Johnson v. Wilfong

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

CENTRAL DIVISION

CEDRIC JOHNSON PLAINTIFF

ADC #099607

v. No: 4:23-cv-00642-KGB-PSH

COREY WILFONG, et al. DEFENDANTS

PROPOSED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

INSTRUCTIONS

The following Recommendation has been sent to Chief United States District

Judge Kristine G. Baker. You may file written objections to all or part of this

Recommendation. If you do so, those objections must: (1) specifically explain the

factual and/or legal basis for your objection, and (2) be received by the Clerk of this

Court within fourteen (14) days of this Recommendation. By not objecting, you may

waive the right to appeal questions of fact.

DISPOSITION

I. Introduction

Plaintiff Cedric Johnson filed a pro se complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983

on July 12, 2023 (Doc. No. 2) and an amended complaint on September 13, 2023

(Doc. No. 6), while detained at the Dub Brassell Detention Center.1 Johnson sues

police detective Corey Wilfong and police officers Rick Bunting and Nate Smith

(collectively the “Defendants”) in both their official and individual capacities. Doc.

No. 6 at 2. He alleges that defendants Bunting and Smith used excessive force

against him while defendant Wilfong failed to intervene on January 24, 2022. Doc.

No. 6 at 4-6. He also alleges the Defendants denied him access to appropriate

medical treatment after he was injured. Id. Johnson also sues Defendants under

Arkansas law for the torts of intentional infliction of emotional distress, battery, and

assault. Id. at 5 & 7.

Before the Court is a motion for summary judgment, brief in support, and

statement of undisputed facts filed by the Defendants (Doc. Nos. 31-33). Johnson

was notified of his opportunity to file a response to the motion for summary

judgment and a separate statement of disputed facts (Doc. No. 38). He filed a

declaration which included a statement of facts (Doc. No. 39), and the Defendants

filed a reply (Doc. No. 40). The Defendants’ statement of facts, and the other

pleadings and exhibits in the record, establish that the material facts are not in

dispute, and they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

1 Johnson is currently incarcerated in the Arkansas Division of Correction’s North

Central Unit. See Doc. No. 29.

II. Legal Standard

Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is

proper if “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact

and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV.

P. 56(a); Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 321 (1986). When ruling on a motion for

summary judgment, the court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to

the nonmoving party.2 Naucke v. City of Park Hills, 284 F.3d 923, 927 (8th Cir.

2002). The nonmoving party may not rely on allegations or denials, but instead must

demonstrate the existence of specific facts that create a genuine issue for trial. Mann

v. Yarnell, 497 F.3d 822, 825 (8th Cir. 2007). The nonmoving party’s allegations

must be supported by sufficient probative evidence that would permit a finding in

his favor on more than mere speculation, conjecture, or fantasy. Id. (citations

omitted).

An assertion that a fact cannot be disputed or is genuinely disputed must be

supported by materials in the record such as “depositions, documents, electronically

2 In Reed v. City of St. Charles, Mo., 561 F.3d 788 (8th Cir. 2009), the Eighth Circuit

Court of Appeals discussed the requirement that facts be viewed in the light most favorable

to the nonmoving party when considering a motion for summary judgment. The Court

stated, “[i]f ‘opposing parties tell two different stories,’ the court must review the record,

determine which facts are material and genuinely disputed, and then view those facts in a

light most favorable to the non-moving party—as long as those facts are not so ‘blatantly

contradicted by the record . . . that no reasonable jury could believe’ them.” Id. at 790

(quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007)).

stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for

purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials

. . .”. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(1)(A). A party may also show that a fact is disputed or

undisputed by “showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or

presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible

evidence to support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(B). A dispute is genuine if

the evidence is such that it could cause a reasonable jury to return a verdict for either

party; a fact is material if its resolution affects the outcome of the case. Othman v.

City of Country Club Hills, 671 F.3d 672, 675 (8th Cir. 2012). Disputes that are not

genuine or that are about facts that are not material will not preclude summary

judgment. Sitzes v. City of West Memphis, Ark., 606 F.3d 461, 465 (8th Cir. 2010).

