James Bourgeois Contractor, Inc. v. Anderson

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

JAMES BOURGEOIS CONTRACTOR, CIVIL ACTION

INC.

VERSUS

JOSEPH ANDERSON, ET AL. NO. 25-00472-BAJ-SDJ

RULING AND ORDER

Before the Court is Plaintiffs Motion For Temporary Restraining Order

And/Or Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 3, the “Motion). Defendants oppose the

Motion. (Doc. 12). Plaintiff filed a Reply. (Doc. 28).

The Court held a Status Conference with the Parties regarding Plaintiffs

request for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”), during which Defendant agreed

to reschedule an Administrative Hearing while the Court considers Plaintiff's request

for a preliminary injunction. (Doc 11). The Court denied without prejudice Plaintiffs

TRO request and set a briefing schedule regarding Plaintiffs request for a

preliminary injunction. (Doc. 10).

Plaintiffs remaining request for injunctive relief asks the Court to enjoin

Defendants from moving forward with an Administrative Hearing concerning the

status of Plaintiffs contractor licenses. (See Doc. 3-1 at 12-18). In its Order following

the Status Conference, the Court specified that it would only consider injunctive relief

regarding the upcoming Administrative Hearing and will not consider on an

expedited basis any reinstatement of Plaintiffs licenses or the constitutionality of the

statutes in question. (/d.). Oral argument is not necessary.

For the reasons that follow, Plaintiffs Motion will be DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

This case arises out of an investigation into Plaintiffs contract work by

Defendant Louisiana State Licensing Board for Contractors (“Defendant LSLBC’).

(Doc. 1 at [| 5-12). Though there are some minor fact discrepancies between Plaintiff

and Defendants’ versions of the facts, the Court accepts the following facts, largely

supplied by Plaintiff, as true for purposes of resolving Plaintiff's Motion:

On September 27, 2024, Defendant Laurie LaRose (“Defendant LaRose”), an

investigator for Defendant LSLBC, emailed Plaintiff requesting documentation and

other information regarding the status of work to construct a camp in

Golden Meadow, Louisiana. (/d. at 5, 7). Plaintiff allegedly never received this

email message. (/d. at § 7). On October 4, 2024, Defendant LaRose sent Plaintiff a

letter via certified mail to Plaintiff with the same request, but Plaintiff allegedly did

not receive the letter in part because Plaintiff was away attending to a relative who

suffered from a serious illness. (/d.). The letter was returned to Defendant LSLBC on

November 15, 2024. Cd.).

On October 24, 2024, Defendant LaRose successfully served a subpoena on

Plaintiff demanding the documentation and information about the Golden Meadow

camp construction project within 72 hours. Ud. at { 8; Doc. 12 at 4).

On Octboer 26, 2024, within 48 hours of receiving the Notice, Plaintiff hand delivered

documents to Defendant LSLBC. (Doc. 1 at 8). Plaintiff asserts that an internal

email by Defendant LSLBC confirms Defendant LSLBC’s receipt of these documents,

though Plaintiff has not yet produced this alleged email message. (See id.).

The Parties agree that one of the Defendants notified Plaintiff that Plaintiff

did not sufficiently respond to the Notice, but they disagree on who said this and

when: Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Joseph Anderson (“Defendant Anderson”),

another investigator for Defendant LSLBC, notified Plaintiff on or about

December 10, 2024, that additional documents received on that date were “[s]till not

enough.” Defendants, however, contend that on the same day in October that Plaintiff

provided documents to Defendant LSLBC, Defendant LaRose informed Defendant

that Plaintiff had not provided all requested information. (See id.; Doc. 12 at 4—5).

On March 25, 2025, Defendant LaRose successfully served upon Plaintiff a

“Notice of Violation and Hearing,” (the “Notice”) which notified Plaintiff that

Defendant LSLBC “has reasonable grounds to believe that [Plaintiff] has violated ...

Section 129(A) of the Rule and Regulations: Contractors must maintain adequate

records and provide such to the Board within 72 hours upon request.” (Doc. 1 at { 8).

The Notice did not provide factual assertions to support Defendant LSLBC’s

allegations against Plaintiff. (Id.). The Notice included a

Summary Suspension Order, which suspended Plaintiffs contractor licenses pending

an Administrative Hearing set for April 17, 2025. Ud. at § 10; Doc. 12 at 6).

On April 9, 2025, at Plaintiffs request, Defendant LSLBC rescheduled the

Administrative Hearing to June 19, 2025. (Doc. 12 at 6). On May 12, 2025, Defendant

LSLBC provided over 200 pages of documents to Plaintiff, which Defendant LSLBC

contends constitutes all materials Defendant LSLBC will use against Plaintiff at the

Administrative Hearing. ([d.; Doc. 1 at § 15). Plaintiff submitted interrogatories and

a set of 18 requests for document production to Defendant LSLBC, which as of

June 2, 2025, the date that Plaintiff filed the Complaint in this case, had gone

unanswered. (Doc. 1 at § 15). However, on July 1, 2025, Defendant LSLBC issued

responses to Plaintiffs interrogatories and requests for production which

Defendant LSLBC claims further articulate the nature of Plaintiffs alleged

violations. (Doc. 37-1 at 6-7).

Plaintiffs Complaint listed the aforementioned Defendants, each in their

respective official capacity, as well as Shannon Sagona (“Defendant Sagona”), who is

Defendant LSLBC’s Enforcement Coordinator, Governor Jeff Landry

(“Defendant Landry”), Brad Hassert (“Defendant Hassert”), who is

Defendant LSLBC’s Executive Director, Lee Mallett (“Defendant Mallett”), who is

Defendant LSLBC’s Commercial Board Chairman, and Elliot J. Temple

(“Defendant Temple”), who is Defendant LSLBC’s Residential Board Chairman.

(Id. at { 2). Plaintiff broadly alleges that “Defendants are secking to conduct a trial

by ambush in violation of Plaintiffs constitutional and civil rights.” (Ud. at J 15).

Plaintiff alleges that (1) Defendants have provided constitutionally insufficient

notice in violation of Due Process rights under the Constitution of the United States

and the Constitution of Louisiana, (2) the denial of a hearing before suspending

Plaintiffs contractor licenses violates federal and state constitutional Due Process

rights, as well Louisiana state law, (8) Defendant LSLBC’s consolidated roles of

investigation, prosecution, and adjudication of Plaintiff violate principles of Due

Process, (4) the Louisiana state statutes which Plaintiff has allegedly violated are

unconstitutionally void for vagueness, and (5) Defendants’ prosecution of Plaintiff

constitutes a fundamentally unfair process in violation of Plaintiffs Due Process

rights under the color of state law. Ud. at ¢§ 13-88).

Plaintiff seeks a preliminary injunction “enjoining any hearings or prosecution

of the accusations of violations by the Defendants-Respondents pending cure of the

deficiencies in the Notices, vacating the Summary Suspension of Plaintiffs licenses

and reinstating those licenses until there is a lawful notice and pre-suspension

hearing, and delaying any further proceedings pending a judgment by the Court on

Plaintiffs request for a declaratory judgment determining the constitutionality of

Rule 129(A) and La. R.S. 37:2158(A)(11).” (Doc. 3-1 at 18). Plaintiff also requests

declaratory judgments with respect to each of its claims, as well as “compensatory

and punitive damages in the amount of twenty million dollars, attorneys’ fees, [and]

all costs.” (Doc. 1 at 4] 40-42).

On August 12, 2025, the Court granted Louisiana Attorney General

Liz Murrill’s (“Intervenor Murrill”) Unopposed Motion to Intervene for the Limited

Purpose of Defending Petitioner's Constitutional Challenge to a Louisiana Statute.

(Doc. 38). Intervenor Murrill submitted a Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 36), and all

Defendants filed a separate Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 37), which are not yet fully

briefed by the Parties.

A Joint Status Report from the Parties indicates that the

Administrative Hearing has been rescheduled to August 20, 2025, yet it also specifies

that it will take place on August 21, 2025. (Doc. 33 at 4-5).

As noted, the Court narrowed its consideration of Plaintiffs

preliminary injunction request to the question of whether to allow the

Administrative Hearing to take place before the Courts resolves Plaintiffs claims.!

(Doc. 10).

I. LEGAL STANDARD

“A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy; it is never

awarded as of right.” Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 689-90 (2008) Gnternal citations

and quotations omitted); see also Allied Mkig. Grp., Inc. v. CDL Mktg., Inc.,

878 F.2d 806, 809 (5th Cir. 1989) (preliminary injunctive relief “is an extraordinary

remedy and should be granted only if the movant has clearly carried the burden of

persuasion with respect to all four factors.”); Miss. Power & Light Co. v. United Gas

Pipe Line Co., 760 F.2d 618, 621 (5th Cir. 1985) (“The decision to grant a preliminary

injunction is to be treated as the exception rather than the rule.”). The decision to

grant or deny a request for a preliminary injunction is within the sound discretion of

the Court. See Allied Mktg., 878 F.2d at 809.

