Gautam v. City of Sunrise, Florida

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 25-CV-60841-STRAUSS

NIHAL MICHAEL GAUTAM,

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY OF SUNRISE, et al.,

Defendants.

/

ORDER1

THIS MATTER came before the Court upon three separate motions to dismiss:

Defendants, Michael West, Anthony Rosa, Christopher Pullease, Sean Visners, Brooke Lebel,

Richard White, and Felcia M. Bravo’s, Motion to Dismiss [DE 22]; Defendants, Maurice

Lawrence, Carlos Lopez, Terrell Bush, Deltamus Cason, and Bradford Jones’, Motion to Dismiss

[DE 23]; and Defendant, City of Sunrise’s, Motion to Dismiss [DE 24] (collectively “the

Motions”). I have reviewed the Motions, Plaintiff’s Response to each [DE 32, 33, 34] and

Defendants’ combined Reply [DE 37] thereto, and all other pertinent portions of the record. For

the discussed herein, the Motions [DE 22, 23, 24] are GRANTED-IN-PART and DENIED-IN-

PART.

1 On June 24, 2025, the parties filed a Joint Notice of Consent where they waived their right to

proceed before a United States District Judge of this Court and consented to have me conduct any

and all further proceedings in this case, including the trial and order of the entry of judgment. [DE

28].

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, Nihal Michael Gautam (“Gautam”), filed his Complaint on April 29, 2025. [DE

1]. He purported to bring a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights claim, a Florida Public Records Act

claim, a RICO claim under 18 U.S.C. § 1961, an abuse of process claim, and an intentional

infliction of emotional distress claim. Id. at 3.2 Gautam also moved to proceed in forma pauperis.

[DE 3]. I entered an order denying without prejudice Gautam’s motion to proceed in forma

pauperis, finding that it contained several deficiencies. [DE 4] at 3. I also found that Gautam’s

Complaint failed “to adequately allege any specific facts from which the Court could reasonably

infer Plaintiff has stated plausible claims or that would give Defendants reasonable notice of what

those claims are.” Id. at 4. I then ordered Gautam to “file a renewed motion to proceed in forma

pauperis[] and file an amended complaint by May 23, 2025.” Id. at 6.

On May 2, 2025, Gautam filed his Amended Complaint and renewed his motion to proceed

in forma pauperis. [DE 5], [DE 6]. Gautam listed the City of Sunrise, Lieutenant Michael West,

Sergeant Christopher Pullease, Officer Rachel Howe, Chief Anthony Rosa, and ten John Doe

SERT officers as defendants in his Amended Complaint. [DE 5] at 3. Gautam purported to bring

a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights claim (alleging malicious prosecution, excessive force, and due

process violations), a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Monell3 claim, and a civil Rico claim under 18 U.S.C. §

1961. [DE 5] at 1.

Then, on May 23, 2025, Gautam sought leave to file a Second Amended Complaint and

attached the proposed Second Amended Complaint to his motion. [DE 11]. I granted his motion

2 Though Gautam listed five causes of action in his Complaint, his Civil Cover Sheet only checked

one box, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations. [DE 1–1] at 1.

3 Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).

for leave, see [DE 12], and granted his renewed motion to proceed in forma pauperis, [DE 16].

Gautam’s Second Amended Complaint contains 385 paragraphs, spans 29 pages, and lists the City

of Sunrise (“City”), Chief Anthony Rosa (“Rosa”) (individually and in his official capacity),

Lieutenant Michael West (“West”), Sergeant Christopher Pullease (“Pullease”), Officer Maurice

Lawrence (“Lawrence”), Officer Carlos Lopez (“Lopez”), Officer Terrell Bush (“Bush”), Officer

Deltamus Cason (“Cason”), Sergeant Bradford Jones (“Jones”), Deputy Chief Sean Visners

(“Visners”), Major Brooke Lebel (“Lebel”), Sergeant Richard White (“White”), Felicia M. Bravo

(“Bravo”) (in her official capacity), and ten John Doe officers as defendants. See [DE 13].

FACTUAL BACKGROUND4

Gautam alleges that at 2:00 AM on March 6, 2025, he went to the residence of his son’s

mother with his two golden retrievers to “peacefully discuss[] child-related matters.” [DE 13] ¶

13. Then Officers Lawrence, Lopez, Bush, Cason, West, Rachel Howe, and Jones arrived at the

scene. Id. ¶ 13. Officer Lawrence then handcuffed Gautam and placed him in the back of a patrol

car. Id. ¶¶ 15–16, 21. Gautam does not provide any allegations as to why Officer Lawrence

arrested him but does mention in one paragraph that the officers repeatedly questioned “the alleged

victim––[his son’s] mother.” Id. ¶ 14. While detained, Gautam alleges that he told the officers

that the handcuffs were too tight, that he could not feel his hands, and that he asked repeatedly

where his dogs were. Id. ¶¶ 15, 18. The officers allegedly ignored all of Gautam’s requests and

ridiculed him. Id. ¶ 16.

4 For purposes of considering the Motions, the Court accepts the factual allegations in the Second

Amended Complaint as true and views them in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. See

Cambridge Christian Sch., Inc. v. Fla. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 942 F.3d 1215, 1229 (11th Cir.

2019).

Gautam alleges that the officers who were present on the night of his arrest tampered with

their body-worn cameras by muting their microphones at various points (specifically when some

of the officers were conferring with each other). Id. ¶¶ 25–43. Moreover, Gautam alleges that

certain officers who appeared on the body-worn camera “were omitted from CAD logs, arrest

reports, and discovery materials produced to Plaintiff and his defense counsel” (in his underlying

criminal case). Id. ¶ 26.

