15, 2022, former Homewood Police Officer Ronald Hughes shot
plaintiff James Logan six times. (Doc. 1). In this lawsuit, Mr. Logan asserts an
individual capacity excessive force claim against Officer Hughes under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 and an assault and battery claim against him under Alabama law. (Doc. 1, p.
11-13, 18-19). Mr. Logan also asserts individual capacity § 1983 claims against
former Homewood Chief of Police Tim Ross and Homewood Police Officer Justin
Self, who oversaw officer training, and a municipal liability claim against the City of
Homewood for an unconstitutional custom or policy, ratification, and failure to train.
Finally, Mr. Logan asserts Alabama state law negligence and wantonness claims
against the City of Homewood, former Chief Ross, and Officer Self. (Doc. 1, pp. 2-
3, 13-18, 19-21). Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
the defendants have asked the Court to dismiss Mr. Logan’s claims against them.
(Docs. 7, 9, 14). The defendants contend that they are immune from Mr. Logan’s
claims.
To resolve these motions, the Court first sets forth the standard for motions to
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Then, the Court describes the factual allegations in Mr.
Logan’s complaint that precede Officer Hughes’s bodycam footage and the events
captured in Officer Hughes’s body camera recording. Finally, the Court evaluates
the factual allegations and the facts established in the video recording under the legal
standards that govern the defendants’ immunity defenses.
I.
Rule 12(b)(6) allows a defendant to move to dismiss claims within a complaint
for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
“A complaint is subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) when its factual allegations,
on their face, establish an affirmative defense that bars recovery.” Myrick v. Fulton
Cnty., Ga., 69 F.4th 1277, 1297 (11th Cir. 2023) (citing Ingram v. Kubik, 30 F.4th
1241, 1250 (11th Cir. 2022)). “That means that if a defendant raises the affirmative
defense of qualified immunity, the district court must dismiss any claims that do not
allege a violation of clearly established law.” Myrick, 69 F.4th at 1297. Officer
Hughes has raised the affirmative defense of qualified immunity with respect to Mr.
Logan’s § 1983 excessive force claim.
Similarly, Officer Hughes has raised the affirmative defense of state agent
immunity with respect to Mr. Logan’s state law claim for assault and battery. (Doc.
10, pp. 14-19). Under Alabama law, a state agent is “immune from civil liability in
his or her personal capacity when the conduct made the basis of the claim against the
agent is based upon the agent’s . . . exercising judgment in the enforcement of the
criminal laws of the State.” Ex parte City of Homewood, 231 So. 3d 1082, 1087 (Ala.
2017) (citing Ala. Code § 6–5–338(a) (1975)).1
In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a district court generally must
view the factual allegations in a complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff
and accept the alleged facts as true. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551
U.S. 308, 322 (2007); Baker v. City of Madison, Ala., 67 F.4th 1268, 1276 (11th Cir.
2023); Watts v. Fla. Int’l Univ., 495 F.3d 1289, 1295 (11th Cir. 2007). Under the
incorporation-by-reference doctrine, a district court may consider evidence attached
to a motion to dismiss without converting the motion into a motion for summary
judgment “if the document is (1) central to the plaintiff’s claim; and (2) undisputed,
meaning that its authenticity is not challenged.” Johnson v. City of Atlanta, 107 F.4th
1292, 1300 (11th Cir. 2024). The incorporation-by-reference doctrine applies to police
1 As discussed below, this immunity extends to supervising officers. Chief Ross and Officer Self
rely on the state agency affirmative defense with respect to Mr. Logan’s negligence and wantonness
claims against them under Alabama law.
body camera footage when the video recording is attached to a motion to dismiss,
depicts events central to the plaintiff’s claims, is referenced in the complaint, and is
not subject to challenge based on authenticity or accuracy. Baker, 67 F.4th at 1277–
78; Swinford v. Santos, 121 F.4th 179, 186–88 (11th Cir. 2024). “[W]here a video is
clear and obviously contradicts the plaintiff’s alleged facts, [a district court] must
accept the video’s depiction instead of the complaint’s account and view the facts in
the light depicted by the video.” Baker, 67 F.4th at 1277-78; see Swinford, 121 F.4th
at 190.
Accordingly, the Court presents the facts Mr. Logan alleges in his complaint in
the light most favorable to him until the point at which Officer Hughes started his body
camera recorder. From the beginning of the recording forward, the Court presents the
facts depicted in the video and addresses in footnotes factual allegations in the
complaint that are at odds with the video recording.2
2 The defendants filed the body camera footage with their supplemental motion to dismiss, (Docs.
14, 15), and Mr. Logan acknowledges that the facts in the complaint are “based on the one minute
of video footage Plaintiff’s counsel and Plaintiff’s brother were allowed to view on Wednesday,
November 16, 2022 at the Alabama State Bureau of Investigation [] office.” (Doc. 16, p. 8). Mr.
