“[W]e have never suggested that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation should be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel.”
How later courts described this case
- “[W]e have never suggested that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation should be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHEASTERN DIVISION
TYMESHA M. WATKINS, )
)
Plaintiffs, )
)
v. ) Case No.: 5:23-cv-1266-LCB
)
LANIER LAKES HOMEOWNERS )
ASSOCIATION, INC., )
)
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER
Tymesha Watkins, proceeding pro se, filed a complaint alleging that her
homeowners’ association, a property management company, several members of
the homeowners’ association board, and two previous tenants violated a bevy of
federal statutes including the Fair Housing Act, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, the Violence Against Women Act, and at least two additional state statutes.
(Doc. 1). She amended her complaint on December 8, 2023, but included only the
homeowners’ association as a defendant. (Doc. 5). Accordingly, the Court
terminated the other defendants as parties.
After the remaining Defendant, Lanier Lakes Homeowners Association,
Inc., (“the HOA”), filed a motion to dismiss, Watkins moved for leave to amend,
which the Court granted. She filed the operative complaint on September 14,
2024, and the HOA again moved to dismiss. (Doc. 30). For the reasons explained
below, the motion is due to be granted.
I. Watkins’s Allegations
Watkins purports to raise five claims in her second amended complaint. The
first count, entitled “The Defendant mismanaged funds,” alleges that the HOA
violated a state statute by assessing various penalties and late fees related to her
property without following proper procedures. Watkins also attempts to raise a
breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim, a Fair Debt Collections Practice Act claim, a
claim labeled, “Fair Housing Act Concerns,” and a bad faith claim. As with her
first claim, the remaining four claims also arise from her allegations regarding the
penalties, late fees, and resulting liens.
II. Watkins’s complaint is due to be dismissed because she failed to
respond to the HOA’s motion to dismiss.
First and foremost, the HOA’s motion to dismiss is due to be granted
because Watkins failed to respond to it. Instead, she filed a motion for entry of
default judgment in which she erroneously asserted that the HOA “failed to answer
or otherwise defend” against her complaint. (Doc. 31 at 1). The present motion
clearly refutes that claim. Watkins also filed a document entitled “Fraudulent
Paperwork Filed and Stay Request” in which she alleged that a “fraudulent Alias
Summons was filed” and that she notified the HOA that it was sending “responses”
to the wrong address. (Doc. 33). It’s unclear what summons and responses
Watkins is referring to. The Court does not find either of these filings to
constitute a response to the motion to dismiss because neither filing remotely
addresses any of the HOA’s grounds for dismissal.
The Court is mindful that “[p]ro se pleadings are held to a less stringent
standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally
construed.” Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998).
The principle underlying this liberal construction is “to give a pro se plaintiff a
break when, although he stumbles on a technicality, his pleading is otherwise
understandable.” Hudson v. McHugh, 148 F.3d 859, 864 (7th Cir. 1998).
However, such “leniency does not give a court license to serve as de facto counsel
for a party or to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an
action.” GJR Investments, Inc. v. County of Escambia, 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th
Cir. 1998), overruled in part on other grounds (internal citations omitted).
Moreover, “a litigant's pro se status in civil litigation generally will not excuse
mistakes he makes regarding procedural rules.” Thompson v. United States Marine
Corp., 398 Fed. Appx. 532, 535 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (citing McNeil v.
United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993) (“[W]e have never suggested that
procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation should be interpreted so as to excuse
mistakes by those who proceed without counsel.”)).
Pursuant to this Court’s initial order entered on August 14, 2024, a party’s
“[f]ailure to respond to a motion within twenty-one days will be construed as non-
opposition to the motion.” (Doc. 19 at 10). Thus, dismissal is warranted on that
basis alone.
III. Watkins’s claim is due to be dismissed pursuant to the doctrine of res
judicata.
Even if the Court ignores Watkins’s failure to respond, the HOA’s motion
would still be granted pursuant to the principles of res judicata. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has explained that “[t]he doctrine of res
judicata, or claim preclusion, bars the parties to an action from litigating claims
that were or could have been litigated in a prior action between the same parties.”
Lobo v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc., 704 F.3d 882, 892 (11th Cir. 2013). As in her
original complaint, Watkins has alleged several grievances with the HOA.
Specifically, she contends that the HOA mismanaged funds, breached its fiduciary
duty, violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, violated the Fair Housing
Act, and acted in bad faith. (Doc. 28 at 2-7). But each of Watkins’s allegations
share a common thread: they take issue with various monetary assessments, related
penalties, and resulting liens on her property.