III. Facts

The facts listed below are taken from those submitted by the Defendants that

are supported by documents attached to their statement of facts which include: the

Deposition Testimony of Cedric Johnson (“Johnson’s Deposition”) (Doc. No. 32-

1); Johnson’s January 24, 2022 Arrest Records (“Arrest Records”) (Doc. No. 32-2);

Bodycam Footage of Johnson’s Arrest (“Arrest Video”) (Doc. No. 32-3); Johnson’s

Post Arrest Interview Audio Footage (“Arrest Interview”) (Doc. No. 32-4);

Johnson’s April 21, 2022 Medical Records (“Medical Record”) (Doc. No. 32-5);

Johnson’s Criminal Information (“Criminal Information”) (Doc. No. 32-6); and

Johnson’s Sentencing Order (“Sentencing Order”) (Doc. No. 32-7). Disputed facts

are noted. Opinions, argument, legal conclusions, and immaterial facts are omitted.

1. Johnson began experiencing chronic back problems as early as 2009

while he was incarcerated with the Arkansas Department of Corrections (“ADC”).

Johnson’s Deposition at 15-16.

2. Johnson’s back problems were further aggravated after he was thrown

over a balcony following an altercation in April of 2015. Johnson’s Deposition at

16-17.

3. The back problems culminated in a surgery known as lumbar

discectomy and fusion at L4-5 on May 18, 2017. Johnson’s Deposition at 16-17.

4. On January 24, 2022, Defendants Smith and Bunting were dispatched

to 1830 South Oak Street in Pine Bluff, Arkansas in reference to a disturbance

between brothers. This was the second time law enforcement was called to this

address that day. The first was based on reports that a male was battering his mother.

The victim/mother was Dianna Johnson and the son allegedly battering her was

Johnson. The first dispatch resulted in the issuance of a warrant against Johnson for

domestic battery. Defendant Wilfong, who responded to the first call, informed

Smith and Bunting that Johnson was wanted related to the previous call. Arrest

Record at 2.

5. At approximately 10:25 p.m., on January 24, 2022, Smith and Bunting

arrived at 1830 South Oak Street. Arrest Video at 1:05 - 1:11.

6. Upon exiting his police cruiser, Smith approached a group of men that

included Johnson. Arrest Video at 1:11 - 1:18.

7. As Smith approached, he addressed the group of men and asked how

they were doing. Arrest Video at 1:24 - 1:26.

8. A male voice then asked Smith what his motives were, to which Smith

replied that somebody called him “over here.” Arrest Video at 1:27 - 1:29.

9. A male voice stated that nobody called the police. Arrest Video at 1:31.

10. Johnson approached Smith and responded that he was the one who had

called the police. Arrest Video at 1:33 - 1:34.

11. Smith requested Johnson’s name, and Johnson got closer to Smith and

stated that his name was Cedric Johnson, and he was there to retrieve his clothes

from his mother’s house. Arrest Video at 1:34 - 1:36.

12. Smith placed his hand on Johnson’s chest and requested that Johnson

“back up a little bit.” Arrest Video at 1:37.

13. Johnson backed up and told Smith to not place his hands on him, and

Smith told Johnson not to “walk up” on him. Arrest Video at 1:38 - 1:39.

14. Smith asked Johnson for his name again, and Johnson replied that his

name was Cedric Johnson. Arrest Video at 1:41 - 1:44.

15. Smith then instructed Johnson to turn around and place his hands

behind his back. Johnson responded by turning around and walking away from

Smith. Arrest Video at 1:45 - 1:48.

16. Smith told Johnson to turn around, to stop running away from him, and

attempted to grab Johnson by the arm. Arrest Video at 1:48 - 1:50.

17. Johnson then threw his arms out and jerked away, and Smith told

Johnson not to touch him. Arrest Video at 1:50 - 1:51.

18. Smith then pushed Johnson in the chest and instructed him to turn

around; Johnson refused and moved closer to Smith; Smith pushed Johnson in the

chest and again ordered Johnson to turn around, and Johnson again refused. Arrest

Video at 1:51 - 1:55.

19. Smith placed his hand on Johnson’s shoulder and again ordered

Johnson to turn around, and Johnson refused once more. Arrest Video at 1:55 - 1:56.

20. At this point, Bunting ran up to Johnson from behind him and wrapped

his arms around his chest. Arrest Video at 1:57. What happened next is not clearly

shown on the video, but Bunting ended up on the ground. Id. at 1:58 - 2:02. Johnson

explained that Bunting flipped over after attempting to jump on his back. Johnson’s

Deposition at 26-27, 32.

21. Smith then placed his hand on the back of Johnson’s neck before he

attempted to restrain Johnson. Arrest Video at 2:02 - 2:11.

22. After calling for back-up, Smith pushed Johnson to the ground, and

both Bunting and Smith restrained and handcuffed Johnson.3 Arrest Video at 2:12 -

2:30. They can be heard arguing, but Johnson did not complain about hurting his

back or ask to be taken to the hospital. Id. at 2:28 – 3:01.

23. In his deposition, Johnson stated that Smith tackled him to the ground

and “threw his knee” into his back. Johnson’s Deposition at 27, 34. He also claimed

that Smith hit him while he was on the ground, and that he asked to be taken to the

hospital. Id. at 34. In his response to the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment,

Johnson claims that Bunting hit him twice in the head while he was on the ground.

Doc. No. 39 at 5. The bodycam footage does not show either Smith or Bunting

hitting Johnson. Arrest Video at 2:12 - 2:30. It also does not support Johnson’s

statement that he asked to be taken to the hospital.

24. After Johnson was handcuffed, Smith escorted him to Smith’s police

cruiser. Johnson did not appear to be injured and had no trouble walking. He did

not claim to be injured or state a need for medical assistance at that time. Arrest

Video at 2:55 - 3:19.

25. Johnson was transported directly from 1830 South Oak Street to W.C.

“Dub” Brassell Detention Center (“Dub Brassell”), by Smith. Johnson’s Deposition

3 According to the arrest record, Bunting lost consciousness and broke his hand and

nose during the incident, and Smith suffered a sprained muscle in his shoulder. Arrest

Record at 5, 8. If Bunting lost consciousness after being flipped over, it did not last long

because he restrained Plaintiff a few moments later. Arrest Video at 2:02 - 2:17.

at 33. In his response to the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, Johnson

claimed he told Smith he needed to go to the hospital during the car ride, and Smith

told him no, he was going to jail. Doc. No. 39 at 2. Audio of an argument between

Johnson and Smith can be heard on the bodycam footage, but there is no mention of

going to the hospital; rather, Johnson argued with Smith about the reason for his

arrest. Arrest Video at 3:20-5:44.

26. Following arrival at Dub Brassell, Smith and Bunting were transported

to Jefferson Regional Medical Center for treatment. Arrest Record at 5.

27. After being taken to Dub Brassell, Johnson never saw Smith or Bunting

again. Johnson’s Deposition at 36.

28. Johnson was booked at Dub Brassell following his arrest and was

interviewed by Defendant Detective Corey Wilfong. Arrest Record at 4-6.

29. Johnson does not know where Wilfong was during his arrest by Smith

and Bunting. Johnson’s Deposition at 32-33.

30. Johnson’s only interaction with Wilfong was during the interview

following his booking at Dub Brassell. Johnson’s Deposition at 35-36. Following

his interview, Johnson never saw Wilfong again. Id. at 36.

31. During his interview with Wilfong, Johnson stated that he had a

scheduled back surgery soon, and the officers may have aggravated his condition.

He did not ask Wilfong to request medical care for him. Arrest Interview at 6:25 -

7:50.