Logan relied on the body camera footage in his responses to the defendants’ motions to dismiss and
does not challenge the authenticity of the footage. (Doc. 16, pp. 8-10; Doc. 17, pp. 7-8). Because
Mr. Logan mentioned the body camera footage in his complaint, (Doc. 1, p. 5, 8, ¶¶32, 66; Doc. 1-
1, p. 3), and the body camera footage depicts the events that are central to Mr. Logan’s claims, (Doc.
15), the Court may rely on the recording without converting Officer Hughes’s motion to dismiss into
a motion for summary judgment. The Court grants the defendants’ motion to supplement their
motion to dismiss to include Officer Hughes’s body camera footage. (Doc. 14).
II.
In his complaint, Mr. Logan alleges that in October 2022, he was 71 years old
and homeless. He lived in his car and frequently parked his car in neighborhoods in
Homewood, Alabama to sleep. (Doc. 1, p. 4, ¶¶ 21-22). On the evening of October
14, 2022, Mr. Logan parked his car on Parkside Circle in Homewood. (Doc. 1, p. 4, ¶
23). Just before 3:00 a.m. on October 15, 2022, a citizen called the Homewood Police
Department because the citizen saw Mr. Logan getting in and out of a car and did not
recognize Mr. Logan. (Doc. 1, p. 4, ¶¶ 24-26). The Homewood Police dispatched
Officer Hughes to the area to investigate a “suspicious person.” (Doc. 1, p. 4, ¶ 27).
Officer Hughes arrived at a house located on Venetian Way in Homewood. (Doc. 1,
p. 5, ¶ 28).
Officer Hughes’s body camera recording of the events that followed begins at
3:02 a.m. Initially, the recording captures Officer Hughes driving his patrol car. (Doc.
15, 00:01-00:26). Officer Hughes parked his patrol vehicle, emerged from the vehicle,
and began walking towards a brick house. As he walked, he activated the sound on
his body camera and turned on his flashlight. (Doc. 15, 00:30-00:30). Officer Hughes
approached the brick house from the left. A picket fence surrounding a yard to the left
of the brick house created an alleyway between the fence and the left side of the brick
house. The gap between the side of the house and the picket fence was dark; Officer
Hughes’s flashlight supplied the only light. (Doc. 15, 00:53).
As he neared the house, Officer Hughes said “hello.” (Doc. 15, 00:41). A few
seconds later, when Officer Hughes stood directly before the alleyway, a figure
became visible at the end of the alleyway at the corner of the fence. (Doc. 15, 00:45).
Branches from a tree located inside the fence extended into the alleyway and blocked
Officer Hughes’s line of sight of the person at the end of the alleyway. (Doc. 15,
00:45).
What happened next transpired in just under 15 seconds. As Officer Hughes
walked closer to the house and shined his flashlight on the person at the fence, Officer
Hughes said “hey,” and “what are you doing?” (Doc. 15, 00:45-00:49; see also Doc.
1, p. 5, ¶ 38). The person who had been facing the picket fence turned silently to face
Officer Hughes. (Doc. 15, 00:45-00:48). The individual, later identified as Mr. Logan,
had his left arm at his side; his right arm was raised. (Doc. 15, 00:52).3 Mr. Logan
took three steps toward Officer Hughes. (Doc. 15, 00:52-00:54).4 As Mr. Logan
neared Officer Hughes, Mr. Logan placed his left hand in what appears to be a black
bag hanging around his neck, and he dropped his right hand in front of his right leg.
3 Early in the video recording, it looks like Mr. Logan had a glove on his left hand, but the poor
lighting makes it difficult to see Mr. Logan’s left hand clearly. (Doc. 15, 00:52). Later, there is clear
video evidence of a glove on Mr. Logan’s left hand. (Doc. 15, 05:34). Mr. Logan did not have a
glove on his right hand. (Doc. 15, 00:53). Mr. Logan alleges that he had been “relieving himself
behind a tree or bush [] next to a wooden fence.” (Doc. 1, p. 5, ¶ 29).
4 Mr. Logan asserts in his complaint that he did not “walk toward [Officer] Hughes.” (Doc. 1, p. 6,
¶ 45). The video contradicts Mr. Logan’s allegation.
Against the dark of Mr. Logan’s blue jeans, a gun pointing toward the ground is visible
in Mr. Logan’s right hand. (Doc. 15, 00:53). The screenshot below shows Mr.
Logan’s left hand under the black bag around his neck and his right hand down at his
side. The gun is difficult to see in the screenshot, but Mr. Logan acknowledges that
he was holding a pistol. (Doc. 1, p. 6, {§ 40-41).°
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(Doc. 15, screen shot of video at 00:53).
Officer Hughes asked “what are you doing?” and exclaimed “hey.” As Officer
Hughes exclaimed “hey,” the sound of the trigger of his gun is audible on the video
> Mr. Logan alleges that he carried a gun to protect himself. (Doc. 1, p. 5, § 30). Mr. Logan alleges
that he held “the pistol in a non-firing grip.” (Doc. 1, p. 6, § 44)
recording. (Doc. 15, 00:54). Officer Hughes commanded “drop that, drop,” stepped
backward, and began firing at Mr. Logan. (Doc. 15, 00:55-00:56). Officer Hughes
fired nine shots. (Doc. 15, 00:55-58). Mr. Logan fell to the ground. (Doc. 15, 00:59).