As part of his general facts, Gautam makes numerous allegations regarding an incident that

took place in November 2021 between Defendant Pullease and another officer, Amanda Mata

(“Mata”). Id. ¶¶ 51–81. In short, Gautam describes the incident as Pullease attacking Mata and

then trying to cover up his attack. Id. Gautam alleges that Pullease was allowed to retire while he

was under investigation and retain his pension. Id. ¶ 66.

Gautam further alleges that between April and May 2025, he submitted a series of public

record requests to the City related to his March 6, 2025 arrest and about the officers involved. Id.

¶ 83. Bravo primarily handled the City’s response to these requests. Id. Gautam alleges that the

City did not provide the requested documents and falsely claimed that there we “no responsive

records” for some of his requests. Id. ¶ 86. Furthermore, Gautam alleges that the City charged

impermissible fees including a “fabricated 25% fringe/pension benefit surcharge” fee. Id. ¶ 91.

Lastly, Gautam alleges that the City has “constructed and preserved an entrenched system of

pension abuse.” Id. ¶ 114. Gautam makes serval allegations regarding this alleged abuse involving

multiple officers, the Sunrise Police Retirement Board, and several cities statewide including

Jacksonville, Miami, West Palm Beach, and Clearwater. Id. ¶¶ 114–145, 177–186.

Gautam brings eight counts against the various Defendants. Count I is a false arrest and

unlawful seizure claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against “All Defendant Officers and the [City].”

Id. ¶¶ 197–98. Count II is an excessive force claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against “All Defendant

Officers and the [City].” Id. ¶¶ 212–13. Count III is a failure to intervene claim under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 against “All Defendant Officers Individually.” Id. ¶¶ 229–30. Count IV is a Monell claim

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City and Chief Anthony Rosa. Id. ¶¶ 245–46. Count V is a

civil RICO claim under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968 against the City, West, Bravo, Pullease, Rosa,

Jones, and John Doe Officers 1–10. Id. ¶¶ 261–62. Count VI is a violation of the Florida Public

Records Act claim under Chapter 119, Florida Statutes against the City and Bravo. Id. ¶¶ 296–

97. Count VII is a negligence and due process claim against the City and “Individual Officers.”

Id. ¶¶ 316–17. And Count VIII is an injunctive and declaratory relief claim against all Defendants.

Id. ¶¶ 334–335.

LEGAL STANDARD

At the pleading stage, a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim

showing the [plaintiff] is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Although Rule 8(a) does not

require “detailed factual allegations,” it does require “more than labels and conclusions”; a

“formulaic recitation of the cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

555 (2007). To survive a motion to dismiss, “factual allegations must be enough to raise a right

to relief above the speculative level” and must be sufficient “to state a claim for relief that is

plausible on its face.” Id. at 555, 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable

for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “The mere possibility

the defendant acted unlawfully is insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.” Sinaltrainal v.

Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1261 (11th Cir. 2009) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). “Where a

complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of

the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court’s review is generally “limited

to the four corners of the complaint.” Wilchombe v. TeeVee Toons, Inc., 555 F.3d 949, 959 (11th

Cir. 2009) (quoting St. George v. Pinellas County, 285 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2002)). Courts

must accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true and view them in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff. Cambridge Christian Sch., 942 F.3d at 1229; Tims v. LGE Cmty. Credit

Union, 935 F.3d 1228, 1236 (11th Cir. 2019). But “[c]onclusory allegations, unwarranted

deductions of facts or legal conclusions masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal.” Jackson

v. Bellsouth Telecomms., 372 F.3d 1250, 1262-63 (11th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted); see also

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“[T]he tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained

in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.”).

Shotgun pleadings violate Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. Vibe Micro, Inc. v.

Shabanets, 878 F.3d 1291, 1294–95 (11th Cir. 2018). There are four types or categories of shotgun

pleadings. See Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 792 F.3d 1313, 1321–23 (11th Cir.

2015). But the “unifying characteristic of all types of shotgun pleadings is that they fail to one

degree or another, and in one way or another, to give the defendants adequate notice of the claims

against them and the grounds upon which each claim rests.” Id. at 1323.

When a plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court must liberally construe the pro se pleadings

and hold them to “less stringent standards” than pleadings drafted by attorneys. Bilal v. Geo Care,

LLC, 981 F.3d 903, 911 (11th Cir. 2020). “Yet even in the case of pro se litigants this leniency

does not give a court license to serve as de facto counsel for a party, or to rewrite an otherwise

deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.” Campbell v. Air Jamaica Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165,

1168–69 (11th Cir. 2014).

ANALYSIS5

I. Count I (False Arrest and Unlawful Seizure Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983)

Gautam brings his false arrest and unlawful seizure claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against

“All Defendant Officers and the [City].” [DE 13] ¶¶ 197–98. Defendants Lawrence, Lopez, Bush,

Cason, and Jones have filed an Answer to this claim and do not join in the Motions for this count.

As to the remaining Defendants, they argue that Gautam failed to plausibly allege facts that could

establish a false arrest claim.

Defendants Rosa, Pullease, Visners, Lebel, and White argue that Gautam does not allege

that they were present at the time of his arrest and could have violated his Fourth Amendment

rights. [DE 22] at 4.6 They are correct.

“A warrantless arrest without probable cause violates the Constitution and provides a basis

for a section 1983 claim.” Bowens v. Superintendent of Miami S. Beach Police Dep’t, 557 F.

App’x 857, 863 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting Kingsland v. City of Miami, 382 F.3d 1220, 1226 (11th

Cir. 2004)). Here, Gautam fails to allege how Defendants Rosa, Pullease, Visners, Lebel, and

5 Although Gautam has alleged extensive general facts, he does not attribute any of his general

facts to a specific cause of action. Thus, it is difficult to ascertain which general facts pertain to

which cause of action.

6 Gautam names the City as a Defendant in this claim. However, “[t]here is no respondeat superior

liability making a municipality liable for the wrongful actions of its police officers in making a

false arrest.” Gold v. City of Miami, 151 F.3d 1346, 1350 (11th Cir. 1998). “Instead, a

municipality may be held liable for the actions of a police officer only when municipal ‘official

policy’ causes a constitutional violation.” Id. This is commonly referred to as a Monell claim.

Gautam, in Count IV, brings a Monell claim against the City (and Rosa). Thus, it appears that

inclusion of the City in Count I is duplicative of the claim brought in Count IV. At any rate, in

Count I Gautam offers only a single conclusory allegation that the City failed to train and supervise

its personnel. Because these allegations against the City are insufficient to support Monell liability

for false arrest, Count I against the City is dismissed.

White were involved in his arrest, much less arrested him without probable cause. Gautam alleges

that “Officers Lawrence, Bush, Lopez, and others executed the arrest without lawful authority.”

[DE 13] ¶ 208.7 But a vague allegation of “and others” does not plausibly state that the above

Defendants participated in anyway with Gautam’s arrest. Therefore, Count I is dismissed as to

Defendants Rosa,8 Pullease, Visners, Lebel, and White.

Count I is not dismissed as to Defendant West. West’s only argument in favor of dismissal

(lumped in with the other defendants in DE 22) is that he was not present during the incident, and

Gautam did not allege that West was present. [DE 22] at 4. However, Gautam’s allegations belie

this assertion. For example, Gautam alleges that West “oversaw the arrest while remaining

undocumented and unaccountable” and “coordinated the operation and directed the unlawful

seizure.” [DE 13] ¶¶ 205, 209. Thus, Gautam did allege that West was present during the incident.

Because West’s only argument in support of dismissal was that there were no allegations that he

was present during the arrest, his motion is denied.

II. Count II (Excessive Force under 42 U.S.C. § 1983)

Gautam brings his excessive force claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against “All Defendant

Officers and the [City].” [DE 13] ¶¶ 212–13. Defendants Lawrence, Lopez, Bush, Cason, and

Jones have filed an Answer to this claim and do not join in the Motions for this count. As to the

7 Earlier in his Second Amended Complaint, Gautam alleges that “[a]t approximately 3:00 AM,

Plaintiff was handcuffed behind his back by Officer Maurice Lawrence.” Id. ¶ 15.

8 Additionally, all other claims against Rosa in his official capacity are dismissed on the grounds

that “suits against a municipal officer sued in his official capacity and direct suits against

municipalities are functionally equivalent.” Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 776 (11th

Cir. 1991). Here, Gautam sues the City and Rosa in his official capacity. Suing Rosa in his official

capacity is the equivalent of suing the City. Id. Keeping the City and Rosa in his official capacity

as a defendant in this case would be “redundant and possibly confusing to the jury.” Id.

remaining Defendants, they argue that Gautam failed to plausibly allege facts that could establish

an excessive force claim.

Gautam alleges that officers used excessive force while arresting him because he was

“handcuffed tightly for over 45 minutes,” and was not provided water or bathroom access while

in the backseat of a patrol vehicle. [DE 13] ¶¶ 216, 218. Defendants West, Rosa, Pullease, Visners,

Lebel, and White argue that Gautam fails to allege that each of the Defendants did not use

objectively reasonable force. [DE 22] at 4.9 I agree that Gautam has failed to plausibly allege

facts that could establish an excessive force claim against Defendants Rosa, Pullease, Visners,

Lebel, and White. I do not agree that Gautam failed to plausibly allege facts that could establish

an excessive force claim against West.

When evaluating whether an officer used excessive force, courts “balance the nature and

quality of the intrusion on the individual against the government justification for using force and

consider (1) the severity of the crime, (2) whether the suspect poses an immediate threat, and (3)

whether the suspect is resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest.” Andrade v. Sheriff of Lee

Cnty., Fla., No. 23-10438, 2023 WL 6389812, at * 5 (11th Cir. Sept. 29, 2023). Additionally,

courts consider “the justification for the use of force, the relationship between the justification and

the force used, and the extent of any injury inflicted.” Id.

Gautam does not allege anywhere in his excessive force claim that Defendants Rosa,

Pullease, Visners, Lebel, or White used any force, let alone excessive force, on him. Indeed,

Gautam does not allege that these Defendants were even present during his arrest. Therefore,

Count II is dismissed as to these Defendants.

9 Gautam also names the City as a Defendant in this claim. For the same reasons described as to

Count I in footnote 6, supra, Count II against the City is dismissed. Again, the claim against the

City appears duplicative of the Monell claim brought in Count IV, and, at any rate, offers only a

conclusory allegation of failure to train officers, failing to supervise, and ignoring excessive force.

As to Defendant West, Gautam alleges that he was present during the arrest and “stood

nearby laughing, as seen on [body-worn camera] footage from Lawrence, Bush, and West.” [DE

13] ¶ 219. Gautam further alleges that West “ignored cries for help” and did not loosen his

handcuffs. Id. ¶¶ 217, 225. Again, these allegations sufficiently rebut West’s entire argument in

support of dismissal that he was not present during the arrest and that Gautam has not alleged that

he was.10 Thus, West’s motion to dismiss Count II is denied.

III. Count III (Failure to Intervene under 42 U.S.C. § 1983)

Gautam brings his failure to intervene claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against “All Defendant

Officers Individually.” [DE 13] ¶¶229–30. Defendants Lawrence, Lopez, Bush, Cason, and Jones

have filed an Answer to this claim and do not join in the Motions for this count. As to the

remaining Defendants, they argue that Gautam failed to plausibly allege any facts that could

establish an ability to intervene.

Defendants West, Rosa, Pullease, Visners, Lebel, and White argue that Gautam does not

plausibly allege that the officers were in a position to intervene. After reviewing the allegations,

Defendants Rosa, Pullease, Visners, Lebel, and White are correct.

“An officer who is present at the scene and who fails to take reasonable steps to protect the

victim of another officer’s use of excessive force, can be held liable for his nonfeasance.” Hadley

v. Gutierrez, 526 F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Velazquez v. City of Hialeah, 484 F.3d

10 The motion on behalf of West and others does cite Gonzalez v. Reno, 325 F.3d 1228, 1233 (11th

Cir. 2003) for the proposition that an excessive force claim requires allegations that each defendant

sued used objectively unreasonable force. To the extent Defendants meant this sentence to

specifically support dismissal of West separate and apart from the defendants who were not even

alleged to be present, there are several problems. For one, they do not cite any analysis from

Gonzalez; rather they only cite to a portion of the opinion recounting what the district court there

did that does not examine whether the district court’s decision was correct or not. For another, it

is wholly unclear whether or how Defendants meant to apply the principle they state to the

allegations against West, given that they do not analyze the allegations against him at all.

1340, 1341 (11th Cir. 2007)). However, “it must also be true that the non-intervening officer was

in a position to intervene yet failed to do so.” Id. at 1331.

Again, as to Defendants Rosa, Pullease, Visners, Lebel, and White, Gautam does not allege

a single fact placing them at the scene of the arrest. Consequently, Gautam has failed to allege

how these Defendants could have intervened if they were not even present during the arrest. Count

III, as to these Defendants, is dismissed.

As to Defendant West, Gautam alleges that he was “present at the scene, within feet of

Plaintiff.” [DE 13] ¶ 234. As explained in Counts I and II, West’s entire argument is that Gautam

did not allege that West was present during the arrest. Seeing that Gautam did allege that West

was present, and West provides no other grounds for dismissal, West’s motion to dismiss Count

III is denied.

IV. Count IV (Municipal Liability Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983)

Gautam brings his Monell claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City and Rosa in his

official capacity. [DE 13] ¶¶245–46. Gautam alleges that the City had a “pattern of misconduct,

including the use of ghost officers, unlawful supervision by retirees, routine evidence muting, and

paperwork falsification.” Id. ¶ 249. Defendants correctly argue that Gautam has failed to plausibly

allege facts that could establish a Monell claim.

As discussed earlier, Count IV against Rosa in his official capacity is dismissed because

“suits against a municipal officer sued in his official capacity and direct suits against municipalities

are functionally equivalent.” Busby, 931 F.2d at 776. Therefore, suing Rosa in his official capacity

is the equivalent of suing the City. Id. Gautam’s Monell claim is against both the City and Rosa.

And as the court in Busby observed, keeping both the municipality and the municipality’s officer

(in his official capacity) as a defendants would be “redundant and possibly confusing to the jury.”

Id.

Count IV is also dismissed against the City.11 A municipal local government body may be

liable under 42 U.S.C. § 198312 if it “‘subjects’ a person to a deprivation of rights or ‘causes’ a

person ‘to be subjected’ to such deprivation.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011) (citing

Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978)); Pellegrino v. Wengert, 703

F. App’x 892, 895 (11th Cir. 2017). However, municipalities “are not vicariously liable under §

1983 for their employees’ actions.” Connick, 563 U.S. at 60; see also Monell, 436 U.S. at 691

(“[A] municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor—or, in other words,

a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.”).

“Instead, to impose municipal liability under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts showing:

‘(1) that his constitutional rights were violated; (2) that the municipality had a custom or policy

that constituted deliberate indifference to that constitutional right; and (3) that the policy or custom

caused the violation.’” Gurrera v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 657 F. App’x 886, 893 (11th

Cir. 2016) (quoting McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004)). Thus, in addition

to demonstrating a violation of constitutional rights, a plaintiff must show “that ‘action pursuant

to official municipal policy’ caused [his] injury.” Connick, 563 U.S. at 60 (quoting Monell, 436

11 The City puts forth several arguments as to why Count I should be dismissed. Because the Court

agrees that Gautam has failed to allege facts to plausibly state a § 1983 claim, the Court need not

address the other grounds for dismissal that the City raises.

12 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides, in pertinent part, the following:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or

usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to

be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the

jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities

secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an

action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .

U.S. at 691). Satisfying the causation element requires a showing that the custom or policy at issue

was “the ‘moving force’ behind the constitutional deprivation.” Gurrera, 657 F. App’x at 893

(citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 690–94).

“A policy is a decision that is officially adopted by the municipality, or created by an

official of such rank that he or she could be said to be acting on behalf of the municipality,” while

“[a] custom is a practice that is so settled and permanent that it takes on the force of law.” Sewell

v. Town of Lake Hamilton, 117 F.3d 488, 489 (11th Cir. 1997). Therefore, “[a] single incident of

a constitutional violation is insufficient to prove a policy or custom even when the incident

involves several employees of the municipality.” Craig v. Floyd County, 643 F.3d 1306, 1311

(11th Cir. 2011). To establish a “custom,” a plaintiff must show a “persistent and wide-spread

practice” of similar constitutional violations. Depew v. City of St. Marys, Georgia, 787 F.2d 1496,

1499 (11th Cir. 1986).

Here, Gautam alleges that City officials “were aware of persistent use of retired personnel

like [West] in field operations, despite West being publicly listed as retired and serving as Pension

Board Chair.” [DE 13] ¶ 250. Gautam also alleges that “[o]fficers routinely omitted supervisors

from arrest paperwork and redacted or altered body camera footage.” Id. ¶ 251. But all these

allegations stem from the one night Gautam was arrested.13 Gautam does not allege any other

examples of retired officers being use in field operations or any other examples of officers omitting

13 Moreover, it is entirely unclear what constitutional right or rights Gautam is alleging that these

supposed policies violated. Gautam fails to provide non-conclusory allegations showing any of

these policies or customs are wide-spread, and it is entirely unclear how any of these policies could

constitute the “moving force” behind the false arrest and excessive force claims in Counts I and II.

