United States v. Brian Moore

USCA11 Case: 23-10971 Document: 48-1 Date Filed: 08/20/2025 Page: 1 of 12

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 23-10971

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

$8,500.00 IN UNITED STATES CURRENCY,

Defendant,

BRIAN MOORE,

Claimant-Appellant.

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2 Opinion of the Court 23-10971

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cv-03847-TWT

____________________

Before ROSENBAUM, ABUDU, and WILSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

In this appeal, Brian Moore challenges the district court’s de-

nial of his motion for attorney’s fees and costs in a forfeiture action

the government brought against him and then later moved to vol-

untarily dismiss with prejudice. The district court granted the gov-

ernment’s motion to dismiss but determined that Moore was not a

prevailing party for purposes of recouping his litigation expenses.

After reviewing the record and the parties’ briefs, and with the ben-

efit of oral argument, we vacate the district court’s order denying

Moore’s motion for attorney’s fees and costs, and remand the case

for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. BACKGROUND

On or around March 26, 2021, agents with the Drug En-

forcement Agency (“DEA”) stopped Moore in a waiting area at

Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport after witnessing

what they believed to be suspicious behavior. The agents ques-

tioned Moore at length and eventually obtained Moore’s consent

to search his bag, which contained $8,500 in cash (the “Currency”).

The agents confiscated the Currency and placed it in an envelope,

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but they allowed Moore to board his flight. The agents then had a

DEA narcotics detection dog sniff the envelope, and the canine

alerted the agents of the possible presence of narcotics. A DEA field

office held onto the Currency before turning it over to the United

States Marshals Service.

On or around June 21, 2021, Moore filed a claim with the

DEA, asserting that he was the rightful owner of the Currency. On

September 17, the government filed a complaint for forfeiture of

the Currency under 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) and 21 U.S.C.

§ 881(a)(6), alleging the Currency was used or intended to be used

in conjunction with illegal drug activity.

Thereafter, the parties engaged in discovery. Moore re-

sponded to the government’s interrogatories and requests for pro-

duction, and he lodged objections to the government’s discovery

requests as well. He also moved to suppress admission of the Cur-

rency and any statements he made as evidence, maintaining that

the DEA agents lacked reasonable suspicion or probable cause to

stop and detain him at the airport. 1 Moore argued that the stop,

the agents’ questioning, and the eventual search of his bag were

unlawful and, therefore, violated his Fourth Amendment rights.

Before the district court ruled on Moore’s motion to suppress, the

government filed an emergency motion to extend discovery,

1 Although a motion to suppress is atypical in a civil proceeding, a motion to

suppress is appropriate in a forfeiture action brought under the Civil Asset For-

feiture Reform Act of 2000 (CAFRA) because such actions must comport with

the Fourth Amendment. See 18 U.S.C. § 981(b)(2)(B).

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which Moore opposed. Moore’s opposition was based in part on

the grounds that discovery had already been extended and that the

forfeiture action was nearly a year old at that point. The district

court denied the government’s motion for an extension, and

Moore moved for summary judgment soon after.

Five days after Moore filed his summary judgment motion,

the government moved to voluntarily dismiss the complaint with

prejudice. The government contended that, after reviewing the

evidence produced during discovery, it had “become convinced

that it [was] not in the public interest to pursue [the] case.” In re-

sponse, Moore filed a qualified objection to the government’s mo-

tion, stating he did not oppose the dismissal, but that the govern-

ment’s proposed order should also include language that he had

“substantially prevailed” under 28 U.S.C. § 2465(b).

The district court found that dismissal was proper because it

would save judicial resources, would allow Moore to avoid any

subsequent litigation, would save Moore from incurring additional

attorney’s fees and costs, and the government would return his

money. Thus, he would suffer no prejudice. The court, however,

did not rule on whether Moore had substantially prevailed in the

litigation.

Following the case’s dismissal, Moore moved for attorney’s

fees, costs, and pre- and post-judgment interest on the Currency

confiscated under the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act (CAFRA),

28 U.S.C. § 2465(b)(1)(A). In his motion, Moore identified around

$15,000 in attorney’s fees he had incurred during the discovery

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process and the filing of his motions to suppress and for summary

judgment. He argued that he was entitled to attorney’s fees be-

cause he had “substantially prevail[ed]” under section 2465(b)(1)

and that the district court also had the discretion to award him at-

torney’s fees pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2).

The government never asserted that Moore was not entitled

to attorney’s fees and instead focused its arguments on whether he

was entitled to the actual amount he was seeking. Moore then filed

a supplemental affidavit supporting the requested amount in fees.

The government responded and again only challenged the amount

of fees Moore sought. It requested that the court reduce the fees

to an amount proportional to the value of property at issue; reduce

Moore’s calculation of prejudgment interest by 120 days; and deny

Moore’s requests for costs and post-judgment interest.

The district court, acknowledging that the government did

not challenge the motion per se, ruled that Moore was not statuto-

rily entitled to attorney’s fees, and it declined to exercise its discre-

tion to award fees. The court’s reasoning was that, first, it had

never addressed the merits of Moore’s defenses in the forfeiture

case and the government’s “voluntary change in conduct” was not

tantamount to a “judgment on the merits” which might have enti-

tled him to fees. Second, the court found that “the parties engaged

in minimal discovery and motions practice” prior to the dismissal,

and that the majority of fees Moore incurred were due to his coun-

sel’s own dilatory actions. The government then returned the Cur-

rency. Moore filed the instant appeal.

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II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review the denial of a motion for attorney’s fees for an

abuse of discretion. United States v. $70,670.00 in U.S. Currency, 929

F.3d 1293, 1300 (11th Cir. 2019). The district court abuses its dis-

cretion if it “applies an incorrect legal standard, relies on clearly er-

roneous factual findings, or commits a clear error of judgment.” Id.

When we review a district court’s prevailing party determination,

we review the court’s underlying factual findings for clear error but

review de novo the legal question of whether those facts establish

“prevailing party” status. 2 Royal Palm Props., LLC v. Pink Palm

Props., LLC, 38 F.4th 1372, 1375 (11th Cir. 2022) (quoting Beach Blitz

Co. v. City of Miami Beach, 13 F.4th 1289, 1297 (11th Cir. 2021)).

III. DISCUSSION

On appeal, Moore argues that the district court committed

a legal error in denying his request for attorney’s fees when it ruled

that he did not “substantially prevail” under CAFRA’s fee-shifting

provision. Specifically, Moore contends that the court did not need

to reach the merits of his claim because the dismissal with prejudice

establishes that he substantially prevailed. The government re-

sponds that because the district court never resolved the merits of

2 Although CAFRA is a “substantially prevailed” fee-shifting statute not a “pre-

vailing party” fee-shifting statute, “we interpret [these two types of statutes]

consistently.” Affordable Aerial Photography, Inc. v. Prop. Matters USA, LLC, 108

F.4th 1358, 1363 (11th Cir. 2024), cert. denied 145 S. Ct. 1177 (2025) (mem.)

(quoting $70,670.00 in U.S. Currency, 929 F.3d at 1303).

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Moore’s claim to the Currency, Moore cannot be said to have pre-

vailed in the case. We agree with Moore that the district court

committed legal error in concluding he could not qualify as a “pre-

vailing party.”

CAFRA’s fee-shifting provision provides that “in any civil

proceeding to forfeit property under any provision of Federal law

in which the claimant substantially prevails, the United States shall

be liable for . . . reasonable attorney fees and other litigation costs

reasonably incurred by the claimant.” 28 U.S.C. § 2465(b)(1)(A).

The pertinent inquiry here is whether the government’s voluntary

dismissal with prejudice establishes that Moore substantially pre-

vailed.

The district court’s denial of Moore’s request for attorney’s

fees relied significantly on the Supreme Court’s decision Buckhan-

non. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health &

Hum. Res., 532 U.S. 598 (2001). In Buckhannon, the Supreme Court

explained that an award of attorney’s fees is merited only when

there is (1) a material alteration of the legal relationship of the par-

ties, and (2) a judicial imprimatur on the change. Id. at 604–05. In

applying this standard, we have explained that “[t]he touchstone of

the prevailing party inquiry is the material alteration of the legal

relationship of the parties, and this change must be marked by ju-

dicial imprimatur.” Affordable Aerial Photography, Inc. v. Prop. Matters

USA, LLC, 108 F.4th 1358, 1362 (11th Cir. 2024), cert. denied 145 S.

Ct. 1177 (2025) (mem.) (internal quotation marks and citations

omitted). Despite the government’s assertion, Buckhannon does

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not require a prevailing party to receive some relief on the merits.

To the contrary, the Supreme Court stated that “enforceable judg-

ments on the merits and court-ordered consent decrees create the

material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties necessary to

permit an award of attorney’s fees.” Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 604

(emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Therefore, a judgment on the merits meets the criteria for award-

ing attorney’s fees, but the Supreme Court did not establish relief

on the merits as the sole means of meeting the criteria. See id.

The different objectives of the parties in litigation also in-

forms the inquiry of whether a party has “prevailed.” Thus, the

Supreme Court has held that a defendant may be the “prevailing

party” entitled to attorney’s fees without obtaining a judgment on

the merits. CRST Van Expedited, Inc. v. EEOC, 578 U.S. 419, 431

(2016). The Court explained its reasoning as follows:

Plaintiffs and defendants come to court with different

objectives. A plaintiff seeks a material alteration in

the legal relationship between the parties. A defend-

ant seeks to prevent this alteration to the extent it is

in the plaintiff’s favor. The defendant, of course,

might prefer a judgment vindicating its position re-

garding the substantive merits of the plaintiff’s allega-

tions. The defendant has, however, fulfilled its pri-

mary objective whenever the plaintiff's challenge is re-

buffed, irrespective of the precise reason for the

court's decision. The defendant may prevail even if

the court’s final judgment rejects the plaintiff’s claim

for a nonmerits reason.

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Id.

Stated more succinctly, in order to establish that one party

is the prevailing party, “there must be: (1) a situation where a party

has been awarded by the court at least some relief on the merits of

his claim or (2) a judicial imprimatur on the change in the legal rela-

tionship between the parties.” Smalbein ex rel. Est. of Smalbein v. City

of Daytona Beach, 353 F.3d 901, 905 (11th Cir. 2003) (internal quota-

tion marks and citation omitted). Accordingly, “a defendant need

not obtain a favorable judgment on the merits to prevail.” Lackey

v. Stinnie, 145 S. Ct. 659, 669 n.* (2025) (citing CRST, 578 U.S. at

431–34).

In addition, the material alteration in the legal relationship

“must be marked by ‘judicial imprimatur.’” CRST, 578 U.S. at 422

(quoting Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 605). Thus, “judicial action reject-

ing or rebuffing a plaintiff’s claim” is required to grant a party pre-

vailing-party status. Affordable Aerial Photography, 108 F.4th at 1364.

The district court found that under Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at

598, the government’s motion for voluntary dismissal with preju-

dice was a “voluntary change in conduct” that lacked “the neces-

sary judicial imprimatur on the change.” However, in Mathews v.

Crosby, this Court found the defendants in the case, “having ob-

tained from [Plaintiff] a voluntary dismissal with prejudice, are con-

sidered prevailing parties,” albeit under Rule 54. 480 F.3d 1265,

1276 (11th Cir. 2007). More recently, in Affordable Aerial Photog-

raphy, we reiterated that a voluntary dismissal without prejudice

lacks the implicit “judicial rejection” of a claim required to merit an

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award of attorney’s fees. 108 F.4th at 1363. Nevertheless, the

Court’s analysis distinguished our holding in Mathews, noting that

“in the past, we have held that a defendant can be considered the

prevailing party after a voluntary dismissal with prejudice.” Id. at

1364 (emphasis altered) (citing Mathews, 480 F.3d at 1276). In a

footnote, we explained that unlike a dismissal without prejudice,

“[t]he voluntary dismissals with prejudice at issue in Mathews

‘clearly rebuffed with the court’s imprimatur’ the plaintiff’s claims

and prevented the plaintiff from re-litigating those same claims in

the future.” Id. at 1364 n.6 (quoting Beach Blitz Co., 13 F.4th at

1301). So, although we have found a Rule 41 dismissal without

prejudice insufficient to merit attorney’s fees in the past, we have

not done so for a dismissal with prejudice.

That said, there is no per se Circuit rule that a voluntary dis-

missal with prejudice by a plaintiff alone either lacks or creates the

necessary judicial imprimatur to establish a claimant “substantially

prevailed.” We decline to make any such rule today. Rather, based

on these facts, Moore substantially prevailed in the proceeding be-

cause there was a material alteration in the legal relationship be-

tween the parties and a sufficient judicial imprimatur on that

change.

First, the government sought to materially alter the parties’

legal relationship through a forfeiture action by permanently con-

fiscating the Currency from Moore. However, the government,

after a year of litigation, decided to abandon the forfeiture action

and returned the Currency to Moore after the district court

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dismissed the action. See CRST, 578 U.S. at 431 (“[W]henever the

plaintiff’s challenge is rebuffed, irrespective of the precise reason

for the court’s decision,” then “[t]he defendant has . . . fulfilled its

primary objective . . . .”).

Second, the facts here present the necessary judicial impri-

matur of that change. The district court explicitly approved the

dismissal by granting the government’s motion under Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2) as opposed to permitting a voluntary

dismissal without a court order under Rule 41(a)(1)(A). Compare

Mathews, 480 F.3d at 1276 (finding defendant was the prevailing

party when plaintiff’s claim was voluntarily dismissed with a court

order under Rule 41(a)(2)), 3 with Affordable Aerial Photography, 108

F.4th at 1364 (finding defendant was not the prevailing party when

the plaintiff’s claim was voluntarily dismissed without a court or-

der under Rule 41(a)(1)). Additionally, the dismissal with prejudice

prevents the government from re-litigating this same claim in the

future. Affordable Aerial Photography, 108 F.4th at 1364 n.6 (in deter-

mining whether a party prevailed, distinguishing cases where the

government was prevented from re-litigating the same action in

the future from those where it could refile the action); see also

$70,670.00 in U.S. Currency, 929 F.3d at 1303 (finding a lack of judi-

cial imprimatur where the order of dismissal at issue posed “no legal

3 Although, in Mathews, this Court did not identify the specific provision under

which the plaintiff’s claims were voluntarily dismissed, this Court in Affordable

Aerial Photography found “[f]rom our review of the district court docket in that

case, it appears that the district court entered an order granting the plaintiff's

motions for voluntary dismissals under Rule 41(a)(2).” 108 F.4th at 1364 n.6.

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bar precluding the government from refiling the same forfeiture

action in the future”). Thus, the district court’s actions here place

the requisite judicial imprimatur on the change in the parties’ legal

relationship. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 605.

Accordingly, Moore substantially prevailed here and is enti-

tled to attorney’s fees under 28 U.S.C. § 2465(b)(1)(A).

III. CONCLUSION

For these reasons, we VACATE the district court’s denial of

Moore’s motion for attorney’s fees and costs and REMAND this

case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

VACATED AND REMANDED.