Officer Hughes yelled, “oh shit, shit, shit, shit, shit, shit, shit.” (Doc. 15, 1:00-
1:03), reported on his radio that shots were fired, (Doc. 15, 1:03-1:05), and stepped
backed towards his vehicle, saying, “crap, crap, crap,” (Doc. 15, 1:05-1:10). Officer
Hughes continued speaking to himself for several seconds and then began walking
towards Mr. Logan. (Doc. 15, 01:10-01:30). While still a significant distance from
Mr. Logan, Officer Hughes directed Mr. Logan to show his hands. (Doc. 15, 01:34).
Officer Hughes stayed close to his vehicle and called other officers to ask where
they were. (Doc. 15, 01:56-01:58). From the street, Officer Hughes said, “Hey, show
me your hands buddy. Show me your hands.” (Doc. 15, 02:03-2:04). Mr. Logan
moved his right arm. (Doc. 15, 02:07). Officer Hughes spoke to someone and
explained that he thought that Mr. Logan lived at the brick house and that he had seen
Mr. Logan in a car. (Doc. 15, 02:32-02:36). From his vehicle, Officer Hughes
instructed Mr. Logan several times to show his hands. (Doc. 15, 02:40-02:57). Officer
Hughes commented to the person from dispatch with whom he was speaking that Mr.
Logan was “the only one” he saw. (Doc. 15, 03:12). He explained that he was
“waiting on more units.” (Doc. 15, 03:37). Officer Hughes explained to someone that
as soon as the scene was secured, they would “get medics rolling this way.” (Doc. 15,
04:27).
Three and one-half minutes after Officer Hughes shot Mr. Logan, he and another
officer left Officer Hughes’s patrol vehicle and began walking toward Mr. Logan.
(Doc. 15, 04:39-05:04). Officer Hughes and the other officer ordered Mr. Logan to
show his hands and to not move. (Doc. 15, 5:03-5:34). Officer Hughes handcuffed
Mr. Logan and asked him his name and where he was shot. (Doc. 15, 6:28-6:30, 7:18-
7:24). Officer Hughes secured Mr. Logan’s pistol. (Doc. 15, 6:47-6:51). Until
paramedics arrived, Officer Hughes administered first aid for Mr. Logan’s wounds on
his shoulder and leg. (Doc. 15, 9:20-14:52).
Bullets struck Mr. Logan in his head, left chest/shoulder, left lower leg, right
lower leg, and left hand. (Doc. 1, pp. 9-10). Paramedics took Mr. Logan to UAB
Hospital where he had several surgeries and remained hospitalized until December 5,
2022. (Doc. 1, p. 8, ¶¶ 64-65). Mr. Logan alleges that he sustained serious injuries to
his head; left shoulder, chest, ribs, and hand; and both legs. (Doc. 1, pp. 9-10, ¶ 70).
He also alleges cognitive impairment, legal blindness, memory loss, impaired gait and
mobility, mental anguish, anxiety, and depression. (Doc. 1, pp. 10-11, ¶ 70).
III.
Claims against Officer Hughes
Officer Hughes argues that qualified immunity shields him from Mr. Logan’s §
1983 excessive force claim and that Alabama discretionary-function immunity shields
him from Mr. Logan’s state-law assault and battery claim. (Doc. 10, pp. 7-19).
Qualified immunity “protects police officers from suit in their individual
capacities for discretionary actions performed in the course of their duties.” Carter v.
Butts Cnty., 821 F.3d 1310, 1318 (11th Cir. 2016) (citing Pearson v. Callahan, 555
U.S. 223, 231 (2009); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)); see also Bogle
v. McClure, 332 F.3d 1347, 1355 n.5 (11th Cir. 2003). Qualified immunity offers a
complete defense to officers sued in their individual capacities if the officers’
conduct “does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which
a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818. The doctrine of
qualified immunity “‘balances two important interests—the need to hold public
officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield
officials from . . . liability when they perform their duties reasonably.’” Miller v. Palm
Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 129 F.4th 1329, 1333 (11th Cir. 2024) (quoting Townsend
v. Jefferson Cnty., 601 F.3d 1152, 1157 (11th Cir. 2010)). District courts determine
whether qualified immunity applies “on a claim-by-claim and defendant-by-defendant
basis.” Miller, 129 F.4th at 1333 (citing Alcocer v. Mills, 906 F.3d 944, 951 (11th Cir.
2018)).
