Charlton-Perkins v. University Of Cincinnati

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION

MARK CHARLTON-PERKINS, : Case No. 1:20-cv-179

:

Plaintiff, : Judge Timothy S. Black

:

vs. :

:

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI, et al., :

:

Defendants. :

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND

DISMISSING THE CASE

This civil action is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment (Doc. 50) and the parties’ responsive memoranda (Docs. 52, 53). Also before

the Court are Defendants’ Proposed Undisputed Facts (Doc. 50-1), as well as Plaintiff’s

Response to Defendants’ Proposed Undisputed Facts (Doc. 52-1).

I. BACKGROUND

On March 2, 2020, Plaintiff Mark Charlton-Perkins (“Plaintiff”) brought this civil

action against Defendants University of Cincinnati (“UC”), Kenneth Petren (“Dr.

Petren”),1 and George Uetz (“Dr. Uetz”) (collectively, “Defendants”). (Doc. 1). Against

UC, Plaintiff asserts a claim under Title IX, 20 U.S.C. § 1861, alleging failure-to-hire

based on gender discrimination; and against Drs. Petren and Uetz, Plaintiff asserts a 42

1 Plaintiff’s Complaint, First Amended Complaint, and response in opposition to the motion for

summary judgment, misspell Dr. Petren’s name as “Petron.” (Docs. 1 and 8). The Court will

use the correct spelling in this Order.

U.S.C. § 1983 claim alleging gender-based discrimination in violation of the Equal

Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. (Doc. 1). On May 12, 2020, in

response to Defendants’ first motion to dismiss, Plaintiff filed a First Amended

Complaint. (Doc. 8).2

A. Undisputed Material Facts3

UC’s Biological Sciences Department (the “Biology Department”) is an academic

unit within the College of Arts and Sciences (the “College”). (Doc. 50 at 3). Dr. Uetz

served as Head of the Biology Department from 2015 to 2018, and was therefore

responsible for overseeing the administration of the Biology Department, including

supervising faculty and staff hiring. (Doc. 50-1, ¶¶ 1, 2). Dr. Uetz reported to Dr. Petren,

who served as the Dean of the College from 2015 to 2019. (Id. at ¶¶ 3, 4). As Dean, Dr.

Petren was responsible for approving hires and also had sole authority to cancel a search.

(Id. at ¶¶ 5, 6).

Each year, the academic units within the College evaluate their staffing needs and

submit hiring proposals to the Dean. (Id. at ¶ 7). In the Biology Department, once the

Dean approves a hiring proposal, the Department Head appoints departmental faculty

2 The First Amended Complaint included additional background allegations and clarifications

but did not amend the claims. (Doc 8 at ¶¶ 22, 25).

3 Specific citations to the record for these findings of undisputed fact are found in Defendants’

motion (Doc. 50), Plaintiff’s response in opposition (Doc. 52), Defendants’ Proposed Undisputed

Facts (Doc. 50-1), and Plaintiff’s response to Defendants’ proposed facts (Doc. 52-1). The Court

further supplemented the facts with direct citations to the depositions, where appropriate.

Additionally, the Court notes that in Plaintiff’s response to Defendants’ proposed facts, many of

the objections are as to the form of the statement or to word choice. For purposes of this Order,

the Court adopts and includes those facts in substance, but has edited the phrasing to resolve the

objection.

members to serve on a search committee, including a committee chair. (Id. at ¶ 8). The

search committee refines the job advertisement, solicits and reviews applications,

interviews candidates, ranks candidates, and provides a hiring recommendation to the

Department Head. (Id. at ¶ 9). The Department Head then shares the search committee’s

findings and presents a recommendation to the Dean. (Id. at ¶ 10).

Consistent with this process, in September 2017, the Biology Department began a

search to hire an Assistant Professor of Cell Biology. (Id. at ¶ 12). Dr. Uetz appointed

Dr. Elke Buschbeck, a full professor in the Biology Department, as chair of the search

committee. (Id. at ¶ 13). Dr. Uetz also appointed Joshua Benoit, Joshua Gross, and

Dennis Grogan to serve on the committee. (Id. at ¶ 14). At the time, Dr. Benoit was an

Assistant Professor, Dr. Gross was an Associate Professor, and Dr. Grogan was a full

Professor. (Id. at ¶ 15). A graduate student was also selected to serve on the search

committee, but was a non-voting member. (Id. at ¶ 16).

Over 60 individuals applied for the Assistant Professor of Cell Biology position.

(Id. at ¶ 17). One of those applicants was Plaintiff Mark Charlton-Perkins, Ph.D. (Id. at

¶ 19).

Plaintiff is a United States citizen who, in 2017, was employed as a Research

Associate at the University of Cambridge in the United Kingdom (the “U.K.”). (Doc. 8

at ¶ 1; Doc. 52 at 5). Plaintiff had previously spent several years working at the

Cincinnati Children’s Hospital Medical Center before attending graduate school at the

University of Cincinnati and receiving his Ph.D. in Molecular and Developmental

Biology in 2014. (Doc. 52 at 4-5). He accepted the position at the University of

Cambridge after graduating, but maintained professional contact and friendships with

faculty and staff at Cincinnati Children’s Hospital and UC. (Id. at 5). Specifically, one

of Plaintiff’s Cincinnati contacts was Dr. Buschbeck. (Id.) During Plaintiff’s final year

in graduate school, he spent several hours per week working in Dr. Buschbeck’s lab, and

Dr. Buschbeck also served on Plaintiff’s thesis committee. (Doc. 27 at 8-9, 27). And

following his graduation, Plaintiff and Dr. Buschbeck continued to collaborate, including

coauthoring two academic papers togethers in 2017. (Doc. 52 at 5). Beyond professional

collaboration, Plaintiff and Dr. Buschbeck also maintained a personal friendship and

socialized together on a number of occasions. (Doc. 50-1, ¶ 24; Doc. 27 at 66-67, 77-81;

Doc. 31 at 49-51, 154-57).

On October 11, 2017, Dr. Buschbeck (who was then chair of the search

committee) forwarded the faculty position opening to Plaintiff and suggested that he

apply. (Doc. 27 at 18-19; Doc. 31 at 36). Dr. Buschbeck explained during her deposition

that it was common practice for faculty members to share open positions with colleagues

at other institutions, and that there was no rule prohibiting her, as chair of the search

committee, from doing so. (Doc. 31 at 37, 210-211).

On December 1, 2017, the search committee whittled down the list of applicants to

nine candidates—Plaintiff was one of them. (Doc. 50-1 at ¶ 19). The search committee

then conducted Skype interviews with the nine individuals. (Doc. 50 at 4).

On December 12, 2017, after several Skype interviews had taken place, including

Plaintiff’s, Dr. Buschbeck emailed the College’s Director of Graduate Student

Recruitment in Access and Diversity, Marilyn Kershaw, to inquire regarding whether Dr.

Buschbeck’s connection to Plaintiff would be considered a conflict of interest. (Doc. 50-

1, ¶ 21). Specifically, Dr. Buschbeck’s email to Ms. Kershaw stated: “One of the

candidates that made it to our top 9 list is one of my collaborators (at least we recently

published a paper together). Does this count as a conflict of interest? If so how should we

proceed?” (Id. at ¶ 22). Ms. Kershaw responded: “I would not say that it is a conflict of

interest as it can be expected that faculty may know one another in the discipline. Let the

committee members know your connection to the candidate and proceed as you would

with any other finalist.” (Id. at ¶ 23). Dr. Buschbeck told Ms. Kershaw that the search

committee was aware of Dr. Buschbeck’s connection to Plaintiff. (Id. at ¶ 25). Dr.

Buschbeck continued to serve as chair of the search committee and participated fully in

discussions and decisions regarding the candidates, including Plaintiff. (Id. at ¶ 27).

On December 14, 2017, the search committee narrowed the candidates down to

five finalists, all of whom were invited to the campus for a final, in-person round of

interviews, which interviews took place in February 2018. (Id. at ¶¶ 28, 31). Plaintiff

was one of the final five. (Id. at ¶ 29). However, one of the five finalists declined the

invitation, thereby leaving four candidates who attended the final February 2018

interviews—two women and two men (one of whom was Plaintiff). (Id. at ¶¶ 29-31).

The February 2018 final interviews consisted of meetings with the search

committee, the Head of the Department, and other faculty members. (Doc. 27 at 30-31).

Additionally, the candidates were asked to give a one-hour long seminar on a topic of

their choosing, which seminar was open to students and faculty. (Id.) After each

candidate’s visit, the search committee solicited feedback from faculty members and

students. (Doc. 31 at 172-73). Based on the evidence before the Court, the faculty and

student feedback shows Plaintiff received generally unfavorable reviews. (Doc. 31 at

101-02, 173-82, Exs. 34-37, 44-47). Specifically, Plaintiff was ranked the least favored

of the four candidate among the students. (Id. at 101-02, Ex. 35). Additionally, Dr.

Buschbeck received emails from faculty members (who were not on the search

committee), many of whom expressed concerns and negative opinions regarding

Plaintiff’s seminar presentation, his demeanor, and the suitability of his research for the

Department. (Id. at 173-82, Exs. 34, 44-47). Dr. Buschbeck consistently replied to this

negative feedback in Plaintiff’s defense. (Id.)

On February 21, 2018, after all in-person interviews were completed, the search

committee, along with Dr. Uetz, met to discuss the committee’s recommendation. (Doc.

50-1, ¶ 32). At that time, each of the search committee members selected a different

candidate as their top pick (Dr. Buschbeck’s top choice being Plaintiff). (Id. at ¶¶ 33-37).

Accordingly, Dr. Buschbeck asked each committee member to make a case for their top-

ranked candidate. (Id. at ¶ 38). During the discussion, the search committee recognized

the other male candidate (not Plaintiff) was the least preferred overall, so agreed to

remove him from the running. (Id. at ¶ 39). Dr. Uetz listened to everyone present their

case and took notes of the discussion. (Id. at ¶ 40). Seeing no consensus on a top

recommendation, the committee agreed to break for the day. (Id. at ¶ 41).

On February 23, 2018, the search committee reconvened and voted again,

resulting in a 3-1 vote in favor of Plaintiff as the top candidate. (Id. at ¶ 42).4 Dr.

Buschbeck shared with Dr. Uetz the search committee’s 3-1 vote recommending

Plaintiff. (Id. at ¶ 45).

On February 27, 2018, Dr. Uetz met with Dr. Petren to discuss the search

committee’s recommendation. (Id. at ¶ 46). During the meeting, Dr. Uetz asked Dr.

Petren whether it was permissible to hire a male candidate for the position when there

were two equally-qualified female candidates; Dr. Petren stated that it was permissible.

(Id. at ¶¶ 48-49; Doc. 29 at 47).5 Additionally, Dr. Uetz raised a separate issue with Dr.

Petren regarding a possible conflict of interest in the search committee. (Doc. 29 at 49).

Specifically, after Dr. Uetz received the committee’s final recommendation, but prior to

his meeting with Dr. Petren (i.e., sometime between February 23 and February 27, 2018),

two non-committee faculty members approached Dr. Uetz to express concern over Dr.

Buschbeck’s apparent conflict of interest and her bias in favor of Plaintiff. (Doc. 50-1,

¶¶ 50-53; Doc. 29 at 49-52).6 In his deposition, Dr. Uetz stated that, “even though [he]

4 The Graduate Student Representative was present and cast a vote for one of the female

candidates; however, as previously determined by the committee, the student vote was not

counted. (See Doc. 50-1, ¶¶ 16, 44).

5 In his deposition, Dr. Uetz explained that he wanted to know whether the College of Arts and

Sciences had any diversity hiring policies or practices that would require reconsideration of the

committee’s recommendation. (Doc. 29 at 47).

