Lewis v. Mathias

IN THE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

PEORIA DIVISION

CHRISTOPHER LEWIS,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 1:25-cv-01067-JEH

JACKIE MATHIAS, et al.,

Defendants.

Order

Plaintiff Christopher Lewis, proceeding pro se, filed a Second Amended

Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his constitutional rights

while he was detained at the McLean County Detention Facility (“Jail”). (Doc. 44).

The Court must “screen” Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint and dismiss any

legally insufficient claim or the entire action if warranted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. A

claim is legally insufficient if it “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant

who is immune from such relief.” Id. In reviewing the Second Amended

Complaint, the Court accepts the factual allegations as true, liberally construing

them in the Plaintiff’s favor. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 2013).

However, conclusory statements and labels are insufficient. Enough facts must be

provided to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Alexander v. United

States, 721 F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).

I

Plaintiff names McLean County, McLean County Sheriff Matt Lane, Casey

Taylor, Lieutenant Mathew Proctor, Jackie Mathias, Bethany Bane, Stacey

Salmonson, Dr. Monica Duran, and Jennifer Verbarg as Defendants. (Doc. 44 at p.

17).

A

Plaintiff alleges he was diagnosed with opioid use disorder (“OUD”) and

prescribed medication as part of a medication-assisted treatment (“MAT”)

program before he was detained at the Jail. Plaintiff alleges Defendants

Salmonson, Mathias, Bane, Duran, and Verbarg, who were aware of his OUD

diagnosis, were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs in violation

of the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to provide his prescribed suboxone films

or pills to treat his OUD beginning in August 2024. As a result, Plaintiff claims he

faced an increased risk of relapse, overdose, and death. Plaintiff also alleges he

became severely ill, defecated on himself, and experienced painful withdrawal

symptoms, such as muscle cramps, severe body pain, anxiety, insomnia,

depression, heart palpitations, cravings, constant diarrhea, fatigue, and “shakes.”

Plaintiff states Defendants provided over-the-counter pain medication to treat his

withdrawal symptoms, but the medication was ineffective.

Plaintiff also alleges Defendants administered Sublocade injections to treat

his OUD, but the injections made him ill. Plaintiff states he informed Defendants

Salmonson, Bane, Mathias, Verbarg, and Duran that the injections made him ill,

and he used Sublocade in the past and knew it was ineffective for treating his

OUD. Plaintiff claims Defendants still refused to provide his prescribed suboxone

films or pills.

Plaintiff alleges he filed multiple grievances about these issues. As a result,

Plaintiff claims Defendants Proctor, Taylor, and Sheriff Lane were aware of the

risks he faced. Plaintiff alleges Defendants Proctor, Taylor, and Sheriff Lane “are

liable because they are supervising officials,” were made aware of their staff

members’ decisions, and agreed with, condoned, and approved their decisions. Id.

at p. 5.

B

Plaintiff also asserts Defendants Sheriff Lane, Proctor, Mathias, Bane,

Salmonson, Duran, Taylor, and Verbarg violated his rights under the Americans

with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the Rehabilitation Act (“RA”) by refusing to

administer suboxone films or pills as prescribed, thereby depriving him of the

benefits of the Jail’s MAT program. Plaintiff claims he is a “qualified individual

with a disability” due to his severe OUD diagnosis.

C

Plaintiff also alleges Defendants Verbarg, Mathias, and Proctor violated his

rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiff

claims that on an unspecified date, Defendant Verbarg threatened to deny him his

medication because he was talking to another detainee and refused to sit in a

certain chair in the medication room. Plaintiff claims “the nurse made me out of

12 detainees sit in a certain seat to receive my medication.” Id. at p. 14. Plaintiff

alleges he submitted grievances regarding this incident. Subsequently, Defendant

Proctor allegedly instructed a correctional officer to write a false conduct report

about Plaintiff. Plaintiff claims he was disciplined, has no tablet privileges, and

limited out-of-cell time.

D

Finally, Plaintiff alleges Defendants Proctor and Mathias retaliated against

him for filing this lawsuit. Plaintiff alleges he “has been receiving false conduct

reports written on him on purpose to place him on disciplinary status, to make the

plaintiff look like he [is] the one creating trouble.” Id. at p. 17. Plaintiff alleges “the

defendants began targeting him and treating him differently.” Id.

II

A

Plaintiff’s claim regarding his medical care arises under the Due Process

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Miranda v. Cnty. of Lake, 900 F.3d 335, 353-

54 (7th Cir. 2018) (detainees entitled to adequate medical care). To establish a

Fourteenth Amendment violation, a detainee must show: “(1) there was an

objectively serious medical need; (2) the defendant committed a volitional act

concerning the [plaintiff’s] medical need; (3) that act was objectively unreasonable

under the circumstances in terms of responding to the [plaintiff’s] medical need;

and (4) the defendant act[ed] purposefully, knowingly, or perhaps even recklessly

with respect to the risk of harm.” Gonzalez v. McHenry Cnty., Illinois, 40 F.4th 824,

828 (7th Cir. 2022) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In determining

whether a challenged action is reasonable, the court must consider the “totality of

facts and circumstances.” Mays v. Dart, 974 F.3d 810, 819 (7th Cir. 2020). Based on

Plaintiff’s allegations, the Court finds that he sufficiently stated a Fourteenth

Amendment claim Defendants Salmonson, Bane, Mathias, Duran, and Verbarg

based on their alleged deliberate indifference to his OUD and denial of his

prescribed medication to treat his OUD.

Plaintiff claims that Defendants Proctor, Taylor, and Sheriff Lane were

deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs, but he did not include any

specific allegations to demonstrate that they were personally involved in any

constitutional deprivation. Vance v. Peters, 97 F.3d 987, 991 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Section

1983 creates a cause of action based on personal liability and predicated upon fault;

thus, liability does not attach unless the individual defendant caused or

participated in a constitutional deprivation.”). There is no respondeat superior under

§ 1983. In other words, Defendants Proctor, Taylor, and Lane cannot be liable

based only on their status as the supervisor of others. Doe v. Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d

652, 664 (7th Cir. 2019). Officials are accountable for their own acts; they are not

vicariously liable for the conduct of subordinates. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,

667 (2009); Vance v. Rumsfeld, 701 F.3d 193, 203-05 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc).

Plaintiff asserts Defendants Proctor, Taylor, and Sheriff Lane were aware of

the risk of harm he faced because he submitted grievances. Simply submitting

grievances is insufficient to establish a deliberate indifference claim, however. See

Norington v. Daniels, No. 3:11-CV-282 RM, 2011 WL 5101943, at *2–3 (N.D. Ind. Oct.

25, 2011) (“Simply receiving correspondence from a prisoner” does not make a

prison official liable for the alleged infraction.); Diaz v. McBride, No. 3:93-CV-

176RM, 1994 WL 750707, at *4 (N.D. Ind. Nov. 30, 1994) (plaintiff cannot establish

personal involvement and subject a prison official to liability under § 1983, merely

by sending the official various letters or grievances complaining about the actions

or conduct of subordinates); Thomas v. Knight, 196 F. App'x 424, 429 (7th Cir. 2006)

(explaining that a warden does not incur § 1983 liability just by participating in the

grievance process). Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim against Defendants

Proctor, Taylor, and Sheriff Lane is dismissed without prejudice for failure to a

claim a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and § 1915A.

B

Plaintiff seeks to assert claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act

(“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12131, and the Rehabilitation Act (“RA”), 29 U.S.C. § 794(a),

based on the denial of his prescribed medication to treat his OUD. The relief

available under the ADA and RA is coextensive. Jaros v. Ill. Dep’t of Corr., 684 F.3d

667, 671 (7th Cir. 2012). To proceed on claims under the ADA and RA, a plaintiff

must allege that (1) he is a qualified individual with a disability, (2) a public entity

denied him the benefits of its services, programs, or activities or otherwise

discriminated against him, and (3) the denial or discrimination occurred because

of his disability. See Shaw v. Williams, No. 16-CV-1065, 2018 WL 3740665, at *10

(N.D. Ill. Aug. 7, 2018) (citing Wagoner v. Lemmon, 778 F.3d 586, 592 (7th Cir. 2015)).

The RA also includes a fourth requirement “that the program or activity in

question receives federal financial assistance.” Phipps v. Sheriff of Cook Cnty., 681 F.

Supp. 2d 899, 911 (N.D. Ill. 2009).

Plaintiff claims he is a “qualified individual with a disability” due to his

OUD diagnosis. Plaintiff’s ADA claim is reviewed under Title II of the ADA,

which applies to detainees in county jails. Lacy v. Cook Cnty. Ill., 897 F.3d 847, 852

(7th Cir. 2018). The ADA provides that “no qualified individual with a disability

shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation or denied the

benefits of the services, programs or activities of a public entity.” § 12132;

Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004); Lacy, 897 F.3d at 852. Drug addiction is a

“disability” under the ADA. See §§ 12102 and 12131(2); 28 C.F.R. § 35.108 (“The

phrase physical or mental impairment includes, but is not limited to … drug

addiction, and alcoholism.”). Although the ADA does not apply to current active

users of illegal drugs, it applies to individuals who are participating in a

supervised drug rehabilitation program. See § 12210(a) & (b).

Here, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that Defendants’ refusal to administer

his medications as prescribed deprives him of the benefit of the Jail’s MAT

program, and that such conduct constitutes discrimination on the basis of his

disability. The medical care provided to the detainees at the Jail qualifies as a

“service” that disabled detainees must receive indiscriminately under the ADA.

See Penn. Dep't of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 210 (1998). Plaintiff asserts that he

should have access to his prescribed suboxone films or pills, as this medication is

effective for treating his disorder. Based on his allegations, the Court finds that

Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged claims under the ADA and RA. The Court notes

that Plaintiff did not allege that the Jail receives federal funds. For purposes of this

Order, the Court will infer that the Jail receives federal funds and allow Plaintiff

to proceed on a claim under the RA. If the Jail does not receive federal funds,

Defendants may raise this issue after the parties have an opportunity to conduct

discovery.

The Court finds that Matt Lane, in his official capacity as McLean County

Sheriff, is the proper defendant for Plaintiff’s ADA and RA claims. See Jaros, 684

F.3d at 670 n. 2 (individual capacity claims are not available; the proper defendant

is the agency or its director (in his or her official capacity)); see also Hogle v. Baldwin,

No. 117CV01059JBMJEH, 2017 WL 4125258, at *4 (C.D. Ill. Sept. 18, 2017) (citing

Jaros, 684 F.3d 670) (internal citations omitted)); McNish v. Kayira, No. 16-CV-

00430-JPG, 2016 WL 2851122, at *3 (S.D. Ill. May 16, 2016) (ADA and RA claims

may be asserted either against the relevant state department or agency, or in an

official capacity claim against the director of the relevant department or agency.).

Plaintiff’s ADA and RA claims against Defendants Proctor, Mathias, Bane,

Salmonson, Duran, Taylor, Verbarg, and McLean County are dismissed with

prejudice for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) and § 1915A. See Hogle,

2017 WL 4125258, at *4 (plaintiff not entitled to relief under the ADA or RA against

defendants in their individual capacities).

C

Plaintiff also asserts Defendants Verbarg, Mathias, and Proctor violated his

rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. “The

equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects individuals against

intentional, arbitrary discrimination by government officials.” Lauderdale v. Ill.

Dep’t of Human Servs., 876 F.3d 904, 909–10 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Hayden ex rel.