“To enjoy qualified immunity’s protection, a government official must first
establish that he was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority when the
alleged wrongful act occurred.” Jarrard v. Sheriff of Polk Cnty., 115 F.4th 1306, 1323
(11th Cir. 2024) (internal quotations and citation omitted). The discretionary authority
“requirement is ‘readily satisfied’ by ‘police officers conducting arrest and
investigative functions’ while on duty.” Plowright v. Miami Dade Cnty., 102 F.4th
1358, 1363–64 (11th Cir. 2024) (quoting Hinson v. Bias, 927 F.3d 1103, 1116 (11th
Cir. 2019)). District courts “look to the general nature of the defendant’s action,
temporarily putting aside the fact that it may have been committed for an
unconstitutional purpose, in an unconstitutional manner, to an unconstitutional extent,
or under constitutionally inappropriate circumstances.” Holloman ex rel. Holloman v.
Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1266 (11th Cir. 2004). If an official carries his initial burden,
then the burden “shifts to the plaintiff to show ‘(1) that the official violated a statutory
or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was clearly established at the time of the
challenged conduct.’” Jarrard, 115 F.4th at 1323 (quotation omitted).
Because Mr. Logan’s claims arise out of Officer Hughes’s conduct while
investigating a citizen’s report of a suspicious person, Officer Hughes has met his
burden of showing that he acted within the scope of his discretionary authority.
Therefore, Mr. Logan must demonstrate that Officer Hughes violated his constitutional
right to be free from excessive force.
District courts evaluate Fourth Amendment excessive force claims like Mr.
Logan’s under an objective reasonableness standard. Powell v. Snook, 25 F.4th 912,
921 (11th Cir. 2022) (internal quotations and citation omitted). Under that standard,
courts must “view the facts from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene
with knowledge of the attendant circumstances and facts” and “balance the risk of
bodily harm to the suspect against the gravity of the threat the officer sought to
eliminate.” Powell, 25 F.4th at 921–22 (internal quotations and citations omitted). A
court must pay “‘careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular
case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an
immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively
resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.’” Kisela v. Hughes, 584 U.S.
100, 103 (2018) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989)). “[Courts]
also consider ‘the relationship between the need and amount of force used and the
extent of the injury inflicted.’” Jones v. Ceinski, 136 F.4th 1057, 1062 (11th Cir.
2025) (quoting Sebastian v. Ortiz, 918 F.3d 1301, 1308 (11th Cir. 2019) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Courts “do not ‘mechanically apply . . . these factors.’”
Jones, 136 F.4th at 1062 (quoting Salvato v. Miley, 790 F.3d 1286, 1293 (11th Cir.
2015)).
An officer may use deadly force when the officer:
“(1) ‘has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of
serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others’ or ‘that he has
committed a crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of
serious physical harm;’ (2) reasonably believes that the use of deadly
force was necessary to prevent escape; and (3) has given some warning
about the possible use of deadly force, if feasible.”
Powell, 25 F.4th at 922 (quoting Vaughan v. Cox, 343 F.3d 1323, 1329-30 (11th Cir.
2003), in turn quoting Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1985)) (emphasis in
Powell). “When considering the threat of physical harm to the officer or others,” a
district court emphasizes “‘the level and immediacy of that threat.’” Powell, 25 F.4th
at 922 (quoting Perez v. Suszczynski, 809 F.3d 1213, 1220 (11th Cir. 2016)).
“‘The calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that
police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that
are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary
in a particular situation.’” Kisela, 584 U.S. at 103 (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396).
“[W]hen an officer confronts an armed suspect ‘in a tense and dangerous situation,’
the law does not require the officer to ‘hope for the best’ and ‘wait until the moment a
suspect uses a deadly weapon to act to stop the suspect.’” Jones, 136 F.4th at 1063
(quoting Jean-Baptiste v. Gutierrez, 627 F.3d 816, 821 (11th Cir. 2010) (alteration
adopted) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Powell, 25 F.4th
at 922 (stating that though the “mere presence of a gun or other weapon” may not
justify the exercise of deadly force, “when a suspect’s gun is available for ready use—
even when the suspect has not drawn his gun—an officer is not required to wait and
hope for the best”) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Confronted with an
individual with ready access to a firearm, an officer faces a legitimate threat of harm,
and a court “must evaluate the situation ‘through the eyes of the officer on the scene
who is hampered by incomplete information and forced to make a split-second
decision . . . in circumstances where inaction could prove fatal.’” Jones, 136 F.4th at
1064 (quoting Crosby v. Monroe County, 394 F.3d 1328, 1334 (11th Cir. 2004)).
To determine whether it was objectively reasonable for Officer Hughes to fire
his weapon at Mr. Logan nine times at fairly-close range, the Court considers the
circumstances that Officer Hughes confronted. Officer Hughes was investigating a
suspicious person at 3:00 a.m. in a residential neighborhood. When Officer Hughes
encountered Mr. Logan, Officer Hughes did not have enough information to determine
whether Mr. Logan was engaged in criminal conduct. After he shot Mr. Logan, Officer
Hughes commented that he thought Mr. Logan may have lived in the brick house and
that he had seen Mr. Logan in his car, but there is nothing in the complaint or in the
video that indicates that Officer Hughes was familiar with or had specific information
about Mr. Logan. If Mr. Logan had lived at the brick house, then he would not have
committed a crime by walking in his yard at 3:00 a.m. If he did not live in the house,
then he may have been trespassing. Mr. Logan’s gloved right hand reasonably might
have suggested to an objective officer that Mr. Logan was looking for a way to enter
the brick house to burglarize it. An objective officer would stop and question an
individual identified by a caller as a suspicious person who was standing behind a tree
at 3:00 a.m. in a dark alleyway beside a residential house to determine if the person
was engaged in or was about to engage in criminal conduct. Mr. Logan did not respond
when Officer Hughes asked him what he was doing.
