Bates-Smith v. Brown

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

JEVON R. BATES-SMITH, ) CASE NO. 1:25 CV 1138

)

Plaintiff, ) JUDGE DAN AARON POLSTER

)

v. )

)

OFFICER AYLASSA BROWN, et al., ) MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

) AND ORDER

)

Defendants. )

Background

Pro se Plaintiff Jevon Bates-Smith, a prisoner incarcerated in Indiana, has filed a civil

rights complaint in this case against the City of Solon and Solon Police Officer Aylassa Brown.

(Doc. No. 1.) He indicates that he asserts claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Bivens v. Six

Unknown Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) for violations of “the 4th

Amendment, Defamation of Character.” (Id. at 3, ¶ II.)

With respect to his Fourth Amendment claim, Plaintiff merely states that “[e]verytime

[he] would travel to visit family . . . Officer Brown would pull him over” and that “[t]he 1st

pullover the date is unavailable [and] the second pull over [he] had just left Detroit Michigan

and was charged for Driving under the Influence parked at a Seven Eleven air pump in Solon.”

(Id. at 2.)

With respect to his claim of defamation, he simply states that he was “harassed by a

public official with false allegations” while “sleeping in his car . . . waiting to put air in his

tires.” (Id.)

He seeks monetary relief ($40,000) for “future life damages.” (Id. at 5, ¶ VI.)

Standard of Review and Discussion

Although pro se pleadings are entitled to liberal construction and held to less stringent

standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365

(1982); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), the lenient treatment generally accorded

pro se plaintiffs "has limits." Pilgrim v. Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 1996). Pro se

plaintiffs must meet basic pleading requirements, and courts are not required to conjure

allegations or create claims on their behalf. See Erwin v. Edwards, 22 F. App'x 579, 2001 WL

1556573 (6th Cir. Dec. 4, 2001).

Federal district courts are expressly required, under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e) and 1915A, to

screen all in forma pauperis complaints and any complaint in which a prisoner seeks redress

from a governmental entity or employee, and to dismiss before service any such complaint that

the court determines is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Hill v.

Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 471 (6th Cir. 2010). To survive a dismissal for failure to state a claim, a

pro se complaint must contain "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face." Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 471 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding

that the dismissal standard articulated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and Bell Atlantic

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) governs dismissals under §§ 1915(e) and 1915A).

Detailed factual allegations are not required, but the “allegations must be enough to raise a right

to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. And courts are not required to

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accept non-specific factual allegations and inferences or unwarranted legal conclusions in

determining whether a complaint states a claim for relief. Hendrock v. Gilbert, 68 Fed. Appx.

573, 574 (6th Cir. 2003), citing See Dellis v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 257 F.3d 508, 511 (6th

Cir.2001); Lillard v. Shelby County Bd. of Educ., 76 F.3d 716, 726 (6th Cir.1996); Morgan v.

Church's Fried Chicken, 829 F.2d 10, 12 (6th Cir.1987); Chapman v. City of Detroit, 808 F.2d

459, 465 (6th Cir.1986).

Upon review, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ complaint warrants sua sponte dismissal

pursuant to §§ 1915(e) and 1915A. To state a claim for relief in federal court, “a complaint

must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements to sustain

a recovery under some viable legal theory.” Hendrock , 68 Fed. Appx. at 574 (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted). Plaintiff’s complaint fails to so. Instead, his complaint consists

entirely of unclear and conclusory assertions and legal conclusions that fail to demonstrate the

elements of any plausible claim for defamation, or under the Fourth Amendment, against either

Defendant. See, e.g, Hendrock, 68 Fed. Appx. 573; Rice v. Jones, No. 23-3972, 2023 WL

8369996, at *2 (6th Cir. June 23, 2023) (plaintiff’s complaint properly dismissed where

complaint failed to “allege any facts to support an inference that the defendants lacked probable

cause to arrest him,” but merely alleged that troopers “falsely accused and arrested” him on

“conjured up charges”);Ryniewicz v. Clarivate Analytics, 803 Fed. Appx. 858, 868 (6th Cir.

2020) (a plaintiff’s general, conclusory allegations that he was falsely accused of embezzlement

were insufficient to allege plausible defamation claim).

The City of Solon, moreover, cannot be sued for violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless

the Plaintiff shows that the City had an official policy or custom that deprived him of a federal

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right. Chukwuani v. City of Solon, Ohio, No. 1:24-cv-2257, 2025 WL 2307923, at *3 (N.D.

Ohio Aug. 11, 2025), citing Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658

(1978). Plaintiff's complaint is also subject to dismissal against the City of Solon because he

does not allege facts sufficient to suggest that Solon had an official policy or custom that was the

moving force behind a violation of his federal rights.

Conclusion

Accordingly, Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. No. 2) is granted,

and for the foregoing reasons, his complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to

28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e) and 1915A. The Court further certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

QL Ge wes

DAN AARON POLSTER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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