A.H. v. Greensburg Cmty. Sch. Corp., 743 F.3d 569, 577 (7th Cir. 2014)). “In the prison

context, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires

inmates to be treated equally, unless unequal treatment bears a rational relation to

a legitimate penal interest.” May v. Sheahan, 226 F.3d 876, 882 (7th Cir. 2000). “To

state a prima facie case under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment, a plaintiff must demonstrate that [he]: (1) is a member of a protected

class; (2) is otherwise similarly situated to members of the unprotected class; (3)

suffered an adverse . . . action; [and] (4) was treated differently from members of

the unprotected class….” McPhaul v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Madison Cnty., 226 F.3d 558,

564 (7th Cir. 2000), overruled on other grounds by Hill v. Tangherlini, 724 F.3d 965 (7th

Cir. 2013).

Plaintiff did not allege that he is a member of a protected class. His

allegations that he was told to sit in a certain seat in the medication room to receive

medication are nonsensical and do not rise to the level of a Fourteenth

Amendment violation. Plaintiff’s claim against Defendants Verbarg, Mathias, and

Proctor for allegedly violating the Equal Protection Clause is dismissed without

prejudice for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) and § 1915A.

D

Plaintiff alleges Defendant Proctor instructed a correctional officer to submit

a false conduct report against him based on a grievance he submitted and that

Defendants Proctor and Mathias retaliated against him for filing this lawsuit.

Prisoners have a protected First Amendment right to file lawsuits and grievances.

Dobbey v. Illinois Dep’t of Corr., 574 F.3d 443, 446 (7th Cir. 2009). A prisoner may not

be disciplined for filing a lawsuit or grievance, as “[a]n act taken in retaliation for

the exercise of a constitutionally protected right violates the Constitution.” DeWalt

v. Carter, 224 F.3d 607, 618 (7th Cir. 2000). To establish First Amendment

retaliation, Plaintiff must successfully allege that (1) his speech was

constitutionally protected, (2) he suffered a deprivation likely to deter free speech,

and (3) his speech was at least a motivating factor in the [defendant’s] action.

Massey v. Johnson, 457 F.3d 711, 716 (7th Cir. 2006). Plaintiff’s conclusory

allegations are insufficient to state a First Amendment retaliation claim against

Defendants Mathias and Proctor.

Additionally, a First Amendment retaliation claim would not be properly

joined in the same lawsuit as Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference, ADA, and RA

claims against Defendants Mathias, Bane, Salmonson, Duran, Verbarg, and Lane.

Unrelated claims against the same Defendant may be joined in one action, but

different Defendants can be joined in one action only if the claims against them

arise from the same series of transactions or occurrences. Fed. R. Civ. P. 18, 20;

Kadamovas v. Stevens, 706 F.3d 843, 846 (7th Cir. 2013) (court “can require the

plaintiff ‘to file separate complaints, each confined to one group of injuries and

defendants.’”) (quoted cite omitted); Wheeler v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 689

F.3d 680, 683 (7th Cir. 2012) (“A litigant cannot throw all of his grievances, against

dozens of different parties, into one stewpot. Joinder that requires the inclusion of

extra parties is limited to claims arising from the same transaction or series of

related transactions.”); George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Thus

multiple claims against a single party are fine, but Claim A against Defendant 1

should not be joined with unrelated Claim B against Defendant 2. Unrelated claims

against different defendants belong in different suits….”). Plaintiff’s First

Amendment retaliation claims against Defendants Mathias and Proctor are

dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) and §

1915A.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

1) According to the Court's Merit Review of Plaintiff's Second Amended

Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, this case shall proceed on (1) a Fourteenth

Amendment claim against Defendants Jackie Mathias, Bethany Bane, Stacey

Salmonson, Dr. Monica Duran, and Jennifer Verbarg based on their alleged

deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's opioid use disorder ("OUD") and failure to

provide his prescribed medications to treat his OUD, and (2) claims under the

Americans with Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation Act against Defendant Matt

Lane, in his official capacity as McLean County Sheriff. Additional claims shall not

be included in the case above, except in the Court's discretion on motion by a party

for good cause shown under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15.

2) The Clerk is directed to ADD Matt Lane, the McLean County Sheriff,

as a Defendant.

3) Defendants Mathew Proctor, Casey Taylor, McLean County, and

Matt Lane (in his individual capacity) are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for

failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 28

U.S.C. § 1915A.

4) Defendants Mathias, Bane, Salmonson, Duran, and Verbarg returned

executed Waivers of Service of Summons. (Docs. 18, 19, 23, 26, and 27). No Waivers

need to be issued for these Defendants. Defendants Mathias, Bane, Salmonson,

Duran, and Verbarg are DIRECTED to answer Plaintiff's Second Amended

Complaint within 30 days of this Order.

5) Pursuant to this District's internal procedures, the Clerk is DIRECTED

to send Defendant Matt Lane the following documents: 1) a Notice of Lawsuit and

Request for Waiver of Summons; 2) a Waiver of Service of Summons; 3) a copy of

Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint; and 4) a copy of this Order.

6) The Court will attempt service on Defendant Lane by mailing a

waiver of service. If Defendant fails to sign and return a waiver of service to the

Clerk within 30 days after the waiver is sent, the Court will take appropriate steps

to effect formal service through the U.S. Marshals Service on Defendant and will

require Defendant to pay the full costs of formal service pursuant to Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 4(d)(2).

7) Defendant Lane shall file an answer within 60 days of the date the

Clerk sends the waiver of service. A motion to dismiss is not an answer. The

answer should include all defenses appropriate under the Federal Rules. The

answer and subsequent pleadings shall be to the issues and claims stated in this

Order. In general, an answer sets forth Defendant's positions. The Court does not

rule on the merits of those positions unless and until Defendant files a motion.

Therefore, no response to the answer is necessary or will be considered. If

Defendant has not filed an answer or appeared through counsel within 90 days of

the entry of this Order, Plaintiff may file a motion requesting the status of service.

After Defendant has been served, the Court will enter an order setting discovery

and dispositive motion deadlines.

8) If Defendant Lane no longer works at the address Plaintiff provided,

the entity for whom Defendant worked while at that address shall submit to the

Clerk Defendant's current work address, or, if not known, Defendant's forwarding

address. This information shall be used only for effectuating service.

Documentation of Defendant's forwarding address shall be retained only by the

Clerk and shall not be maintained in the public docket nor disclosed by the Clerk.

9) This District uses electronic filing, which means that after Defendant

Lane's counsel has filed an appearance, Defendant's counsel will automatically

receive electronic notice of any motion or other paper filed by Plaintiff with the

Clerk. Plaintiff does not need to mail to Defendants' counsel copies of motions and

other documents that Plaintiff has filed with the Clerk. However, this does not

apply to discovery requests and responses. Discovery requests and responses are

not filed with the Clerk. Plaintiff must mail his discovery requests and responses

directly to Defendants' counsel. Discovery requests or responses sent to the Clerk

will be returned unfiled unless they are attached to and the subject of a motion to

compel.

10) Defendants’ counsel is hereby granted leave to depose Plaintiff at

Plaintiff's place of confinement. Defendants’ counsel shall arrange the time for the

deposition.

11) Plaintiff shall immediately inform the Court, in writing, of any change

in his mailing address and telephone number. Plaintiff's failure to notify the Court

of a change in mailing address or phone number will result in dismissal of this

lawsuit, with prejudice.

12) Plaintiff shall be provided a copy of all pertinent medical records

upon request.

13) Within 10 days of receiving from Defendants' counsel an

authorization to release medical records, Plaintiff is directed to sign and return the

authorization to Defendants' counsel, if Plaintiff has not already done so.

14) The Clerk is directed to set an internal deadline 60 days from the entry

of this Order for the Court to check on the status of service regarding Defendant

Lane.

15) Defendants' deadline for filing a Motion for Summary Judgment on

the issue of exhaustion of administrative remedies is RESET for November 19,

2025. The discovery deadline is RESET for April 20, 2026, and the deadline for

filing dispositive motions is RESET for May 20, 2026.

It is so ordered.

Entered: August 20, 2025

s/Jonathan E. Hawley

U.S. District Judge