A reasonable officer on the scene with knowledge of the attendant
circumstances and facts would view the individual Officer Hughes confronted as an
immediate threat to the officer’s safety. Powell, 25 F.4th at 921–22. Mr. Logan did
not answer when Officer Hughes asked him what he was doing, but Mr. Logan stepped
toward Officer Hughes. Mr. Logan had his left hand in or behind a bag that was
hanging around his neck, and he held a pistol in his right hand. Though Mr. Logan
pointed the pistol to the ground as he stepped toward Officer Hughes, the pistol was
readily available, and Officer Hughes did not know whether the pistol was loaded or
whether Mr. Logan might be concealing another weapon in his hidden left hand. As
the Eleventh Circuit recently reiterated in Jones, Officer Hughes did not have to wait
to find out whether Mr. Logan’s pistol was loaded or whether he was holding another
weapon in his left hand. Jones, 136 F.4th at 1063; see also Powell, 25 F.4th at 922.6
6 In Powell, the Eleventh Circuit wrote:
Our Shaw decision drives that point home. In that case an officer used deadly force
against a mentally unstable man who had a hatchet in his hand and was advancing on
the officer. 884 F.3d at 1096–97. The man had not raised the hatchet, but we affirmed
the grant of summary judgment for the officer on qualified immunity grounds
An objective officer in Officer Hughes’s position would be entitled to use force to
protect himself under the circumstances that Officer Hughes confronted.
“The question remains whether [Officer Hughes’s] use of force was reasonably
proportionate to the need for it.” Jones, 136 F.4th at 1062 (citing Lee v. Ferraro, 284
F.3d 1188, 1198 (11th Cir. 2002)). Standing a few yards from Mr. Logan, Officer
Hughes fired nine bullets in quick succession over the course of three seconds. (Doc.
15, 00:55-58). As he fired, Officer Hughes stepped backwards as Mr. Logan walked
towards him. (Doc. 15, 00:55-58). In an unpublished decision, the Eleventh Circuit
wrote in 2012 that it could not “find a single case in this circuit or from the Supreme
Court that establishes that a large number of shots fired makes a reasonable use of
deadly force unreasonable.” Cooper v. Rutherford, 503 Fed. Appx. 672, 676 (11th
Cir. 2012). In Jean-Baptiste, the Eleventh Circuit found that an officer who was
standing eight to ten feet from Mr. Jean-Baptiste did not use excessive force and was
entitled to qualified immunity when the officer continually fired his gun, shooting 14
bullets, eight of which struck Mr. Jean-Baptiste. Jean-Baptiste, 627 F.3d at 819. On
the facts of that case, the Eleventh Circuit held that the officer “reasonably responded
anyway. Id. at 1100–01. We did so because: “A reasonable officer could have also
concluded, as [the officer] apparently did, that the law did not require him to wait
until the hatchet was being swung toward him before firing in self-defense.” Id. at
1100; see also Singletary v. Vargas, 804 F.3d 1174, 1183 (11th Cir. 2015).
Powell, 25 F.4th at 922 (citing Shaw v. City of Selma, 884 F.3d 1093, 1096-1101 (11th Cir. 2018)).
with deadly force, and [the officer] was not required to interrupt a volley of bullets
until he knew that Jean–Baptiste had been disarmed.” Jean-Baptiste, 627 F.3d at 819.
Here, the footage from Officer Hughes’s body camera shows that Mr. Logan
did not collapse to the ground until Officer Hughes fired his gun the ninth time, and
the video does not indicate that in the three seconds during which Officer Hughes fired
his gun, Mr. Logan showed Officer Hughes his hands, dropped his pistol, or tried to
convey to Officer Hughes that he was not a threat. Under the circumstances depicted
in Officer Hughes’s body camera video, Officer Hughes’s use of deadly force to
protect himself was not excessive and did not violate Mr. Logan’s constitutional rights.
Mr. Logan argues that he did not have a “chance to hear” and comply with
Officer Hughes’s command to drop the pistol he was holding. (Doc. 16, p. 9). Under
the circumstances of this case, Officer Hughes did not have to warn Mr. Logan to drop
his gun and wait to see how Mr. Logan would respond. Officer Hughes had to act
within seconds in a tense and rapidly evolving situation. Swinford, 121 F.4th at 190;
see Pipkins v. City of Hoover, Alabama, 134 F.4th 1163, 1173 (11th Cir. 2025) (“The
feasibility of a warning is dependent on many variables, two of which are the proximity
of the danger to the officer or others and the time available to the officer.”); Robinson
v. Arrugueta, 415 F.3d 1252, 1256 (11th Cir. 2005) (upholding the use of deadly force
against a person who was driving a car towards the officer where, “[a]t the most,
[Officer] Arrugueta had only 2.72 seconds to react to what he perceived as a threat of
using physical harm from Walters.”).