6 In his deposition, Dr. Uetz stated that, during the February 21, 2018 committee meeting, he too

had sensed Dr. Buschbeck was “very enthusiastic about [Plaintiff’s] candidacy,” to the extent

that it prompted him to inquire of Dr. Buschbeck whether she had spoken with Ms. Kershaw

regarding a potential conflict of interest. (Doc. 29 at 52).

was planning to recommend [Plaintiff] as the candidate, [he] felt an obligation to raise

those issues of [alleged] impropriety” to Dr. Petren. (Doc. 29 at 51; Doc. 50-1, ¶ 55;

Doc. 52-1 at 2). Dr. Petren then instructed Dr. Uetz to investigate and find out if other

faculty shared similar concerns. (Doc. 50-1, ¶ 56).

As Dr. Petren directed, Dr. Uetz proceeded to talk to additional faculty, including

one of the search committee members—Dr. Gross. (Id. at ¶ 57). Dr. Gross advised that

he felt Dr. Buschbeck had bullied the junior faculty on the search committee to get them

to vote a certain way. (Id. at ¶ 58). Further, Dr. Gross felt there was a conflict of interest

relating to Dr. Buschbeck and Plaintiff and advised that he (Dr. Gross) was

uncomfortable with the search process. (Id. at ¶ 59). Dr. Gross reported his concerns to

Dr. Bruce Jayne, Assistant Head of the Biology Department. (Id. at ¶ 60). In addition,

Dr. Jayne had heard from other faculty members regarding concerns with Dr.

Buschbeck’s conduct during the search (notably, regarding Dr. Buschbeck’s defense of

Plaintiff in response to negative feedback). (Id. at ¶ 61; Doc. 45 at 9-11). Dr. Jayne

reported these concerns to Dr. Uetz. (Doc. 50-1 at ¶ 61). Ultimately, approximately six

faculty members expressed to Dr. Uetz their concerns about Dr. Buschbeck’s prior

collaboration with Plaintiff and her advocacy for Plaintiff during the search process. (Id.

at ¶ 62).

On March 2, 2018, Dr. Uetz met with Dr. Petren to share what he had learned

during his investigation. (Id. at ¶ 63). In his deposition, Dr. Petren, in reference to this

second meeting, stated: “At the point after bringing this other information in, I said, I’m

going to have a hard time. I don’t think we should make the offer to [Plaintiff].” (Doc.

49 at 19). Dr. Petren also stated in his deposition that, during the second meeting, he and

Dr. Uetz discussed the option of hiring one of the other candidates instead. (Id.)

On March 4, 2018, Dr. Uetz emailed the search committee, stating: “Based on

multiple factors, [Dr. Petren] recommended that the most appropriate course of action

was to focus on the women candidates first.” (Id. at ¶¶ 70, 71; Doc. 29-19 at 3). In the

email, Dr. Uetz then asked the search committee to contact the two female candidates to

determine their availability and continued interest. (Id.) The email does not specify the

“multiple factors” referenced, nor does it make mention of the conflict of interest.

On March 5, 2018, Dr. Buschbeck responded to Dr. Uetz’s email, questioning why

the search committee’s recommendation was not being followed. (Doc. 29-19 at 2-3).

Dr. Buschbeck further stated her opinion that “[p]utting the two lower ranked candidates

up first is not only against the recommendation of the committee, but also plain

discrimination.” (Id.) Dr. Uetz responded to this email, explaining that, inter alia, the

search committee’s vote was not unanimous; while Plaintiff received three committee

votes (after an initial impasse), one of the female candidates was favored by the fourth

search committee member, the student representative, and the faculty at large; that both

female candidates had received higher average scores from the faculty than Plaintiff; and

that the search committee’s role in the hiring process is advisory to the Department Head

and the Dean. (Id. at 1-2).

On March 8, 2018, Dr. Buschbeck (who, by this point, had learned of the concerns

regarding a conflict of interest) met with Dr. Petren and Dr. Margaret Hanson (the

Associate Dean for Natural Sciences in the College of Arts and Sciences) regarding the

search, the conflict of interest concerns, and avenues for possibly salvaging the search

process. (Id.; Doc. 31 at 127, 132-33; Doc. 31-15 at 1-2; Doc. 47 at 8). That same day, a

full faculty meeting was also held, during which the status of the search was discussed.

(Doc. 50-1, ¶ 75). During this time, there was discord among the faculty as a result of the

search. (Id. at ¶ 78). At the faculty meeting, Dr. Buschbeck addressed the faculty and

spoke in defense of her conduct during the search process. (Id. at ¶ 75). After the faculty

meeting, a faculty member sent an email to Dr. Uetz reiterating his concerns with the

search. (Id. at ¶ 76-77).

On March 13, 2018, Dr. Petren informed the faculty that he had canceled the

search. (Id. at ¶ 95). On March 21, 2018, Dr. Petren met with the Biology Department

faculty to explain the cancelation and answer questions. (Id. at ¶ 96). During his meeting

with the faculty, Dr. Petren stated that concerns of a conflict of interest had come up

during the search, that the conflict of interest had not been handled appropriately by all

parties involved (including his office), and that the circumstances had ultimately created

a contentious situation in which the search process could no longer be salvaged. (Doc.

29-7). During his deposition, Dr. Petren offered the same explanation for canceling the

search. (Doc. 49 at 19-20).

Dr. Petren intended to approve the Biology Department for another hire the

following year. (Doc. 50-1 at ¶ 98). But the focus of a new search is based on proposals

from the faculty, and Dr. Petren’s role is to consider those proposals. (Id. at ¶¶ 99-100).

By the following year, the Biology Department’s needs had shifted. (Id. at ¶ 101). The

Associate Professor in Cell Biology position was never reposted. (Id. at ¶ 103). Dr.

Petren is no longer the Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences; and Dr. Uetz is no

longer the Head of the Department of Biological Sciences. (Id. at ¶¶ 104-105).

Two years after the cancelation of the job search, Plaintiff brought this civil

action, alleging that Defendants refused to hire him due to his gender, in violation of Title

IX and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. (Doc. 8).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A motion for summary judgment should be granted if the evidence submitted to

the court demonstrates that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact, and that

the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see Celotex

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

242, 247-48 (1986). The moving party has the burden of showing the absence of genuine

disputes over facts which, under the substantive law governing the issue, might affect the

outcome of the action. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. All facts and inferences must be

construed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Matsushita Elec.

Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

A party opposing a motion for summary judgment “may not rest upon the mere

allegations or denials of his pleading, but … must set forth specific facts showing that

there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248 (1986) (emphasis added).

“[T]here is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving

party for a jury to return a verdict for that party.” Id. at 249 (emphasis added).

III. ANALYSIS

Defendants move for summary judgment as to all claims against Defendants.

(Doc. 50). Specifically, Defendants argue that: (a) Eleventh Amendment immunity bars

Plaintiff’s Equal Protection claim against Drs. Petren and Uetz in their official capacities;

(b) Plaintiff fails to assert any cognizable claims against Drs. Petren and Uetz in their

personal capacities and both are entitled to qualified immunity; (c) Plaintiff’s claim

against UC fails because Plaintiff was not living in the United States at the time of his

interview and, therefore, Title IX does not apply; and (d) all claims fail on the merits

because Defendants have articulated a non-discriminatory reason for cancelling the job

search and Plaintiff cannot show that the reason is merely a pretext.

A. Eleventh Amendment Immunity as to the Equal Protection Claim

Defendant argues that Eleventh Amendment immunity bars Plaintiff’s Equal

Protection claim against Drs. Petren and Uetz in their official capacities, and that the Ex

Parte Young exception does not apply given the nature of the relief Plaintiff seeks (i.e.,

“instatement” to the UC faculty as a professor). (Doc. 50 at 12-14).

The Eleventh Amendment bars “any suit in law or equity, commenced or

prosecuted against one of the United States.” U.S. Const. amend. XI. The Eleventh

Amendment also extends to bar “suits for monetary relief against state officials sued in

their official capacity.” Thiokol Corp. v. Dep’t of Treasury, State of Mich., Revenue Div.,

987 F.2d 376, 381 (6th Cir. 1993).

However, in Ex Parte Young, the Supreme Court established an exception to this

immunity for state officials, such that the Eleventh Amendment “does not preclude

actions against state officials sued in their official capacity for prospective injunctive or

declaratory relief.” Thiokol, 987 F.2d at 381 (citing Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123

(1908)) (emphasis added). Simply put, the Ex Parte Young exception to Eleventh

Amendment immunity “rests on the premise … that when a federal court commands a

state official to do nothing more than refrain from violating federal law, [the state

official] is not the State for sovereign-immunity purposes.” Virginia Off. for Prot. &

Advoc. v. Stewart, 563 U.S. 247, 255 (2011) (citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v.

Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101 (1984)).

“In determining whether the doctrine of Ex parte Young avoids an Eleventh

Amendment bar to suit, a court need only conduct a ‘straightforward inquiry into whether

[the] complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly

characterized as prospective.’” Verizon Maryland, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of

Maryland, 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002) (quoting Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521

U.S. 261, 296 (1997)). And, in that regard, the Sixth Circuit has held that “claims for

reinstatement are prospective in nature and appropriate subjects for Ex parte Young

actions.” Diaz v. Michigan Dep’t of Corr., 703 F.3d 956, 964 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting

Carten v. Kent State Univ., 282 F.3d 391, 396 (6th Cir. 2002)) (emphasis added).

Notably, however, the Eleventh Amendment still bars a suit against a state official

if “the state is the real, substantial party in interest.” Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 101 (quoting

Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945)). “The general

rule is that a suit is against the sovereign if the judgment sought would expend itself on

the public treasury or domain, or interfere with the public administration, … or if the

effect of the judgment would be ‘to restrain the Government from acting, or to compel it

to act.” Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 620 (1963) (internal quotations and citations

omitted); see also Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974) (“a suit by private parties

seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in the state treasury is

barred by the Eleventh Amendment”).

Here, while “claims for reinstatement are prospective in nature,” Plaintiff cannot

seek “reinstatement” because he did not receive, nor has he ever held, the faculty position

for which he applied. See Diaz, 703 F.3d at 964. Rather, Plaintiff seeks “instatement” in

the first instance to a position that he believes he was unlawfully denied. To complicate

the matter, however, the position was never filled by anyone and was ultimately

cancelled. In other words, Plaintiff asks to be given a job that does not currently exist.

Thus, the relief Plaintiff seeks would require the University of Cincinnati (a public

institution) to create and fully fund a new position just for Plaintiff, based on the

argument that the job’s non-existence is the result of Drs. Petren and Uetz’s alleged prior

discriminatory conduct. But Drs. Petren and Uetz do not have the authority to create new

positions, nor are they responsible for funding the faculty.7 Therefore, the entirety of the

burden would be borne by the University of Cincinnati and, by extension, the State and

the public.

7 As Defendants note in their reply brief, the University’s Board of Trustees is responsible for

determining the availability and compensation of faculty positions. (Doc. 53 at 14) (citing Ohio

Rev. Code § 3361.03 (“The board of trustees of the university of Cincinnati shall employ, fix the

compensation of, and remove the president and such number of professors, teachers, and other

employees, as may be deemed necessary”)).

To be sure, as the Supreme Court explained in Edelman, a proper claim under the

Ex Parte Young exception could result in a monetary loss, such as when “fiscal

consequences to state treasuries [are] the necessary result of compliance with decrees

which by their terms were prospective in nature.” 415 U.S. at 667-68. But Edelman

distinguishes such a necessary expenditure from the notion of “equitable restitution,” i.e.,

“a monetary loss resulting from a past breach of a legal duty on the part of the defendant

state officials.” Id. at 668. And, here, Plaintiff’s claim falls into the latter category. That

is, there is no continuing violation to enjoin. There is merely the allegation of a past

wrong that Plaintiff seeks to rectify at the University’s expense. Thus, Plaintiff’s claim is

not prospective in nature, and the Ex Parte Young does not apply.

Accordingly, Eleventh Amendment immunity bars Plaintiff’s Equal Protection

claim against Drs. Petren and Uetz in their official capacities.

B. Qualified Immunity as to the Equal Protection Claim

Defendants further argue that qualified immunity shields Drs. Petren and Uetz

against the Equal Protection claim in their personal capacities because Plaintiff fails to

demonstrate discriminatory intent or the violation of a clearly established right. (Doc. 50

at 20-21).

“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials ‘from liability

for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Pearson v.

Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818

(1982)). Thus, in resolving a qualified immunity claim, the Court must undertake a two-

step inquiry: (1) whether “the facts that a plaintiff has alleged … or shown … make out a

violation of a constitutional right”; and (2) “if the plaintiff has satisfied this first step, the

court must decide whether the right at issue was ‘clearly established’ at the time of

defendant’s alleged misconduct.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232 (internal citations omitted).

“On a summary judgment motion, the burden is on the plaintiff to satisfy both prongs.”

Sexton v. Cernuto, 18 F.4th 177, 184 (6th Cir. 2021) (citing Bunkley v. City of Detroit,

902 F.3d 552, 559 (6th Cir. 2018)) (emphasis added).

As the Court discusses in Section III.D., infra, while Plaintiff can show that

candidates’ genders were referenced and the faculty’s gender-balance was discussed

during the search process, Plaintiff fails to show that gender discrimination motivated

either the decision not to award him the position or the cancelation of the search. Thus,

the Court cannot conclude that Plaintiff has met his burden at the first-stage of the

analysis.

Moreover, even if Plaintiff’s allegations and evidence were sufficient to establish

the violation of a constitutional right, Plaintiff fails to evidence that the right was “clearly

established.” Specifically, Plaintiff argues that “it is well-settled case law in this Circuit

that gender discrimination and reverse gender discrimination is unlawful, and the cases so

holding are legion.” (Doc. 52 at 33). However, in undertaking a qualified immunity

analysis, the Court must ensure that the constitutional right in question is “[d]efined at the

appropriate level of generality—a reasonably particularized one.” Hagans v. Franklin

Cnty. Sheriff's Off., 695 F.3d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 2012) (emphasis added). Indeed, “[i]n

deciding whether a right has been clearly established, the Supreme Court has ‘repeatedly’

warned lower courts not to define the right at ‘a high level of generality.’” Id. at 508

(quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011)). Thus, turning back to the instant

case, “[t]he pertinent question is not whether the law banning discrimination on the basis

of sex is clearly established, but a more nuanced one….” Yerkes v. Ohio State Highway

Patrol, No. 22-3030, 2022 WL 17753528, at *5 (6th Cir. Dec. 19, 2022) (emphasis

added).

Here, following a prolonged interview process with multiple candidates, the search

committee narrowed its list of finalists to three individuals—one male (Plaintiff) and two

females—and ultimately settled on recommending Plaintiff for the faculty position. Drs.

Petren and Uetz consulted with one another regarding the recommendation and the search

process, after which Dr. Petren briefly considered hiring the other two candidates

instead—both of whom were female (the search committee had already excluded all

male candidates other than Plaintiff). Dr. Petren’s consideration of the other two

candidates in lieu of Plaintiff led to Dr. Buschbeck raising concerns of gender

discrimination, whereas other faculty members questioned Dr. Buschbeck’s investment in

and bias for Plaintiff. Ultimately, Dr. Petren made the decision to halt the hiring

process—a decision that eventually became permanent when the open position was

canceled altogether.

Therefore, the question here is, whether it is a clearly established constitutional

violation to stop and ultimately cancel a contentious hiring process after allegations of

gender discrimination are raised. Plaintiff does not provide citation to any case law to

answer this question in the affirmative, nor has the Court found any sufficiently similar

cases.8

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not met his burden to show the

violation of a clearly established constitutional right and, accordingly, qualified immunity

shields Drs. Petren and Uetz against the Equal Protection claim in their personal

capacities.

C. Title IX’s Applicability

Pursuant to Title IX: “No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be

excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to

discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial

assistance….” 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). Thus, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s Title IX

claim against UC fails because Title IX, by its plain language, applies only to individuals

“in the United States,” whereas Plaintiff was residing in the U.K. at the time the job

search was canceled. (Doc. 50 at 14). The Court finds Defendants interpretation of the

language would frustrate the purpose of the legislation and invite arbitrary inconsistency

in the application of the law.

8 There is, however, ample case law establishing that judgment in favor of an employer is proper

on an employment discrimination claim when the employer makes a “reasonably informed and

considered decision” to take adverse employment action based on the employer’s “honest belief”

in a nondiscriminatory basis for the adverse action, even if the basis for the decision is “later

shown to be mistaken, foolish, trivial, or baseless.” E.g., Hardesty v. Kroger Co., 758 F. App’x

490, 493 (6th Cir. 2019); Tingle v. Arbors at Hilliard, 692 F.3d 523, 530-31 (6th Cir. 2012);

Chen v. Dow Chem. Co., 580 F.3d 394, 401 (6th Cir. 2009); Braithwaite v. Timken Co., 258 F.3d

488, 494 (6th Cir. 2001).

“Congress enacted Title IX in 1972 with two principal objectives in mind: ‘[T]o

avoid the use of federal resources to support discriminatory practices’ and ‘to provide

individual citizens effective protection against those practices.’” Gebser v. Lago Vista

Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 286 (1998) (quoting Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441

U.S. 677, 702 (1979)). Moreover, Title IX was enacted under Congress’ Spending

Clause powers and, therefore, the legislation operates by “conditioning an offer of federal

funding on a promise by the recipient not to discriminate, in what amounts essentially to

a contract between the Government and the recipient of funds.” Cummings v. Premier

Rehab Keller, P.L.L.C., 596 U.S. 212, 219 (2022) (quoting Gebser, 524 U.S. at 286). In

other words, “in return for federal funds, the [recipients] agree to comply with federally

imposed conditions,” which, in the context of Title IX, means that the entity accepting

federal funding “voluntarily and knowingly” agrees to refrain from discriminatory

practices. Cummings, 596 U.S. at 219 (quoting Pennhurst State School and Hospital v.

Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981); Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 186 (2002)).

Speaking in terms of the Supreme Court’s analogy, UC is (as it acknowledges),

generally, a party to the Title IX “contract.” (See Doc. 53 at 4). Further, here, all

relevant decisions were made within the United States; which decisions, in turn, affected

Plaintiff, who is a United States citizen. And while the Court acknowledges that Title

IX’s language prohibits discrimination against a “person in the United States,” it bears

noting that the language does not specify the need to reside in the United States. Thus,

Defendants’ argument relies on the notion that Title IX’s application hinges upon a

plaintiff’s physical location at the precise moment a cause of action arises. But, as the

Supreme Court has stated, the purpose of Title IX, is to “avoid the use of federal

resources to support discriminatory practices’ and ‘to provide individual citizens effective

protection against those practices.’” Gebser, 524 U.S. at 286. Allowing Title IX’s

protection to be turned on and off based on nothing more than where a plaintiff happens

to be located at any given moment would severely undermine the purposes of the

legislation.

Moreover, adopting such an interpretation would result in arbitrary and

inconsistent applications of the law. For example, if, after his interview, Plaintiff had

opted to stay in the United States for a few weeks and visit family before returning to the

U.K., Defendants’ argument would be moot because Plaintiff would have been “in the

United States.” On the other hand, if, hypothetically, a plaintiff resided in the United

States but traveled abroad for even a single day, and that day happened to be when a

discriminatory decision was made, that plaintiff would lose protection under Title IX.

In support of its argument, the defense cites to two cases—Ofori-Tenkorang v.

American International Grp., Inc., 460 F.3d 296 (2nd Cir. 2006) and Rodrigues v. Martin

Marietta Corp., No. 86-8403, 1987 WL 44766 (6th Cir. Sept. 16, 1987). The Court finds

neither case persuasive in this context.

To start, both of Defendants’ cited cases involve claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981,

which statute provides that “[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall

have the same right in every State and Territory … as is enjoyed by white citizens ….”

42 U.S.C. § 1981(a). Thus, unlike Title IX, the language of § 1981 quite expressly and

repeatedly delineates the jurisdictional boundaries the law’s protections.

Additionally, both of Defendants’ cited cases involved conduct that occurred

outside the United States. In Ofori-Tenkorang, the plaintiff alleged that his employer

(based in Connecticut and London) subjected him to racial discrimination; however, the

plaintiff was living and working in South Africa at the time, and the alleged

discrimination consistently arose from or resulted in acts that occurred in South Africa.

460 F.3d at 299. Similarly, Rodrigues involved “a Brazilian national employed, and later

laid off, in Brazil, by a Brazilian subsidiary of a United States corporation ….” 1987 WL

44766 at *1. In both cases, the Second and the Sixth Circuits rejected plaintiffs’

arguments that § 1981’s protection traced back to the location of hiring or where the

discriminatory decisions were made, citing instead to the express jurisdictional

limitations of § 1981’s language. But Title IX’s language is far less direct. Moreover,

the entirety of § 1981’s focus is on ensuring equal rights of individuals within the United

States and its territories, whereas Title IX focuses on ensuring non-discriminatory

practices from recipients of federal funds. Thus, Title IX’s language affords greater room

for interpretation, and its purpose is most logically accomplished by looking to the

location of the conduct rather than the precise location of the plaintiff.

In short, while the Court agrees that the language of Title IX references persons

“in the United States,” adopting Defendants’ interpretation would frustrate the purpose of

the law and result in inconsistent application of Title IX’s protection based on an

arbitrary factor. Accordingly, the Court finds that Title IX’s protections are applicable in

this instance.

D. Title IX and Equal Protection Claims

Finally, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s gender discrimination claims fail under

both Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause because Plaintiff cannot show that

Defendants’ legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for canceling the job search was a

pretext.

The Court analyzes a Title IX discrimination claim using the same legal standard

applicable to a claim brought under Title VII. Nelson v. Christian Bros. Univ., 226 F.

App’x 448, 454 (6th Cir. 2007). Similarly, “[t]o bring a successful § 1983 claim under

the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, Plaintiff must prove the same

elements as are required to establish a disparate treatment claim under Title VII.” Black

v. Columbus Pub. Sch., 124 F. Supp. 2d 550, 576 (S.D. Ohio 2000), aff’d in relevant part,

79 F. App’x 735, 738 (6th Cir. 2003); Gutzwiller v. Fenik, 860 F.2d 1317, 1325 (6th Cir.

1988).

“A plaintiff may establish a claim of discrimination either by introducing direct

evidence of discrimination, or by proving circumstantial evidence which would support

an inference of discrimination.” Johnson v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561, 572 (6th

Cir. 2000) (citing Kline v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 128 F.3d 337, 348 (6th Cir.1997)).

“[D]irect evidence is that evidence which, if believed, requires the conclusion that

unlawful discrimination was at least a motivating factor in the employer’s actions.”

Johnson v. Kroger Co., 319 F.3d 858, 865 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Jacklyn v. Schering–

Plough Healthcare Prods. Sales Corp., 176 F.3d 921, 926 (6th Cir. 1999)) (emphasis

added). In other words, “direct evidence does not require a factfinder to draw any

inferences” in order to conclude discriminatory motives played a part in the employment

action. Kroger Co., 319 F.3d at 865 (quoting Nguyen v. City of Cleveland, 229 F.3d 559,

563 (6th Cir. 2000) (noting that, “a facially discriminatory employment policy or a

corporate decision maker’s express statement of a desire to remove employees in the

protected group is direct evidence of discriminatory intent”)). “Where a plaintiff presents

direct evidence of discriminatory intent in connection with a challenged employment

action, ‘the burden of both production and persuasion shifts to the employer to prove that

it would have [taken the same action] even if it had not been motivated by impermissible

discrimination.’” Id.

Conversely, if a plaintiff relies on circumstantial evidence of discrimination, the

Court applies the “McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting approach” to evaluate the

allegations. Johnson, 215 F.3d at 572; McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792

(1973). Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, the plaintiff bears the initial burden

of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affs. v.

Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981). If the plaintiff successfully makes a prima facie

case, the burden then shifts to the defendant “to articulate some legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason” for its actions. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. Finally,

if the defendant carries its burden, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to evidence that

the defendant’s stated reasons are a pretext. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253.

Accordingly, the Court must, as an initial matter, determine whether Plaintiff has

presented direct evidence of discriminatory motives, or whether the claims rely solely on

circumstantial evidence.

Plaintiff argues that “[t]he record is rife with direct evidence of discrimination,”

and identifies a number of instances in which Drs. Uetz and Petren referenced the gender

of the candidates, discussed the gender balance of the faculty, or stated intent to “focus

on the women candidates.” (Doc. 52 at 20-22). However, evidence that gender was

referenced or discussed is not the equivalent of evidence that “requires the conclusion

that [gender] was at least a motivating factor in the employer’s actions.” Kroger Co., 319

F.3d at 865 (emphasis added). Plaintiff’s cited evidence accomplishes the former (i.e.,

establishing that gender was referenced), but not the latter (i.e., requiring the conclusion

that gender was a motivating factor).

Additionally, Plaintiff’s examples are often misleading or taken out of context.

For instance, Plaintiff quotes Dr. Uetz’s deposition, in which Dr. Uetz stated that he

asked Dr. Petren whether it was appropriate to advance a male candidate over two

equally qualified female candidates. (Doc. 52 at 20). But Plaintiff excludes the

remainder of the deposition testimony, in which Dr. Uetz explains that his inquiry was

intended to determine whether the College of Arts and Sciences adhered to any diversity

hiring policies. (Doc. 29 at 47). And, most critically, Plaintiff excludes Dr. Uetz’s

testimony stating that Dr. Petren responded to the inquiry by stating it was permissible to

hire a male candidate over the female candidates. (Id.)

In short, when viewed in full and in context, Plaintiff’s cited examples do not

directly evidence discriminatory motives and are, instead, circumstantial at best.

Therefore, the Court applies the “McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting approach” to

evaluate the allegations. Johnson, 215 F.3d at 572.

To establish a prima facie case for failure to hire claim, a plaintiff must

demonstrate that: (1) he or she was a member of a protected class; (2) he or she applied

and was qualified for the job; (3) despite his or her qualifications, he or she was rejected;

and (4) following the rejection, the position was filled by someone outside the protected

class, or the position remained unfilled or was canceled to discriminate against plaintiff.

See McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802; Charlton-Perkins v. Univ. of Cincinnati,

35 F.4th 1053, 1061 (6th Cir. 2022); Zambetti v. Cuyahoga Cmty. Coll., 314 F.3d 249,

255 (6th Cir. 2002) (“The McDonnell Douglas test arose in the context of racial

discrimination in hiring, but the Supreme Court recognized the need to adapt the test to

different employment contexts”).9

Defendants’ motion does not challenge Plaintiff’s prima facie case and, thus,

effectively concedes the first step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis. Accordingly, the

issues before the Court are as to whether Defendants can “articulate some legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason” for its actions and, if so, whether Plaintiff can prove that

9 The Court notes that claims of “reverse discrimination” have long been held to a higher

evidentiary standard, under which Plaintiff was required to demonstrate that “he was

intentionally discriminated against ‘despite his majority status,’” by presenting “background

circumstances to support the suspicion that the defendant is that unusual employer who

discriminates against the majority.” E.g., Murray v. Thistledown Racing Club, Inc., 770 F.2d 63,

67 (6th Cir. 1985); Zambetti., 314 F.3d at 255 (6th Cir. 2002). However, in June 2025, the

Supreme Court held that the text and purpose of Title VII do not differentiate between

discrimination against individuals in the minority versus majority and, therefore, the heightened

“background circumstances” requirement was improper. Ames v. Ohio Dep’t of Youth Srvs., 605

U.S. 303 (2025). This Court further notes that discrimination claims under Title IX and the

Equal Protection Clause are analyzed under Title VII’s legal framework. Nelson, 226 F. App’x

448 at 454; Black, 124 F. Supp. 2d at 576. Accordingly, for purposes of this Order, the Court

will not apply the heightened standard.

Defendants’ stated reasons are a pretext. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Burdine,

450 U.S. at 253.

Here, Defendants can and have successfully articulated a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory basis for not hiring Plaintiff, calling off the search process, and

canceling the position altogether. Specifically, Defendants have consistently maintained

that the search was canceled because the perceived conflict of interest created too much

contention among the faculty; and the position was never re-posted because the needs of

the Biology Department shifted, as determined by the faculty at large. Accordingly, the

burden shifts to Plaintiff to show that the articulated reason was a pretext.

“The plaintiff may demonstrate that the defendant’s explanation was merely

pretext by showing (1) that the proffered reason had no basis in fact, (2) that the proffered

reason did not actually motivate the [adverse decision], or (3) that the proffered reason

was not sufficient to motivate the [adverse decision].” Smith v. Leggett Wire Co., 220

F.3d 752, 759 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing Manzer v. Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co., 29 F.3d

1078, 1084 (6th Cir. 1994)). In this regard, “plaintiff must produce sufficient evidence

from which the jury could ‘reasonably reject [the defendants’] explanation’ and infer that

the defendants ‘intentionally discriminated’ against him.” Braithwaite v. Timken Co.,

258 F.3d 488, 493 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting Woythal v. Tex-Tenn Corp., 112 F.3d 243,

246-47 (6th Cir. 1997)). In other words, “a reason cannot be proved to be ‘a pretext for

discrimination’ unless it is shown both that the reason was false, and that discrimination

was the real reason.” St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515 (1993)

(emphasis in original).

Plaintiff argues that “the record does not support [Defendants’] version of events”

and “[i]nstead, it shows overwhelmingly that concerns about gender predominated

Defendants’ decision not to hire [Plaintiff] and to cancel the search entirely to mask their

discrimination.” (Doc. 52 at 26). The Court cannot agree with this statement.

Specifically, the evidence shows and, indeed, Plaintiff does not dispute, that,

during the search, but prior to its cancelation, a number of faculty members, as well as at

least one search committee member, expressed concerns regarding Dr. Buschbeck’s

conflict of interest in favor of Plaintiff, and faculty members questioned the legitimacy of

Plaintiff’s selection by the search committee. (Doc. 50-1 at ¶¶ 50-53, 56-63, 76-77). The

evidence shows, and Plaintiff does not dispute, that Dr. Buschbeck and Plaintiff were, in

fact, colleagues, collaborators, and personal friends. (Id. at ¶ 24). The evidence shows,

and Plaintiff does not dispute, that after Plaintiff’s final interview for the position, Dr.

Buschbeck received critical feedback regarding Plaintiff, which feedback Dr. Buschbeck

consistently attempted to rebut. (Id. at ¶¶ 82-85). The evidence shows, and Plaintiff does

not dispute, that the search committee (while in Dr. Uetz’s presence) was initially evenly

split as to their top choice among the four finalists—i.e., each of the four voting

committee members cast their vote for a different finalist—and that Dr. Buschbeck was

the only vote in favor of Plaintiff. (Id. at ¶¶ 32-37). The evidence shows, and Plaintiff

does not dispute, that, after further discussion, the committee agreed on a last place

finalist—i.e., the other male candidate—and excluded him from consideration, but still

could not reach a consensus as to their top choice. (Id. at ¶¶ 39, 41). The evidence

shows, and Plaintiff does not dispute, that the committee agreed to adjourn their meeting,

and only after resuming discussions (outside of Dr. Uetz’s presence) did they reach a 3 to

1 vote in favor of Plaintiff, two days after they initially convened. (Id. at ¶ 42). The

evidence shows, and Plaintiff does not dispute, that after receiving the committee’s

recommendation but before reporting the recommendation to Dr. Petren, Dr. Uetz

received reports from faculty members expressing their belief that Dr. Buschbeck acted

improperly during the search. (Id. at ¶ 50). The evidence shows, and Plaintiff does not

dispute, that Dr. Uetz met with Dr. Petren to report the recommendation of the committee

and that, during the meeting, Dr. Petren instructed Dr. Uetz to further investigate the

faculty’s conflict of interest concerns and to report back. (Id. at ¶¶ 46, 56-57, 63). The

evidence shows, and Plaintiff does not dispute, that Dr. Uetz’s investigation revealed

similar concerns from other faculty members, including, inter alia, one of the search

committee members (as well as the Graduate Student Representative) who “felt like Dr.

Buschbeck had bullied the junior faculty on the search committee to get them to vote a

certain way.” (Id. at ¶¶ 58, 62). The evidence also shows, and Plaintiff does not dispute,

that the search process and the conflict of interest question became a topic of concern and

discussion within the Biology Department at large, and that there was “discord among the

faculty as a result of the search.” (Id. at ¶¶ 75-78). The evidence shows, and Plaintiff

does not dispute, that Dr. Petren ultimately canceled the search, but intended to approve

the Biology Department for another hire the following year. (Id. at ¶ 95, 98). Finally, the

evidence shows, and Plaintiff does not dispute, that faculty members make proposals

regarding the focus of a new search, that Dr. Petren’s only role is to consider the faculty’s

proposals, and that, by the following year, the Biology Department’s needs had shifted.

(Id. at ¶¶ 99-101).

In short, there is ample evidence in the record to support Defendants’ articulated

basis for canceling the search and for never reposting the position. That is, the record is

replete with evidence that the search process and Dr. Buschbeck’s role were a cause of

great concern among faculty members, and there is substantial evidence to support the

legitimacy of the faculty’s concerns. Additionally, Dr. Petren’s decision to cancel the

search was not an immediate reaction and, indeed, only came after an investigation and a

number of meetings and discussions, including a recorded faculty meeting that further

supports Dr. Petren’s stated perception that the search process had created a rift among

faculty and devolved beyond the point of salvaging. And, critically, it is undisputed that

the faculty could have proposed reinitiating the search for the same position, but such a

proposal was never made, and the needs of the Biology Department subsequently shifted.

Where the evidence is lacking, however, is in Plaintiff’s assertion that discussions

of gender dominated Defendants’ decision to forego Plaintiff or to cancel the search. To

be clear, the Court acknowledges that a number of faculty and students reported favoring

greater diversity.10 But the faculty and students were not the decisionmakers. Indeed,

not even Dr. Uetz was the final decisionmaker. Plaintiff does not dispute that, as the

Dean, Dr. Petren was responsible for approving the new hire and also had sole authority

to cancel the search; nor does Plaintiff dispute that it was Dr. Petren who canceled the

10 At times, these calls for diversity were gender-specific, but in other instances, could

legitimately be construed as referencing diversity as to the candidate’s field of research.

search. (Doc. 50-1, ¶¶ 5, 6, 95). But Plaintiff fails to cite to any instance in which Dr.

Petren expressed a sentiment that could be reasonably construed as discriminatory.

Indeed, even accounting for Dr. Uetz’s inquiry as to hiring a male over a female

candidate, or his subsequent comment regarding “focus[ing] on the women candidates,”

the reality is that no female candidate was ever hired to the position, and there is no

evidence that those comments played any part in the decision not to hire Plaintiff or to

cancel the search.

In short, Plaintiff essentially relies on any references to gender—regardless of the

context or the speaker—to serve as potential points of ambiguity from which

discrimination may be inferred. But, absent any evidence, Plaintiff’s own alternative

interpretation is insufficient to create a factual dispute. See Block v. Meharry Med. Coll.,

723 F. App’x 273, 280 (6th Cir. 2018) (“Disputing facts is not enough—instead, the

plaintiff must produce evidence ‘demonstrat[ing] that the employer did not ‘honestly

believe’ in the proffered nondiscriminatory reason for its adverse employment action’”)

(quoting Braithwaite, 258 F.3d at 494) (emphasis added). Ultimately, the record plainly

belies the assertion that Defendants’ proffered reason had no basis in fact, and Plaintiff

fails to evidence that the articulated reason did not actually motivate Defendants’

decision or that the proffered reason was insufficient to motivate the decision.

Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to evidence that Defendants’ explanation is a pretext or

that the decision was motivated by anything other a contentious search effort and the

desire not to hire a new employee under the cloud of questionable circumstances. Thus,

summary judgment in favor of Defendants is required.

IV. CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 50) is

GRANTED, and this case is dismissed with prejudice. The Clerk’s Office shall docket a

Judgment accordingly.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: 8/15/2025 Fine a CS hok

Timot lack

United States District Judge

31