Opinion

L. Rodriguez v. L.R. Harry, Sec'y. of the PA DOC

Court
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
Filed
Aug 20, 2025
Status
Unpublished
On the bench
Covey
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 38.9%

“DOC is not an adjudicative body. Rather, it is an executive branch agency charged with faithfully implementing the sentences imposed by the courts.”

How later courts described this case

  • “DOC is not an adjudicative body. Rather, it is an executive branch agency charged with faithfully implementing the sentences imposed by the courts.”
  • “DOC must follow the sentencing court’s order.”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Luis Rodriguez, :

Petitioner :

:

v. :

:

Laurel R. Harry, Secretary of the :

Pennsylvania Department of :

Corrections, : No. 277 M.D. 2024

Respondent : Submitted: July 7, 2025

BEFORE: HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge

HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY

JUDGE COVEY FILED: August 20, 2025

Before this Court are the Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of

Corrections (DOC) Laurel R. Harry’s (Secretary Harry) preliminary objections

(Preliminary Objections) to Luis Rodriguez’s (Petitioner) Petition for Review

(Petition). After review, this Court overrules Secretary Harry’s first Preliminary

Objection, sustains her second Preliminary Objection and dismisses the Petition.

On or about September 9, 2020, Lehigh County1 arrested Petitioner and

charged him with one count of Possession of Paraphernalia, and three counts of

Manufacture/Sale/Possession with Intent to Deliver a Controlled Substance.2 See

Petition ¶ 4. The Pennsylvania Parole Board paroled Petitioner to an inpatient drug

1

The Petition does not specify whether it was the Lehigh Township Police Department,

the Allentown Police Department, or the Lehigh County Sheriff’s Office that arrested him.

2

Petitioner does not aver in the Petition on what date the Lehigh County Common Pleas

Court convicted him thereof or what sentence it imposed therefor.

rehabilitation program on January 26, 2021. See Petition ¶ 5. On April 26, 2021,

Petitioner left the inpatient program and did not return. See id. On November 9,

2022, Lehigh County rearrested Petitioner and charged him with one count of

Manufacture/Sale/ Possession with Intent to Deliver a Controlled Substance and one

count of Carrying a Firearm Without a License. See id. Petitioner remained in

custody at the State Correctional Institution at Chester until October 30, 2023. See

Petition ¶ 6. While incarcerated, Petitioner wrote a letter to his “counselor” seeking

an updated copy of his sentence “status sheet.” Petition ¶ 7. The status sheet

indicated that DOC credited 355 days from November 9, 2022 to October 30, 2023,

to Petitioner’s case number CP0004548 CT1/2018. See id. DOC allegedly should

have credited the time from November 9, 2022 until October 30, 2023, to his

overlapping, concurrent sentences imposed for case numbers CP0002548 CT1/2020,

CP0002549 CT1/2020, CP0002547 CT1/2020, CP0004057 CT5/2022, and

CP0004057 CT1/2022 because he was continuously confined while these cases were

pending plea agreements and sentencing. See Petition ¶ 8.

On May 16, 2024, Petitioner filed the Petition in this Court’s original

jurisdiction seeking to have this Court direct DOC to properly recognize and

calculate his 355 days of total confinement time from November 9, 2022 to October

30, 2023, and apply that time to his sentences for case(s) CP0002548 CT1/2020,

CP0002549 CT1/2020, CP0002547 CT1/2020, CP0004057 CT5/2022, and

CP0004057 CT1/2022 according to the law. Also, on May 16, 2024, Petitioner filed

an application to proceed in forma pauperis, which this Court granted on May 29,

2024. On June 27, 2024, Secretary Harry filed the Preliminary Objections. On

2

September 11, 2024, Secretary Harry filed her brief in support of the Preliminary

Objections.3

Initially,

[i]n ruling on preliminary objections, [this Court] must

“accept as true all well-pleaded material allegations in the

petition for review,” as well as inferences reasonably

deduced therefrom. Garrison v. Dep’t of Corr., 16 A.3d

560, 563 n.5 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011). Th[is] Court need not

accept as true conclusions of law, “unwarranted inferences

from facts, argumentative allegations, or expressions of

opinion.” Id. To sustain preliminary objections, “it must

appear with certainty that the law will not permit recovery,

and any doubt should be resolved by a refusal to sustain

them.” Torres v. Beard, 997 A.2d 1242, 1245 (Pa.

Cmwlth. 2010).

A preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer admits

well-pleaded facts and inferences reasonably deduced

therefrom in order to test the legal sufficiency of a petition

for review. Id. A demurrer can “be sustained only in cases

where the pleader has clearly failed to state a claim for

which relief can be granted.” Id.

Robinson v. Pa. Parole Bd., 306 A.3d 969, 972 n.7 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2023), aff’d, 328

A.3d 467 (Pa. 2024).

Secretary Harry first argues that Petitioner failed to plead the requisite

level of personal involvement against Secretary Harry because a theory of

respondeat superior is not sufficient under the law. Specifically, Secretary Harry

contends that personal involvement of defendants in an alleged constitutional

violation is a prerequisite under Section 1983 of the United States Code (Section

1983).

3

On November 19, 2024, this Court issued a dormant Order for Petitioner’s failure to file

a brief, giving Petitioner until December 3, 2024, to file his brief or risk the Court proceeding

without it. Petitioner did not file a brief.

3

Section 1983 provides, in relevant part:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,

regulation, custom, or usage, of any [s]tate . . . subjects, or

causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or

other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities

secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the

party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other

proper proceeding for redress[.]

42 U.S.C. § 1983. However, here, Petitioner does not mention Section 1983 in his

Petition against Secretary Harry, and a Section 1983 claim cannot be implied. See

Hill v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 271 A.3d 569, 573 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2022) (emphasis omitted)

(quoting West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988)) (“[T]o state a claim under [Section]

1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and

laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed

by a person acting under color of state law.”). Rather, Petitioner’s claim is akin to a

mandamus action, as he is asking this Court to compel DOC to recalculate his

maximum sentence release date to give him proper credit for all time he was

incarcerated.4 Accordingly, Secretary Harry’s first Preliminary Objection is

overruled.

4

Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy “designed to compel

performance of a ministerial act or mandatory duty where there

exists a clear legal right in the petitioner, a corresponding duty in the

respondent, and want of any other adequate and appropriate

remedy.” Toland v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 263 A.3d 1220, 1232

(Pa. Cmwlth. 2021) (cleaned up). A petitioner may not use

mandamus “to compel a purely discretionary act.” Coady v.

Vaughn, . . . 770 A.2d 287, 290 ([Pa.] 2001). “[T]he purpose of

mandamus is not to establish legal rights, but to enforce rights

[that] are already established.” Clark v. Beard, 918 A.2d 155, 159

(Pa. Cmwlth. 2007).

Robinson, 306 A.3d at 972-73 (emphasis added).

4

Secretary Harry next asserts that Petitioner failed to state a claim for

which relief can be granted because Petitioner did not provide any support for his

conclusory statements that he is entitled to additional credit. Specifically, Secretary

Harry proclaims that when DOC calculates an inmate’s sentence, it must rely on the

sentencing court’s orders and commitment forms.

This Court has held:

[M]andamus is an appropriate remedy to correct an error

in DOC’s computation of maximum and minimum dates

of confinement where the sentencing order clearly gives

the inmate credit for the time period in question and

DOC’s computation does not comply with that credit.

However, mandamus is not available to challenge

DOC’s failure to give credit where the sentencing

order is either ambiguous or does not specify the credit

at issue.

Allen v. Dep’t of Corr., 103 A.3d 365, 370 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014) (emphasis added;

citation omitted).

Here, Petitioner alleged that the 355 days from November 9, 2022 until

October 30, 2023, should be credited to the overlapping, concurrent sentences

imposed for case numbers CP0002548 CT1/2020, CP0002549 CT1/2020,

CP0002547 CT1/2020, CP0004057 CT5/2022, and CP0004057 CT1/2022.

However, although Petitioner referenced specific docket numbers, Petitioner did not

make clear what credit he is currently receiving on which dockets, nor what

additional credit he is seeking. Further, Petitioner did not attach any corresponding

sentencing court orders to his Petition. Without sentencing orders indicating the

particular credit Petitioner claims should be awarded for each criminal docket

number, DOC does not have the authority to alter, adjust, or change time credit dates.

See Hoyt v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 79 A.3d 741, 742 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013) (“DOC must

follow the sentencing court’s order.”); see also Detar v. Beard, 898 A.2d 26, 30 (Pa.

5

Cmwlth. 2006) (“DOC is not an adjudicative body. Rather, it is an executive branch

agency charged with faithfully implementing the sentences imposed by the courts.”).

Because it is not clear in the Petition what credit, if any, should have

been applied to his concurrent sentences, Petitioner does not have a “clear legal right

to relief” warranting mandamus. Robinson, 306 A.3d at 973 (quoting Toland v. Pa.

Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 263 A.3d 1220, 1232 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021) (cleaned up)).

Accordingly, because Petitioner has “failed to state a claim for which relief can be

granted[,]” Robinson, 306 A.3d at 972 n.7 (quoting Torres, 997 A.2d at 1245),

Secretary Harry’s second Preliminary Objection must be sustained.

For all of the above reasons, Secretary Harry’s first Preliminary

Objection is overruled and her second Preliminary Objection is sustained.

Petitioner’s Petition is dismissed.

_________________________________

ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

6

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Luis Rodriguez, :

Petitioner :

:

v. :

:

Laurel R. Harry, Secretary of the :

Pennsylvania Department of :

Corrections, : No. 277 M.D. 2024

Respondent :

ORDER

AND NOW, this 20th day of August, 2025, the Secretary of the

Pennsylvania Department of Corrections Laurel R. Harry’s (Secretary Harry) first

preliminary objection to Luis Rodriguez’s Petition for Review (Petition) is

OVERRULED, Secretary Harry’s second preliminary objection is SUSTAINED,

and the Petition is DISMISSED.

_________________________________

ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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