The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION
SHANETTE JENKINS-PARKS, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) No. 25-cv-2207-SHL-tmp
)
PORTFOLIO RECOVERY ASSOCIATES, )
)
Defendant. )
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Before the court is pro se plaintiff Shanette Jenkins-Parks’s
complaint.1 Because Jenkins-Parks is proceeding in forma pauperis,
the undersigned must screen the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2).2 For the reasons below, the undersigned recommends that
Jenkins-Parks’s complaint be dismissed.
I. PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT
Jenkins-Parks filed her complaint on February 24, 2025,
alleging violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), 15
U.S.C. §§ 1681 et seq., and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
(“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692 et seq. (ECF No. 2.) She alleges that
1Pursuant to Administrative Order No. 2013-05, this case has been
referred to the United States magistrate judge for management of
all pretrial matters for determination or report and
recommendation, as appropriate.
2The undersigned granted Jenkins-Parks leave to proceed in forma
pauperis on July 18, 2025. (ECF No. 7.)
she “is a consumer as defined under the FCRA and FDCPA,”3 and that
defendant Portfolio Recovery Associates (“PRA”) “is a debt
collection agency.” (Id. at PageID 2.) Jenkins-Parks states that
she “discovered inaccurate and misleading information on [her]
credit report furnished by [PRA], specifically[] [PRA] placed a
soft inquiry on [her] credit report without proper authorization
or any related debt.”4 (Id.) She alleges that she “disputed the
inaccurate information with credit reporting agencies, yet [PRA]
failed to conduct a reasonable investigation.” (Id.) As a result,
she claims that she suffered “damage to [her] creditworthiness,
financial standing, and emotional distress.” (Id. at PageID 3.)
Jenkins-Parks seeks to bring one claim each under the FCRA
and the FDCPA.5 (Id.) First, it appears that Jenkins-Parks is
alleging PRA violated § 1681s-2(b) of the FCRA based on its failure
3The FCRA defines a consumer broadly as “an individual.” 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681a(c). The FDCPA defines a consumer as “any natural person
obligated or allegedly obligated to pay any debt.” 15 U.S.C. §
1692a(3).
4“A soft inquiry occurs when a person or company checks your credit
report as part of a background check or when an individual checks
his/her credit score.” Malcolm v. Am. Express Nat'l Bank, No. 3:23-
CV-545, 2024 WL 4218019, at *1 n.2 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 17, 2024)
(quoting McMahan v. Byrider Sales of Ind. S, LLC, No. 3:17-CV-
00064-GNS, 2017 WL 4077013, at *1 n.1 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 14, 2017))
(citation modified).
5Jenkins-Parks does not identify specific sections of either law.
(See ECF No. 2 at PageID 3.) Thus, the undersigned has attempted
to identify the relevant provisions based on the allegations of
her complaint.
to conduct a reasonable investigation into disputed information.6
(Id.) Second, it appears that Jenkins-Parks is alleging that PRA
violated § 1692f of the FDCPA, stating that it “engaged in unfair
and deceptive collection practices by furnishing and maintaining
inaccurate information.” (Id.) As relief, she requests actual,
statutory, and punitive damages, as well as costs for filing this
suit. (Id.)
II. PROPOSED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
A. Legal Standard
This court is required to screen in forma pauperis complaints
and must dismiss any complaint, or any portion thereof, if the
action: (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim
on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief
against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(i-iii). To avoid dismissal for failure to state a
claim, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); see also
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(a), 12(b)(6). “A claim is plausible on its face if the ‘plaintiff
6Although Jenkins-Parks’s allegations are consistent with the
language of § 1682s-2(b), her statement that PRA performed an
impermissible soft inquiry is also consistent with a claim under
§ 1681b. Thus, the undersigned will address this alternative
section.
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.’” Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. Napolitano, 648
F.3d 365, 369 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
Without factual allegations in support, mere legal conclusions are
not entitled to the assumption of truth. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
Pro se complaints are held to less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers and are thus liberally
construed. Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011)
(citing Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2002)).
Even so, pro se litigants must adhere to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, see Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989),
and the court cannot create a claim that has not been spelled out
in a pleading, see Brown v. Matauszak, 415 F. App’x 608, 613 (6th
Cir. 2011); Payne v. Sec’y of Treas., 73 F. App’x 836, 837 (6th
Cir. 2003).
