finding that a same- sex supervisor’s explicit sexual propositions sufficed to support a jury’s finding of sexual harassment based on sex
How later courts described this case
- finding that a same- sex supervisor’s explicit sexual propositions sufficed to support a jury’s finding of sexual harassment based on sex
- “[R]emanding the case to allow another pleading would do nothing but prolong the inevitable.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Case: 24-10962 Document: 51-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/21/2025
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
____________
FILED
August 21, 2025
No. 24-10962
____________ Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
Chad Lewis Lanier,
Plaintiff—Appellant,
versus
Wise County; Lane Akin, Wise County Sheriff; Wes Wallace,
Defendants—Appellees.
______________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 4:23-CV-1241
______________________________
Before Jones and Graves, Circuit Judges, and Rodriguez, District
Judge.*
Per Curiam:**
Chad Lanier served as a sheriff’s deputy in Wise County, Texas. He
retired in January 2022 after enduring 18 months of “repeated, explicit and
_____________________
*
United States District Judge for the Southern District of Texas, sitting by
designation.
**
Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion
should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set
forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
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No. 24-10962
unwanted sexual comments” from his male supervisor, Captain Wes
Wallace. Lanier sued Wise County, Sheriff Lane Akin, and Wallace for sexual
harassment and sex discrimination under Title VII and the Texas
Commission on Human Rights Act, as well as for constructive discharge and
retaliation. The district court dismissed his causes of action because he failed
to allege discrimination or harassment based on sex. Finding no error, we
AFFIRM the dismissal of Lanier’s claims.
I.
Lanier’s allegations of the unwanted sexual comments and conduct
appear in one paragraph of his complaint:
Over an eighteen month period, Plaintiff Lanier was subjected
to repeated, explicit and unwanted sexual comments from his
supervisor Defendant Wes Wallace [. . .] on a continuous basis.
Examples include Defendant Wallace repeatedly telling
Plaintiff Lanier to perform oral sex on Chief Deputy Craig
Johnson to get him in a better mood, repeated[ly] calling
Plaintiff Lanier a “cum guzzler,” referring to Plaintiff Lanier
as his lover and other unwanted sexual comments.
In January 2022, Lanier complained about Wallace’s conduct to his
superiors. According to Lanier, the Defendants determined that “Wallace
repeatedly subjected [ ] Lanier to unwanted sexual comments in the
workplace,” but despite this conclusion, they “failed to take appropriate
action.” And when Lanier was told that Wallace would continue to supervise
him, Lanier “chose to retire instead of being forced to work” under Wallace.
Lanier sued Wise County, Akin, and Wallace. He alleged a claim
against Wise County and Akin for sexual harassment and sex discrimination
under 42 U.S.C. § 2000-e2 (Title VII) and Section 21.051 of the Texas Labor
Code (TCHRA). He also alleged a Section 21.051 claim against Wallace in
his individual capacity on the grounds that Wallace committed sexual
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No. 24-10962
harassment as defined by Texas Labor Code § 21.141, which Texas recently
promulgated. Finally, Lanier alleged constructive discharge and retaliation,
and sought damages, declaratory relief, and attorney’s fees.
The Defendants moved for dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). In Lanier’s response, he argued that his complaint
presented cognizable claims and, in the alternative, requested that he
“should be granted the opportunity to amend his pleading to address any
issues identified by the Court.”
The district court granted the Defendants’ motion, analyzing first the
Title VII claim and concluding that Lanier failed to allege that any
discrimination or harassment occurred because of his sex. The district court
then addressed Lanier’s claim under Texas Labor Code § 21.051, reasoning
that because Texas applies the Title VII standard to the statute, Lanier’s
state-law claim was also subject to dismissal. The district court next
dismissed Lanier’s claims for constructive discharge and retaliation, and then
denied the “general request for leave to amend” as futile because Lanier
failed to explain how he would amend his complaint or allege that new facts
had come to light. The district court dismissed all claims with prejudice.
Lanier timely appealed. He raises three issues. First, he argues that he
alleged a viable cause of action for same-sex sexual harassment under Title
VII. Second, he claims that his allegations also satisfied the pleading standard
for his state-law claim, and that even if not, the district court should have
declined supplemental jurisdiction and dismissed it without prejudice to
allow Lanier to present the cause of action to a Texas state court. Finally, he
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No. 24-10962
argues that the district court abused its discretion by not granting him leave
to amend his complaint.1
For the following reasons, the Court concludes that none of Lanier’s
arguments have merit.
II.
We afford de novo review to a district court’s granting of a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim. Calogero v. Shows, Cali & Walsh, L.L.P.,
970 F.3d 576, 580 (5th Cir. 2020). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Terwilliger v. Reyna, 4 F.4th 270,
279 (5th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678,
129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009)).
III.
Lanier did not allege a plausible claim of sexual harassment or sex
discrimination under Title VII.
In the context of Title VII, a plaintiff “need not make out a prima facie
case of discrimination in order to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim.” Raj v. La. State Univ., 714 F.3d 322, 331 (5th Cir.
2013). Rather, a plaintiff must plead sufficient facts to allege a plausible claim
of discrimination. Id.
Title VII prohibits two types of sexual harassment: “quid-pro-quo and
hostile-environment harassment.” Newbury v. City of Windcrest, 991 F.3d
_____________________
1
Lanier does not challenge the dismissal of his claims for constructive discharge or
retaliation. As a result, he has abandoned these claims. Ross v. Univ. of Tex. at San Antonio,
139 F.3d 521, 524 n.1 (5th Cir. 1998).
4
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No. 24-10962
672, 675 (5th Cir. 2021). Here, Lanier alleges only a claim of hostile work
environment.
When the alleged harasser is the same sex as the plaintiff in a hostile-
work-environment claim, a two-step inquiry controls: (1) whether the alleged
conduct constituted sex discrimination; and (2) whether the conduct meets
the standard for a hostile work environment. E.E.O.C. v. Boh Bros. Const. Co.,
731 F.3d 444, 453 (5th Cir. 2013) (en banc). As to the first step, this Court
has recognized three typical “evidentiary paths”:
(1) a plaintiff may show that the harasser was homosexual and
motivated by sexual desire; (2) a plaintiff may show that the
harassment was framed “in such sex-specific and derogatory
terms . . . as to make it clear that the harasser [was] motivated
by general hostility to the presence” of a particular gender in
the workplace; and (3) a plaintiff may “offer direct
comparative evidence about how the alleged harasser treated
members of both sexes in a mixed-sex workplace.”
Id. at 455 (citing (citing Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75,
80–81 (1998)). Relevant allegations demonstrating that sexual desire
motivated the alleged harassment include that the “harasser intended to have
some kind of sexual contact with the plaintiff” or “that the alleged harasser
made same-sex sexual advances to others[.]” La Day v. Catalyst Tech., Inc.,
302 F.3d 474, 480 (5th Cir. 2002).
Here, the district court dismissed Lanier’s Title VII claim because his
allegations, accepted as true, did not satisfy any of the evidentiary paths.2 In
_____________________
2
Lanier argues that the district court incorrectly required him to produce evidence
in response to the Rule 12(b)(6) motion. While the district court’s Opinion and Order
references “evidence,” it is clear that the court applied the correct standard under Rule
12(b)(6) by “taking as true” Lanier’s allegations. The district court did not dismiss
Lanier’s claims because he failed to offer evidence supporting his allegations, but because
those allegations, accepted as true, did not present viable causes of action.
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No. 24-10962
the alternative, the district court considered whether Lanier alleged a hostile
work environment, concluding that the allegations did not pass “the high bar
required to establish an actionable hostile-work-environment claim.”
This Court agrees that Lanier’s allegations fail to show that he was
discriminated against because of his sex. No allegation even suggests that
Wallace possessed anti-male hostility or that he treated men worse than
women. And his allegations neither directly allege nor allow a reasonable
inference that Wallace was homosexual or motivated by sexual desire. For
example, Lanier alleges no conduct by Wallace suggesting that he desired or
proposed to have sex with Lanier or another male co-worker. See, e.g., Cherry
v. Shaw Coastal, Inc., 668 F.3d 182, 188 (5th Cir. 2012) (finding that a same-
sex supervisor’s explicit sexual propositions sufficed to support a jury’s
finding of sexual harassment based on sex).
Lanier spends little time addressing this issue, arguing only that his
allegations, “[w]hile they may not prove that Defendant Wallace is gay, may
fairly be inferred to express homosexual desires.” Not so. That Wallace
implied that Lanier performed oral sex on men, or told him to do so on a male
Chief Deputy, allows no inference that Wallace himself was homosexual or
that sexual desire motivated his actions. The allegation that Wallace called
Lanier his “lover” comes closer, but absent more, does not permit a plausible
inference that Wallace possessed a sexual desire toward Lanier. “[M]erely
because the words used have sexual content or connotation” does not
automatically establish a discriminatory intent. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80.
Viewing Lanier’s allegations as a whole, they do not allow the inference that
Wallace discriminated against Lanier based on his sex. The district court did
not err in reaching the same conclusion.
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No. 24-10962
As Lanier failed to adequately plead a claim of discrimination based on
sex, the Court declines to address whether his allegations satisfy the standard
for a hostile work environment.3
IV.
The district court dismissed Lanier’s sexual harassment and sex
discrimination claims under Texas Labor Code § 21.051, reasoning that the
state statute also requires that any harassment “occurred because of sex.” As
Lanier had not pled a viable claim under Title VII, the district court
concluded that Lanier’s analogous causes of action under state law also
failed.
On appeal, Lanier challenges the district court’s conclusion, and
furthermore contends that the lower court, having dismissed all federal
claims, should have declined supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining
state-law causes of action. On this issue, Lanier highlights the 2021
amendments to the TCHRA and argues that his allegations present novel
questions under those amendments that Texas state courts should have the
opportunity to address.
We apply de novo review to the district court’s dismissal for failure to
state a claim. Calogero, 970 F.3d at 580. We review the exercise of
supplemental jurisdiction for abuse of discretion. Enochs v. Lampasas Cnty.,
641 F.3d 155, 158 (5th Cir. 2011).
The district court correctly concluded that Title VII and the Texas
statutory provisions on which Lanier rests his claims apply the same
_____________________
3
Lanier devotes substantial time in his brief arguing that his allegations suffice to
demonstrate a hostile work environment. As explained, however, the district court reached
this issue only in the alternative. We likewise need not reach the matter, as Lanier fails to
properly allege that any harassment or discrimination occurred because of sex.
7
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No. 24-10962
standard. A sexual harassment or sex discrimination claim under Texas
Labor Code § 21.051 requires that the alleged harassment or discrimination
occur because of the plaintiff’s sex. See Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective
Services v. Whitman, 530 S.W.3d 703, 711 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2016, no
pet.) (applying the same standard under the TCHRA as La Day applied to a
Title VII claim of same-sex sexual harassment). Given that Lanier failed to
allege that any harassment or discrimination occurred because of his sex, his
TCHRA claim proves deficient.
In addition, the district court did not abuse its discretion by exercising
supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law causes of action. Lanier
presented all his claims in a single pleading, giving the district court
supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). The federal and state
claims arose out of a common nucleus of operative facts–i.e., Wallace’s
alleged harassment of Lanier and Wise County’s and Akin’s refusal to
address the situation. Because Lanier chose to litigate a combination of state
and federal claims within the same complaint and arising out of the common
nucleus of operative facts, the district court did not abuse its discretion by
exercising supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. Mendoza v.
Murphy, 532 F.3d 342, 347 (5th Cir. 2008). This principle holds particular
weight when the grounds supporting dismissal of a federal claim likewise
warrant dismissal of an analogous state-law claim. See e.g., Lucky Tunes #3,
L.L.C. v. Smith, 812 Fed. App’x. 176, 184 (5th Cir. 2020) (concluding that
the district court did not abuse its discretion in exercising supplemental
jurisdiction over state law claims when those claims “concern[ed] the same
facts and similar law as the federal claims, making it more convenient to
dispose of them in this action”).
Lanier emphasizes the 2021 amendments to the TCHRA, arguing that
the district court should have declined supplemental jurisdiction to allow
Texas state courts to address novel issues that the amendments present. The
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statutory amendments, however, did not alter Section 21.051, the provision
under which Lanier alleges his claims. The law is well established as to this
statute.
The 2021 amendments, in relevant part, added Sections 21.141 and
21.142 to the Texas Labor Code, and Lanier references the first provision in
his complaint. But Section 21.141 merely defines sexual harassment. Lanier
seeks to apply this definition to Wallace’s alleged “violation of Section
21.051.” He is wrong in doing so. The definition in Section 21.141 applies
only to a cause of action based on Section 21.142. See TEX. LABOR CODE
§ 21.141 (limiting definition of sexual harassment to “this subchapter”).
Lanier alleges no claim based on Section 21.142, rendering the definition in
Section 21.141 irrelevant to his claims.4 Thus, any novel questions that may
exist as to a cause of action under Section 21.142, based on the definition in
the preceding provision, do no bear on Lanier’s lawsuit.
Furthermore, Texas law makes clear that Lanier cannot hold Wallace
individually liable under Section 21.051. See Butler v. Collins, 714 S.W.3d 562,
567 (Tex. 2025) (noting that Texas law “does not subject individual
employees to personal liability” for workplace discrimination claims). And
Lanier does not allege individual liability against Akin. Although Akin as an
elected sheriff could qualify as an “employer” under Texas Labor Code
§ 21.002(8)(C) for purposes of a Section 21.051 claim, such a cause of action
would run against him solely in his official capacity. Sauls v. Montgomery
Cnty., 18 S.W.3d 310, 316 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2000, no pet.) (concluding
_____________________
4
Neither Lanier’s complaint nor his briefing before this Court reference Section
21.142. Before the district court, in his response to the Defendants’ motion to dismiss, he
mentions the provision, but only in a footnote. And on appeal, he does not argue that he
alleged a cause of action under Section 21.142.
9
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No. 24-10962
that the TCHRA did not waive a sheriff’s “common law immunity against
personal liability”).
V.
Finally, Lanier argues that the district court erred by not permitting
him to amend his complaint. We disagree.
We review a district court’s denial of leave to amend for an abuse of
discretion. Porretto v. City of Galveston Park Bd. of Trs., 113 F.4th 469, 491
(5th Cir. 2024). Lanier presented only a perfunctory request for leave to
amend his complaint, if the district court found his pleadings deficient. He
failed to offer a proposed amended complaint or to explain what additional
facts he would allege in light of the Defendants’ arguments in their motion to
dismiss. Under these circumstances, district courts do not abuse their
discretion by denying a “general curative amendment request.” Goldstein v.
MCI WorldCom, 340 F.3d 238, 254 (5th Cir. 2003); see also McKinney v. Irving
Indep. Sch. Dist., 309 F.3d 308, 315 (5th Cir. 2002) (“[R]emanding the case
to allow another pleading would do nothing but prolong the inevitable.”). In
this case, the district court acted within its discretion.
VI.
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment
dismissing Lanier’s causes of action.
10