32. According to Johnson, he asked for medical treatment after arriving at

Dub Brassell, but was denied. Johnson’s Deposition at 34. He stated that Dub

Brassell is operated by Captain Adams of the Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office, and

he asked Adams to the take him to the hospital. Id. at 37.

33. Johnson remained at Dub Brassell for 45 days until he was able to

“bond out” on March 11, 2022. Johnson’s Deposition at 37-40. Johnson claims that

while detained, he slipped and fell and sprained his back. Id. at 40-41.

34. Johnson claimed he saw a doctor the morning after he bonded out of

Dub Brassell, complaining that he hurt his back when he slipped and fell on a wet

floor while detained there. Johnson’s Deposition at 40-41; Medical Record at 5.

35. Medical records indicate that Johnson received an X-ray from Conway

Regional Health System (“CRHS”) on April 21, 2022, and he was diagnosed with

degenerative disc disease. Medical Record at 6.

36. On June 16, 2022, Johnson underwent a procedure called transpedicular

kyphoplasty at the L3 level. Johnson’s Deposition at 43.

37. Johnson was ultimately charged via criminal information with domestic

battery in the second degree for the battery on his mother, in violation of Ark. Code

Ann. § 5-26-304; and battery in the second degree for the battery on Bunting, in

violation of Ark. Code Ann. § 5-13-202. Criminal Information at 1; Sentencing

Order.

38. Johnson entered a negotiated plea of nolo contendere for the charge of

domestic battery in the second degree and was sentenced to 60 months in the ADC.

Sentencing Order at 1.

39. Johnson entered a negotiated plea of nolo contendere for the charge of

battery in the second degree and was sentenced to 60 months in the ADC.

Sentencing Order at 2.

IV. Analysis

A. Official Capacity Claims

The Defendants argue that Johnson fails to state an official capacity claim.

Official capacity claims are “functionally equivalent to a suit against the employing

governmental entity.” Veach v. Bartels Lutheran Home, 627 F.3d 1254, 1257 (8th

Cir. 2010). Thus, a suit against the Defendants in their official capacities is in

essence a suit against the city of Pine Bluff. See Murray v. Lene, 595 F.3d 868 (8th

Cir. 2010); Liebe v. Norton, 157 F.3d 574 (8th Cir. 1998). A municipality cannot be

held liable on the basis of respondeat superior, or simply by virtue of being the

employer of a tortfeasor. Atkinson v. City of Mountain View, Mo., 709 F.3d 1201

(8th Cir. 2013). Accordingly, as city employees, the Defendants can be held liable

in their official capacities in this case only if Johnson can establish that a

constitutional violation was committed pursuant to “(1) an ‘official municipal

policy,’ . . . (2) an unofficial ‘custom,’ . . . ; or (3) a deliberately indifferent failure

to train or supervise . . . .” Corwin v. City of Indep., MO., 829 F.3d 695, 699–700

(8th Cir. 2016) (internal citations omitted).

In his complaint, Johnson does not assert that a custom or policy of the city of

Pine Bluff was the moving force behind the claimed violations of his constitutional

rights. Doc. No. 6. Accordingly, the Defendants are entitled to summary judgment

on Johnson’s official capacity claims.

B. Qualified Immunity – Individual Capacity Claims

The Defendants argue they are entitled to qualified immunity with respect to

Johnson’s individual capacity claims. Qualified immunity protects government

officials from liability for damages “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person [in their

positions] would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).

Qualified immunity is a question of law and is appropriately resolved on summary

judgment. McClendon v. Story County Sheriff’s Office, 403 F.3d 510, 515 (8th Cir.

2005); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). To determine whether a

defendant is entitled to qualified immunity, the Court must consider two questions:

(1) do the facts alleged by plaintiff establish a violation of a constitutional or

statutory right; and (2) if so, was that right clearly established at the time of the

defendant’s alleged misconduct. Wright v. United States, 813 F.3d 689, 695 (8th

Cir. 2015). Courts may exercise “their sound discretion in deciding which of the

two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of

the circumstances of the particular case at hand.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S.

223, 236 (2009).

1. Excessive Force/Failure to Intervene.

Johnson claims that defendants Bunting and Smith used excessive force

against him while defendant Wilfong failed to intervene during his arrest on January

24, 2022. Doc. No. 6 at 4-6. Johnson acknowledges in his deposition that Wilfong

was not present during his arrest, and that he first encountered Wilfong during an

interview at Dub Brassell. Johnson’s Deposition at 32-33. Therefore, Wilfong was

not involved in any use of force and is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See

Mayorga v. Missouri, 442 F.3d 1128, 1132 (8th Cir. 2006) (“Liability under section

1983 requires a causal link to, and direct responsibility for, the deprivation of

rights.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

Regarding Bunting and Smith’s use of force, Johnson alleged in his amended

complaint that they broke his back. Doc. No. 6 at 4-5. In his deposition, he testified

that Bunting tried to jump on his back, and then Smith tackled him to the ground and

threw his knee in Johnson’s back. Johnson’s Deposition at 33-34. He further

claimed that Smith hit him once in his back and that Bunting hit him twice in the

head. Id.; Doc. No. 39 at 5. In his response to the Defendant’s motion for summary

judgment, Johnson asserts that this incident resulted in a fracture in his vertebrae,

and that his medical records prove this. Doc. No. 39 at 1 & 5.

The Fourth Amendment’s objective reasonableness standard governs a claim

that an officer used excessive force “in the course of making an arrest, investigatory

stop, or other ‘seizure.’” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989). A court’s

analysis “requires a careful balancing of the nature and quality of the intrusion on

the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing

governmental interests at stake,” as well as “careful attention to the facts and

circumstances of each particular case.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (quotations

omitted); see County of Los Angeles v. Mendez, 581 U.S. 420, 427-28 (2017).

“‘Reasonableness’ of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective

of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.”

Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (citations omitted). A court may consider factors such as:

“the severity of the crime; whether the suspect poses a threat of harm to others;

whether the suspect is resisting arrest; and other factors, such as whether the situation

is ‘tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving,’ which would force an officer to make

‘split-second judgments’ about how much force is necessary.” Coker v. Arkansas

State Police, 734 F.3d 838, 842–43 (8th Cir. 2013) (quoting McKenney v. Harrison,

635 F.3d 354, 360 (8th Cir. 2011)).

Applying the objective reasonableness standard to this case, the Court finds

that neither Smith nor Bunting used excessive force during Johnson’s arrest on

January 24, 2022. As described above, Johnson tells a different story about these

events than the story told by Smith and Bunting. And if opposing parties describe

two different stories, as is the case here, the Court is required to view genuinely

disputed material facts in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, as long as

those facts are not so blatantly contradicted by the record that no reasonable jury

could believe them. In this case, the bodycam footage blatantly contradicts

Johnson’s story about the events leading to his arrest. It shows that Johnson argued

with Smith and walked away when he was told to turn around and place his hands

behind his back. It shows Smith attempting to place Johnson’s hands behind his back

and Johnson jerking his arm away from Smith and walking away from Smith.

Johnson continued to refuse to submit to arrest as instructed to by Smith, and

Johnson argued with Smith as Bunting grabbed him from behind. While the

bodycam footage does not show Bunting being thrown or flipped over by Johnson,

Johnson acknowledges that this happened. The video also contradicts Johnson’s

story that Smith and Bunting hit Johnson after he was taken to the ground, as he

alleged in his deposition and response to their motion for summary judgment.

When Smith and Bunting arrived at the scene, they were aware that an arrest

warrant had been issued for Johnson for battering his mother and that Johnson

therefore posed a potential threat of harm. And in fact, Johnson did pose a threat of

harm as evidenced by his refusal to submit to arrest, his jerking his arm away from

Smith and walking away, and then by throwing Bunting to the ground when Bunting

tried to restrain Johnson, causing him injury. A viewing of the video establishes that

the situation was ‘tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving,’ and would force an officer

to make ‘split-second judgments’ about how much force is necessary. Under these

circumstances, it was not unreasonable for Bunting to attempt to restrain Johnson or

for Smith to subdue Johnson by tackling him to the ground.

The Court also notes that the bodycam footage blatantly contradicts Johnson’s

claim that he told the defendants that he had suffered an injury warranting immediate

medical treatment, and that he repeatedly asked to go to the hospital but was denied.

Instead, the video shows that he walked to the police car without difficulty and

continued to argue with Smith about why he was arrested during the drive to Dub

Brassell. He does not complain about an injury or ask for medical treatment.

Additionally, his medical records after his release from Dub Brassell do not support

his claim that Smith and Bunting broke his back when they arrested him. Those

medical records document Johnson sought treatment for back injuries which he

claimed resulted from a recent slip and fall at Dub Brassell, not from excessive force

at the time of his arrest.

Finally, Johnson has not provided any relevant case law indicating that a

reasonable officer in White or Bunting’s position would know that their conduct

violated clearly established law at the time of the incident. See Monroe v. Ark. State

Univ., 495 F.3d 591, 594 (8th Cir. 2007) (“Although the defendant bears the burden

of proof for this affirmative defense [of qualified immunity], the plaintiff must

demonstrate that the law was clearly established.”). On the contrary, clearly

established law holds that officers can use force in circumstances where an

individual is refusing to comply with reasonable orders. See e.g., Ehlers v. City of

Rapid City, 846 F.3d 1002, 1011 (8th Cir. 2017) (holding no constitutional violation

in using a spin take-down or taser where an arrestee was “continuing to lay on his

hands and refusing to comply with instructions” because officers “could have

interpreted” this “as resistance,” “regardless of whether [the man] actually intended

to resist”); Smith v. City of Minneapolis, 754 F.3d 541, 547 (8th Cir. 2014) (finding

no law clearly establishing that hitting and kicking a domestic abuse suspect who

refused to comply with officer’s orders to “get down on the ground” and be

handcuffed); Wertish v. Krueger, 433 F.3d 1062, 1066 (8th Cir. 2006) (finding it

reasonable for an officer to pull suspect, who had failed to follow multiple orders,

out of a vehicle and take him down to the ground to handcuff him). For these

reasons, defendants Bunting and Smith should therefore be granted qualified

immunity as to Johnson’s excessive force claims and their motion for summary

judgment should be granted.

2. Medical Treatment

Johnson also alleges that Smith, Bunting, and Wilfong were deliberately

indifferent to his serious medical needs by not taking him to the hospital to get

treatment for his alleged back injury. The evidence does not support Johnson’s

allegations or illustrate that any defendant violated his constitutional rights by not

taking him to the hospital.

Pretrial detainees’ claims are evaluated under the Fourteenth Amendment’s

Due Process Clause rather than the Eighth Amendment. See Hartsfield v. Colburn,

371 F.3d 454, 457 (8th Cir. 2004). Pretrial detainees are entitled to at least as much

protection under the Fourteenth Amendment as under the Eighth Amendment. See

id. (citing Spencer v. Knapheide Truck Equip. Co., 183 F.3d 902, 906 (8th Cir.

1999)); see also Davis v. Hall, 992 F.2d 151, 152–53 (8th Cir. 1993) (per curiam)

(applying deliberate indifference standard to pretrial detainee’s claims of inadequate

medical care).4 To succeed with an Eighth Amendment inadequate medical care

4 In Spencer, the Eighth Circuit explained that it had never articulated an exact

standard for evaluating medical treatment claims brought by pretrial detainees. 183 F.3d

at 905. The Court acknowledged that pretrial detainees’ claims may be subject to an

objective reasonable test rather than the subjective deliberate indifference standard. Id.

The Eighth Circuit addressed this issue again in Bailey v. Feltmann, 810 F.3d 589, 593

(8th Cir. 2016), where it declined to address the proper constitutional standard

unnecessarily, but noted that when that case was decided it was not clearly established

that a pre-trial detainee was entitled to more protection than that provided by the Eighth

Amendment.

claim, a plaintiff must allege and prove that: (1) he had objectively serious medical

needs; and (2) prison officials subjectively knew of, but deliberately disregarded,

those serious medical needs. Dulany v. Carnahan, 132 F.3d 1234, 1239 (8th Cir.

1997). For a medical need to be objectively serious, it must be diagnosed by a

medical provider as requiring treatment, or the need must be so obvious that a

layperson would easily recognize the need for medical treatment. See Barton v.

Taber, 820 F.3d 958, 964 (8th Cir. 2016). See also Williams v. Whitfield, No.

2:09CV00100 JLH/BD, 2010 WL 4792146, at *2 (E.D. Ark. Nov. 17, 2010)

(quoting Roberson v. Bradshaw, 198 F.3d 645, 648 (8th Cir.1999) (“‘[W]e have

repeatedly emphasized that the need or the deprivation alleged must be either

obvious to the lay person or supported by medical evidence, like a physician’s

diagnosis.’”) (emphasis in original). Additionally, the Eighth Circuit has held that a

“prisoner must show more than negligence, more even than gross negligence, and

mere disagreement with treatment decisions does not rise to the level of a

constitutional violation.” Estate of Rosenberg by Rosenberg v. Crandell, 56 F.3d

35, 37 (8th Cir. 1995).

Johnson’s actions after his arrest did not exhibit that he had objectively serious

medical needs that would be obvious to the layperson. He walked without difficulty.

He did not claim an injury immediately after Bunting attempted to restrain him or

after Smith successfully took him to the ground. He argued with Smith during the

drive to the police station about the reason for his arrest, and did not claim to be

injured or need medical attention. And he walked from the police car to the station

upon arrival there without complaint. His interactions with Smith and Bunting

simply do not evidence facts from which a reasonable person would believe he had

serious medical needs. Nor can they be a basis for a finding that Smith or Bunting

subjectively knew of but deliberately disregarded any serious medical needs.

Additionally, Johnson’s interaction with Wilfong does not support a finding

that he had objectively serious medical needs. The interview lasted a little over

seven minutes. The bulk of the interview consists of Wilfong reading Johnson his

Miranda rights and Johnson describing what took place during the alleged altercation

with his mother and complaining about the altercation with Smith and Bunting. He

briefly references his back one time but does not appear to ask for medical assistance.

The whole of the interview with Johnson simply does not support a finding that a

reasonable person would believe Johnson exhibited serious medical needs at that

time or that any such need would have been obvious to a layperson. The interview

likewise fails to support a finding that Wilfong subjectively knew of but deliberately

disregarded any serious medical needs Johnson had at the time.

In addition, Johnson has not produced any medical records or expert opinion

testimony to establish that he had serious medical needs warranting immediate

medical treatment. Instead, the evidence of record establishes that Johnson sought

treatment for a back injury after he was released from Dub Brassell, and reported to

the medical provider that the injury resulted from a recent slip and fall at that facility,

not from any injury resulting from his arrest. For these reasons, the Defendants are

entitled to qualified immunity and should be awarded summary judgment on

Johnson’s medical treatment claims.

C. State Law Claims

Because Johnson’s constitutional claims are subject to dismissal, the Court

should decline to exercise jurisdiction over Johnson’s state law claims for intentional

infliction of emotional distress and assault/battery. See Gibson v. Weber, 433 F.3d

642, 647 (8th Cir. 2006) (Congress unambiguously gave district courts discretion in

28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) to dismiss supplemental state law claims when all federal claims

have been dismissed).

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons described herein, the undersigned recommends that the

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 31) be granted. Johnson fails

to state official capacity claims, and the Defendants are entitled to qualified

immunity on Johnson’s individual capacity Fourth Amendment claims. Johnson’s

Fourth Amendment claims should be dismissed with prejudice. The Court should

decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction as to Johnson’s state law claims, and

those claims should be dismissed without prejudice.

DATED this 19th day of August, 2025.

UNITED STATES oe JUDGE