In re Estate of Boey

NOTICE

2025 IL App (5th) 240271-U

NOTICE

Decision filed 08/22/25. The

This order was filed under

text of this decision may be NO. 5-24-0271 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is

changed or corrected prior to

the filing of a Petition for not precedent except in the

Rehearing or the disposition of

IN THE limited circumstances allowed

the same. under Rule 23(e)(1).

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIFTH DISTRICT

______________________________________________________________________________

In re ESTATE OF HERBERT BOEY III, Deceased ) Appeal from the

) Circuit Court of

(Constance D. White, ) St. Clair County.

)

Petitioner-Appellant, )

)

v. ) No. 23-PR-149

)

Karzell D. Boey, ) Honorable

) Thomas B. Cannady,

Respondent-Appellee). ) Judge, presiding.

______________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE VAUGHAN delivered the judgment of the court.

Justices Barberis and Boie concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: We affirm the circuit court’s order finding respondent to be the natural son and sole

heir at law of the decedent where petitioner admitted to the authenticity of the

genetic testing.

¶2 This matter arises out of probate proceedings regarding the estate of Herbert Boey III.

Petitioner Constance D. White, the half-sister of decedent, appeals pro se the circuit court’s order

granting respondent Karzell D. Boey’s motions for summary judgment and judgment on the

pleadings, in which it found Karzell was the natural son and heir of Herbert Boey III. Karzell

moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing this court lacks jurisdiction because the order from which

Constance appeals is not a final and appealable judgment. He further contends that Constance lacks

standing because she is neither the administrator of the estate nor a real party of interest in the

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circuit court’s determination of Karzell’s heirship. We took the motion to dismiss with the case.

For the reasons explained below, we deny the motion to dismiss and affirm the judgment of the

circuit court.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 In the underlying probate matter, Herbert Boey III died intestate on April 10, 2023.

Constance, decedent’s half-sister, filed a petition for letters of independent administration of his

estate on April 13, 2023. On April 18, 2023, Karzell also filed an amended petition for letters of

administration, claiming he was the son and sole heir of decedent. On May 2, 2023, over Karzell’s

objection, the circuit court entered an order appointing Constance as the administrator of Herbert

Boey III’s estate and required “supervised administration.”

¶5 Upon the oral motion of Karzell’s counsel, the circuit court entered an order on May 16,

2023, requiring the collection and submission of DNA samples from Karzell and decedent for

testing to determine heirship. The court later continued the matter upon the lab’s request for

additional samples, as the initial testing was inconclusive. On June 13, 2023, Karzell filed a

petition entitled “Petition to Determine the Existence of the Father and Child Relationship.” The

petition requested the court acknowledge him as the son of decedent. In support, he attached the

DNA paternity report indicating a probability of paternity of 99.99996%. Karzell also filed a

petition asking the court to remove Constance as the administrator of the estate and appoint him

in her stead.

¶6 On June 21, 2023, Constance, as administrator of the estate, filed a motion seeking

additional DNA testing of Karzell and decedent. The following day, the circuit court entered an

order granting her request. On June 22, 2023, Karzell filed a motion for determination of heirship,

asking the court to enter an order of heirship identifying himself and Herbert Jaron Boey IV,

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deceased, as the only natural born children and legal heirs of decedent, and establishing their

entitlement to the proceeds from the settlement of the estate.

¶7 The circuit court entered an order on August 31, 2023, removing Constance and her counsel

as the administrator of the estate and the attorney for the estate, respectively. The court appointed

a separate attorney as representative of the estate for the sole purpose of litigating the pending

paternity and heirship issues.

¶8 On September 14, 2023, Karzell filed a request to admit pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court

Rule 216 (eff. May 1, 2013), requesting that Constance and six other identified siblings and half-

siblings of decedent admit to the genuineness and authenticity of the DNA paternity report he

acquired and attached to his prior motions to determine heirship. Constance, through counsel,

submitted a response, stating that she admitted the genuineness and authenticity of the DNA

paternity report obtained by Karzell and that decedent could not be excluded as Karzell’s biological

father. However, she denied that Karzell “established legal paternity” to the deceased. She also

denied that decedent represented that he was Karzell’s father, claiming a lack of personal

knowledge.