Against the backdrop of this binding precedent, the evidence from Officer
Hughes’s body camera establishes that under the circumstances that Officer Hughes
confronted, Officer Hughes did not violate Mr. Logan’s constitutional rights when he
fired nine bullets toward Mr. Logan in three seconds, Mr. Logan’s serious injuries
notwithstanding. See Powell, 25 F.4th at 924 (stating that “what’s clearly established
is that it ‘is reasonable, and therefore constitutionally permissible, for an officer to use
deadly force when he has probable cause to believe that his own life is in peril’”)
(quoting Tillis v. Brown, 12 F.4th 1291, 1298 (11th Cir. 2021)).7 Therefore, Officer
Hughes is entitled to qualified immunity on Mr. Logan’s excessive force claim.
The same analysis applies with respect to Officer Hughes’s affirmative defense
of state agent immunity concerning Mr. Logan’s state law assault and battery claim.
The restatement of state-agent immunity set out by the Alabama Supreme
Court in Ex parte Cranman, 792 So. 2d 392, 405 (Ala. 2000), governs
whether the officers are entitled to immunity under § 6–5–338(a). Brown
v. City of Huntsville, 608 F.3d 724, 741 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing Ex parte
City of Tuskegee, 932 So. 2d 895, 904 (Ala. 2005)). The test laid out in
Cranman, as modified by Hollis v. City of Brighton, 950 So. 2d 300, 309
(Ala. 2006), provides in relevant part:
7 Compare Turk v. Bergman, 685 Fed. Appx. 785, 788 (11th Cir. 2017) (finding a factual dispute
regarding whether Mr. Turk, who was suicidal and had a gun on his lap in his car, “posed an
immediate threat of serious bodily harm to [] officers” if he was not holding a weapon when he was
shot and “made no threatening moves towards the police”). As noted, Mr. Logan did not respond to
Officer Hughes’s questions and stepped toward Officer Hughes in a dark alleyway with a gun in one
hand and his other hand in or beside a bag that hung around his neck.
A State agent shall be immune from civil liability in his or
her personal capacity when the conduct made the basis of
the claim against the agent is based upon the agent’s ...
exercising judgment in the enforcement of the criminal laws
of the State, including, but not limited to, law-enforcement
officers’ arresting or attempting to arrest persons, or serving
as peace officers under circumstances entitling such officers
to immunity pursuant to § 6–5–338(a).
Ex parte City of Homewood, 231 So. 3d 1082, 1087 (Ala. 2017) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted). In other words, law enforcement
officers are immune from tort liability for conduct within the scope of
their discretionary law enforcement duties. City of Huntsville, 608 F.3d
at 741. Nonetheless, a state agent is not entitled to state-agent immunity
if (1) the U.S. Constitution, federal law, the state Constitution, or state
laws, rules, or regulations enacted or promulgated for the purpose of
regulating the activities of a governmental agency, require otherwise; or
(2) the agent acts “willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith,
beyond his or her authority, or under a mistaken interpretation of the
law.” City of Homewood, 231 So. 3d at 1086; Cranman, 792 So. 2d at
405.
The test for state-agent immunity follows a similar burden-shifting
framework as the test for qualified immunity. First, the state agent
asserting immunity “bears the burden of demonstrating that the
plaintiff’s claims arise from a function that would entitle the State agent
to immunity.” Ex parte City of Montgomery, 272 So. 3d 155, 161 (Ala.
2018) (quoting Ex parte Kennedy, 992 So. 2d 1276, 1282–83 (Ala.
2008)). The burden then shifts to the plaintiff to show that one of the
two exceptions to immunity recognized in Cranman applies. Id.
. . .
The Alabama Supreme Court has largely equated qualified immunity
with discretionary-function immunity, and so the same facts which
establish an entitlement to qualified immunity may also establish that
the officers are entitled to discretionary-function immunity. Sheth v.
Webster, 145 F.3d 1231, 1240 (11th Cir. 1998) (per curiam); id. at 1239
(“Under both Alabama law and federal law, the core issue is whether a
defendant violated clearly established law.”).
Hunter v. City of Leeds, 941 F.3d 1265, 1283–84 (11th Cir. 2019).
Officer Hughes has demonstrated that he was performing a discretionary law
enforcement function in investigating a suspicious person. “Police investigations and
arrests usually are considered discretionary function[s] within the line and scope of . .
. law enforcement duties for the purposes of discretionary-function immunity.”