B. FCRA Claim
It appears that Jenkins-Parks seeks to bring her first claim
under § 1681s-2(b) of the FCRA. “[Section] 1681s–2 is designed to
prevent ‘furnishers of information’ from spreading inaccurate
consumer-credit information.”7 Boggio v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 696
7“While § 1681s-2 does not define ‘furnisher,’ courts have defined
the term as ‘any entity which transmits information concerning a
particular debt owed by a particular customer to consumer reporting
agencies.’” Carter v. Holzman L., PLLC, No. CV 24-11990, 2025 WL
F.3d 611, 614 (6th Cir. 2012). “[It] works in two phases.” Id.
First, under § 1681s-2(a), “it imposes a duty to provide accurate
information.” Carter, 2025 WL 1065379, at *4 (citing LaBreck, 2016
WL 6927454, at *2). Second, under § 1681s-2(b), it imposes “a duty
to undertake [a reasonable] investigation upon receipt of notice
of dispute from a [consumer reporting agency].” Id. (citing
LaBreck, 2016 WL 6927454, at *2).
“A private cause of action against a furnisher of information
[under § 1681s-2(b)] does not arise until a consumer reporting
agency provides proper notice of a dispute.” Brown v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 507 F. App'x 543, 547 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Boggio,
696 F.3d at 615-16). Thus, to plausibly state a claim under §
1681s-2(b), a plaintiff must at least allege that they disputed an
inaccuracy with a consumer reporting agency, that the consumer
reporting agency then notified the furnisher of that dispute, and
that the furnisher then violated a statutory duty under § 1681s-
2(b)(1)(A)-(E). See Rajapakse v. Credit Acceptance Corp., No. 19-
1192, 2021 WL 3059755, at *2 (6th Cir. Mar. 5, 2021) (citing 15
U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b)(1)(A)-(E); Boggio, 696 F.3d at 616-18)
(affirming dismissal of complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) because
plaintiff “did not allege that [defendant] violated any of the
1065379, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 13, 2025), report and
recommendation adopted, 2025 WL 868615 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 20, 2025)
(quoting LaBreck v. Mid-Mich Credit Bureau, 2016 WL 6927454, at *2
(W.D. Mich. Nov. 28, 2016)).
statutory duties to investigate and properly report information
once notified of her dispute related to [defendant]”); see also
Green v. Cont. Callers, Inc., No. 3:21-CV-2005, 2022 WL 2209436,
at *2 (N.D. Ohio June 21, 2022) (citing Rajapakse, 2021 WL 3059755,
at *2) (finding that plaintiff failed to state a § 1681s-2(b)
claim).
Here, Jenkins-Parks alleges that PRA reported inaccurate
information by “plac[ing] a soft inquiry on [her] credit report
without proper authorization or any related debt,” that she
disputed that information with “credit reporting agencies,” and
that PRA then failed to conduct a reasonable investigation. (ECF
No. 2 at PageID 2.) She has not plausibly alleged any facts to
plausibly plead a claim.
First, although Jenkins-Parks alleges that PRA “placed a soft
inquiry,” (id.), she has not alleged any facts describing how a
“soft inquiry” constitutes inaccurate or misleading information.
See Settles v. Trans Union, LLC, No. 3:20-CV-00084, 2020 WL
6900302, at *5 (M.D. Tenn. Nov. 24, 2020) (“[T]o establish any
FCRA violation Plaintiff must show that the credit report is
patently incorrect or materially misleading”; finding that
plaintiff had not plausibly alleged that the reported information
was inaccurate and dismissing for failure to state a claim).
Indeed, several courts within the Sixth Circuit have explained
that “[s]oft inquiries do not affect credit scores in any way.”
Malcolm, 2024 WL 4218019, at *1 n.2. (quoting McMahan, 2017 WL
4077013, at *1 n.1); see also Lockhart v. Deluca, No. 2:23-CV-
11873-TGB-EAS, 2023 WL 5963429, at *1 n.2 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 13,
2023) (“A ‘soft inquiry,’ meanwhile, has no impact on a credit
score[.]”). Second, Jenkins-Parks has not alleged that a consumer
reporting agency notified PRA of her dispute to trigger its duties
under the FCRA—let alone identified which consumer reporting
agencies she filed a dispute with. See Green v. Navy Fed. Credit
Union, No. 3:24-CV-632, 2024 WL 4564421, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 24,
2024) (“Absent this essential element, Plaintiff's FCRA claim
cannot proceed and fails as a matter of law.”). Lastly, she has
not alleged any facts as to how PRA “violated any of the statutory
duties to investigate and properly report information once
notified of her dispute.” Rajapakse, 2021 WL 3059755, at *2 (citing
15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b)(1)(A)-(E); Boggio, 696 F.3d at 616-18).
Accordingly, Jenkins-Parks fails to state a § 1681s-2(b) claim.
Although Jenkins-Parks fails to plead a § 1681s-2(b) claim,
construing her complaint liberally, her allegations also track the
language of § 1681b. Section 1681 “regulates the permissible uses
of ‘consumer reports,’ which summarize credit history and credit
worthiness, and [the FCRA] creates a private right of action
allowing injured consumers to recover for negligent and willful
violations[.]” Bickley v. Dish Network, LLC, 751 F.3d 724, 728
(6th Cir. 2014) (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681b, 1681n, 1681o). To that
end, under § 1681b(a)(3), a consumer reporting agency may only
provide a report to a person (or entity) where it has reason to
believe the person:
(A) intends to use the information in connection with a
credit transaction involving the consumer on whom the
information is to be furnished and involving the
extension of credit to, or review or collection of an
account of, the consumer; or
(B) intends to use the information for employment
purposes; or
(C) intends to use the information in connection with
the underwriting of insurance involving the consumer; or
(D) intends to use the information in connection with a
determination of the consumer's eligibility for a
license or other benefit granted by a governmental
instrumentality required by law to consider an
applicant's financial responsibility or status; or
(E) intends to use the information, as a potential
investor or servicer, or current insurer, in connection
with a valuation of, or an assessment of the credit or
prepayment risks associated with, an existing credit
obligation; or
(F) otherwise has a legitimate business need for the
information—
(i) in connection with a business transaction that
is initiated by the consumer; or
(ii) to review an account to determine whether the
consumer continues to meet the terms of the
account.
(G) executive departments and agencies in connection
with the issuance of government-sponsored individually-
billed travel charge cards.
15 U.S.C. § 1691b(a)(3). “A plaintiff bringing a claim for an
improper use of a credit report must show the requisite culpability
and three additional elements: (i) that there was a ‘consumer
report’ within the meaning of the statute; (ii) that the defendant
used or obtained it; and (iii) that the defendant did so without
a permissible statutory purpose.” Durbin v. AmeriCredit Fin.
Servs., Inc., 466 F. Supp. 3d 743, 747 (W.D. Ky. 2020) (quoting
Bickley, 751 F.3d at 728) (discussing elements of a § 1681b claim
under Rule 12(b)(6)) (citation modified). Jenkins-Parks’s claim
under § 1681b still fails because her complaint is limited to a
conclusory allegation that PRA did not have a proper purpose to
access her report, without pleading any factual details in support.
See Miles v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, No. 1:22-CV-00283, 2023 WL
5410379, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 22, 2023) (finding plaintiff failed
to state a § 1681b claim where they alleged only that a “consumer
credit report was furnished that included items that [plaintiff]
did not expressly provide written instruction to furnish”).
Because Jenkins-Parks fails to state claims under both §
1681s-2(b) and § 1681b, the undersigned recommends that her FCRA
claim be dismissed.
C. FDCPA Claim
It appears that Jenkins-Parks seeks to bring her second claim
under § 1692f of the FDCPA. “Congress passed the FDCPA to address
the widespread and serious national problem of debt collection
abuse by unscrupulous debt collectors.” Currier v. First Resol.
Inv. Corp., 762 F.3d 529, 533 (6th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted).
Section 1692f of the FDCPA “prohibits a debt collector from using
unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect
any debt.” Carter, 2025 WL 1065379, at *6 (quoting 15 U.S.C. §
1692f) (citation modified). “It sets forth a non-exhaustive list
of conduct that rises to that level.” Currier, 762 F.3d at 534.
(citing Glazer v. Chase Home Fin. LLC, 704 F.3d 453, 461–62 (6th
Cir. 2013), abrogated by Obduskey v. McCarthy & Holthus LLP, 586
U.S. 466 (2019); Limited, Inc. v. C.I.R., 286 F.3d 324, 332 (6th
Cir. 2002)). To state a claim under the FDCPA, Jenkins-Parks must
allege that: (1) she is a “consumer” under the FDCPA; (2) the
“debt” arises out of transactions entered primarily for personal,
family or household purposes; (3) PRA is a “debt collector” as
defined by the FDCPA, and (4) PRA violated a provision of the FDCPA
in attempting to collect a debt. White v. Universal Fid., LP, 793
F. App'x 389, 391 (6th Cir. 2019) (citing Bauman v. Bank of Am.,
N.A., 808 F.3d 1097, 1100 (6th Cir. 2015)).
Jenkins-Parks fails to state a FDCPA claim. First, she has
not alleged any facts identifying a personal debt. Second, despite
her allegations that PRA is a debt collector, such conclusory
allegations alone are insufficient. See Bates v. Green Farms Condo.
Ass'n, 958 F.3d 470, 480 (6th Cir. 2020) (“But we need not accept
th[e] ‘conclusory statement[]’ [that defendants ‘were acting as
debt collectors’] as true if the complaint has not supported it
with enough pleaded facts to plausibly suggest that [defendants]
were, in fact, general debt collectors.” (citations omitted)
(second bracket in original)). The Sixth Circuit has explained
that the FDCPA’s “general debt-collector definition ties a
defendant's ‘debt collector’ status not to what the defendant
specifically did in a given case, but to what the defendant
generally does.” Id. at 480–81 (citing Thompson v. Five Bros.
Mortg. Co. Servs. & Securing, Inc., 800 F. App'x 369, 371-72 (6th
Cir. 2020); Lewis v. ACB Bus. Servs., Inc., 135 F.3d 389, 411 (6th
Cir. 1998); Henson v. Santander Consumer USA Inc., 582 U.S. 79
(2017)). Jenkins-Parks’s complaint “contains [] no well-pleaded
allegations about the principal business or regular activities” of
PRA. Id. at 481; see also Wilkinson v. Passport Labs, Inc., No.
22-10714, 2022 WL 4870793, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 3, 2022)
(“[Plaintiff’s] conclusory allegation that [defendant] is a debt
collector under the FDCPA is insufficient to survive a motion to
dismiss.” (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679)). Lastly, although §
1692f is meant to be non-exhaustive, Jenkins-Parks has not alleged
any facts demonstrating how PRA’s alleged “furnishing and
maintaining inaccurate information,” (ECF No. 2 at PageID 3), was
an unfair or unconscionable attempt to collect a debt. See Jones
v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., No. 2:15-CV-10171, 2017 WL 9471877, at *12
(E.D. Mich. Feb. 12, 2017) (finding plaintiff failed to allege
facts demonstrating how “the defendant used an unfair or
unconscionable practice to collect or attempt to collect the debt”
under § 1692f), report and recommendation adopted, 2017 WL 875297
(E.D. Mich. Mar. 6, 2017), aff'd, No. 17-1516, 2017 WL 9291893
(6th Cir. Dec. 8, 2017). Accordingly, Jenkins-Parks fails to state
a § 1692f claim, and the undersigned recommends that this claim be
dismissed.
III. RECOMMENDATION
For the above reasons, the undersigned recommends that
Jenkins-Parks’s complaint be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B).
Respectfully submitted,
s/Tu M. Pham
TU M. PHAM
Chief United States Magistrate Judge
July 18, 2025
Date
NOTICE
WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS AFTER BEING SERVED WITH A COPY OF THIS
REPORT AND RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION, ANY PARTY MAY SERVE AND FILE
SPECIFIC WRITTEN OBJECTIONS TO THE PROPOSED FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS. ANY PARTY MAY RESPOND TO ANOTHER PARTY’S
OBJECTIONS WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS AFTER BEING SERVED WITH A
COPY. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b)(2); L.R.
72.1(g)(2). FAILURE TO FILE OBJECTIONS WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS
MAY CONSTITUTE A WAIVER AND/OR FORFEITURE OF OBJECTIONS,
EXCEPTIONS, AND FURTHER APPEAL.