¶9 On November 1, 2023, Karzell filed a motion to deem facts admitted, arguing that

Constance had not responded to his requests in compliance with Rule 216, and asking the court to

deem all the requested facts admitted. On November 30, 2023, he filed a motion for summary

judgment on his petition to determine the existence of the father and child relationship. On

February 14, 2024, Karzell filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings regarding the issues of

parentage and heirship. In this motion, he further argued that Constance lacked standing to

challenge paternity pursuant to section 602 of the Illinois Parentage Act of 2015 (Act) (750 ILCS

46/602 (West 2022)).

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¶ 10 The circuit court held a hearing on all pending motions on February 22, 2024. This included

Karzell’s amended petition to determine parentage, motion to determine heirship, motion for

summary judgment, and motion for judgment on the pleadings. It also included three pro se

motions that Constance filed—one seeking to transfer venue, and two attempting to submit

additional evidence—and Karzell’s motion to strike all of Constance’s pro se motions. In

attendance were Karzell with counsel, Constance, pro se, the court-appointed representative of the

estate, and Lisa Boey, pro se.

¶ 11 The court allowed Constance and Lisa to speak over Karzell’s counsel’s objection based

on their lack of standing. Lisa alleged that she was the biological half-sister and adopted daughter

of decedent, and therefore an heir. She also argued that it was illegal to take DNA samples from

decedent, because he could not give consent, and that the statutory limitations period that applied

to Karzell’s request for DNA testing expired when he turned 20 years of age. Constance argued

that the DNA testing was mishandled and inaccurate based on online articles she had printed. The

court rejected both women’s arguments as conclusory and based on improperly-presented

evidence.

¶ 12 Karzell’s counsel argued that pursuant to section 602 of the Act (id.), Constance lacked

standing to challenge paternity because she never filed anything alleging that she was an heir.

Counsel also presented two DNA tests establishing a 99.99% probability of paternity, as well as

Constance’s answers to Karzell’s request to admit, in which she admitted to the genuineness and

authenticity of the DNA testing she now contested.

¶ 13 The circuit court granted Karzell’s motions for summary judgment and judgment on the

pleadings, finding no genuine issues of material fact and further stating that none of the allegations

set forth in either motion were contested. The court determined that Constance and Lisa presented

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conclusions, and while Constance appeared to research DNA testing and issues, she was not an

expert pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 213(f) (eff. Jan. 1, 2018) and was not qualified to

testify on any DNA issues. It also noted a pending issue regarding the parentage of Lisa Boey and

whether she was adopted by decedent. The court’s February 22, 2024, order included a finding

that Herbert Boey III was the father of Karzell, and directed the administrator of the estate to

prepare an order finding heirship. Constance filed a notice of appeal the same day, prior to the

entry of the pending heirship order.

¶ 14 On February 23, 2024, an order finding heirship was filed by the clerk of the court but was

not signed by the judge. The order contained the following findings: (1) Herbert Boey III died

intestate and (2) the court’s ruling of February 22, 2024, determined that Karzell Boey was the

natural son of decedent. The order stated that decedent “left only the above mentioned sole heir at

law and that Karzell Boey is entitled to the proceeds from the settlement of this estate as prescribed

by law.” The second clause, regarding Karzell being entitled to the proceeds, was scratched out

and replaced with a handwritten “TBC.” 1 A second, identical order signed by the judge was entered

nunc pro tunc on March 21, 2024. We provide additional background below, as necessary to

analyze the issues on appeal.

¶ 15 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 16 On appeal, Constance challenges the validity and admissibility of the DNA test results and

raises various claims of misconduct against the attorneys involved in this case. Karzell filed a

motion to dismiss Constance’s appeal, on the grounds that this court lacks jurisdiction and

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Presumably “To Be Continued,” although the record on appeal does not contain any explanation

of the changes to the order.

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Constance lacks standing. This court ordered that the motion would be taken with the case, and so

we turn to it now.

¶ 17 A. Jurisdiction

¶ 18 Regarding jurisdiction, Karzell contends that Constance’s appeal from the circuit court’s

February 22, 2024, order is not an appeal from a final judgment, because the order “did not finally

terminate the litigation between the parties.” While Karzell provided no support for this argument,

we nevertheless have a duty to consider, sua sponte, whether we have jurisdiction over an appeal.

See In re Marriage of Mackin, 391 Ill. App. 3d 518, 519 (2009).

¶ 19 Constance’s notice of appeal listed the February 22, 2024, order and “all orders” of 2023

and 2024 as the basis of her appeal. Karzell’s motion to dismiss mentions that Constance’s notice

was filed one day prior to the entry of the order of heirship but does not develop any further

argument as to why we may not consider the appeal to include this order.

¶ 20 Pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 303, a “notice of appeal filed after the court

announces a decision, but before the entry of the judgment or order, is treated as filed on the date

of and after the entry of the judgment or order.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 303(a)(1) (eff. July 1, 2017). This

rule applies in situations such as here, where the circuit court announces its oral ruling and

contemplates the entry of a written motion, but a notice of appeal is filed before the written

judgment is entered. See, e.g., Village of Orion v. Hardi, 2022 IL App (4th) 220186, ¶ 21; Pedigo

v. Youngblood, 2015 IL App (4th) 140222, ¶ 15; Eclipse Manufacturing Co. v. United States

Compliance Co., 381 Ill. App. 3d 127, 132 (2007). Here, the circuit court explained at the hearing

that it was granting Karzell’s motions for summary judgment and judgment on the pleadings,

which addressed the issues of paternity and heirship. The court also made a finding of parentage

and instructed the attorney representing the estate to present “an order finding heirship, consistent

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with [the court’s] rulings here today.” Thus, the premature filing of Constance’s notice of appeal

does not deprive us of jurisdiction.

¶ 21 We next consider whether the court’s February 23, 2024, order of heirship was a final and

appealable order. The order includes the findings that Karzell is the natural son and sole legal heir

of the decedent, but the line ruling that he is entitled to the proceeds from the settlement of the

estate is stricken, with a handwritten indication that this issue will be continued. Notably, the court

contemplated additional heirs at the February 22, 2024, hearing, stating:

“Now there is a pending issue. I’m not addressing it one way or another, but there is a

pending issue that I am concerned about, and that pending issue as to [sic] any alleged

paternity issues pertaining to Lisa Boey. If she was an adoptive child of the deceased[,] I

do believe that ought to be considered if it’s being presented in a timely manner.”

Despite this prior statement, the court’s order explicitly stated that “decedent left only” Karzell

Boey as the “sole heir at law” (emphasis added), which seemingly precludes the aforementioned

pending issue. The record is silent as to whether Lisa pursued the issue of her parentage and/or

heirship in this matter. Regardless, we do not find the contradictory statements dispositive on the

issue of our jurisdiction.

¶ 22 A judgment is considered final for the purposes of appeal “ ‘ “if it terminates the litigation

between the parties on the merits or disposes of the rights of the parties, either on the entire

controversy or a separate part thereof.” ’ ” In re A.H., 207 Ill. 2d 590, 594 (2003) (quoting In re

Curtis B., 203 Ill. 2d 53, 59 (2002), quoting R.W. Dunteman Co. v. C/G Enterprises, Inc., 181 Ill.

2d 53, 59 (1998)). Where a judgment is final as to fewer than all parties or claims, Illinois Supreme

Court Rule 304(b)(1) provides that a specific written finding by the circuit court is not needed to

appeal from “[a] judgment or order entered in the administration of an estate, guardianship, or

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similar proceedings which finally determines a right or status of a party.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 304(b)(1)

(eff. Mar. 8, 2016); see also In re Estate of Meyer, 2024 IL App (4th) 230787, ¶ 14; Ill. S. Ct. R.

304, Committee Comments (rev. Sept. 1988) (explaining that subparagraph (b)(1) applies to orders

that “are final in character although entered in comprehensive proceedings that include other

matters”).

¶ 23 The purpose of this rule is “ ‘to prevent multiple lawsuits and piecemeal appeals, while

encouraging efficiency and granting certainty as to specific issues during the often lengthy process

of estate administration.’ ” In re Marriage of Salviola, 2020 IL App (1st) 182185, ¶ 41 (quoting

In re Estate of Thorp, 282 Ill. App. 3d 612, 616-17 (1996)); see also Thorp, 282 Ill. App. 3d at

616-17 (“Without the Rule 304(b)(1) exception, an appeal would have to be brought after an estate

was closed, the result of which may require reopening the estate and marshalling assets that have

already been distributed.”). However, such orders must still be final—while they need not resolve

all matters in the proceedings, they must resolve all matters on the particular issue. Cushing v.

Greyhound Lines, Inc., 2012 IL App (1st) 100768, ¶ 84.

¶ 24 Karzell does not cite to any authority discussing a similar situation to the one before us in

which an appeal is taken from an order finding parentage and heirship, where there may be other

heirs impacting Karzell’s rights to the proceeds of the settlement of the estate. However, in the

wardship case of In re Armani S., 2020 IL App (1st) 200616, ¶ 20, the First District found that

jurisdiction existed under Rule 304(b)(1) over an appeal from an order “finally determin[ing]” the

putative father’s parentage of the minor, where both the minor and putative father were parties to

the underlying case.

¶ 25 Similarly, In re Estate of Meyer, 2024 IL App (4th) 230787, ¶ 16, found an order

construing a will to entitle the respondent to sole ownership of certain real property was appealable

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under Rule 304(b)(1), if it had been timely filed. The court reasoned that by directing the executor

to have the property alone succeed to the respondent, the lower court “finally determined the rights

of all interested parties—the four named beneficiaries—with respect to the disposition of the ***

property.” Id. ¶¶ 12, 16. Although the court below did not rule on the issue of what actions, if any,

the executor should take to equalize the distribution of the estate’s assets, that was a separate and

distinct issue that had no bearing on the adjudicated issue of the ownership of the property. Id.

¶¶ 12, 17; see also Thorpe, 282 Ill. App. 3d at 617 (order directing the executor to sell a piece of

real estate was final and appealable under Rule 304(b)(1), because “[w]hile the exact dollar

amounts to be received by the legatees were yet to be ascertained, their rights under the will had

been finally determined”).

¶ 26 Here, the court’s February 23, 2024, order definitively determined the question of Karzell’s

status as the natural son and legal heir of the decedent. The only remaining issue was the specific

amount of the proceeds from the settlement of the estate to which Karzell was entitled. While the

circuit court noted the pending question of Lisa Boey’s potential status as another heir, her

involvement in the underlying probate case is unclear from the record. Despite seeming to have

left this question open, the circuit court was clear that the decedent “left only” Karzell as his “sole

heir at law.” We find that the court’s order fully determined the question of Karzell’s parentage

and heirship in the underlying estate proceedings, and, as in the cases cited above, any question of

the exact distribution of estate proceedings to Karzell is a separate and distinct issue that does not

bar our jurisdiction over the present appeal pursuant to Rule 304(b)(1).

¶ 27 B. Standing

¶ 28 Karzell next argues that Constance lacks standing to appeal. In support, Karzell argues that

Constance is not named as an heir beneficiary of the estate in either her or Karzell’s petition for

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letters of independent administration. He further relies on the circuit court’s removal of Constance

as administrator of the estate in its August 31, 2023, order, well before Constance filed her notice

of appeal and the court entered its February 22, 2024, order finding paternity. Karzell thus argues

that Constance cannot challenge the court’s order, as she does not fall under any category of an

individual with standing to maintain a proceeding to adjudicate parentage under section 602 of the

Act (750 ILCS 46/602 (West 2022)).

¶ 29 Article 6 of the Act is titled “Proceeding to Adjudicate Parentage” and specifically

authorizes civil proceedings “to adjudicate the parentage of a child.” Id. § 601. Section 602 of the

Act lists who has standing to maintain such proceedings. Id. § 602. Section 603 states that the

provisions of the Act “shall apply if parentage is at issue,” even if the civil action is not brought

under the Act. Id. § 603(a). In the present matter, Constance challenges the circuit court’s findings

that Karzell is the decedent’s biological son and sole legal heir.