Grider v. City of Auburn, Ala., 618 F.3d 1240, 1268 (11th Cir. 2010) (internal
quotations and citations omitted). Therefore, Officer Hughes is entitled to
discretionary-function immunity on Mr. Logan’s assault and battery claim unless Mr.
Logan can show that Officer Hughes violated his constitutional rights or acted
“willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond his or her authority, or under
a mistaken interpretation of the law.” Cranman, 792 So. 2d at 405.
As discussed, based on the video evidence, Mr. Logan cannot show that Officer
Hughes violated his constitutional right to be free from excessive force. Mr. Logan
conclusively alleges that Officer Hughes was “willful, wanton, malicious” and that he
fired shots “with reckless disregard for [Mr. Logan’s] rights and safety.” (Doc. 1, p.
19, ¶121). Mr. Logan has not alleged facts, and the video evidence does not show,
reckless, willful, wanton, or malicious conduct. To the contrary, footage from Officer
Hughes’s body camera shows that he backed away as Mr. Logan stepped toward him;
after he retreated to his patrol vehicle, he waited impatiently for backup to arrive so
that he could check on Mr. Logan; and he rendered first aid to Mr. Logan until
paramedics arrived. In a calm voice, Officer Hughes tried to assure Mr. Logan that
the officers at the scene were trying to provide care until paramedics arrived. Given
this video evidence, the Court disregards Mr. Logan’s unsupported, conclusory
allegation of reckless and malicious conduct. Brivik v. Law, 545 Fed. Appx. 804, 807
(11th Cir. 2013) (finding that a conclusory allegation that a police officer acted
maliciously and in bad faith was “insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss”).
Mr. Logan argues that Officer Hughes acted beyond his authority when he shot
Mr. Logan. (Doc. 16, pp. 28-29). A state agent acts beyond his authority when he
“fail[s] to discharge duties pursuant to detailed rules and regulations, such as those
stated on a checklist.” Howard v. City of Atmore, 887 So. 2d 201, 208 (Ala. 2033)
(internal quotations and citations omitted). Mr. Logan argues that Officer Hughes is
not entitled to discretionary-function immunity because he “was acting outside the line
and scope of his enforcement duties” because Officer Hughes did not follow the City
of Homewood Police Department’s Use of Force Policy when he shot Mr. Logan.
(Doc. 16, pp. 28-29).8 As explained, under the circumstances that confronted Officer
8 Mr. Logan alleged in his complaint that the “City of Homewood’s policies on the use of force and
training of its [police] officers are inadequate,” (Doc. 1, p. 16, ¶ 98), and that the City of Homewood
“found the shooting of and subsequent use of force” against Mr. Logan “to be within and consistent
with the City of Homewood Police Department’s policy,” (Doc. 1, p. 13, ¶ 84), but Mr. Logan has
not specifically identified Homewood Police Department’s Use of Force Policy in his complaint.
Mr. Logan included the text of Homewood’s use of force policy in his response to Officer Hughes’s
motion to dismiss. (Doc. 16, pp. 39-21). The Court recognizes that Mr. Logan could amend his
complaint to add specific allegations concerning the HPD’s policy.
Hughes, he did not use excessive force against Mr. Logan. Mr. Logan has not alleged
how Officer Hughes violated HPD policy other than by allegedly using excessive force.
For the reasons that Officer Hughes is entitled to qualified immunity on Mr.
Logan’s § 1983 claim, Officer Hughes also is entitled to discretionary-function
immunity on Mr. Logan’s state law assault and battery claim. Therefore, the Court
will dismiss Mr. Logan’s claims against Officer Hughes.
Claims against the City of Homewood, Chief Ross, and Officer Self9
For Mr. Logan to establish a § 1983 claim against the City of Homewood based
on municipal liability, Mr. Logan must plausibly allege that “(1) his constitutional
rights were violated, (2) the municipality had a policy (or custom) that constituted
deliberate indifference to that constitutional right, and (3) the municipal policy (or
custom) caused the violation.” Baker, 67 F.4th at 1282. “Supervising officers can be
held independently liable under § 1983 for a failure to train their subordinates ‘either
when the supervisor personally participates in the alleged constitutional violation or
9 These defendants argue that Mr. Logan abandoned several of his claims against them because he
did not respond to their arguments in his response to their motion to dismiss. (Doc. 18, p. 5). At the
motion to dismiss stage, a plaintiff does not abandon his claims by not responding to the defendants’
arguments. See Boyd v. Peet, 249 Fed. Appx. 155, 157 (11th Cir. 2007) (finding that “at the motion
to dismiss stage, the scope of a court’s review must be limited to the four corners of the complaint”
and that the “district court erred by going beyond the face of the complaint” in finding that Boyd
abandoned his claims “by failing to adequately address them in his response brief”) (citing St. George
v. Pinellas Co., 285 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2002), for the proposition that a district court is
limited to the “four corners of the complaint” at the motion to dismiss stage). The “appropriate
inquiry at this stage of the litigation [is] whether the allegations of the complaint plausibly indicate
that [Mr. Logan] has a claim for relief.” Boyd, 249 Fed. Appx. at 157 (alterations added).
