Golden v. Warden

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

SOUTH BEND DIVISION

TERRAL LERRON GOLDEN,

Petitioner,

v. CAUSE NO. 3:18-CV-385-PPS-JEM

WARDEN,

Respondent.

OPINION AND ORDER

Terral Golden, a prisoner without a lawyer, seeks habeas relief from his

conviction by a jury in St. Joseph Superior Court for murder and attempted murder. On

January 15, 2016, the St. Joseph Superior Court sentenced him to 105 years of

incarceration. Golden decided to represent himself at trial. The sole claim in his habeas

petition is that his waiver of trial counsel was not done knowingly and intelligently. The

claim has no merit. A review of the record shows that the state trial judge did a

commendable job in thoroughly ensuring that Golden understood the perils of his

choice to go it alone and that his decision to waive counsel was made knowingly and

voluntarily. Therefore, because there are no conceivable grounds for relief here,

Golden’s petition will be denied.

Background

The basic background facts were laid out by the Indiana Court of Appeals in the

direct appeal. See [DE 25-5]; Golden v. State, 68 N.E.3d 1130 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). In

summary, Golden was present at a drug house in St. Joseph County, Indiana when two

men arrived looking for a third person. A dispute erupted and Golden got in the

middle of it. Armed with a gun, Golden held the two visitors at bay pointing the gun at

them going back and forth between the two in what was described as an “eenie meenie

miney mo” sort of way. [DE 25-5 at 2]. Golden ended up shooting and killing one of the

two men who had arrived at the house. An eyewitness testified to personally seeing

Golden shoot the victim. [DE 29-6 at 135-136].

On May 23, 2018, Golden initiated this case by filing a habeas petition

challenging his conviction for murder and attempted murder in the St. Joseph Superior

Court. [DE 1]. On July 9, 2018, I stayed and statistically closed this case pursuant to

Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005), for the purpose of allowing Golden to complete his

post-conviction relief proceedings in State court. [DE 5]. I did not require him to file

periodic status reports but ordered him to notify the court within 30 days of the

conclusion of the State court proceedings. [Id.]

Four years later, on July 7, 2022, the court reviewed the electronic docket for the

State post-conviction proceeding and observed that no action had taken place in the

State case since January 7, 2021. [DE 6]. According to Rhines, “[a] mixed petition should

not be stayed indefinitely.” 544 U.S. at 277. Based on this dictate, I ordered Golden to

clarify whether he intended to continue pursuing post-conviction relief in State court or

whether he preferred to proceed in this federal case solely on his exhausted claims. [DE

6]. I also ordered Golden to account for the delay and to explain how he would proceed

in the event he intended to continue pursuing post-conviction relief in State court. [Id.]

Finally, I cautioned him that, if he did not respond by August 23, 2022, this case might

be dismissed without further notice. [Id.]

Golden did not respond to that order. Instead, the order was returned as

undeliverable, indicating that Golden had not promptly notified the court of his change

of address. [DE 7]. On September 7, 2022, I observed the inaction in this case and the

State case, the lack of a response to my prior order, and the lack of a current address,

and I concluded that Golden had abandoned this case. [DE 8]. Consequently, I

dismissed this case consistent with Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). [Id.]

Two years later, on September 11, 2024, Golden filed a motion to reopen this

case. [DE 11]. He explained that he understood my order staying this case as exempting

him from filing any status reports with this court until his State court proceedings had

concluded. He also explained that his State post-conviction proceedings had nearly

concluded and that he was awaiting a decision from the Indiana Supreme Court on his

petition to transfer. I expressed several substantial concerns with reopening this case,

but, in an abundance of caution toward Golden’s pro se status and his lengthy sentence,

I granted the motion to reopen without prejudice to any related objections raised by the

Warden. [DE 14].

Relief from Judgment Under Rule 60(b)

The Warden initially argues that I should not have allowed Golden to reopen this

case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). This rule authorizes me to relieve a

party from a final judgment based on: “(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable

neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have

been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether

previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an

opposing party; or . . . (6) any other reason that justifies relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).

“A motion under Rule 60(b) must be made within a reasonable time and for

reasons (1), (2), and (3) no more than a year after the entry of the judgment or order or

the date of the proceeding.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1). “[I]f the asserted ground for relief

falls within one of the enumerated grounds for relief subject to the one-year time limit

of Rule 60(b), relief under the residual provision of Rule 60(b)(6) is not available.”

Arrieta v. Battaglia, 461 F.3d 861, 865 (7th Cir. 2006). “To permit relief under the catchall

provision in such situations would render the one-year time limitation meaningless.” Id.

“Accordingly, [courts] have held that the first three clauses of Rule 60(b) and the

catchall clause are mutually exclusive.” Id.

The Warden’s argument here closely resembles my previously expressed

concerns. Significantly, while I had declined to require Golden to file status reports on a

periodic basis, I had not excused him from filing status reports when specifically

ordered to do so or from otherwise complying with court orders. This

misunderstanding might qualify as a mistake under Rule 60(b)(1), but Golden did not

file an appropriate motion within the one-year deadline set by Rule 60(c)(1), and the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure expressly prohibit me from extending the time to file a

motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(2).

Additionally, Golden declined to notify the court of a change of address for at least two

years and has provided no explanation for this delay. See Snyder v. Nolen, 380 F.3d 279,

285 (7th Cir. 2004) “[L]itigants, including prisoners, bear the burden of filing notice of a

change of address . . . .”); Tylicki v. Ryan, 244 F.R.D. 146, 147 (N.D. N.Y. 2006) (“The

demand that plaintiffs provide contact information is no esoteric rule of civil procedure,

but rather the obvious minimal requirement for pursuing a lawsuit.”).

In sum, Golden was not entitled to any relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Because

this case was properly dismissed for abandonment and should have remain closed, I

also cannot grant Golden habeas relief. Nevertheless, out of an abundance of caution

and for the sake of completeness, I will consider the merits of the sole habeas claim

presented in the amended habeas petition.

Timeliness

The Warden first argues that the petition is untimely, noting that Golden’s

conviction became final and that the one-year limitations period began to run on May

24, 2017. However, the Warden focuses on the date on which Golden filed the motion to

reopen rather than the date on which Golden filed the habeas petition initiating this

case on May 23, 2018. It is unclear why the motion to reopen date would be the

operative date, and the Warden cites no authority for this proposition. Though Golden

has since amended his petition, the initial petition includes his remaining denial of

appointed counsel claim, and so the relation-back doctrine applies. See Fed. R. Civ. P.

15(c)(1)(B). Because Golden filed the initial petition within one year of the date on

which his conviction became final, I find that the petition is timely.

On a related note, Golden asserts actual innocence to excuse the untimely and

procedurally defaulted nature of his petition, relying on McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S.

383, 386 (2013); House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 536–37 (2006). However, this assertion is moot

because I have found that his petition was timely, and the Warden did not assert

procedural default. Further, Golden could not have prevailed on his assertion of actual

innocence even if he intended it as a freestanding claim. In the traverse, Golden

elaborates that the reason for his assertion is that he was improperly denied trial

counsel. [DE 32 at 10-11]. But “actual innocence means factual innocence, not mere legal

insufficiency.” Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998). Therefore, even if

Golden intended to assert actual innocence as a freestanding claim, I could not grant

him habeas relief on that basis.

Waiver of Counsel Claim

Let’s begin by reviewing the standards that govern my decision making. Here’s

what the pertinent statute says:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect

to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings

unless the adjudication of the claim—

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The Supreme Court has made it clear that this standard is

“intentionally difficult to meet.” Woods v. Donald, 575 U.S. 312, 316 (2015). This means

that before I grant habeas relief, I have to be convinced that the application of supreme

court holdings by the state court was “objectively unreasonable, not merely wrong;

even clear error will not suffice.” Id. This is a tall order because “]f]ederal habeas review

. . . exists as a guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems,

not a substitute for ordinary error correction through appeal.” Id. Put another way, a

“state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so

long as fair-minded jurists could disagree on the correctness of the state court’s

decision.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011).

“The Sixth Amendment does not provide merely that a defense shall be made for

the accused; it grants to the accused personally the right to make his defense.” Faretta v.

California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 (1975). It is “undeniable that in most criminal prosecutions

defendants could better defend with counsel’s guidance than by their own unskilled

efforts.” Id. at 834. However, “where the defendant will not voluntarily accept

representation by counsel, the potential advantage of a lawyer’s training and experience

can be realized, if at all, only imperfectly.” Id. As the Supreme Court has explained: “To

force a lawyer on a defendant can only lead him to believe that the law contrives

against him. . . . [A]lthough he may conduct his own defense ultimately to his own

detriment, his choice must be honored out of that respect for the individual which is the

lifeblood of the law.” Id. (citation omitted).

To proceed pro se, the defendant must “knowingly and intelligently” waive the

right to counsel, acting in a manner that shows he “knows what he is doing” and made

his choice “with eyes open.” Id. at 835. In determining whether a defendant’s waiver

was knowing and intelligent, the court considers the extent of the warnings given by

the court as well as “other evidence in the record that establishes whether the defendant

understood the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation.” United States v.

Johnson, 980 F.3d 570, 577 (7th Cir. 2020); see also United States v. Eads, 729 F.3d 769, 775

(7th Cir. 2013) (“[O]ur task is to examine the record as a whole to see if [the defendant]

‘knowingly and intelligently’ waived his right to counsel.”). The court also considers

“the background and experience of the defendant” and “the context of the defendant’s

decision to waive his right to counsel.” Johnson, 980 F.3d at 577.

Golden argues that he is entitled to habeas relief because his waiver of trial

counsel was not knowing and intelligent. The trial transcript indicates that the trial

court interrogated and advised Golden against waiving his right to appointed trial

counsel on seven separate occasions. [DE 29-4; DE 29-5 at 15-24, 190-91]. On direct

appeal, Golden argued that the trial court did not sufficiently inquire into his

background, experience, and motivation before allowing him to waive trial counsel.

[DE 25-3 at 19-20]. In the direct appeal opinion, the Indiana Court of Appeals

meticulously laid out the relevant portions of transcript and addressed the waiver of

trial claim in a detailed 26-page opinion.1 [DE 25-5]; Golden v. State, 68 N.E.3d 1130 (Ind.

Ct. App. 2016). The appellate court noted the trial court’s thorough and repeated

warnings and found that Golden had knowingly and intelligently waived trial counsel.

Id.

1 Given the detailed nature of the direct appeal opinion, I see no utility in recounting the relevant

events in detail here.

After carefully reviewing the trial transcript and the direct appeal opinion, I

conclude that there is no basis for finding that the State court unreasonably applied

constitutional law or that it made an unreasonable determination of fact. The trial

court’s efforts at ensuring Golden’s waiver of trial counsel was knowing and intelligent

were exceedingly thorough. The State appellate court also expressly cited and

reasonably addressed each of the factors for assessing waivers of counsel set forth by

the Seventh Circuit. [DE 25-5 at 19-21].

In the amended petition, Golden asserts a narrower argument, which I will also

address. There, he contends that his motivation for waiving counsel was to obtain an

earlier trial setting, which he believed he needed in order to secure an earlier release

from custody and to assume the care of his child. He maintains that this motivation was

irrational because he had pending parole holds in other jurisdiction and would not have

been promptly released from custody even if he had been acquitted on the Indiana

charges of murder and attempted murder.

The problem with this argument is that Golden was presented with the fact that

he had pending parole holds on three separate occasions. [DE 29-4 at 27, 30-31, 37-39].

And, on the final occasion, Golden appeared to accept the potential consequences of the

parole holds, responding, “I got to take one at a time.” [Id. at 39]. While this response

might not reflect optimal judgment, it does reflect that Golden understood the risk that

he might not be promptly released from custody even if he obtained an acquittal. The

odds were certainly against Golden in his effort to quickly prevail in a series of criminal

proceedings, but they were greater than zero, and Golden had also expressed a

substantial interest in obtaining a quicker release from custody to care for his child.

Golden then reaffirmed his decision to waive counsel with the trial court on two more

occasions. [DE 29-5 at 15-24, 190-91]. Golden’s prior criminal history, which included

three felony convictions and three juvenile adjudications, also would have assisted him

in evaluating his decision and his chances of success in his criminal proceedings.

Consequently, it would be reasonable to conclude that Golden’s decision to proceed

without trial counsel was merely inadvisable, not irrational or otherwise indicative of

an unintelligent or unknowing waiver, so the argument presented in the amended

petition is without merit. In sum, the improper waiver of counsel claim is not a basis for

habeas relief.

Certificate of Appealability

Pursuant to Section 2254 Habeas Corpus Rule 11, I must grant or deny a

certificate of appealability. To obtain a certificate of appealability under 28 U.S.C. §

2253(c), the petitioner must make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional

right by establishing “that a reasonable jurist could debate whether (or, for that matter,

agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the

issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Slack v.

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). For the reasons explained in this order, there is no

basis for encouraging Golden to proceed further.

For these reasons, the court DENIES the amended habeas corpus petition [DE

20]; DENIES a certificate of appealability pursuant to Section 2254 Habeas Corpus Rule

11; and DIRECTS the clerk to enter judgment in favor of the Respondent and against

the Petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

ENTERED: August 15, 2025.

/s/ Philip P. Simon

PHILIP P. SIMON, JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT