first quoting Kisela v. Hughes, 584 U.S. 100, 104 (2018) (per curiam); and then quoting City of Tahlequah v. Bond, 595 U.S. 9, 13 (2021) (per curiam)
How later courts described this case
- first quoting Kisela v. Hughes, 584 U.S. 100, 104 (2018) (per curiam); and then quoting City of Tahlequah v. Bond, 595 U.S. 9, 13 (2021) (per curiam)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Case: 24-50998 Document: 69-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/19/2025
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
____________ Fifth Circuit
FILED
No. 24-50998 August 19, 2025
Summary Calendar
Lyle W. Cayce
____________ Clerk
Samantha Lee-Ann Sealey,
Plaintiff—Appellant,
versus
Arturo Mancias; City of San Antonio,
Defendants—Appellees.
______________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
USDC No. 5:24-CV-399
______________________________
Before Davis, Graves, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam: *
Samantha Lee-Ann Sealey paid a late-night visit to a 7-Eleven in San
Antonio, Texas. A police officer with a warrant for Sealey’s arrest met her in
the parking lot with handcuffs. When the officer turned his back, she made a
break for it. In a foot chase, the officer drew close and Sealey fell face-first
onto the pavement, her hands still cuffed behind her back. Sealey says that
_____________________
*
This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 24-50998 Document: 69-1 Page: 2 Date Filed: 08/19/2025
No. 24-50998
she was shoved and brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of
her Fourth Amendment rights. The district court concluded that the officer
was entitled to qualified immunity and dismissed Sealey’s complaint for
failure to state a claim. Sealey appeals. We AFFIRM.
I.
Sealey brought this action against Officer Arturo Mancias and the City
of San Antonio. 1 Her complaint pressed two Fourth Amendment claims: one
for excessive force against the officer and another for failure to train or
supervise against the City. Officer Mancias and the City filed motions to
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Officer Mancias invoked qualified immunity,
while the City argued that the Monell 2 claim had not been sufficiently pled.
The district court granted those motions, and this appeal followed.
II.
In her opening brief, Sealey challenged the district court’s dismissal
of her excessive-force claim on qualified-immunity grounds. “Qualified
immunity shields federal and state officials from money damages unless a
plaintiff pleads facts showing (1) that the official violated a statutory or
constitutional right, and (2) that the right was ‘clearly established’ at the time
of the challenged conduct.” 3 Federal “courts have discretion to decide which
of the two prongs of qualified-immunity analysis to tackle first.” 4 Exercising
_____________________
1
Sealey’s original complaint also named the San Antonio Police Department as a
defendant. She later amended her complaint, dropping the Department as a party
defendant.
2
See generally Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978) (establishing
the criteria for municipal liability under § 1983).
3
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
800, 818 (1982)).
4
Id. (citing Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009)).
2
Case: 24-50998 Document: 69-1 Page: 3 Date Filed: 08/19/2025
No. 24-50998
that discretion, the district court resolved Sealey’s claim against Officer
Mancias on the second prong, holding that no clearly established Fourth
Amendment violation occurred. On de novo review, 5 we elect to begin with
the first.
A.
“An officer violates the Fourth Amendment when an arrestee suffers
an injury that results directly and only from a clearly excessive and objectively
unreasonable use of force.” 6 Because “police officers are often forced to
make split-second judgments,” we must not critique their actions “with the
20/20 vision of hindsight.” 7 Instead, the test is objective reasonableness. To
that end, a plaintiff must allege what a reasonable officer would have done
under the circumstances. 8 Sealey did not.
Sealey’s complaint states that Officer Mancias violated her Fourth
Amendment rights when he “unnecessarily pushed [her], rather than using
the appropriate level of force, de-escalating the situation and apprehending
[her] without inflicting serious physical injuries.” But “reasonableness . . .
does not necessarily or invariably turn on the existence of alternative ‘less
intrusive’ means.” 9 Accepting Sealey’s allegations as true, Officer
Mancias’s split-second decision to use force was reasonable to apprehend a
suspect in active flight. Sealey does not specify what superior alternative he
_____________________
5
See, e.g., Anderson v. Estrada, 140 F.4th 634, 641 (5th Cir. 2025).
6
Wilson v. City of Bastrop, 26 F.4th 709, 713 (5th Cir. 2022) (quoting Cloud v. Stone,
993 F.3d 379, 384 (5th Cir. 2021)).
7
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396–97 (1989).
8
See Jackson v. Gautreaux, 3 F.4th 182, 188 (5th Cir. 2021).
9
Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 647 (1983).
3
Case: 24-50998 Document: 69-1 Page: 4 Date Filed: 08/19/2025
No. 24-50998
had. By failing to do so, she has failed to plausibly allege a Fourth Amendment
violation.
B.
Even if Sealey alleged a constitutional violation, it would not be clearly
established. “The clearly established inquiry is especially demanding for
excessive force claims.” 10 “The right may not be defined at a ‘high level of
generality’ because the question is ‘whether the violative nature of particular
conduct is clearly established.’” 11 “Rights are ‘clearly established’ when
‘existing precedent squarely governs the specific facts at issue,’ not when a
rule is merely ‘suggested by then-existing precedent.’” 12
Sealey asserts a right that prohibits an officer from “viciously”
pushing her “to the concrete ground” while evading arrest. But she identifies
no “controlling authority or . . . robust consensus . . . of persuasive
authority” suggesting that this right is of a constitutional dimension. 13
Instead, each case she cites recognizes a different right.
Sealey chiefly relies on Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985). “At
most, Garner prohibits using deadly force against an unarmed burglary
suspect fleeing on foot who poses no immediate threat.” 14 And Garner did
_____________________
10
Santander v. Salazar, 133 F.4th 471, 480 (5th Cir. 2025) (citation modified).
11
Id. (quoting al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 742).
12
Henderson v. Harris County, 51 F.4th 125, 132 (5th Cir. 2022) (first quoting Kisela
v. Hughes, 584 U.S. 100, 104 (2018) (per curiam); and then quoting City of Tahlequah v.
Bond, 595 U.S. 9, 13 (2021) (per curiam)).
13
District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 63 (2018) (quoting al-Kidd, 563 U.S.
at 741–42).
14
Harmon v. City of Arlington, 16 F.4th 1159, 1167 (5th Cir. 2021).
4
Case: 24-50998 Document: 69-1 Page: 5 Date Filed: 08/19/2025
No. 24-50998
not address whether a “vicious” shove amounted to deadly force. So, Garner
is of no help.
Sealey’s circuit cases fare no better. See Singleton v. Casanova, No. 22-
50327, 2024 WL 2891900, at *8 (5th Cir. June 10, 2024); Aguirre v. City of
San Antonio, 995 F.3d 395, 414 (5th Cir. 2021); Mason v. Lafayette City-Par.
Consol. Gov’t, 806 F.3d 268, 276–77 (5th Cir. 2015); Gaillard v. Commins, 562
F. App’x 870, 876–77 (11th Cir. 2014). She cites those authorities for the
proposition that Officer Mancias’s conduct constituted an “obvious”
constitutional violation under Garner. Sealey has identified no judicial
opinion—and we have found none—involving even remotely similar facts to
those presented here which would’ve placed Officer Mancias on notice that
his conduct violated a constitutional right. Nor does the rule of Garner,
discussed above, and that case’s progeny impel the conclusion that an officer
may not shove a fleeing suspect to the ground. Therefore, accepting Sealey’s
account of the facts, this case falls short of the “sky high” standard of
obviousness. 15 Because Sealey’s proffered right was not clearly established,
the district court properly concluded that Officer Mancias was shielded by
qualified immunity and dismissed the § 1983 claim against him.
III.
Sealey also raised a late challenge to the district court’s dismissal of
her Monell claim against the City in her reply brief. But because her opening
brief made no mention of that issue, she forfeited her opportunity to argue
against the dismissal of that claim. 16
_____________________
15
Joseph ex rel. Est. of Joseph v. Bartlett, 981 F.3d 319, 337 (5th Cir. 2020).
16
See, e.g., Guillot ex rel. T.A.G. v. Russell, 59 F.4th 743, 751 (5th Cir. 2023).
5
Case: 24-50998 Document: 69-1 Page: 6 Date Filed: 08/19/2025
No. 24-50998
IV.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
6