¶ 30 Karzell does not cite any authority interpreting section 602 of the Act or explain how

section 602’s limit on who can maintain a parentage proceeding would also limit who may appeal

a finding of parentage in a probate proceeding. We note that Karzell raised his standing argument

before the circuit court at the hearing on the pending motions and petitions, and the court expressed

doubt as to the possibility that Constance would not have standing to contest Karzell’s paternity

as the decedent’s sister and potential heir. After allowing for further argument from Karzell, the

court stated that it made no ruling on the standing question at that time. The court made no further

ruling on this question before granting Karzell’s motions for summary judgment and judgment on

the pleadings. While the latter motion referenced the challenge to Constance’s standing, the court

did not address it in its ruling on the motion. It also did not address the issue in either of its written

orders on paternity and heirship.

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¶ 31 A plaintiff need not allege facts establishing standing; rather, the defendant bears the

burden of proving lack of standing as an affirmative defense. Rowe v. Raoul, 2023 IL 129248,

¶ 22. Without any support from Karzell for why Constance cannot now appeal from the circuit

court’s orders rendering a decision on her challenge to Karzell’s paternity and heirship, aside from

a conclusory citation to the Act, we find that she may maintain the present appeal. See Ill. S. Ct.

R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020) (“Points not argued are forfeited ***.”); In re Estate of Doyle, 362

Ill. App. 3d 293, 301 (2005) (“a court of review is entitled to have issues clearly defined with

pertinent authority cited and coherent arguments presented or the inadequately presented argument

is deemed forfeited”). She was unquestionably a party to Karzell’s motions for summary judgment

and judgment on the pleadings and has been involved in the underlying proceedings since their

beginning. Because we hold that the issue of standing was forfeited, we find Constance’s issues

on appeal must be considered.

¶ 32 C. Issues on Appeal

¶ 33 On appeal, Constance primarily challenges the validity and admissibility of the DNA test

results. Additionally, she argues that Karzell’s counsel improperly filed the petition to determine

parentage under a repealed statute and raises several claims of attorney misconduct against her

original and second attorneys under various theories.

¶ 34 i. Validity and Admissibility of DNA Evidence

¶ 35 As he notes in his response, Karzell served requests to admit on Constance pursuant to

Illinois Supreme Court Rule 216 (eff. July 1, 2014). In her response to those requests, Constance

admitted to the genuineness and authenticity of both DNA tests conducted in this matter, as well

as to the facts that two experts, if called to testify, would testify that the DNA showed a probability

of paternity of 99.99996%, and that the decedent “cannot be excluded as the biological father of”

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Karzell. At the hearing on all pending motions and petitions, Constance presented a printout of an

article she found online about DNA testing done on Beethoven’s hair and argued that the DNA

sample in this case was “mishandled” because it was tested two months after collection. The circuit

court found that Constance was not an expert pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 213(f) (eff.

Jan. 1, 2018) and was not qualified to testify on any DNA issues. The court further stated that it

was “clear to the court” that Constance wanted to present conclusions and issues that had not been

properly presented as evidence.

¶ 36 On appeal, Constance argues that (1) the chain of custody of the DNA samples was not

maintained, and the samples from the decedent should be deemed inadmissible due to “degradation

and contamination” from, inter alia, formaldehyde causing “cross-linking of DNA strands,” and

the decedent’s liver conditions impacting DNA integrity; (2) the lab “violated procedural

standards, impacting the reliability of the DNA results,” as allegedly evidenced by the fact that the

initial specimen from the decedent’s hair did not reveal any DNA; (3) Karzell’s attorney

committed misconduct by failing to correct the lab when individuals from the lab stated they would

obtain additional DNA samples later that same day, despite the fact that the circuit court’s order

allowing for additional testing had not yet been issued, and by communicating with the lab through

unsecured email; and (4) Karzell’s attorney violated the court’s order to use the LabCorp facility

in Maryville, Illinois, and compromised the chain of custody by using a LabCorp facility located

in Missouri. Constance argues that each of the above contributed to the unreliability of the DNA

samples tested in this case and concludes that evidence of the DNA testing and analysis should not

have been considered.

¶ 37 As the circuit court noted during its hearing, Constance offered nothing more than

conclusions regarding her challenges to the DNA testing and report, she had not proven herself as

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an expert witness to testify on issues of DNA collection, preservation, testing, or analysis. See

Cleveringa v. J.I. Case Co., 230 Ill. App. 3d 831, 851 (1992) (“There is no presumption that a

witness is competent to give an expert opinion, and it is incumbent upon the party offering the

witness to show that he possesses the necessary learning, knowledge, skill, or practical experience

to enable him to testify as an expert.”). Despite having the opportunity to present evidence, she

failed to present any witnesses, including a qualified expert, to support her conclusions or explain

how her articles were relevant to DNA testing in this case. We therefore find that the circuit court

properly rejected her arguments on this point.

¶ 38 Next, Constance raises for the first time on appeal the argument that Karzell’s attorney

filed the amended petition to determine parentage under the repealed Illinois Parentage Act of

1984 (750 ILCS 45/1 et seq. (repealed by Pub. Act 99-85 (eff. Jan. 1, 2016))), rather than the

Illinois Parentage Act of 2015 (750 ILCS 46/101 et seq. (West 2022)). This argument is forfeited.

See Mabry v. Boler, 2012 IL App (1st) 111464, ¶ 15 (“Generally, arguments not raised before the

circuit court are forfeited and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”); In re S.L., 2014 IL

115424, ¶ 17; see also 735 ILCS 5/2-612(c) (West 2022) (“All defects in pleadings, either in form

or substance, not objected to in the trial court are waived.”). Relatedly, Constance offers nothing

more than general citations to statutes and caselaw and conclusory, unsupported statements for

many of the issues on appeal. See Walters v. Rodriguez, 2011 IL App (1st) 103488, ¶ 5 (A

reviewing court “is entitled to have the issues on appeal clearly defined with pertinent authority

cited and a cohesive legal argument presented. The appellate court is not a depository in which the

appellant may dump the burden of argument and research.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)).

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¶ 39 Therefore, we conclude the court properly rejected all of Constance’s arguments regarding

the DNA collection, preservation, testing, and reports. We further find her arguments regarding

Karzell’s attorney and his amended petition are forfeited.

¶ 40 ii. Attorney Misconduct

¶ 41 Next, Constance argues that her attorneys in the underlying case committed misconduct

under several theories. Her claims on appeal include: (1) “breach of fiduciary duty” against her

original attorney (“Collins”) for failing to disclose the results of the DNA testing to her prior to

the court hearing; (2) negligence against Collins for failing to prepare a will for decedent, in which

Constance would be named the sole beneficiary; (3) conflict of interest where Collins also

represented the estate; (4) ineffective assistance of counsel by her second attorney (“Campagna”)

based on the argument before the court that he had not received discovery from Collins, and could

not prepare for trial; (5) a second conflict of interest against Collins because Constance allegedly

overheard Collins telling someone at the DNA lab that “he did not want to test a live relative,” and

she concluded that he withheld DNA evidence; and (6) breach of ethics because Campagna filed

a response to Karzell’s requests to admit pursuant to Rule 216 without Constance’s knowledge or

consent, and the document of admissions she signed was not the same as the one filed with the

court.

¶ 42 Claims for ineffective assistance of counsel are inappropriate in a civil case. See People

ex rel. Director of Department of Corrections v. Melton, 2014 IL App (4th) 130700, ¶ 18. Any

claims Constance may have against either of her attorneys may be raised in an independent suit

for malpractice or breach of fiduciary duty. Lastly, even if Constance could assert these claims,

we cannot address any claims based on matters outside the record, as there is no evidentiary

support before this court to support them.

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¶ 43 iii. Compliance With News Station Request

¶ 44 Constance raises one additional issue on appeal, which is that the circuit court erred by not

complying with a news station’s request for the case file in the underlying matter. In support, she

alleges that the court breached its duty to provide public access to court records. The present appeal

concerns Constance’s challenge to the circuit court’s determination of paternity and heirship

between the decedent and Karzell, as well as the court’s rulings on Karzell’s motions concerning

the same issue. As such, we find Constance’s argument is beyond the scope of the present appeal.

¶ 45 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 46 For the above reasons, we find that the circuit court did not err in granting Karzell’s

motions for summary judgment and judgment on the pleadings, or in finding him to be the natural

son and legal heir of the decedent. Accordingly, we deny Karzell’s motion to dismiss the appeal

and affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

¶ 47 Motion denied; judgment affirmed.

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