The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION
MARQUIS EZEKIEL HEARD,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No.: 2:24-cv-00872-SPC-NPM
SGT. HUGHES, RICKY OPSAHI,
AND OFFICER JOHN DOE,
Defendants,
/
OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court are Defendant Sgt. Hughes’ Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 26) and Ricky Opsahi’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 28).
Background
Plaintiff Marquis Ezekiel Heard is a prisoner of the Florida Department
of Corrections. He sues two correctional officers—one identified as John Doe—
and a prison nurse under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Eighth Amendment. The
two named defendants move to dismiss Heard’s Amended Complaint (Doc. 17).
The Court recounts the factual background as pled in the amended complaint,
which it must take as true to decide whether it states a plausible claim. See
Chandler v. Sec’y Fla. Dep’t of Transp., 695 F.3d 1194, 1198-99 (11th Cir. 2012).
On July 22, 2023, Heard told Hughes and Doe—around 5:50 p.m. and
6:30 p.m., respectively—that he was suicidal and declared a mental health
emergency. Both officers ignored Heard. On his next round check around 7:00
p.m., Doe found Heard hanging from the cell bunk with a sheet around his
neck. Doe called Hughes over. Hughes laughed at Heard and said, “Inmate
Heard, you know black people don’t turn blue while they’re hanging?” (Doc. 17
at 14). Hughes and Doe left Heard hanging from the bunk and walked away.
Realizing the sheet would not kill him, Heard cut his arm five times with a
razor. Hughes found Heard bleeding in his cell around 8:50 p.m. Heard again
declared a mental health emergency, but Hughes refused to notify medical
staff. Doe came by Heard’s cell during another round check and also left Heard
bleeding in his cell.
Around 9:30 p.m., Hughes and nurse Ricky Opsahi came to Heard’s dorm
to distribute medication. Hughes told Opsahi not to help Heard. Heard
showed Opsahi his neck and arm and declared a mental health emergency.
Opsahi refused to provide treatment or notify other medical staff. Heard’s neck
and arm were sore, bruised, and swollen for five to seven days, and the self-
inflicted injuries caused Heard emotional distress. Heard claims Hughes, Doe,
and Opsahi were deliberately indifferent to his threats of self-harm and
medical needs, and he seeks compensatory and punitive damages. The named
defendants argue Heard fails to state a plausible claim, and Huges raises
immunity defenses.
Legal Standard
When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), courts must
accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and view them in a light
most favorable to the plaintiff. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
The preferential standard of review, however, does not let all pleadings
adorned with facts survive to the next stage of litigation. The Supreme Court
has been clear on this point—a district court should dismiss a claim when a
party does not plead facts that make the claim facially plausible. See Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible when
a court can draw a reasonable inference, based on facts pled, that the opposing
party is liable for the alleged misconduct. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. This
plausibility standard requires “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant
has acted unlawfully.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (internal quotation
marks omitted)). And a plaintiff must allege more than labels and conclusions
amounting to a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
Heard files his Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a § 1983
claim, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant deprived him of a right
secured under the Constitution or federal law, and (2) the deprivation occurred
under color of state law. Bingham v. Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1175 (11th Cir.
2011) (citing Arrington v. Cobb Cnty., 139 F.3d 865, 872 (11th Cir. 1998)). In
addition, a plaintiff must allege and establish an affirmative causal connection
between the defendant’s conduct and the constitutional deprivation. Marsh v.
Butler Cnty., Ala., 268 F.3d 1014, 1059 (11th Cir. 2001).
Heard is representing himself in this action. Courts hold the pleadings
of pro se litigants to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by
attorneys. Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998).
But courts do not have a duty to “re-write” a pro se litigant’s complaint to find
a claim. See Washington v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 256 F. App’x 326, 327
(11th Cir. 2007).
Discussion
Hughes and Opsahi argue Heard fails to state a plausible claim against
them. Hughes also raises Eleventh Amendment immunity and qualified
immunity.
A. Pleading sufficiency
“To establish a § 1983 claim for deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must
show (1) a substantial risk of serious harm; (2) the defendants’ deliberate
indifference to that risk; and (3) causation.” Marbury v. Warden, 936 F.3d
1227, 1233 (11th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
In a prison suicide case, “deliberate indifference requires that the defendant
deliberately disregard a strong likelihood rather than a mere possibility that
the self-infliction of harm will occur.” Cook ex rel. Estate of Tessier v. Sheriff
of Monroe Cnty., Fla., 402 F.3d 1092, 1115 (11th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). Deliberate indifference is akin to subjective
recklessness as used in criminal law, and to establish it, a plaintiff “must show
that the defendant was actually, subjectively aware that his own conduct
caused a substantial risk of serious harm to the plaintiff.” Wade v. McDade,
106 F.4th 1251, 1262 (11th Cir. 2024).
Heard’s amended complaint plausibly alleges that Hughes was
deliberately indifferent to a serious risk of self-harm. Heard told Hughes he
felt suicidal, and even after witnessing Heard’s first suicide attempt, Hughes
did nothing. That is enough to establish that Hughes subjectively knew Heard
would likely harm himself again if Hughes did not intervene. But Hughes did
nothing, and Heard attempted suicide a second time.
On the other hand, Opsahi did not have an opportunity to prevent Heard
from harming himself, so Heard cannot establish causation between Opsahi’s
inaction and his suicide attempts. Heard must instead show that Opsahi was
deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need. In the Eleventh Circuit, “[a]
serious medical need is ‘one that has been diagnosed by a physician as
mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that a lay person would easily
recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.’” Shaw v. Allen, 701 F. App’x
891, 893 (11th Cir. 2017) (quoting Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1243 (11th
Cir. 2003)).
Heard alleges he showed Opsahi the self-inflicted injuries to his neck and
arm, but he does not allege enough detail about the injuries for the Court to
infer that Opsahi subjectively knew of a serious risk of substantial harm if he
did not treat Heard. Heard’s allegation that his injuries healed on their own
within a week suggest the injuries did not create a serious medical need. Thus,
Heard has not stated a plausible claim against Opsahi.
Hughes also argues Heard’s amended complaint does not contain a
“short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief” as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). The Court
disagrees. Heard’s amended complaint is concise, direct, and understandable,
and it gives each defendant fair notice of the factual and legal claims against
him.
B. Eleventh Amendment immunity
Heard sues the defendants in their individual and official capacities. The
Eleventh Amendment states, “The Judicial power of the United States shall
not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by
Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. Const. amend. XI. Absent an
abrogation of immunity by Congress or a waiver of immunity by the state being
sued, the Eleventh Amendment is an absolute bar to suit by an individual
against a state or its agencies in federal court. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S.
651, 662 (1974).
“When the action is in essence one for the recovery of money from the
state, the state is the real, substantial party in interest and is entitled to invoke
its sovereign immunity from suit even though individuals are nominal
defendants.” Id. at 663. “Thus, the rule has evolved that a suit by private
parties seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in
the state treasury is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.” Id. In other words,
the bar protects state officials sued in their official capacities but not in their
individual capacities. Melton v. Abston, 841 F.3d 1207, 1234-35 (11th Cir.
2016).
Congress has not abrogated Florida’s Eleventh Amendment immunity,
nor has Florida waived it. Thus, Heard cannot sue the defendants in their
official capacities.
C. Qualified immunity
“Qualified immunity protects government officials from individual
liability unless they violate clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Snorton v. Owens,
808 F. App’x 814, 820 (11th Cir. 2020). An official invoking qualified immunity
must first show he was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority.
The burden then shifts to the plaintiff to show: (1) the official violated a federal
statutory or constitutional right; and (2) the unlawfulness of the official’s
conduct was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. Id. at 820-
21.
There is no doubt Hughes was acting in his discretionary authority when
Heard’s claim against him arose. Hughes argues he is entitled to qualified
immunity because a reasonable corrections employee would not know his
alleged conduct violated Heard’s constitutional rights. Not so. The relevant
standard is well established by Eleventh Circuit precedence. It “requires a
strong likelihood rather than a mere possibility that the self-infliction of harm
will occur[.]” Popham v. Cty. of Talladega, 908 F.2d 1561, 1563 (11th Cir.
1990). As explained above, Heard plausibly accuses Hughes of ignoring a
strong possibility of self-harm. Hughes is not entitled to qualified immunity
here.
Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED:
Defendant Sgt. Hughes’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc.
26) is granted in part and denied in part and Ricky Opsahi’s Motion to
Dismiss (Doc. 28) is granted.
(1) Heard’s official capacity claims are dismissed with prejudice.
(2) Heard’s claim against Opsahi is dismissed without prejudice.
(3) Hughes must answer Heard’s Amended Complaint on or before
September 3, 2025.
DONE AND ORDERED on August 20, 2025, in Fort Myers, Florida.
, tite WObLatrat he 3
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
SA: FTMP-1
Copies: all parties