Accordingly, the Court addresses Mr. Logan’s claims against these defendants.
when there is a causal connection between actions of the supervising official and the
alleged constitutional deprivation.’” Knight ex rel. Kerr v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 856
F.3d 795, 820 (11th Cir. 2017) (quoting Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 671 (11th
Cir. 1990)).
Here, because there was no constitutional violation, Mr. Logan’s municipal
liability claims against the City of Homewood “fail[] as a matter of law.” Baker, 67
F.4th at 1282; see Banuchi v. City of Homestead, No. 22-12375, 2024 WL 2014424,
at *6 (11th Cir. May 7, 2024) (finding that a custom or policy cannot be the moving
force of a constitutional violation under Monell when there is no constitutional
violation).10 Likewise, there is no supervisory liability under § 1983 against Chief
Ross or Officer Self for failure to train or ratification “when there is no underlying
constitutional violation.” Knight, 856 F.3d at 821; Hicks v. Moore, 422 F.3d 1246,
1253 (11th Cir. 2005) (“Because we conclude that Plaintiff’s constitutional rights
were not violated by the search, Plaintiff cannot maintain a § 1983 action for
supervisory liability against Sheriff Moore, Captain Ausburn, or Sergeant Gosnell for
failure to train.”).
10 Mr. Logan acknowledges that “[i]n Banuchi, it was determined that there was no constitutional
violation, so there would be no constitutional violation under Monell.” (Doc. 17, p. 17). Mr. Logan
argues that the Court should allow him “to conduct meaningful discovery prior to any resolution
based on disputed facts” and that he “should be afforded the opportunity to prove that he suffered a
constitutional violation prior to wholesale dismissal.” (Doc. 17, pp. 17-18). As discussed, the video
evidence in this case establishes that Officer Hughes did not violate Mr. Logan’s constitutional rights.
Therefore, discovery would be futile.
Chief Ross and Officer Self argue that they are entitled to state-agent immunity
for Mr. Logan’s claim against them for negligent and wanton hiring, training,
supervision, and discipline of Officer Hughes. (Doc. 8, pp. 16, 24-25). Under
Cranman, a state agent is immune for “‘formulating plans, policies, or designs’” or
for “‘exercising his [] judgment’” in hiring, firing, transferring, assigning, supervising,
or training personnel. Howard, 887 So. 2d at 210 (quoting Cranman, 792 So. 2d at
405). Under Cranman, Chief Ross and Officer Self are immune from Mr. Logan’s
negligent hiring, training, supervision, and discipline claim.
Mr. Logan argues that Chief Ross and Officer Self are not entitled to state-agent
immunity because they “acted in bad faith and beyond their authority when they
provided no supervision or training” to Officer Hughes “regarding restraint in the use
of force.” (Doc. 17, p. 15). Mr. Logan asserts that “[i]t is obvious that needed training
was absent in the instant case.” (Doc. 17, p. 16).
As discussed, the video evidence shows that Officer Hughes did not use
excessive force against Mr. Logan under the circumstances of this case. In other
words, the video footage demonstrates that the force Officer Hughes used was
objectively reasonable even though the force used caused Mr. Logan significant
injuries. Because the video evidence contradicts Mr. Logan’s assertion that Officer
Hughes used unconstitutional force, an alleged lapse in training did not cause Mr.
Logan’s injuries. Mr. Logan’s conclusory allegations that Chief Ross or Officer Self
acted in bad faith, beyond their authority, or with wantonness fail to state a claim
against these defendants. See Brivik v. Law, 545 Fed. Appx. 804, 807 (11th Cir. 2013)
(“Brivik’s allegation that Officer Law acted maliciously and in bad faith is conclusory
and therefore insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.”).
Because Chief Ross and Officer Self have state-agent immunity on Mr. Logan’s
negligence and wantonness claims, the City of Homewood also is immune on these
claims. See Berry v. City of Montgomery, 99 So. 3d 282, 298 (Ala. 2012) (“It is well
established that, if a municipal peace officer is immune pursuant to § 6-5-338(a), then
pursuant to 6-5-338(b), the city by which he is employed is also immune.”) (internal
quotations and citations omitted). Moreover, under Ala. Code § 11-47-190, the City
of Homewood cannot be liable for the alleged wanton conduct of its employees. Ex
parte City of Orange Beach, No. SC-2024-0526, 2025 WL 1007962, at *9 (Ala. Apr.
4, 2025) (construing § 11-47-190 to exclude liability for wanton misconduct).
Therefore, the Court will dismiss Mr. Logan’s negligence and wantonness claims
against the City of Homewood, Chief Ross, and Officer Self.
IV.
Consistent with the discussion in this opinion, the Court grants the defendants’
motions to dismiss. By separate order, the Court will dismiss Mr. Logan’s claims in
this case.
The Clerk shall please TERM Docs. 7, 9, and 14.
DONE and ORDERED this August 22, 2025.
eae E HUGHES HAIKALA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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