To the extent Gautam is claiming some other kind of constitutional violations, the Second

Amended Complaint is entirely unclear as to what other constitutional violation Gautam purports

to bring.

supervisors from arrest paperwork. Again, “[a] single incident of a constitutional violation is

insufficient to prove a policy or custom.” Craig, 643 F.3d at 1311.

Additionally, Gautam makes several allegations regarding the City’s response to Gautam’s

public record requests. [DE 13] ¶¶ 254, 259. In particular, Gautam alleges that, due to the

deficiencies in the City’s responses, Gautam has proved that the City has “an official policy of

denying citizens access to core constitutional evidence.” Id. ¶ 254. These allegations do not

plausibly state an official policy or custom. The alleged policy or custom spans one event (the

City’s response to Gautam’s public records request), and Gautam does not make any allegation

that the City provided deficient public record responses to other individuals. Thus, Count IV is

dismissed.

V. Count V (Civil RICO Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–68)

Gautam brings his civil RICO claim against the City, West, Bravo, Pullease, Rosa, Jones,

and John Doe Officers 1–10. [DE 13] ¶¶ 261–62. Gautam alleges these individuals (and

municipality) operated an enterprise that “consists of a closed-loop network operated by [the City],

Sunrise PD command staff, and pension board actors.” Id. ¶ 264. Together, Gautam alleges, these

Defendants: obstructed justice by muting their body-worn camera footage (in violation of 18

U.S.C. § 1503); tampered with a witness regarding an incident with Defendant Pullease (in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512); engaged in mail and wire fraud by issuing false denials of his

public records requests and demanding inflated fees for those requests (in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§§ 1341 and 1343); destroyed Defendant Pullease’s internal phone data, failed to maintain body-

worn camera chain-of-custody logs, and destroyed or concealed public records (in violation of 18

U.S.C. § 1519); committed fraud in pension administration (in violation of some unspecified

“financial institution fraud”); and retaliated against whistleblowers in relation to the incident

between Defendant Pullease and Officer Mata. Id. ¶¶ 272–77. Defendants argue that Gautam has

not alleged any criminal activity and lacks standing to bring a possibly RICO claim.

Defendants are correct that Gautam’s civil RICO claim must be dismissed. “A plaintiff

suing under the ‘civil provisions of RICO must plausibly allege six elements: that the defendants

(1) operated or managed (2) an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity that

included at least two predicate acts of racketeering, which (5) caused (6) injury to the business or

property of the plaintiff.’” Otto Candies, LLC v. Citigroup Inc., 137 F.4th 1158, 1196 (11th Cir.

2025) (quoting Cisneros v. Petland, Inc., 972 F.3d 1204, 1211 (11th Cir. 2020)). The statute

specifically defines what types of conduct constitutes “racketeering activity,” as well as what

constitutes an “enterprise” and a “pattern of racketeering activity.” 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1), (4), (5).

Further, “the test for RICO standing is whether the alleged injury was directly caused by the RICO

violation, not whether such harm was reasonably foreseeable.” Bivens Gardens Off. Bldg., Inc. v.

Barnett Banks of Fla., Inc., 140 F.3d 898, 908 (11th Cir. 1998); see also Beck v. Prupis, 162 F.3d

1090, 1095 (11th Cir. 1998) (“In addition to proving racketeering activity, a civil RICO plaintiff

must show that the racketeering activity caused him to suffer an injury.”); Green Leaf Nursery v.

E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 341 F.3d 1292, 1307 (11th Cir. 2003) (“In order for a pattern of

racketeering activity to be a cognizable cause of civil RICO injury to a private plaintiff, one or

more of the predicate acts must not only be the ‘but for’ cause of the injury, but the proximate

cause as well.”).

First, regarding many of the alleged predicate acts of racketeering activity, Gautam has not

plausibly alleged facts that could establish that these acts caused his alleged injuries. Gautam’s

allegations about the incident between Defendant Pullease and Officer Mata and its aftermath

(which Gautam alleges constitute witness tampering, documents destruction through deletion of

phone data, and retaliation against whistleblowers) are entirely about acts and events that have

nothing to do with his arrest and have no discernable connection to his injuries. Similarly, his

allegations regarding fraud in the pension system have no bearing on him or his injuries. Gautam

does not allege how he has suffered any harm from the City’s retirement program. Gautam is not

a police officer or an employee qualified to participate in the retirement program. And whatever

systemic effects Gautam believes operation of the pension system had on what officers were or

were not present on the night of his arrest, none the alleged wrongs could be considered the

proximate cause of his injuries. See Green Leaf Nursery, 341 F.3d at 1307 (defining proximate

cause to be “a substantial factor in the sequence of responsible causation”).

Second, the alleged predicate acts that bear some connection to Plaintiff’s arrest (and his

subsequent attempts to obtain information about his arrest) do not constitute “racketeering

activity.” Gautam cites to various federal obstruction of justice statutes regarding what he

describes as suppression of body-worn camera evidence, “muting of key conversations,” and ghost

officer cover-ups (18 U.S.C. § 1503), witness tampering (18 U.S.C. § 1512), and destruction of

public records and failure to maintain body-worn camera chain-of-custody logs (18 U.S.C. §

1519). While the statue’s definition of “racketeering activity” includes conduct that violates §§

1503 and 1512, it does not include violations of § 1519. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1). Regardless, all

of these statutes apply only to conduct obstructing federal proceedings and investigations. Green

Leaf Nursery, 341 F.3d at 1307 (“The federal obstruction and witness intimidation claims

[referring to § 1503 and § 1512] are only applicable to federal proceedings.”) (citing O’Malley v.

New York City Transit Auth., 896 F.2d 704, 707 (2d Cir. 1990)); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1519

(referring to destroying records “with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence the investigation

or proper administration of any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the

United States”) (emphasis added). Gautam makes no allegations suggesting any sort of federal

nexus with his arrest and subsequent state prosecution. Therefore, even assuming any of the

conduct Gautam alleges regarding the use of body-worn cameras, retention of that footage, or

concealment or destruction of other documents relevant to his arrest occurred and are improper,14

they do not constitute “racketeering activity” within the RICO statute’s definition.

Gautam’s allegations regarding responses to his public records requests also do not amount

to violations of the federal mail or wire fraud statutes, and thus do not constitute racketeering

activity. Gautam alleges that Defendant Bravo responded to his public records requests by falsely

claiming that no responsive records existed. [DE 13] ¶ 280. However, even if Bravo’s statements

were knowingly false (and even if she used interstate wires or mails to make them), they do not

constitute violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 or 1343. That is because these statutes only criminalize

deceptions that aim to obtain money or property. Ciminelli v. United States, 598 U.S. 306, 312

(2023). Bravo’s alleged false statements about the existence of records – even if injurious and

wrongful in some other way – did not harm or seek to harm Gautam’s property rights. Therefore,

they cannot amount to mail or wire fraud and do not amount to a crime within the definition of

racketeering activity.

Nor do Gautam’s allegations about the City charging him “fabricated” public record

request fees amount to mail or wire fraud. While these charges do amount to attempts to obtain

money from him, they were clearly authorized by state law, and thus not fraudulent. Section

14 But c.f. United States v. Scott, No. CR 120-028, 2021 WL 5411955, at *6 (S.D. Ga. July 13,

2021), report and recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 5410899 (S.D. Ga. Nov. 18, 2021) (“[T]he

failure of an officer to turn on a body camera or dash camera is not sanctionable and does not

justify suppression of evidence, even when the failure to do so violates department policy.”); see

also Kern v. Sacramento Police Dep’t, No. 223CV00560JDPPC, 2023 WL 3077107, at *2 (E.D.

Cal. Apr. 25, 2023) (“[A]n officer does not violate the constitution by having his body worn camera

off.”).

119.07, Florida Statutes, states that “[t]he custodian of public records shall furnish a copy or a

certified copy of the record upon payment of the fee prescribed by law.” § 119.07(4), Fla. Stat.

(2025). The statute further provides that:

If the nature or volume of public records requested to be inspected or copied

pursuant to this subsection is such as to require extensive use of information

technology resources or extensive clerical or supervisory assistance by personnel

of the agency involved, or both, the agency may charge, in addition to the actual

cost of duplication, a special service charge, which shall be reasonable and shall be

based on the cost incurred for such extensive use of information technology

resources or the labor cost of the personnel providing the service that is actually

incurred by the agency or attributable to the agency for the clerical and supervisory

assistance required, or both.

§ 119.07(4)(d), Fla. Stat. The City’s municipal code specifically promulgates that:

City personnel providing clerical or supervisory assistance or information

technology resources necessary to comply with the public records request shall

maintain records of the time expended and tasks conducted regarding each such

request, and the actual city cost of information technology resource use, in

responding to the public records request. A debit based upon the city’s actual cost

of information technology resources and the time expended and the applicable

hourly rate shall be charged against the public records request deposit account.

The hourly rate used to calculate the special service charge shall be equal to a city

employee’s actual hourly rate of pay (if such person is paid by the hour) or an

approximation of his or her hourly compensation based upon a weekly salary

divided by forty (40) hours (if said employee is a person who is compensated on a

salaried basis) together with an additional factor of twenty-five (25) percent

reflecting said person’s hourly value of fringe and pension benefits.

Sunrise, Fla., Code § 2-398(b) (emphasis added).

Here, Gautam’s allegation that the City (and Bravo) “inflated [public record request] fees

using a fabricated 25% pension surcharge” is belied by the ordinance. [DE 13] ¶ 280. The 25%

surcharge is not fabricated. Section 119.07(4) permits municipalities to charge a reasonable

“special service charge.” § 119.07(4)(d), Fla. Stat. And the City’s Code details that it will charge

an additional 25% charge reflecting the employee’s “fringe and pension benefits.” Sunrise, Fla.,

Code § 2-398(b). Florida courts have held that such a fee charge is reasonable. See Bd. of Cnty.

Comm’rs of Highlands Cnty. v. Colby, 976 So. 2d 31, 37 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (approving the

county’s “formula that includes both an employee’s salary and his or her benefits when calculating

the labor cost to be included in the special service charge authorized by that statute.”); see also

Trout v. Bucher, 205 So. 3d 876, 877–79 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016); Charnley v. Town of S. Palm Beach,

No. 13-81203-CIV, 2015 WL 12999749, at *9 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 23, 2015), report and

recommendation adopted, 2015 WL 12999750 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 9, 2015). Consequently, Gautam

has failed to allege that mandating this fee surcharge constitutes fraud (and, thus, “racketeering

activity”).

Because some of the alleged predicate acts did not cause Gautam’s injuries and the other

acts are not racketeering activities, Count V is dismissed as to all Defendants.

VI. Count VII (Negligence and Due Process Violations)

Gautam brings what appears to be a combined negligence and due process violation claim

against the City and “Individual Officers.” [DE 13] ¶¶ 316–17. Gautam makes several allegations

in this claim spanning different issues. For example, Gautam alleges that while being arrested, he

was never informed of the charges against him, never issued Miranda warnings, had personal

property taken, and officers did not ensure the safety of his one-year-old son. Id. ¶¶ 320–25. The

named Defendants argue that this claim should be dismissed for several reasons, including that it

is an improper shotgun pleading and Gautam has failed to allege a negligence or due process claim.

The Defendants are correct that this claim is a shotgun pleading, as it appears to mix two

different causes of action (one based on the Fourteenth Amendment and, presumably, § 1983, and

one based on common law negligence). Failure to separate different causes of action into different

counts creates a shotgun pleading. Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1322–23 (“The third type of shotgun

pleading is one that commits the sin of not separating into a different count each cause of action

or claim for relief.”). This deficiency alone warrants the dismissal of Count VII.

Even if Gautam’s Negligence and Due Process claims were pled separately, Gautam has

failed to plausibly allege facts that could establish either claim.

a. Defendants West, Rosa, Pullease, Visners, Lebel, and White

Gautam alleges that officers did not make any effort to ensure the safety of Plaintiff’s one-

year-old son who remained sleeping inside his mother’s house while Gautam was arrested. [DE

13] ¶ 324. Gautam also alleges several deficiencies with the manner he was arrested and

subsequently held. ¶¶ 320–21. Gautam does not allege that Defendants Rosa, Pullease, Visners,

Lebel, and White, were present during the arrest. Therefore, based on Gautam’s allegations, these

Defendants did not engage in any negligent conduct regarding Gautam’s son, nor violate his due

process rights regarding his arrest and detainment because, again, Gautam has not even alleged

that they were present during the arrest. Therefore, Count VII is dismissed as to Defendants Rosa,

Pullease, Visners, Lebel, and White.

Further, to the extent Gautam brings a common law negligence claim, Defendants Rosa,

Pullease, Visners, Lebel, and White, as well as Defendant West, are immune under Florida law.

An officer, employee, or agent of the state or of any of its subdivisions may not be

held personally liable in tort or named as a party defendant in any action for any

injury or damage suffered as a result of any act, event, or omission of action in the

scope of her or his employment or function, unless such officer, employee, or agent

acted in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and

willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.

§ 768.28(9)(a), Fla. Stat. (2025). Gautam does not allege that any of the Defendants “acted in bad

faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human

rights, safety, or property.” At best, Gautam has merely alleged simple negligence. Indeed, he

fails to respond to Defendants’ state-law immunity argument at all. Therefore, this count fails to

the extent it brings a claim based on negligence.

Insofar as Gautam seeks to state a § 1983 claim for violation of due process, his claim also

fails. As to Gautam’s allegation that he was not provided with Miranda warnings, failure to follow

Miranda procedures “does not violate any substantive Fifth Amendment right such that a cause of

action for money damages under § 1983 is created.” Jones v. Cannon, 174 F.3d 1271, 1291 (11th

Cir. 1999); see also Newman v. Garcia, No. 3:16-CV-137-J-PDB, 2016 WL 8939133, at *6 (M.D.

Fla. Sept. 26, 2016) (“Failure to give a Miranda warning establishes no cause of action for money

damages under § 1983.”).

Moreover, Gautam alleges that his business property, pets, and phone were taken “without

documentation or chain-of-custody receipts.” [DE 13] ¶ 323. Gautam appears to be attempting to

allege a claim for seizure of his property, but such a claim is properly under the Fourth Amendment

not the Fourteenth. See Alcocer v. Mills, 906 F.3d 944, 952–53 (11th Cir. 2018). Regarding

Gautam’s allegation about a lack of documentation, he fails to explain or provide any authority

supporting why such a failure amounts to a constitutional violation of due process.

Lastly, to the extent Gautam’s due process claim stems from his allegations that he was

arrested without probable cause and subject to excessive force, this claim falls within Gautam’s

earlier causes of action (Counts I and II). See Alcocer, at 954–55.

b. The City

Gautam alleges that the City “failed to train its officers in basic custodial procedures, failed

to implement safeguards for property handling, and failed to protect family stability in domestic

response scenarios.” [DE 13] ¶ 326. Gautam further alleges that the City “negligently designed,

trained, and supervised personnel in a manner that foreseeable resulted in the loss of property.”

Id. ¶ 329.

Gautam’s allegations are vague and conclusory and do not adequately describe the training

deficiency. Additionally, Gautam appears to base his claim on the City’s allegedly inadequate

training policies. “A city’s decision regarding how to train its officers and what subject matter to

include in the training is clearly an exercise of governmental discretion regarding fundamental

questions of policy and planning.” Lewis v. City of St. Petersburg, 260 F.3d 1260, 1266 (11th Cir.

2001). Because Gautam seems to be challenging the reasonableness of the City’s basic policy

decisions, “the ‘discretionary’ function exception to the waiver of sovereign immunity applies”

and bars Gautam’s claim to the extent it is based on state tort law. Id. To the extent Gautam is

attempting to bring a Monell claim under § 1983, he has not alleged non-conclusory facts that

would establish a policy or custom of failing to train. Instead, Gautam conclusively alleges that

the City “negligently designed, trained, and supervised personnel in a manner that foreseeably

resulted in the loss of property, harm to family integrity, and violation of procedural due process.”

[DE 13] ¶ 329. Therefore, Count VII is dismissed as against the City.

c. Defendants Lawrence, Lopez, Bush, Cason, and Jones

Defendants Lawrence, Lopez, Bush, Cason, and Jones move to dismiss Count VII on

several grounds. They argue they are immune from Gautam’s negligence claim pursuant to section

768.28(9)(a), Florida Statutes. Defendants further contend that Gautam’s purported due process

claim falls within his previous counts (Counts I and II).

Gautam fails to allege that Defendants Lawrence, Lopez, Bush, Cason, and Jones “acted in

bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of

human rights, safety, or property.” Again, Gautam has at best merely alleged simple negligence.

As to the failure to provide Miranda warnings, there is no cause of action for money damages

under § 1983. See Jones, 174 F.3d at 1291. Finally, any alleged due process claim for lack of

probable cause or use of excessive force falls within Counts I and II. Consequently, Count VII

against Defendants Lawrence, Lopez, Bush, Cason, and Jones is dismissed.

VII. Count VIII (Injunctive and Declaratory Relief)

Gautam’s eighth cause of action seeks declaratory relief under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201–2202

against all Defendants. Gautam realleges several facts he already alleged earlier in his Second

Amended Complaint. For example, Gautam alleges that he was falsely arrested without probable

cause, that the body-worn camera footage from the night of the arrest was suppressed, that “ghost

officers” supervised the arresting officers, that there is whistleblower suppression, and the pension

program is abused. [DE 13] ¶¶ 338–45. Defendants correctly argue that Gautam has not stated a

basis for any of the Defendants to be subjected to declaratory relief and that Gautam has not alleged

facts that would entitle him to injunctive relief.

“The Declaratory Judgment Act is ‘an enabling Act, which confers a discretion on courts

rather than an absolute right upon the litigant.’” Ameritas Variable Life Ins. Co. v. Roach, 411

F.3d 1328, 1330 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 287 (1995)).

“[A] court should not entertain an action for declaratory relief when the issues are properly raised

in other counts of the pleadings and are already before the court.” Perret v. Wyndham Vacation

Resorts, Inc., 889 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1346 (S.D. Fla. 2012); see also Dear v. Q Club Hotel, LLC,

No. 15-60474-CIV, 2015 WL 4273054, at *2 (S.D. Fla. July 14, 2015). Here, Gautam’s basis for

declaratory relief is identical to the facts alleged in his earlier counts. For example, his allegations

regarding probable cause are identical to Count I, his allegations regarding “ghost officers” are

identical to Count IV, and allegations about whistleblower and evidence suppression are identical

to Count V. In other words, all the issues Gautam raises in Count VIII, are already raised in his

other counts.

As to injunctive relief, there is no cause of an action for injunctive relief. An injunction is

an equitable remedy, not a separate cause of action. See Klay v. United Healthgroup, Inc., 376

F.3d 1092, 1097 (11th Cir. 2004) (“There is no such thing as a suit for a traditional injunction in

the abstract.”); see also Exum v. Nat’l Tire & Battery, 437 F. Supp. 3d 1141, 1158–59 (S.D. Fla.

2020); Rubinstein v. Keshet Inter Vivos Tr., No. 17-61019-CIV, 2018 WL 3730875, at *7 (S.D.

Fla. June 11, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 3730867 (S.D. Fla. June 27,

2018). Regardless, Gautam has failed to plead any facts showing that he can satisfy the elements

required to obtain injunctive relief, including facts suggesting that he faces a “serious risk of

continuing irreparable injury” in the future. See Thomas v. Bryant, 614 F.3d 1288, 1318 (11th Cir.

2010). Consequently, Count VIII is dismissed.

VIII. Count VI (Violation of Florida Public Records Act Under Chapter 119,

Florida Statutes)

Lastly, Gautam alleges that the City and Bravo violated the Florida Public Records Act.

[DE 13] ¶¶ 296–97. Gautam claims that he submitted several public records requests from April

to May 2025 and the City and Bravo responded with “[f]alse denials,” “[d]eliberate delay tactics,”

and “[f]rabricated cost demands.” Id. ¶¶ 301–04. In response, the City and Bravo argue that the

Court should decline jurisdiction over Gautam’s Public Records Act claim.

The Court declines to exercise jurisdiction over Gautam’s state-law claim. Gautam only

brings this cause of action against the City and Bravo. As discussed above, all the other claims

against the City and Bravo are due to be dismissed. Thus, the only remaining claim against these

two Defendants is Gautam’s Public Records Act claim (a state-law claim). “The decision to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over pendant state claims rests within the discretion of the

district court.” Raney v. Allstate Ins. Co., 370 F.3d 1086, 1088 (11th Cir. 2004). The Eleventh

Circuit has “encouraged district courts to dismiss any remaining state claims when, as here, the

federal claims have been dismissed prior to trial.” Id. Therefore, Count VI is dismissed.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, the Motions [DE 22, 23, 24] are GRANTED-IN-PART

and DENIED-IN-PART.

a. Counts I, II, and III are dismissed with prejudice as to all Defendants except Defendants

West, Lawrence, Lopez, Bush, Cason, and Jones.15

b. Count V is dismissed with prejudice.16

c. Counts IV, VII, and VIII are dismissed without prejudice.17

d. Count VI is dismissed without prejudice, as the Court declines to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over this claim.

15 “Our cases make clear that ‘a [pro se] plaintiff must be given at least one chance to amend the

complaint before the district court dismisses the action with prejudice’—at least, that is, where ‘a

more carefully drafted complaint might state a claim.’” Silberman v. Miami Dade Transit, 927

F.3d 1123, 1132 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting Woldeab v. Dekalb Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 885 F.3d 1289,

1291 (11th Cir. 2018)) (alteration in original). Here, the Court has provided Gautam with three

opportunities to sufficiently plead a viable claim against these Defendants for Counts I–III, but he

has failed to do so. Additionally, given that Gautam has not even alleged that Defendants Rosa,

Pullease, Visners, Lebel, and White were present during his arrest, there is nothing to suggest that

it would be possible for a more carefully drafted complaint to state a claim. Thus, dismissal with

prejudice is appropriate.

16 As with Counts I–III, Gautam has had three opportunities to sufficiently plead his RICO claim.

However, he has failed to do so. Moreover, based on the allegations in the Second Amended

Complaint and Gautam’s responses to the Motions, there is nothing to suggest that it would be

possible for a more carefully drafted complaint to state a claim. Thus, dismissal with prejudice is

appropriate.

17 These Counts are dismissed without prejudice because a more carefully drafted complaint might

state a claim. However, Gautam is warned that failure to state a claim in a possible Third Amended

Complaint may result in dismissal of these claims with prejudice.

e. The Court will afford Gautam one final opportunity to amend his complaint regarding

those claims that have been dismissed without prejudice. Gautam may file a Third

Amended Complaint by September 4, 2025.

DONE AND ORDERED in Fort Lauderdale, Florida this 21st day of August 2025.

ared M. Strauss

United States Magistrate Judge

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