The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON
MEDFORD DIVISION
RICHARD VAUGHN Sr., RICHARD Case No. 1:22-cv-00161-CL
VAUGHN Jr. Individually and as
Personal Representative for The Estate
of Teresa Vaughn, Deceased, MARJO
VAUGHN, LARRY VAUGHN, DEBRA OPINION AND ORDER
BLANK, and VIVIAN KIMBOL,
Plaintiffs,
v.
KLAMATH COUNTY FIRE DISTRICT
No. 1 an Oregon Special District,
GREGORY DAVIS, CODY ENGLER,
and ALEX DUSTIN,
Defendants.
CLARKE, Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiffs represent the family and Estate of now-deceased Teresa Vaughn. They bring this
action against Defendants Klamath County Fire District No. 1 (“KCFD”), Gregory Davis, Cody
Engler, and Alex Dustin (collectively, "Defendants") for claims arising out of a 911 response.
Before the Court is Defendants’ Joint Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law (“JMOL”), ECF
No. 203. Defendants renew their motion for JMOL on the Estate’s section 1983 claim against
Engler and Dustin and on Plaintiffs’ negligent supervision and training claims against KCFD. For
the reasons below, Defendants’ Motion is DENIED.
//
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BACKGROUND
This case arises out of the death of Teresa Vaughn ("Ms. Vaughn"). Plaintiffs are Richard
Vaughn, Jr. (decedent's brother and personal representative of her Estate), Vivian Kimbol
(domestic partner), Marjo Vaughn (mother), Richard Vaughn, Sr. (father), Larry Vaughn (brother),
and Debra Blank (sister). SAC, ECF No. 59 at 7.
Ms. Vaughn tested positive for Covid-19 on December 21, 2020. Mylander Decl., ECF No.
71-1 at 12, Her partner, Ms. Kimbol, tested negative. Jd. Ms. Vaughn's symptoms remained
generally mild until the morning of December 26, at which point they appeared to escalate
dramatically. Jd. at 15. According to Ms. Kimbol, Ms. Vaughn awoke with difficulty breathing and
she struggled to navigate the stairs of their apartment, unable to grip her water bottle and purse
and requiring Ms. Kimbol's assistance. Jd. After setting Ms. Vaughn down in a chair to call her
sister, Ms. Kimbol called 911. Jd at 16. She told the dispatcher her "roommate was having
difficulty breathing, and that she had tested COVID positive, and that [they] needed 9-1-1." Jd. at
17. Ms. Kimbol contends that Ms. Vaughn was gasping on the phone with her sister, only able to
respond with an "uh-huh" or a "yes." Jd.
KCFD paramedic, Defendant Cody Engler, arrived five to ten minutes later in personal
protective equipment. Jd. at 18-19. He claims Ms. Kimbol communicated through the door that.
Ms. Vaughn had Covid for a week, was feeling shaky, and wanted to go to the hospital to get
checked out. ECF No. 71-3 at 13. Ms. Kimbol placed masks on herself and Ms. Vaughn, and Engler
entered the apartment enough to glance at Ms. Vaughn in the chair. ECF No. 71-1 at 20. His account
of Ms. Vaughn's condition differs from Ms. Kimbol's. Engler claims that from looking at Ms.
Vaughn and briefly speaking to her, he was able to conclude there were no signs of respiratory
1 Page numbers correspond to ECF pagination.
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distress or increased respiratory rate, she was not tripoding or breathing shallow, and her skin
showed positive signs of being pink, warm, and dry. ECF No. 71-3 at 13. Engler asked a few
questions about Ms. Vaughn's symptoms and condition, and he inquired as to how she got down
the stairs, to which Ms. Kimbol answered that she assisted. ECF No. 71-1 at 22- 23. It's unclear
exactly when he raised it, but at some point early into the visit Engler asked Ms. Kimbol if she
was willing to drive Ms. Vaughn to the hospital in her own vehicle, claiming it was encouraged at
the time to limit exposure. Jd. at 20; ECF No. 71-3 at 16. Ms. Kimbol contends she responded:
"Isn't that your fucking job? I wouldn't have called you." ECF No. 71-1 at 21. Additionally, at some
point during this initial encounter, Engler canceled the oncoming engine en route with
defibrillators, medical equipment, and three more senior paramedics. ECF No. 71-3 at 27-28.