The problem for Watkins is that her opportunity to challenge these
assessments and late fees has come and gone. On February 9, 2018, the HOA sued
Watkins in the Small Claims Court of Madison County, Alabama. 1 (Doc. 30 at 13-
15). In its complaint, the HOA alleged in pertinent part that Watkins failed to pay
an agreed-upon general assessment in the amount of $300. The HOA also alleged
that Watkins owed $300 in late fees and $751.25 in attorney’s fees and costs for a
total of $1,351.25.
The small claims court entered default judgment in favor of the HOA and
against Watkins on April 10, 2018. (Doc. 30 at 63). In its order, the court found
that Watkins “was duly served with the summons and complaint and, not being an
infant or an unrepresented incompetent person … failed to plead or otherwise
defend the action.” Id. It does not appear that Watkins attempted to appeal or
otherwise challenge the default judgment. Thus, any claims or arguments Watkins
had relating to these challenged assessments could have been, but were not,
addressed in that action.
The Eleventh Circuit has held that when “asked to give res judicata effect to
a state court judgment, [we] must apply the res judicata principles of the law of the
state whose decision is set up as a bar to further litigation.” Amey, Inc. v. Gulf
Abstract & Title, Inc., 758 F. 2d 1486, 1509 (11th Cir.1985) (quotation omitted).
11 “Federal Rule of Evidence 201 permits a court to ‘judicially notice a fact that is not subject to
reasonable dispute because it ... can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose
accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.’” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2). Paez v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't
of Corr., 947 F. 3d 649, 651 (11th Cir. 2020). Records from a state court proceeding meet this
requirement. The Court hereby takes judicial notice of Lanier Lakes Homeowners Association,
Inc. v. Tymesha Watkins, case number 47-SM-2018-900581.00, from the Small Claims Court of
Madison County, Alabama.
Because the HOA contends that an Alabama judgment bars this action, the res
judicata principles of Alabama apply. Under Alabama law, “the essential elements
of res judicata are (1) a prior judgment on the merits, (2) rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction, (3) with substantial identity of the parties, and (4) with the
same cause of action presented in both actions.” Equity Res. Mgmt., Inc. v. Vinson,
723 So. 2d 634, 636 (Ala.1998). If all four elements are met, any claim that was,
or could have been, adjudicated in the prior action is barred from future litigation.
Id.
The first three elements are clearly met. The Alabama Supreme Court has
held that “a default judgment constitutes a ‘prior judgment on the merits’ for
purposes of res judicata.” Phillips v. Montoya, 253 So. 3d 438, 441 (Ala. Civ.
App. 2017), citing McDonald v. U.S. Die Casting & Dev. Co., 628 So.2d 433,
433–34 (Ala. 1993). Regarding the second element, the small claims court was
one of competent jurisdiction to hear a dispute over $1,351.25. See Ala. Code §
12-12-31(a) (“The district court shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over all civil
actions in which the matter in controversy, exclusive of interest and costs, does not
exceed six thousand dollars ($6,000). These actions shall be placed on a small
claims docket by each district court….”). As to the third element, the parties in
each action are identical.
The Court also finds that the same cause of action was presented in both
cases. The Eleventh Circuit has noted:
Alabama uses the “substantial evidence” test to determine whether
two causes of action are the same for res judicata purposes. [Equity
Res. Mgmt., Inc. v. Vinson, 723 So. 2d 634, 637 (Ala.1998)]. Under
this test, res judicata applies when the same evidence substantially
supports both actions. Id. As the Supreme Court of Alabama has
explained:
[i]t is well-settled that the principal test for comparing
causes of action for the application of res judicata is
whether the primary right and duty or wrong are the same
in each action. Res judicata applies not only to the exact
legal theories advanced in the prior case, but to all legal
theories and claims arising out of the same nucleus of
operative facts.
Kizzire v. Baptist Health Sys., Inc., 441 F.3d 1306, 1308–09 (11th Cir. 2006)
(internal citations omitted). All of Watkins’s claims in the present case arise out of
the same nucleus of operative facts, i.e., her alleged violations of the HOA’s
declarations and the resulting assessments, late fees, attorney’s fees, court costs,
and liens against her property. Watkins could have litigated these issues in the
small claims court action but failed to do so. Accordingly, her claims in the
present case are barred by the doctrine of res judicata and are due to be dismissed.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the HOA’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 30) is
GRANTED, and this case is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. A separate,
final judgment will be entered.
DONE and ORDERED August 18, 2025.
Ah
LILES C. BURKE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE