Johnson v. Lampley

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

NASHVILLE DIVISION

BRENDA JOHNSON, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) NO. 3:24-cv-1304

)

TRAVIS MACON LAMPLEY, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff filed a 71-page, single-spaced, rambling Complaint against the Tennessee

Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”), the Commissioner of DCS, five DCS employees

(including two foster parents), two judges, a state prosecutor, two court-appointed attorneys (who

protected the interests on Plaintiff’s minor children during court proceedings), three police officers,

and Rutherford County. (Doc. No. 1).

The Magistrate Judge undertook the Herculean effort of attempting to decipher the

Complaint and subsequent Motion for Removal. In her Report and Recommendation (“R&R”),

Judge Holmes recommended: (1) remanding the DCS matter involving Plaintiff’s children back to

the Rutherford County Juvenile Court; (2) dismissing all claims against Brandon Huddleston,

Ashley Mellinger, Victor Morris, Travis Lampley, and Ray White; and (3) abstaining from

exercising further jurisdiction under the domestic relations exception to federal jurisdiction and

the Younger doctrine. (Doc. No. 89). Plaintiff filed Objections to Judge Holmes’ Report, arguing

that: (1) she is entitled to remove the state court case involving the termination of her parental

rights, (Doc. No. 92 at 5); (2) she stated § 1983 claims that were independent of any state court

proceedings, (id.); (3) it is illegal for the state court to have merged her children’s removal

proceedings under a single judge who had “limited appointment authority,” (id. at 6); and (4) the

domestic relations exception does not apply to her claims that are based on “closed or void state

proceedings.” (Id.).

The Court would be inclined to accept and adopt significant portions of the R&R; however,

there are two outstanding motions to amend (Doc. Nos. 40 and 69). Because leave to amend should

be liberally granted and because Plaintiff’s amended pleading (especially if she applies the

principles set forth in the R&R and this Order) could substantially change the issues presented, the

better course of action is to strike Plaintiff’s existing allegations and then rule on any motions that

follow. See Med. Ctr. at Elizabeth Place, LLC v. Atrium Health Sys., 922 F.3d 713, 732–33 (6th

Cir. 2019) (“The standard for a motion to amend is governed by the general principle that ‘cases

should be tried on their merits rather than the technicalities of pleadings.’”).

Accordingly, the Court will strike the Complaint (Doc. No. 1) and Plaintiff’s “First Motion

for Entry of Judgment/Notice of Removal” (Doc. No. 70). The Court will deny all remaining

motions (Doc. Nos. 2, 7, 8, 14, 23, 29, 42, 47, 54, 56, 78, 81, 91) as moot except for Plaintiff’s

motions to amend her complaint. Plaintiff will be allowed to amend her complaint, subject to the

guidelines (and warnings) below.

A. The Complaint must be stricken because it fails to comply with the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure.

Although pro se pleadings are held “to less stringent standards[,]” Haines v. Kerner, 404

U.S. 519, 520 (1972), pro se parties are not excused from complying with simple, easily-

understandable requirements that make for orderly proceedings. See Brown v. L.E. Woodward,

1998 WL 211785, at *1 (6th Cir. Apr. 23, 1998) (a pro se litigant is not “relieved of the

responsibility to comply with the basic rules of court”); see also Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591,

594 (6th Cir. 1989) (collecting cases where courts have required pro se litigants to adhere to basic

pleading requirements).

The Complaint fails to comply with the most basic rules of civil procedure. First, Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief[.]” Although “no technical form” is required by Rule 8, it does require

allegations that are “simple, concise, and direct.” Rule 8(d)(1). The Complaint does not satisfy

either the “plain” or “short” requirements of Rule 8.

Rule 8 requires a “plain” statement of the claim because “the principal function of

pleadings under the Federal Rules is to give the adverse party fair notice of the claim asserted so

as to enable him to answer and prepare for trial.” Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir.

1988). A court is not obligated to “stitch together cognizable claims for relief from [a] wholly

deficient pleading” filed by a plaintiff. See Shophar v. United States, 838 F. App’x 328, 333 (10th

Cir. 2020). Plaintiff’s statement of her claims is not plain. It includes page after page of irrelevant

information followed by grievances. None of this peripheral information appears connected to a

particular legal issue. The Defendants and the Magistrate Judge admirably tried to make sense of

what Plaintiff was saying, but this Court is disinclined to engage in similar guesswork. If Plaintiff

believes her constitutional rights have been violated by a state actor, she should articulate the right

that has been violated, the person who did so, and the facts showing how the right was violated.

Rule 8 also requires that the statement be short because “unnecessary prolixity [] places an

unjustified burden on the court and the party who must respond to it because they are forced to

select the relevant material from a mass of verbiage.” Id.; see also Vicom, Inc. v. Harbridge Merch.

Servs., Inc., 20 F.3d 771, 775–76 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting that a complaint that is “prolix and/or

confusing makes it difficult for the defendant to file a responsive pleading and makes it difficult

for the trial court to conduct orderly litigation”). The Complaint is 71 single-spaced pages. If she

complied with the Court’s Local Rules governing font-size and spacing, see L.R. 7.03, her

Complaint would be closer to 150 pages. Other courts have dismissed or stricken similarly prolix

complaints. E.g., Flayter v. Wisconsin Dep’t of Corr., 16 Fed. Appx. 507, 509 (7th Cir. 2001)

(affirming dismissal of 116-page complaint pursuant to Rule 8(a)(2)); Plymale v. Freeman, 930

F.2d 919, 1991 WL 54882, at *1 (6th Cir. Apr.12, 1991) (affirming district court's dismissal of 119

page “rambling complaint”); Kuot v. Corrections Corp. of America, 2018 WL 655158 (M.D. Tenn.

Feb. 1, 2018) (Finding 143-page, “rambling, repetitive, and far-reaching” complaint violated Rule

8 and requiring the plaintiff to file an amended complaint). The Court will do the same here.

In addition to running afoul of Rule 8, the Complaint also ignores Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 10(b). Rule 10(b) requires that claims be set out “in numbered paragraphs, each limited

as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances.” The current Complaint contains no numbered

paragraphs, as required by the Rule. Should Plaintiff file an amended complaint, she must comply

with Rule 10(b) and individually number each factual allegation and state each legal claim in a

separately identified count.

B. Leave to amend will be granted.

Plaintiff has twice requested leave to amend. (Doc. Nos. 40, 69). However, none of her

proposed amended complaints comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or the Local

Rules. The proposed amended complaints also repeat claims against individuals that are simply

unviable. Because leave to amend should be liberally granted, see Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178,

182 (1962), the Court will give Plaintiff another opportunity to state viable claims based on federal

law. “In deciding whether to grant a motion to amend, courts should consider undue delay in

filing, lack of notice to the opposing party, bad faith by the moving party, repeated failure to cure

deficiencies by previous amendments, undue prejudice to the opposing party, and futility of

amendment.” Brumbalough v. Camelot Care Ctrs., Inc., 427 F.3d 996, 1001 (6th Cir. 2005).

Because this case is only ten months old, Plaintiff quickly moved to amend, and Plaintiff has not

been given a previous opportunity to cure pleading deficiencies, the Court will give her a second

bite at the apple.

However, her existing proposed amended complaints do not do the trick. As Plaintiff

considers whether to file an amended complaint, and if so, what to include in one, she should be

mindful of the legal principles set forth in Judge Holmes’ Report and Recommendation (Doc. No.

89) and further emphasized below. Plaintiff, despite being untrained in the law, can no longer

plead ignorance of the law.

To be clear, before filing an amended complaint, Plaintiff must consider the factual and

legal viability of her claims, or she may subject herself to potential monetary sanctions under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11.1 For example, Plaintiff should embrace these legal principles

if she files an amended complaint:

• Lawsuits against judges related to their official duties are barred by the doctrine of

absolute judicial immunity. (Doc. No. 89 at 18-19) (describing the legal standards

for absolute judicial immunity).

• Prosecutors are immune from civil suit for their conduct in “initiating a prosecution

and in presenting the State's case. See Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486, (1991).

• Lawsuits brought against a state or its agencies are barred by sovereign immunity

unless the state waives its Eleventh Amendment immunity or Congress overrides

it. See Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S.

139, 144 (1993); see also Crawford v. Child Protective Servs., 2009 WL 790173, at

*2 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 23, 2009); Binkowski v. Fam. & Children’s Servs. Agency, 39

F. Supp. 2d 882, 887 (W.D. Mich. 1998). In enacting § l983, Congress did not

intend to override the traditional sovereign immunity of the states, Whittington v.

Milby, 928 F.2d l88 (6th Cir. 1991), and Tennessee has not waived its immunity for

1 For example, if she were to refile a claim that is clearly time-barred or if she were to refile a

claim against someone who is protected by absolute judicial immunity, Plaintiff could be made to

pay the legal expenses of those parties that have to respond to frivolous claims.

§ l983, see Morgan v. Bd. of Pro. Resp. of the Supreme Ct. of Tennessee, 63 F.4th

510, 518 (6th Cir. 2023) (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-13-102(a)).

• A county department or agency is not a “person” within the meaning of § 1983 and

therefore cannot be sued under that statute. See Boykin v. Van Buren Twp., 479

F.3d 444, 450 (6th Cir. 2007); Edward v. Jail, 2016 WL 2937146, *2 (E.D. Mich.

May 20, 2016).

• To state a § 1983 claim against a county, the plaintiff must prove that the county

had a policy, practice, or custom that was deliberately indifferent to a third party’s

constitutional rights. See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989). A

county cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a theory of respondeat superior or

vicarious liability. Id.; see also Kiner v. City of Memphis, 2025 WL 1841252, at

*5 (W.D. Tenn. Feb. 12, 2025).

• State and county employees are often shielded from § 1983 liability by the doctrine

of qualified immunity. An employee is immune if they perform a discretionary

function, and their conduct does not violate clearly established rights that a

reasonable official should have known. See Badder v. Schmidt, 50 F. Supp. 3d 902,

909 (E.D. Mich. 2014).

• Lawsuits must be timely. Lawsuits that are clearly barred by an applicable statute

of limitations should not be brought. For example, Judge Holmes correctly

explained why claims against Officers Huddleston, Mellinger, and Morris that were

based on an arrest that took place on March 4, 2023 arrest are time-barred. (Doc.

No. 89 at 16).

• Generally, federal courts will not become entangled in ongoing state court

proceedings. (Id. at 10-15). Moreover, the Court lacks jurisdiction to enter or

modify any order relating to a “child-custody decree.” McGuire v. Tennessee, 2023

WL 9289932, at *2 (6th Cir. Mar. 17, 2023). To the extent Plaintiff wants this Court

to alter the outcome of the proceedings to terminate her parental rights or any

proceedings relating to the custody of her children, this Court cannot do so.

Based on these principles, it is unlikely that Plaintiff can brings claims against many of the entities

or individuals she named in her original (and now stricken) Complaint. Nevertheless, if Plaintiff

truly has a claim arising out of federal law—e.g., § 1983 claim—that does not run afoul of the

aforementioned legal principles, she may bring it. For example, if she has been arrested and the

officers used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment, she should plainly and

succinctly plead that claim (assuming the claim is not time-barred). Or if she has been barred from

a public court proceeding, especially one involving her or her children, she may be able to claim a

First or Fifth Amendment violation under § 1983. But she cannot ignore well-established legal

principles by suing people who are clearly immune or by bringing claims that are clearly time

barred. She also cannot rant about her circumstances (as unfortunate as they may be) and then

state, in a conclusory manner, that a state actor has violated a generalized constitutional right.

Plaintiff must articulate a viable federal claim to move forward, and she must comply with the

Federal Rules in filing any future pleadings. Plaintiff has been forewarned, so now she is

forearmed.

C. The state court proceedings do not need to be remanded because removal was

never “effected.”

Six months after filing this case, Plaintiff also attempted to “remove” the underlying state

court proceedings and combine them with this federal action. To remove an action from state court

a defendant must: (1) “file … a notice of removal,” (2) provide “copy of all process, pleadings,

and orders,” (3) file the notice of removal “within 30 days after the receipt by the defendant,

through service or otherwise, a copy of the initial pleading,” and (4) file the notice of removal

“with the clerk of the State court.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446. There is no evidence that Plaintiff complied

with the requirements for removal and, therefore, removal was never “effected.” Id. Because

Plaintiff did not meaningfully comply with § 1446, there is nothing to remand. However, out of

an abundance of caution, even if removal was properly “effected,” the Court would still remand

the state court action for the reasons set forth in Judge Holmes’ Report. (Doc. No. 89). Under no

circumstances can this federal district court preside over what amounts to an appeal of a custody

order from a state juvenile and domestic court. (Doc. 70 at 15) (Plaintiff requests that this Court

“[d]eclare Judge Meise’s ruling in case TC4915 void due to lack of jurisdiction,” and “order

removal of future [custody] proceedings to the Middle Tennessee District Court.”).

In sum, nothing precludes the state court from proceeding with any cases relating to the

custody of Plaintiffs’ children or the termination of Plaintiff’s parental rights.

D. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, the Complaint (Doc. No. 1) is STRICKEN.

Plaintiff’s Motions to Amend (Doc. Nos. 40 and 69) are GRANTED IN PART. The

proposed amended complaints will not become the operative pleading(s). Rather, Plaintiff shall

have thirty (30) days from the date of this Order to file an amended complaint that complies with

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including Rules 8, 10 and 11.

Plaintiff’s “First Motion for Entry of Judgment/Notice of Removal” (Doc. No. 70) is

STRICKEN from the record. No removal has been “effected” and, therefore, the state court has

full jurisdiction over its case(s). Alternatively, if removal has been “effected,” the matter is

remanded to state court.

The remaining motions (Doc. Nos. 2, 7, 8, 14, 23, 29, 42, 47, 54, 56, 78, 81, 91) are

DENIED AS MOOT.

The Clerk is instructed to administratively close the file. The case should only be reopened

if Plaintiff files an amended complaint within thirty days. If Plaintiff fails to meet the Court’s 30-

day deadline, she will have to file a new case, and this matter will remain closed.

IT IS SO ORDERED. We »

Osho

a na Cistint

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE