WEBSTER v. FLORIDA SUPREME COURT

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TALLAHASSEE DIVISION

FREDERICK WEBSTER,

D.O.C. # 856553,

Plaintiff,

vs. Case No. 4:25-cv-297-MW-MAF

FLORIDA SUPREME COURT,

et al.,

Defendants.

_________________________/

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a civil rights complaint

challenging the Florida Supreme Court’s denial of his petition for a writ of

mandamus. ECF No. 1. Plaintiff alleges the denial violated his constitutional

rights. He has paid the filing fee. ECF No. 3. For the reasons discussed

below, this case should be dismissed as malicious.

I. Background

This is not Plaintiff’s first attempt at litigating the matter. As noted by

Plaintiff in his complaint, he previously raised the same claims in Webster v.

Florida Supreme Court, et al., Case No. 4:24-cv-449-AW-MJF (N.D. Fla.)

(hereinafter “Webster I”). ECF No. 1 at 3. Plaintiff’s complaint in Webster I

was docketed November 5, 2024. See Webster I at ECF No. 1. On January

15, 2025, United States Magistrate Judge Frank recommended the

complaint be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at ECF No.

9. On February 11, 2025, United States District Judge Walker adopted the

recommendation and dismissed the case without prejudice for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction, citing the Rooker-Feldman doctrine:

Indeed, “it is well settled that a federal district court lacks jurisdiction to

review, reverse, or invalidate a final state court decision.” Dale v.

Moore, 121 F.3d 624, 626 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing District of Columbia

Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity

Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923)); see also Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi

Basic Indus. Corp., 522 U.S. 280, 284 (2005) (noting that a federal

district court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate “cases brought by state-

court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments

rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting

district court review and rejection of those judgments”). “Under the

Rooker–Feldman doctrine, the authority to review final decisions from

the highest court of the state is reserved to the Supreme Court of the

United States.” Jones v. Crosby, 137 F.3d 1279, 1280 (11th Cir. 1998).

Although Webster casts his lawsuit as a section 1983 action, he is—in

fact—seeking collateral review in federal court of a final state court

decision. This he cannot do.

Id. at ECF No. 13. Judgment was entered the same day. Id. at ECF No. 14.

Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal on March 4, 2025. Id. at ECF No. 18. The

Eleventh Circuit dismissed the appeal on June 9, 2025 because Plaintiff

failed to pay the filing fee. Id. at ECF No. 30. On July 2, 2025, Plaintiff paid

the appeal filing fee. Id. at ECF No. 32. Plaintiff’s appeal has not yet been

reopened.

Despite Judge Walker’s Order, Plaintiff has now filed a nearly identical,

successive complaint on the same issues and against the same Defendants

in the instant case.1 Compare ECF No. 1 of this case with ECF No. 1 of

Webster I. The instant complaint was filed July 1, 2025 by prison mailbox

rule and docketed July 14, 2025. See ECF No. 1. Plaintiff again attempts to

sue the Florida Supreme Court in its official capacity because he believes its

denial of his petition for writ of mandamus was “illegal” and “resulted in the

violation of his [First and Fourteenth Amendment] rights.” Id. at 3. Plaintiff

claims that “in this instant action Plaintiff will show that he is not attempting

to seek review of the State court judgment…the Rooker-Feldman doctrine

does not apply where Defendants [have] committed illegal acts and

omissions.” Id. Plaintiff then proceeds to regurgitate the same arguments he

made in Webster I. Id. at 4-6; ECF No. 1 at 4-6 of Webster I.

II. Discussion

The Court is required to screen, “as soon as practicable after

docketing,” any civil complaint “in which a prisoner seeks redress from a

1 In Webster I, Plaintiff listed seven Defendants—the Florida Supreme Court and six of its

justices—in their official capacity. In the instant case, Plaintiff lists two Defendants in their

official capacity—the Florida Supreme Court and Chief Justice Muniz. Given the official

capacity designation, the judge-defendants are redundant and both cases are only

against the Florida Supreme Court.

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28

U.S.C § 1915A(a). Relevant here, the Court must dismiss the complaint if it

is malicious. 28 U.S.C § 1915A(b)(1). The Eleventh Circuit has made clear

that “a plaintiff's duplicative complaint is an abuse of the judicial process and

is properly dismissed without prejudice as malicious” under both §§

1915A(b)(1) & 1915(e)(2)(B). Daker v. Ward, 999 F.3d 1300, 1308 (11th Cir.

2021); see also Moore v. Brown, No. 3:22-cv-2311/MCR/ZCB, 2022 WL

18108679, at *1 (N.D. Fla. Nov. 7, 2022) (same) (collecting cases).

Further, collateral estoppel bars Plaintiff from getting a second bite of

the apple on the same issue. Webster I was dismissed for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction. Though such a non-merits determination does not allow

for a res judicata dismissal “on the substance of the asserted claim, it does

adjudicate the court's jurisdiction, and a second complaint cannot command

a second consideration of the same jurisdictional claims.” N. Georgia Elec.

Membership Corp. v. City of Calhoun, Ga., 989 F.2d 429, 433 (11th Cir.

1993). In other words, relitigating “the precise issue of jurisdiction…that led

to the initial dismissal” is barred. Id.

The Webster I dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant

to Rooker-Feldman precludes Plaintiff from seeking review again on the

same issue here. As discussed, Plaintiff’s claims in both cases are identical.

The only difference is that now, he has added argument as to why he

believes Rooker-Feldman does not apply and this Court has jurisdiction. But

Plaintiff was already given the opportunity to fully and fairly litigate the

jurisdictional issue—and in fact did—in Webster I. The question of jurisdiction

was a critical and necessary part of that judgment. See Irvin v. United States,

335 F. App'x 821, 824 (11th Cir. 2009) (citing the “four prerequisites” of issue

preclusion as stated in Christo v. Padgett, 223 F.3d 1324, 1339 (11th Cir.

2000) and holding “jurisdictional determinations are entitled to preclusive

effect under the collateral estoppel doctrine”); see also Burns v. Lozada,

2022 WL 41762, at *2 (11th Cir. Jan. 5, 2022) (“Our precedent establishes

that issue preclusion applies to jurisdictional determinations”).

Plaintiff’s remedy for displeasure with a court opinion is to appeal to

the appropriate appellate authority, not file a duplicative complaint. Plaintiff

signed the Rule 11 Certification, indicating the complaint in this case was

“not being presented for an improper purpose” and was “supported by

existing law or by a non-frivolous argument for extending, modifying, or

reversing existing law.” ECF No. 1 at 9-10. Filing an identical complaint in

the same court a few months after the first complaint was dismissed for lack

of jurisdiction is the epitome of frivolous, malicious, and an improper purpose.

The rules apply equally to Plaintiff as they do other litigants. See In re Bailey,

521 F. App'x 920, 922 (11th Cir. 2013) (“pro se litigants must conform to

procedural rules”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b) (“By presenting to the court a

pleading…or other paper…an attorney or unrepresented party certifies

that…”) (emphasis added); Patterson v. Aiken, 841 F.2d 386, 388 (11th Cir.

1988) (affirming Rule 11 sanctions against a pro se litigant). Plaintiff is

warned that should he continue to file complaints involving the same issue

in this Court, Rule 11 sanctions will be imposed against him.

III. Recommendation

For the reasons discussed, it is respectfully RECOMMENDED that this

action be DISMISSED without prejudice2 as malicious under 28 U.S.C §

1915A(b)(1) and because Plaintiff’s jurisdictional claim is barred by collateral

estoppel. Any amendment before this Court would be futile.

IN CHAMBERS at Tallahassee, Florida on July 17, 2025.

s/ Martin A. Fitzpatrick

MARTIN A. FITZPATRICK

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

2 A dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction must be without prejudice. Stuart v.

Ryan, 818 F. App'x 858 (11th Cir. 2020). This does not mean Plaintiff is permitted to re-

file the same complaint in a federal district court—he is not. Plaintiff is free to litigate the

issues he is raising in the appropriate forum. As was previously explained to him, “the

authority to review final decisions from the [Florida Supreme Court] is reserved to the

Supreme Court of the United States.” See supra at 2.

NOTICE TO THE PARTIES

Within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this

Report and Recommendation, a party may serve and file specific

written objections to these proposed findings and recommendations.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). A copy of the objections shall be served upon

all other parties. A party may respond to another party’s objections

within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Fed.

R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). Any different deadline that may appear on the

electronic docket is for the Court’s internal use only and does not

control. If a party fails to object to the Magistrate Judge’s findings or

recommendations as to any particular claim or issue contained in this

Report and Recommendation, that party waives the right to challenge

on appeal the District Court’s order based on the unobjected-to factual

and legal conclusions. See 11th Cir. Rule 3-1; 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C).