At all times, the burden of persuasion rests with the plaintiff to establish each

1 The Court acknowledges that the Parties, in their briefing regarding Plaintiffs request for a

preliminary injunction, briefed the issue of whether Defendant LSLBC’s summary suspension of

Plaintiffs licenses violates Plaintiff's Due Process rights. However, as noted in its prior Order,

(Doc. 10), because the Court is only addressing the legality of the Administrative Hearing itself, the

Court declines to review this question on an expedited basis.

of the four elements required for issuance of a preliminary injunction:

(1) a substantial likelihood of prevailing on the merits; (2) a substantial threat of

irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted; (8) the threatened injury outweighs

any harm that will result to the non-movant if the injunction is granted; and

(4) the injunction will “not disserve the public interest.” See Barton v. Huerta,

613 F. App’x 426, 427 (5th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). If a plaintiff fails to meet its

burden regarding any of the necessary elements, the Court need not address the other

elements necessary for granting a preliminary injunction. See Roho, Inc. v. Marquis,

902 F.2d 356, 361 (5th Cir. 1990) (declining to address the remaining elements

necessary to obtain a preliminary injunction after finding that the plaintiff failed to

show a substantial likelihood of success on the merits); see also Garden Dist. Book

Shop, Inc. v. Stewart, 184 F. Supp. 8d 331, 3385 (M.D. La. 2016). A preliminary

injunction is an “extraordinary remedy” that should not be granted unless a party

demonstrates the above four factors by a “clear showing.” Valley v. Rapides Par. Sch.

Bd., 118 F.3d 1047, 1051 (5th Cir.1997).

Wil. DISCUSSION

To succeed on a preliminary injunction, Plaintiff must establish a substantial

likelihood of prevailing on the merits. See Barton, 613 F. App’x at 427. Accordingly,

the Court begins its inquiry here. The Court will also address whether there is a

substantial likelihood that Plaintiff will suffer an irreparable injury if the Court does

not grant its preliminary injunction request. For the reasons stated below, the Court

finds that Plaintiff cannot bear its burden at this stage of the litigation.

A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

With respect to the legality of the upcoming Administrative Hearing, Plaintiff

asserts that Defendants’ Notice does not comply with Due Process requirements and

that Defendant LSLBC’s consolidated roles of investigation, prosecution, and

adjudication of Plaintiff violate principles of Due Process. (Doc. 1 at 36-37).

Defendants counter that Plaintiff is not likely to succeed on the merits because the

Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the injunctive relief claims against

certain Defendants. (Doc. 12 at 9-12). The Court will address each issue in turn.

1. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Defendants assert that Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity applies to

Plaintiffs injunctive claims against Defendants Anderson, Sagona, Landry, and

Hassett, and that the Court therefore lacks subject matter jurisdiction to decide those

claims. (Doc. 12 at 9).

Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity generally bars private suits against

nonconsenting states in federal court. City of Aus. v. Paxton, 9438 F.3d 998, 997

(5th Cir. 2019). Sovereign immunity also prohibits suits against state officials or

agencies that are effectively suits against a state. Id. However, an exception to

sovereign immunity exists pursuant to the Supreme Court of the United States’

decision in Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), which allows plaintiffs to pursue

injunctive or declaratory relief against individual state officials in their official

capacities acting in violation of federal law. Raj v. La. State Univ., 714 F.3d 322, 328

(5th Cir. 2013). The Ex parte Young exception requires a defendant to have “some

connection” to the state law’s enforcement and to threaten to exercise that authority.

Aur Evac EMS, Inc. v. Tex., Dep’t of Ins., Div. of Workers’ Comp., 851 F.3d 507, 517

(5th Cir. 2017).

Although Defendants argue that the aforementioned Defendants do not fall

within the Ex parte Young exception, Defendants acknowledge that

Defendants Mallett and Temple may fall within the exception since they will serve

as adjudicators at the Administrative Hearing. (Doc. 12 at 11). The Court agrees that

at least some Defendants have “some connection” to the state’s law enforcement

efforts here and the threatened use of that enforcement via the upcoming

Administrative Hearing. Because dismissing claims for injunctive relief against the

aforementioned Defendants would not prevent the Administrative Hearing from

taking place, the Court defers for further consideration Defendants’ request to

dismiss those claims. Further, because there are Defendants against whom a

preliminary injunction could be imposed, the Court will not deny Plaintiffs request

for a preliminary injunction on the basis of Eleventh Amendment sovereign

immunity.

Defendants also assert that the Court should exercise its discretion to abstain

from hearing this case under the Burford abstention doctrine, as articulated by the

Supreme Court in Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1948). Burford abstention

“allows federal courts to avoid entanglement with state efforts to implement

important policy programs.” Elec. Reliability Council of Tex., Inc. v. Just Energy Tex.,

L.P., 57 241, 249 (5th Cir. 2028) (quoting Grace Ranch, L.L.C. v. BP Am. Prod.

Co., 989 F.8d 301, 313 (5th Cir. 2021)).

Where timely and adequate state-court review is available, a federal

court sitting in equity must decline to interfere with the proceedings or

orders of state administrative agencies: (1) when there are “difficult

questions of state law bearing on policy problems of substantial public

import whose importance transcends the result in the case then at

bar;’or (2) where the “exercise of federal review of the question in a case

and in similar cases would be disruptive of state efforts to establish a

coherent policy with respect to a matter of substantial public concern.”

New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 361 (1989)

(quoting Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 814

(1976)).

In deciding whether to abstain under Burford, courts consider: (1) whether the

plaintiff raises state or federal claims, (2) whether the case involves unsettled state

law or detailed local facts, (8) the importance of the state’s interest in the litigation,

(4) the state’s need for a coherent policy in the area, and (5) whether there is a special

state forum for judicial review. Elec. Reliability, 57 F.4th at 249. “The power to

abstain under Burford charges courts with a careful balancing of state and federal

interest, but one that ‘only rarely favors abstention.” Grace Ranch, 989 F.3d at 313

(quoting Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 728 (1996)).

Here, the balance of state and federal interests do not favor abstention. First,

though Plaintiffs claims involve state laws, Plaintiff also asserts all of his claims

under the United States Constitution. Second, while the facts of the case revolve

around a state investigation, the thrust of Plaintiffs claims are that Defendants did

not comply with federal Due Process standards. Third, although the state has a

strong interest in the regulation of licensed contractors within its borders, this

interest does not outweigh Plaintiffs federal right to Due Process. Fourth, the Court

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acknowledges the state’s need for a coherent policy with respect to license regulation.

However, Plaintiffs Complaint only requests that state law comply with

Constitutional mandates. The fifth and final Burton factor weighs in Defendants’

favor because state law allows for a petition for review of an agency decision to be

brought in the state district court of the parish in which the agency is located.

See La. Stat. Ann § 49:978.1 (2025). Nonetheless, because four of the five Burton

factors weigh in Plaintiffs favor, the Court will not deny the preliminary injunction

on this basis.

2. Notice of the Administrative Hearing

Plaintiff argues that “[i]t is self-evident from an examination of the Notices ...

that they provide absolutely no substantive information or notice of the facts or

accusations. They merely make reference to the Rules and Statutes allegedly

violated.” (Doc. 3-1 at 6). Plaintiff also argues that Defendant LSLBC never

responded to Plaintiffs interrogatories, “and provided only some documents which it

claims are its exhibits and its investigative file. This single discovery response

provides absolutely no information.” (d. at 3).

Defendants contend that because the Notice identifies the project, the statutes

and rules Plaintiff is accused of violating, and the date, time, and location of the

Administrative Hearing, its contents along with “the totality of the circumstances

related to the investigation” provide Plaintiff with sufficient notice to prepare for the

Administrative Hearing. (Doc. 12 at 14-15). The Court additionally notes that after

the Parties briefed the Court on the sufficiency of Defendants’ notice,

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Defendant LSLBC issued responses to Plaintiffs interrogatories and requests for

production. (Doc. 37-1 at 6-7).

A procedural due process violation requires a finding that the defendant

deprived plaintiff of a property interest without notice and an opportunity to be heard

“at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Mathews v. Eldridge,

424 U.S. 319, 3382-33 (1976). The extent of the required notice and hearing

requirement is context dependent. Lion Elastomers, L.L.C. v. Nat'l Lab. Rels. Bd.,

108 F.4th 252, 260 (5th Cir. 2024). Courts determine the extent of the proper

procedural protections that a particular situation demands by evaluating (1) “the

private interest that will be affected by the official action,” (2) “the risk of an

erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and [the]

probative value, if any, of additional procedural safeguards,’ and (8) “the

Government’s interest, including the fiscal and administrative burdens that the

additional or substitute procedures would entail.” Jabary v. City of Allen,

547 F. App’x 600, 606-07 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Mathews, 424 U.S. at 321).

“(P]rocedural due process in the administrative setting does not always require

application of the judicial model.” Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 115 (1977). “The right

to a fair hearing in an administrative proceeding embraces ‘a reasonable opportunity

to know the claims of the opposing party and to meet them.” Intercontinental Indus.,

Inc. v. Am. Stock Exch., 452 F.2d 935 (5th Cir. 1971) (quoting Morgan v. United

States, 304 U.S. 1, 18 (1938)).

Here, in evaluating Plaintiff's inadequate notice claim, the Court considers the

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Notice in combination with Defendants’ responses to Plaintiffs interrogatories and

the trial exhibits Defendants have provided to Plaintiff. Plaintiffs private interest is

significant, as it affects its ability to operate as a business. Correspondingly,

Defendants’ interest in protecting the public from contractors who do not follow legal

requirements also serves a critical function.

The crux of Plaintiffs argument is that although the charges against Plaintiff

and the date, time, and location of the Administrative Hearing are clear, Notices that

explicitly describe the factual allegations underlying the charged conduct are

necessary to protect against the risk of an erroneous deprivation of Plaintiffs

contractor licenses. The Court agrees that providing this information would be

helpful in allowing Plaintiff to mount a robust defense to Defendants’ allegations.

However, given Defendants’ subsequent evidentiary disclosures to Plaintiff,

including responses to Plaintiffs interrogatories, the investigative file that led to

Defendants’ enforcement action against Plaintiff, and the exhibits that will be used

against Plaintiff at the Evidentiary Hearing, the Court cannot conclude that the

extraordinary and drastic remedy of issuing a preliminary injunction to prevent the

Evidentiary Hearing from taking place is appropriate here. Having had responses to

its interrogatories and the evidence that Defendants will use against Plaintiff at the

Administrative Hearing for over a month, (Doc. 37-1 at 6-7), the information Plaintiff

has received since requesting the preliminary injunction likely exceeds the relief

Plaintiff seeks in the first place.

The Court therefore finds that Plaintiffis not substantially likely to succeed in

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prevailing in its claim that it did not receive proper notice of the

Administrative Hearing. The Court accordingly denies issuing a preliminary

injunction on this basis.

3. Consolidated Roles of Investigation, Prosecution, and

Adjudication

Plaintiff argues that Defendant LSLBC is unable to act as a fair and impartial

tribunal because, having already decided to summarily suspend Plaintiffs license

ahead of the Administrative Hearing, Defendant LSLBC has already “pre-judged”

Plaintiffs guilt. (Doc. 23 at 9). Plaintiff contends that Defendant LSLBC now has “an

undeniable direct interest in the outcome of the Administrative Hearing” and cites

La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 671(A)(5), which in criminal cases, requires the recusal

of a judge who has performed a judicial act in the same case in another forum.

Ud. at 9). Plaintiff also cites La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 151, which forbids civil judges

from overseeing cases in which the judge is “biased, prejudiced, or interested in the

cause or its outcome.” (/d.)

Defendant argues that Plaintiff has not presented any evidence of personal

bias, pecuniary interest, or other special circumstances indicating an intolerably high

risk of unfairness. (Doc. 12 at 19).

“A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.” Withrow v.

Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 46 (1975) Gnternal citation omitted). The right to a fair tribunal

applies to both courts and administrative agencies which take on adjudicative

functions. Id. (citing Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 579 (1978)). A plaintiffs

contention that the combination of investigative and adjudicative functions

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necessarily creates an unconstitutional risk of bias “must overcome a presumption of

honesty and integrity in those serving as adjudicators.” Jd. at 47. This is a “difficult

burden” to overcome, and the plaintiff must show “such a risk of actual bias or

prejudgment that the practice must be forbidden.” Jd.

A plaintiff may rebut the presumption of honesty and integrity on the part of

adjudicators by presenting “special circumstances” which demonstrate that “the risk

of unfairness is intolerably high.” Id. at 58. The Supreme Court has found cases in

which “the adjudicator has a pecuniary interest in the outcome” and where the

adjudicator “has been the target of personal abuse or criticism from the party before

him” to be instances where “the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or

decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable.” Id. at 47.

Here, Plaintiff demonstrates no pecuniary interest on the part of Defendant

LSLBC, and Defendant LSLBC has not been the subject of abuse from Plaintiff. Nor

does Plaintiff present any “special circumstances” at all that would demonstrate an

intolerably high risk of unfairness to overcome the presumption of honesty and

integrity that the law requires the Court apply to Defendant LSLBC. Instead,

Plaintiff merely references an earlier decision in the case—the summary suspension

of Plaintiffs licenses—to support its claim of bias.

Plaintiffs broad references to standards imposed on criminal and civil judges

do not appear to apply to the administrative adjudicators here; however, even if they

did apply, the Court cannot conclude that the administrative adjudicators here have

contravened those standards.

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The Court therefore finds that Plaintiff is not substantially likely to succeed in

prevailing in its claim that the Administrative Hearing is a fundamentally unfair

tribunal. The Court accordingly denies issuing a preliminary injunction on this basis.

B. Irreparable Injury

The Court also finds that, for several reasons, Plaintiff has not shown a

substantial threat of irreparable injury if the preliminary injunction is not granted.

Plaintiff argues that it will suffer irreparable harm if the

Administrative Hearing goes forward because allegations of constitutional violations

permit a per se finding of irreparable harm. (Doc. 3-1 at 9-10 (citing Jolly v. Coughlin,

76 F.3d 468, 482 (2nd Cir. 1996))).?

However, injunctive relief is generally an “extraordinary remedy which

requires the movant to unequivocally show the need for its issuance.”

Valley v. Rapides Par. Sch. Bd., 118 F.8d 1047, 1050 (5th Cir. 1997)

(citing Allied Mktg. Grp., Inc. v. C.D.L. Mktg., Inc., 878 F.2d 806, 809 (5th Cir. 1989)).

As in Ryon v. Burkhalter, Plaintiff has not shown that it “will not receive a favorable

outcome in the administrative hearing which [it] seek[s] to enjoin,” and thus is not

entitled to injunctive relief on this basis. See Ryon v. Burkhalter,

No. CIV. A. 08 - 333- C, 2008 WL 2704838, at *1 (M.D. La. July 7, 2008).

Further, as previously noted, Plaintiff may petition a state court to review the

result of the Administrative Hearing. See La. Stat. Ann § 49:978.1 (2025). Though

Plaintiff cites statistics that it believes show that its chances of success are low,

Court emphasizes that the case cited by Plaintiff for the proposition that it will suffer

irreparable harm is merely persuasive but not binding precedent.

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(Doc. 23 at 6), the fact that an Administrative Hearing will take place does not mean

that Plaintiff will not prevail at that Hearing, that such Hearing will be conducted in

a fundamentally unfair or biased manner, or that said hearing is the final chance for

Plaintiff to argue its case.

Additionally, a preliminary injunction is generally an inappropriate remedy

where harm may be relieved by damages. See Endurance Assurance Corp. v. Axon

Power & Gas LLC, No. 3:20-CV-00285-X, 2020 WL 3792259, at *1 (N.D. Tex. July 6,

2020) (finding that harm that is “strictly financial” without allegations of economic

loss that would threaten the existence of plaintiffs business does not constitute

irreparable harm). Here, though Plaintiff alleges that it has “suffered the improper

termination of his business,” Plaintiff “seeks compensatory and punitive damages in

the amount of twenty million dollars.” (Doc. 1 at □ 382-33). See Sampson v. Murray,

415 U.S. 61, 90 (1074) (The possibility that adequate compensatory or other

corrective relief will be available at a later date, in the ordinary course of litigation,

weighs heavily against a claim of irreparable harm.”).

Accordingly, Plaintiffs potential suspension or revocation of its contractor

licenses following the Administrative Hearing fails to amount to the “immediate and

irreparable harm necessary to justify the issuance of a temporary restraining order.”

Ryon, No. CIV.A. 08-333-C, 2008 WL 2704833, at *1.

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IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly,

ITIS ORDERED that Plaintiffs Motion (Doc. 3) be and is “de DENIED.

Baton Rouge, Louisiana, this q of August, 2025

R.

JUDGE BRIAN A. J SON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

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