Oguntuyi v. Manuel

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

LAFAYETTE DIVISION

SAMSON A OGUNTUYI DOCKET NO. 2:24-cv-1069

SECTION P

VERSUS JUDGE JAMES D. CAIN, JR.

MICHAEL J. MANUEL MAGISTRATE JUDGE LEBLANC

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Before the court is a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241

by pro se petitioner Samson A. Oguntuyi on August 8, 2024. Doc. 1.

At the time of filing, Petitioner was an immigration detainee in the custody of the

Department of Homeland Security / U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“DHS/ICE”),

detained at the Allen Parish Public Safety Complex in Oberlin, Louisiana. Petitioner has since

been removed from the United States.

This matter has been referred to the undersigned for review, report, and recommendation

in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636 and the standing orders of this Court. For the reasons set forth

below, IT IS RECOMMENDED that this petition for habeas corpus should be DENIED AND

DISMISSED because petitioner’s claims are MOOT.

I. BACKGROUND

Oguntuyi filed the instant petition, through which he sought the issuance of a writ of habeas

corpus directing his release from the Allen Parish Public Safety Complex in Oberlin, Louisiana.

The Court has been informed by the United States Attorney’s Office that while this matter was

pending, Petitioner was removed from the United States. See Online Detainee Locator System

search results, https://locator.ice.gov/odls/#/results.

II. LAW & APPLICATION

“"Article III of the Constitution limits federal ‘Judicial Power,’ that is, federal-court

jurisdiction, to ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies.’” United States v. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445

U.S. 388, 395 (1980). A case or controversy becomes moot “when the issues presented are no

longer ‘live’ or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” Id. at 396 (quoting

Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496 (1969)).

This case-or-controversy requirement subsists through all stages of federal

judicial proceedings, trial and appellate . . . The parties must continue to

have a “personal stake in the outcome” of the lawsuit. This means that,

throughout the litigation, the plaintiff “must have suffered, or be threatened

with, an actual injury traceable to the defendant and likely to be redressed

by a favorable judicial decision.”

Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

“[T]o be eligible for habeas relief [under 28 U.S.C. § 2241], a petitioner must be ‘in

custody’ and must have exhausted his available state remedies.” Dickerson v. Louisiana, 816 F.2d

220, 224 (5th Cir. 1987). A habeas petition “is not moot simply because a § 2241 petitioner is no

longer in custody.” Salgado v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 220 F. App’x 256, 257 (5th Cir. 2007) (per

curiam) (citing Brown v. Resor, 407 F.2d 281, 283 (5th Cir. 1969)). A habeas petition may be

moot, however, “when the court cannot grant the relief requested by the moving party.” Id. at 257

(citing Bailey v. Southerland, 821 F.2d 277, 278 (5th Cir. 1987)); see also Kokoski v. Fox, No.

1:10cv777, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134754, 2012 WL 4321717, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2012)

(“A case may become moot when an ‘intervening factual event . . . causes the [petitioner] to no

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longer have a present right to be vindicated or a stake or interest in the outcome.’”) (quoting Dailey

v. Vought Aircraft Co., 141 F.3d 224, 227 (5th Cir. 1998)).

Here, Petitioner challenged the lawfulness of his continued detention. Because Petitioner

is no longer detained and has been removed from the United States, the § 2241 petition is moot.

See Francis v. Lynch, 622 F. App’x 455, 455-56 (5th Cir. 2015) (challenge to length of detention

awaiting removal became moot when the petitioner was removed); Odus v. Ashcroft, 61 F. App’x

121 (5th Cir. 2003) (same). The petition therefore should be dismissed.

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly,

IT IS RECOMMENDED that this petition for habeas corpus should be DENIED

WTHOUT PREJUDICE and DISMISSED because petitioner’s claims are MOOT.

Under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. Section 636(b)(1)(C) and Rule 72(b), parties aggrieved

by this recommendation have fourteen (14) business days from service of this report and

recommendation to file specific, written objections with the Clerk of Court. A party may respond

to another party’s objections within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of any

objections or response to the district judge at the time of filing.

Failure to file written objections to the proposed factual findings and/or the proposed legal

conclusions reflected in this Report and Recommendation within fourteen (14) days following the

date of its service, or within the time frame authorized by Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(b), shall bar an aggrieved

party from attacking either the factual findings or the legal conclusions accepted by the District

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Court, except upon grounds of plain error. See, Douglass v. United Services Automobile

Association, 79 F.3d 1415 (Sth Cir. 1996).

THUS DONE AND SIGNED in chambers this 21st day of July, 2025.

a P. LEBLANC

UNITED S S MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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