A second KCFD paramedic, Defendant Alex Dustin, came to the doorway with a medical
bag. ECF No. 71-1 at 24, 39. Engler stopped Dustin from entering and explained that Ms. Kimbol
would be providing transport. Jd. at 24. Engler verbally confirmed with Ms. Vaughn that it was
alright for Ms. Kimbol to take her, to which she responded, "I guess so." Jd. at 25. The two women
then got up and headed out of the apartment with Ms. Kimbol physically supporting Ms. Vaughn
the entire way. Jd. at 26. As they approached the car, Ms. Vaughn dropped to the step and started
to fall sideways. Jd. Dustin steadied her and helped walk Ms. Vaughn the rest of the way to her car.
Id. He put her seatbelt on and retrieved her slipper, which had fallen off in the process. Jd. Once
the women were in their car, Engler and Dustin got back into the ambulance. Ms. Kimbol began
driving towards the hospital; the paramedics began driving the opposite direction. Jd. at 27.
Approximately three-tenths of a mile down the road, Ms. Vaughn suffered a cardiac event.
Id. at 29. She and Ms. Kimbol arrived at the emergency room approximately eight minutes later,
at which point Ms. Vaughn had lost consciousness and wasn't breathing. Jd. at 30. Hospital
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personnel met the car in the ambulance bay, retrieved Ms. Vaughn, and began administering CPR
and oxygen. /d. at 31. Ms. Vaughn's brother and sister arrived later, but Ms. Kimbol, not permitted
to enter the hospital due to her Covid-19 exposure, returned home alone. /d. at 31-32. The doctors
were able to revive Ms. Vaughn, but they could not keep her alive without ventilator support. Jd.
at 33. The family, with Ms. Kimbol!'s counsel, made the decision to end life support a short while
later. Id.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs’ complaint was originally filed on January 31, 2022. By the time of trial, two
claims remained.
First, the Estate of Teresa Vaughn alleged Defendants caused Ms. Vaughn’s death under
Oregon’s wrongful death law. Second, the Estate and Ms. Vaughn’s parents alleged Engler and
Dustin violated the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution by being deliberately
indifferent to a known danger they themselves caused. The Estate of Teresa Vaughn and her parents
sought economic and noneconomic damages alleging the defendants caused the death of Teresa
Vaughn. Defendants denied both claims and denied that their actions were the cause of Ms.
Vaughn’s death.
A two-week jury trial was held in Medford, Oregon beginning on June 4, 2025. On the
third day of deliberation, the jurors notified the Court that they were unable to reach a verdict. A
mistrial was declared.
LEGAL STANDARD
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b), “[i]f the court does not grant a motion for
judgment as a matter of law made under Rule 50(a),” then “no later than 28 days after the jury was
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discharged . . . the movant may file a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law[.]” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 50(b).
“Judgment as a matter of law is appropriate when the evidence presented at trial permits
only one reasonable conclusion.” Santos v. Gates, 287 F.3d 846, 851 (9th Cir. 2002). In other
words, “|a] motion for a judgment as a matter of law is properly granted only if no reasonable juror
could find in the non-moving party’s favor.” E/-Hakem v. BUY, Inc., 415 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir.
2005). “The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and all
reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of that party.” Torres v. City of Los Angeles, 548 F.3d
1197, 1205-06 (9th Cir. 2008) (quotation omitted). “If conflicting inferences may be drawn from
the facts, the case must go to the jury.” LaLonde v. Cty. of Riverside, 204 F.3d 947, 959 (9th Cir.
2000).
DISCUSSION
Defendants renew their motion for JMOL on the Estate’s section 1983 claim against Engler
and Dustin and on Plaintiffs’ negligent supervision and training claims against KCFD. The Court
previously denied this motion during trial. ECF No. 187. Because Defendants fail to raise any new
facts, law, or argument on the issue, the Court once again denies the motion.
L JMOL is denied on the Estate’s section 1983 claim against Engler and Dustin.
Defendants argue JMOL is appropriate on the Estate’s section 1983 claim because the Estate
has failed to show that Engler and Dustin are not entitled to qualified immunity. The Court
disagrees.
a. Section 1983
A Section 1983 claim requires a plaintiff must show (1) a violation of a (2) constitutional
right (3) committed by a person acting under color of state law. Anderson v. Warner, 451 F.3d
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1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2006). Plaintiffs here claim that Defendants violated the Fourteenth
Amendment, which provides "[n]o state shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law." U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 1.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment acts "as a limitation on the State's
power to act, not as a guarantee of certain minimal levels of safety and security. It forbids the State
itself to deprive individuals of life, liberty, or property without 'due process of law,' but its language
cannot fairly be extended to impose an affirmative obligation on the State to ensure that those
interests do not come to harm through other means." DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc.
Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989).
Consistent with these principles, the general rule is that a state is not liable for its omissions.
Munger vy. City of Glasgow Police Dep't, 227 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir. 2000). However, a state's
“omission or failure to protect" may violate the Fourteenth Amendment if one of two exceptions
apply. Patel v. Kent Sch. Dist., 648 F.3d 965, 971-72 (9th Cir. 2011). Plaintiffs here rely on the
state-created danger exception.
b. State-created danger
The state-created danger exception arises "when the state affirmatively places the plaintiff
in danger by acting with 'deliberate indifference’ to a ‘known or obvious danger." Jd. Thus, to
survive JMOL, Plaintiffs must raise a question of fact as to whether Defendants Engler and Dustin
(1) affirmatively placed Ms. Vaughn in danger (2) by acting with deliberate indifference to a
foreseeable risk. The Court finds they have.
First, in examining whether the state affirmatively placed a person in danger, we examine
whether the state actor "left the person in a situation that was more dangerous than the one in which
they found him." Munger, 227 F.3d at 1086. Plaintiffs here claim Engler and Dustin acted
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affirmatively in the following ways: signaling to Dustin not to proceed into the house with medical
instruments or conduct any further examination on Ms. Vaughn; canceling the oncoming engine
equipped with superior aid, tools, and experienced EMS workers; walking Ms. Vaughn 25 feet to
her car, when she was visibly stumbling and unable to ambulate independently; and driving the
ambulance in the opposite direction rather than following Ms. Vaughn and Ms. Kimbol to the
hospital, as was standard procedure. Interpreting these facts in the manner most favorable to
Plaintiffs, reasonable minds could differ as to whether these were affirmative state actions that
resulted in Ms. Vaughn being placed in arguably the least equipped situation with the farthest
access to medical aid following harmful, unnecessary physical exertion.
Defendants argue that the referenced conduct is more properly framed as inaction, or a
failure to act, rather than actual affirmative action. In Penilla v. City of Huntington Park, 115 F.3d
707 (9th Cir. 1997), the decedent was found in grave medical condition and the officers
nonetheless moved him inside, locked the door, and left. That was a clear example of affirmative
state action creating a danger. To Defendants’ point, the Court agrees that the facts of this case do
not present as clear an example as Penilla. However, they also do not present a clear antithesis,
where the defendants merely do nothing upon arrival. The testimony is undisputed that Engler and
Dustin did not merely show up and leave; they took some active steps which resulted in a change
in circumstances for Ms. Vaughn. It is arguable that, like Penilla, Defendants’ actions cut Ms.
Vaughn off from receiving immediate medical attention. Further, a dispute exists as to the degree
of those steps, such as how much of a visual assessment was or was not made by Engler and how
poor or alarming Ms. Vaughn's condition was upon arrival. Ms. Kimbal also asserts that had Engler
not encouraged them to transport themselves as he did, she would have pursued other medical aid
through her employing hospital, thereby avoiding the car ride but for Engler's encouragement. In
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light of such dispute, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have raised a genuine question as to whether
Engler and Dustin's conduct crossed from mere inaction into affirmative action that placed Ms.
Vaughn in a worse circumstance than she otherwise would have found herself in.
The second step for the exception to apply examines whether the state acted with
"deliberate indifference" to a "known or obvious danger." Patel, 648 F.3d at 974. Deliberate
indifference "is a stringent standard of fault, requiring proof that a municipal actor disregarded a
known or obvious consequence of his action." Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cty., Okl. v. Brown,
520 U.S. 397, 410 (1997). The state actor must recognize the unreasonable risk and intend to
expose the person to it, without regard to any consequences to the person. Sinclair v. City of Seattle,
61 F.4th 674, 680 (2023). "The deliberate-indifference inquiry should go to the jury if any rational
factfinder could find this requisite mental state." Patel, 648 F.3d at 974.
Plaintiffs here have presented evidence that Engler and Dustin knew of Ms. Vaughn's
Covid-19 diagnosis, were responding to her 911 call requesting urgent assistance, saw her in a
state where she could barely breath or walk on her own, and still, they chose to cut off further aid
and abandon Ms. Vaughn and Ms. Kimbol. Drawing all inferences in Plaintiffs' favor, reasonable □
minds could differ regarding whether Defendants actions rose beyond mere negligence to
-deliberate indifference to the known danger presented by Ms. Vaughn's condition. The Court is
further mindful that the danger and uncertainty surrounding Covid-19 in December 2020 was
significantly heightened compared to our current understanding in 2025.
c. Qualified immunity
At the crux of Defendants’ motion for JMOL is the argument that the Estate has failed to show
that Engler and Dustin are not entitled to qualified immunity.
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A plaintiff attempting to overcome the presumption of qualified immunity must first show □□□
constitutional right was clearly established. Gasho v. United States, 39 F.3d 1420, 1438 (9th Cir.
1994). The burden then shifts to the defendant to show that a reasonable state actor "could have
believed, in light of the settled law, that he was not violating a constitutional or statutory right."
Id. "Summary judgment on qualified immunity is not proper unless the evidence permits only one
reasonable conclusion. Where 'conflicting inferences may be drawn from the facts, the case must
go to the jury.”” Munger, 227 F.3d at 1087 (quoting Lalonde v. County of Riverside, 204 F.3d 947,
959 (9th Cir. 2000)).
While the particular facts of this case present a somewhat novel application of the state-created
danger exception, the right to be free from state-created danger is, and has been, a clearly
established constitutional right. Given the possibility of conflicting inferences, the Court declines
to grant Defendants qualified immunity as a matter of law. Moreover, significant disputes of fact
exist in this case creating uncertainty as to whether Engler and Dustin knew of the danger they
were creating with their actions.
There is sufficient evidence to lead a reasonable juror to find that qualified immunity does not
apply here. Defendants’ motion for JMOL on this claim is therefore denied.
I. JMOL is denied on Plaintiffs’ negligent supervision and training claims against
KCFD.
Defendants next argue that Plaintiffs have failed to present any evidence demonstrating
negligent supervision or training by KCFD. Once again, the Court disagrees.
Oregon law recognizes direct negligence claims against public employers for failing to
supervise employees who commit foreseeable harm. “[L]iability attaches when an employer
negligently places an employee with known dangerous propensities, or dangerous propensities
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which could have been discovered by a reasonable investigation, in a position where it is
foreseeable that he could injure the plaintiff in the course of the work." Branford v. Wash. Cty.,
No. 3:17-cv-94-SI, 2019 WL 1957951, at *21 (D. Or. May 2, 2019) (cleaned up). □
KCFD’s systemic failures contributed to Teresa’s death. Engler claims he misunderstood a
“Provider-Initiated Refusal” policy. If it existed, it would only allow for non-transport of Covid-
positive patients in very limited circumstances — after a full evaluation including vital signs.
According to KCFD leadership, the policy was never a license to discourage people from going to
the hospital in an ambulance if they wanted to. Whatever the policy was, it was poorly
communicated, giving paramedics like Engler and Dustin an excuse to refuse service to patients
in need.
Additionally, KCFD leadership failed to enforce review mechanisms for EMTs’ run reports.
Reports indicating refusals to transport Covid-positive patients, such as Engler’s prior incidents,
went unchecked. Had KCFD’s captains and battalion commanders conducted proper reviews as
Chief Davis expected of them, they could have identified and corrected this dangerous practice
before Teresa’s death.
Plaintiffs have presented sufficient evidence for a jury to find in their favor on the negligent
supervision and training claims against KCFD. Defendants’ motion for JMOL on this claim is
therefore denied.
ORDER
Defendants’ Joint Motion for Judgment as a Matter of ‘6. 2034 NIED.
It is so ORDERED and LP :
MARKD.CLARKE |
United States Magistrate Judge
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