The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION
MEGHAN LEATH, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) No. 25-cv-2165-MSN-tmp
)
ABSOLUTE RECOVERY SERVICES )
LLC, )
)
Defendant. )
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Before the court is pro se plaintiff Meghan Leath’s
complaint.1 Because Leath is proceeding in forma pauperis, the
undersigned must screen the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2).2 For the reasons below, the undersigned finds that
Leath fails to state a claim, but recommends that she be given
leave to amend in lieu of dismissal.
I. PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT
Leath filed her complaint on February 13, 2025, alleging
violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1681 et seq. (ECF No. 2.) Leath alleges that defendant
1Pursuant to Administrative Order No. 2013-05, this case has been
referred to the United States magistrate judge for management of
all pretrial matters for determination or report and
recommendation, as appropriate.
2The undersigned granted Leath leave to proceed in forma pauperis
on February 14, 2025. (ECF No. 7.)
Absolute Recovery Services LLC (“ARS”) “is a company engaged in
the business of debt collection and reporting credit
information,” and that “[i]t is a ‘furnisher of information.’”
(Id. at PageID 2.) Leath alleges that she “obtained a copy of
[her] credit report and found multiple inaccuracies regarding
two accounts.” (Id.) She claims that “[d]espite formal disputes
under 15 U.S.C. § 1681i, [ARS] failed to conduct a reasonable
investigation, resulting in the continued reporting of false and
misleading information.” (Id.) She alleges that the following
information was inaccurate:
I. Absolute Recovery Services (1544)
a. Incorrect balance of $508, which was disputed
but remains unchanged.
b. Account falsely reported as being in
collections, despite lack of proper validation or
resolution of the dispute.
II. Absolute Recovery Services (1630)
a. Incorrect balance of $5,207, which was
disputed but remains unchanged.
b. Account falsely reported as "placed for
collection" despite no valid basis for such
status.
c. Failure to properly update dispute remarks
after Plaintiffs formal dispute.
(Id. at PageID 3.) As a result, she claims to have “suffered
credit denials, financial harm, emotional distress, and
reputational damage.” (Id.)
Leath alleges two violations of the FCRA.3 (Id.) First, she
alleges that ARS violated § 1681i by failing to conduct a
reasonable investigation and continuing to report false and
inaccurate information on her consumer report. (Id.) Second, she
alleges that ARS violated § 1681e(b) by failing to maintain
reasonable procedures to ensure maximum possible accuracy of her
consumer report. (Id.) As relief, she asks that the court award
her actual, statutory, and punitive damages, and attorneys’ fees
and costs pursuant to the FCRA. (Id.)
II. PROPOSED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
A. Legal Standard
This court is required to screen in forma pauperis
complaints and must dismiss any complaint, or any portion
thereof, if the action: (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii)
fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii)
seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from
such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i-iii). To avoid
dismissal for failure to state a claim, “a complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); see also Bell Atl. Corp. v.
3Leath also seeks to bring standalone claims for violations of §
1681n and § 1681o. (ECF No. 2 at PageID 3.) However, those
sections create a private cause of action and govern damages for
willful and negligent noncompliance with the FCRA, respectively,
and are not independent claims.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), 12(b)(6). “A
claim is plausible on its face if the ‘plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’” Ctr.
for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. Napolitano, 648 F.3d 365, 369
(6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Without
factual allegations in support, mere legal conclusions are not
entitled to the assumption of truth. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
Pro se complaints are held to less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers and are thus liberally
construed. Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011)
(citing Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2002)).
Even so, pro se litigants must adhere to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, see Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir.
1989), and the court cannot create a claim that has not been
spelled out in a pleading, see Brown v. Matauszak, 415 F. App’x
608, 613 (6th Cir. 2011); Payne v. Sec’y of Treas., 73 F. App’x
836, 837 (6th Cir. 2003).
B. Analysis
Leath alleges that ARS willfully and negligently violated §
1681i and § 1681e(b). However, both of those statutes apply only
to the conduct of a “consumer reporting agency.” See 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1681e(b) (“Whenever a consumer reporting agency prepares a
consumer report it shall follow reasonable procedures to assure
maximum possible accuracy of the information concerning the
individual about whom the report relates.”); 1681i(a) (requiring
that a “consumer reporting agency . . . conduct a reasonable
reinvestigation” where a consumer disputes the accuracy of a
consumer credit report); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1681a (“The term
‘consumer reporting agency’ means any person which, for monetary
fees, dues, or on a cooperative nonprofit basis, regularly
engages in whole or in part in the practice of assembling or
evaluating consumer credit information or other information on
consumers for the purpose of furnishing consumer reports to
third parties, and which uses any means or facility of
interstate commerce for the purpose of preparing or furnishing
consumer reports.”); Bass v. Aidvantage Fed. Student Loan
Servicing, No. 3:24-CV-279, 2024 WL 4296952, at *2 (W.D. Ky.
Sept. 25, 2024) (“Notably, § 1681e(b) and 1681i relate only to
the duties of a [consumer reporting agency].” (citing 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681e(b); Lewis v. Ohio Pro. Elec. Network LLC, 248 F. Supp.
2d 693 (S.D. Ohio 2003)). Because Leath has not alleged any
facts demonstrating that ARS is a consumer reporting agency, her
claims under § 1681e(b) and § 1681i necessarily fail. See Bass,
2024 WL 4296952, at *3 (dismissing plaintiff’s complaint
“because [§ 1681e(b) and § 1681i] create a private right of
action against [consumer reporting agencies], not furnishers”).
Instead, reading Leath’s complaint liberally, the
undersigned interprets her allegations as bringing a claim under
§ 1681s-2(b) of the FCRA. “[Section] 1681s–2 is designed to
prevent ‘furnishers of information’ from spreading inaccurate
consumer-credit information.”4 Boggio v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 696
F.3d 611, 614 (6th Cir. 2012). And “[it] works in two phases.”
Id. First, under § 1681s-2(a), “it imposes a duty to provide
accurate information.”5 Carter, 2025 WL 1065379, at *4 (citing
LaBreck, 2016 WL 6927454, at *2). Second, under § 1681s-2(b), it
imposes several duties on furnishers, including “a duty to
undertake an investigation upon receipt of notice of dispute
from a [consumer reporting agency].” Id. (citing LaBreck, 2016
WL 6927454, at *2); see also Boggio, 696 F.3d at 616-18
(outlining furnishers’ duties under § 1681s-2(b)(1)(A)-(E)).
“A private cause of action against a furnisher of
information does not arise until a consumer reporting agency
4“While § 1681s-2 does not define ‘furnisher,’ courts have
defined the term as ‘any entity which transmits information
concerning a particular debt owed by a particular customer to
consumer reporting agencies.’” Carter v. Holzman L., PLLC, No.
CV 24-11990, 2025 WL 1065379, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 13, 2025),
report and recommendation adopted, 2025 WL 868615 (E.D. Mich.
Mar. 20, 2025) (quoting LaBreck v. Mid-Mich Credit Bureau, 2016
WL 6927454, at *2 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 28, 2016)).
5But there is no private cause of action under § 1681s-2(a).
Boggio, 696 F.3d at 615 (“This is because § 1681s–2(c) expressly
precludes consumers from enforcing the requirement that
furnishers, under § 1681s–2(a), initially provide complete and
accurate consumer information to a [credit reporting agency].”).
provides proper notice of a dispute.” Brown v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., 507 F. App'x 543, 547 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Boggio, 696
F.3d at 615-16). Thus, to plausibly state a claim under § 1681s-
2(b), a plaintiff must at least allege that they disputed an
inaccuracy with a consumer reporting agency, that the consumer
reporting agency then notified the furnisher of that dispute,
and that the furnisher then violated a statutory duty under §
1681s-2(b)(1)(A)-(E). See Rajapakse v. Credit Acceptance Corp.,
No. 19-1192, 2021 WL 3059755, at *2 (6th Cir. Mar. 5, 2021)
(citing 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b)(1)(A)-(E); Boggio, 696 F.3d at
616-18); see also Green v. Cont. Callers, Inc., No. 3:21-CV-
2005, 2022 WL 2209436, at *2 (N.D. Ohio June 21, 2022) (citing
Rajapakse, 2021 WL 3059755, at *2) (finding that plaintiff
failed to state a § 1681s-2(b) claim).
Here, Leath’s claim under § 1681s-2(b) fails for at least
three reasons. First, although Leath alleges that she filed a
formal dispute under § 1681i (presumably to a consumer reporting
agency), (ECF No. 2 at PageID 2), she does not allege “that
[ARS] received notice from a [consumer reporting agency]
regarding the disputed information.” Green v. Navy Fed. Credit
Union, No. 3:24 CV 632, 2024 WL 4564421, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Oct.
24, 2024) (“Absent this essential element, Plaintiff's FCRA
claim cannot proceed and fails as a matter of law.”). Second,
Leath has not alleged specific facts demonstrating how the
information she disputed is inaccurate or misleading. See
Settles v. Trans Union, LLC, No. 3:20-CV-00084, 2020 WL 6900302,
at *5 (M.D. Tenn. Nov. 24, 2020) (“[T]o establish any FCRA
violation Plaintiff must show that the credit report is patently
incorrect or materially misleading”; finding that plaintiff had
not plausibly alleged that the reported information was
inaccurate and dismissing for failure to state a claim). Lastly,
Leath has not plausibly alleged facts demonstrating how ARS’s
investigation was unreasonable. See Bailey v. Equifax Info.
Servs., LLC, No. 13-10377, 2013 WL 3305710, at *9 (E.D. Mich.
July 1, 2013) (dismissing plaintiff’s complaint because she
“failed to make factual allegations that support her claims that
[defendant] reported inaccurate or misleading information or had
unreasonable procedures” (citing Elsady v. Rapid Global Bus.
Solutions, Inc., 09–11659, 2010 WL 2740154, at *7 (E.D. Mich.
July 12, 2010)). Thus, Leath fails to state a claim under §
1681s-2(b). However, in lieu of dismissal, the undersigned
recommends that Leath be given leave to amend her complaint.
III. RECOMMENDATION
Based on the above, the undersigned recommends that Leath
be given thirty days to amend her complaint and bring her claim
under § 1681s-2(b).
Respectfully submitted,
s/Tu M. Pham
TU M. PHAM
Chief United States Magistrate Judge
July 17, 2025
Date
NOTICE
WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS AFTER BEING SERVED WITH A COPY OF THIS
REPORT AND RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION, ANY PARTY MAY SERVE AND FILE
SPECIFIC WRITTEN OBJECTIONS TO THE PROPOSED FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS. ANY PARTY MAY RESPOND TO ANOTHER PARTY’S
OBJECTIONS WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS AFTER BEING SERVED WITH A
COPY. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b)(2); L.R.
72.1(g)(2). FAILURE TO FILE OBJECTIONS WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS
MAY CONSTITUTE A WAIVER AND/OR FORFEITURE OF OBJECTIONS,
EXCEPTIONS, AND FURTHER APPEAL.