Mathews v. Goldie

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

AARON DOUGLAS MATHEWS, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) Case No. CIV-25-287-JD

)

TIM CARTER, )

)

Respondent. )

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Petitioner Aaron Douglas Mathews, a federal prisoner appearing pro se,1 has filed

a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. 1).2 United States

District Judge Jodi W. Dishman referred the matter to the undersigned Magistrate Judge

for initial proceedings consistent with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). (Doc. 10). Respondent

has filed a Motion to Dismiss and Brief in Support. (Doc. 13). As fully set forth below,

the undersigned recommends that the Court GRANT Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss

(Doc. 13) and DISMISS the Petition without prejudice for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction.

1 A pro se litigant’s pleadings are liberally construed “and held to a less stringent standard

than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir.

1991); see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam). But the court cannot

serve as Petitioner’s advocate, creating arguments on his behalf. See Yang v. Archuleta, 525

F.3d 925, 927 n.1 (10th Cir. 2008).

2 Citations to the parties’ filings and attached exhibits will refer to this Court’s CM/ECF

pagination.

I. Background

Petitioner filed the Petition on January 14, 2025, in the United States District Court

for the District of Minnesota. (Doc. 1, at 1, 8). The District Court for the District of

Minnesota transferred the Petition to this Court because Petitioner was incarcerated at the

Federal Correctional Institution (“FCI”) in El Reno, Oklahoma, in the Western District of

Oklahoma, when he filed the Petition and at the time the court reviewed the Petition.

(Docs. 6, 7, 8). In the Petition, Petitioner alleges that the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”)

incorrectly categorized two of his past offenses as crimes of violence, negatively affecting

his PATTERN score.3 (Doc. 1, at 6-7). Petitioner requests that the offenses be

recategorized and that his “history of violence, custody, and [PATTERN] scores be

recalculated to reflect the changes.” (Id. at 7). Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss and

Brief in Support, arguing that the Petition is now moot, depriving the Court of subject

matter jurisdiction, because BOP officials have removed Petitioner’s “history of violence”

score and recalculated Petitioner’s PATTERN score accordingly. (Doc. 13, at 4-6).

Petitioner’s recidivism score is now “Low for both his General and Violence scores,” and

BOP officials have applied FSA time credits to Petitioner’s sentence as if he never had a

history of violence score. (Id. at 4-5). Petitioner did not file a response.

3 A PATTERN score represents an inmate’s risk of recidivism and affects whether First Step

Act (“FSA”) time credits are applied to a prisoner’s supervised release and/or pre-release

custody date. (See Doc. 13, at Ex. 1).

II. Standard of Review

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), a defendant may move to dismiss

a claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. “Federal courts are courts of limited

jurisdiction and, as such, must have a statutory basis to exercise jurisdiction.” Montoya v.

Chao, 296 F.3d 952, 955 (10th Cir. 2002). “A court lacking jurisdiction cannot render

judgment but must dismiss the cause at any stage of the proceedings in which it becomes

apparent that jurisdiction is lacking.” Basso v. Utah Power & Light Co., 495 F.2d 906, 909

(10th Cir. 1974).

“Motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction generally take one of two

forms: (1) a facial attack on the sufficiency of the complaint’s allegations as to subject

matter jurisdiction; or (2) a challenge to the actual facts upon which subject matter

jurisdiction is based.” City of Albuquerque v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 379 F.3d 901, 906

(10th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).

When considering a factual attack on subject matter jurisdiction mounted in

a motion to dismiss, “a district court may not presume the truthfulness of the

complaint’s factual allegations,” and it “has wide discretion to allow

affidavits, other documents, and a limited evidentiary hearing to resolve

disputed jurisdictional facts.” [Holt v. United States, 46 F.3d 1000, 1003

(10th Cir. 1995).] Unless the jurisdictional issue is intertwined with the

merits of the case, considering evidence outside the complaint does not

convert the dismissal motion into one for summary judgment under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 56.

Herrera v. Las Cruces Pub. Sch., 695 F. App’x 361, 367 (10th Cir. 2017).

III. Discussion

The undersigned agrees with Respondent that the Court no longer has subject matter

jurisdiction over the Petition because it is moot. “At the start of litigation, a plaintiff must

show standing under Article III by demonstrating: ‘(1) an injury in fact; (2) a causal

connection between the injury and the challenged action; and (3) a likelihood that a

favorable decision will redress the injury.’” Ind v. Colo. Dep’t of Corr., 801 F.3d 1209,

1213 (10th Cir. 2015) (quoting Jordan v. Sosa, 654 F.3d 1012, 1019 (10th Cir. 2011)). A

case becomes moot “when a plaintiff no longer suffers ‘actual injury that can be redressed

by a favorable judicial decision.’” Id. (quoting Rhodes v. Judiscak, 676 F.3d 931, 933 (10th

Cir. 2012)). A court loses subject matter jurisdiction when a case becomes moot and must

dismiss the case “rather than issue an advisory opinion.” Fleming v. Gutierrez, 785 F.3d

442, 444-45 (10th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The following circumstances trigger an exception to the mootness doctrine:

(1) secondary or ‘collateral’ injuries survive after resolution of the primary

injury; (2) the issue is deemed a wrong capable of repetition yet evading

review; (3) the defendant voluntarily ceases an allegedly illegal practice but

is free to resume it at any time; or (4) it is a properly certified class action

suit.

R.M. Inv. Co. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 511 F.3d 1103, 1107 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting Riley v.

INS, 310 F.3d 1253, 1257 (10th Cir.2002)).

Here, a unit manager at FCI El Reno has sworn in an affidavit that Petitioner’s

PATTERN score has been adjusted as he requested in the Petition and that his FSA Time

Credits have now been applied as if his PATTERN score never incorrectly represented a

history of violence. (Doc. 13, at Ex. 1). Petitioner has not disputed the declarations made

in the affidavit nor responded in any way to the Motion to Dismiss.4 Given that BOP

4 “Any motion that is not opposed within 21 days may, in the discretion of the court, be

deemed confessed.” LCvR 7.1(g).

officials have remedied the injury caused by their mischaracterizing one of Petitioner’s past

offenses as violent and consequently miscalculating his PATTERN score, and given that

nothing suggests that BOP officials would repeat or resume these actions, no exception to

mootness applies. Since Petitioner has received the relief he requested in his Petition, the

Petition is moot, and this Court no longer has subject matter jurisdiction over it. Thus, the

Petition should be dismissed without prejudice. Brown v. Buhman, 822 F.3d 1151, 1165,

1179 (10th Cir. 2016) (explaining that “[m]ootness deprives federal courts of jurisdiction”

and lack of subject-matter jurisdiction results in a dismissal without prejudice).

IV. Recommendation and Notice of Right to Object

For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that the Court GRANT Respondent’s

Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 13) and DISMISS the Petition without prejudice. Petitioner is

advised of the right to file an objection to this Report and Recommendation with the

Clerk of Court by August 12, 2025, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Fed. R. Civ.

P. 72. Petitioner is further advised that failure to timely object to this Report and

Recommendation waives the right to appellate review of both factual and legal issues

contained herein. Moore v. United States, 950 F.2d 656, 659 (10th Cir. 1991).

This Report and Recommendation disposes of all issues referred to the undersigned

Magistrate Judge and terminates the referral unless and until the matter is re-referred.

ENTERED this 22" day of July, 2025.

AMANDA L. MAXFIELD

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE