Opinion

Blacher v. Gautreaux

Court
District Court, M.D. Louisiana
Filed
Jul 17, 2025
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 38.8%

recognizing that “[a] supervisor may not be held liable for a civil rights violation under any theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability”

How later courts described this case

  • recognizing that “[a] supervisor may not be held liable for a civil rights violation under any theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

RAYMOND BLACHER (#435148) CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

24-1025-JWD-RLB

SID GAUTREAUX, ET AL.

NOTICE

Please take notice that the attached Magistrate Judge’s Report has been filed with the

Clerk of the United States District Court.

In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), you have fourteen (14) days after being served

with the attached Report to file written objections to the proposed findings of fact, conclusions of

law, and recommendations therein. Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings,

conclusions, and recommendations within 14 days after being served will bar you, except upon

grounds of plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and

legal conclusions of the Magistrate Judge which have been accepted by the District Court.

ABSOLUTELY NO EXTENSION OF TIME SHALL BE GRANTED TO FILE

WRITTEN OBJECTIONS TO THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT.

Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on July 16, 2025.

S

RICHARD L. BOURGEOIS, JR.

U NITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

RAYMOND BLACHER (#435148) CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

24-1025-JWD-RLB

SID GAUTREAUX, ET AL.

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

The pro se Plaintiff, a person formerly confined at East Baton Rouge Parish Prison, filed

this proceeding pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants Sid Gautreaux and East Baton

Rouge Parish Prison, complaining that his constitutional rights were violated due to

unconstitutional conditions of confinement and deliberate indifference to his serious medical

needs. He seeks monetary and injunctive relief.

On May 12, 2025, the plaintiff was ordered to amend his Complaint.1 A review of the

record reveals that the plaintiff has not filed an amended Complaint.

28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e) and 1915A

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e) and 1915A, this Court is authorized to dismiss an

action or claim brought by a prisoner who is proceeding in forma pauperis or is asserting a claim

against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity if satisfied that

the action or claim is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted. An action or claim is properly dismissed as frivolous if the claim lacks an arguable basis

either in fact or in law. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992), citing Neitzke v. Williams,

1 The Order to Amend (R. Doc. 7) detailed the relevant law and ordered the plaintiff to amend his Complaint by

adding additional defendants, if necessary, and factual allegations indicating how each defendant was personally

involved, for each claim for which he sought relief.

490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Hicks v. Garner, 69 F.3d 22, 24-25 (5th Cir. 1995). A claim is

factually frivolous if the alleged facts are “clearly baseless, a category encompassing allegations

that are ‘fanciful,’ ‘fantastic,’ and ‘delusional.’” Id. at 32-33. A claim has no arguable basis in

law if it is based upon an indisputably meritless legal theory, “such as if the complaint alleges the

violation of a legal interest which clearly does not exist.” Davis v. Scott, 157 F.3d 1003, 1005

(5th Cir. 1998). The law accords judges not only the authority to dismiss a claim which is based

on an indisputably meritless legal theory, but also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the

factual allegations. Denton v. Hernandez, supra, 504 U.S. at 32. Pleaded facts which are merely

improbable or strange, however, are not frivolous for purposes of § 1915. Id. at 33; Ancar v. Sara

Plasma, Inc., 964 F.2d 465, 468 (5th Cir. 1992). A § 1915 dismissal may be made any time,

before or after service of process and before or after an answer is filed, if the court determines

that the allegation of poverty is untrue; or the action is frivolous or malicious; fails to state a

claim on which relief may be granted; or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is

immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and Green v. McKaskle, 788 F.2d 1116,

1119 (5th Cir. 1986).

Plaintiff’s Allegations

In his Complaint Plaintiff alleges the following: At the East Baton Rouge Parish Prison,

the plaintiff was denied the guarantees of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments due to

understaffed food preparation personnel, medical personnel, and security. A PREA incident was

not reported to the Secretary. The plaintiff’s living conditions were hazardous, unhealthy, unsafe

and unsanitary due to mold, rodents, rust, and raw sewage.

Juridical Person

First, with regards to defendant East Baton Rouge Parish Prison, section 1983 only

imposes liability on a “person” who violates another’s constitutional rights under color of law. In

accordance with Rule 17(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Louisiana law governs

whether a person or entity can be sued. Under Louisiana law, to possess such a capacity, an entity

must qualify as a “juridical person.” This term is defined by the Louisiana Civil Code as an

“entity to which the law attributes personality, such as a corporation or partnership.” See La. Civ.

Code Ann. art. 24.

Defendant East Baton Rouge Parish Prison is not a “person” within the meaning of the

statute. See Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989) (a state is not a

“person” within the meaning of § 1983); See also Delta Fuel Co., Inc. v. Maxwell, 485 F. App’x.

685 (5th Cir. 2012) (affirming dismissal of claim against Concordia Parish Sheriff’s Department

because it is not a legal entity capable of being sued); Castillo v. Blanco, 2007 WL 2264285

(E.D. La., Aug. 1, 2007) (holding that Elayn Hunt Correctional Center and Dixon Correctional

Institute are not persons within the meaning of § 1983); and Glenn v. Louisiana, 2009 WL

382680 (E.D. La., Feb. 11, 2009) (“[a] jail is merely a building, not a ‘person’ subject to suit

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”). As such, the plaintiff cannot state a plausible claim against this

defendant.

Personal Involvement

As the defendant Gautreaux, in his individual capacity, in order for a prison official to be

found liable under § 1983, the official must have been personally and directly involved in

conduct causing an alleged deprivation of an inmate's constitutional rights, or there must be a

causal connection between the actions of the official and the constitutional violation sought to be

redressed. Lozano v. Smith, 718 F.2d 756, 768 (5th Cir. 1983). Any allegation that the defendant

is responsible for the actions of subordinate officers or co-employees under a theory of vicarious

responsibility or respondeat superior is alone insufficient to state a claim under § 1983. See

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009), citing Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436

U.S. 658, 691 (1978). See also Bell v. Livingston, 356 F. App’x. 715, 716–17 (5th Cir. 2009)

(recognizing that “[a] supervisor may not be held liable for a civil rights violation under any

theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability”). Further, in the absence of direct personal

participation by a supervisory official in an alleged constitutional violation, an inmate plaintiff

must allege that the deprivation of his constitutional rights occurred as a result of a subordinate's

implementation of the supervisor's affirmative wrongful policies or as a result of a breach by the

supervisor of an affirmative duty specially imposed by state law. Lozano v. Smith, supra, 718

F.2d at 768.

As to defendant Gautreaux, in his official capacity, a suit against a government official in

his official capacity is the equivalent of filing suit against the government agency of which the

official is an agent. Burge v. Parish of St. Tammany, 187 F.3d 452, 466 (5th Cir. 1999).

Therefore, to determine whether the plaintiff has stated such a claim, the Court must conduct a

municipal liability analysis under Monell v. Dep't of Social Services of the City of New York, 436

U.S. 658 (1978). See Nowell v. Acadian Ambulance Service, 147 F.Supp.2d 495, 501 (W.D. La.

2001) (citing Turner v. Houma Mun. Fire and Police Civil Service Bd., 229 F.3d 478, 483 fn. 10

(5th Cir. 2000)).

“Section 1983 offers no respondeat superior liability.” Pineda v. City of Houston, 291

F.3d 325, 328 (5th Cir. 2002). “Municipalities face § 1983 liability ‘when execution of a

government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts

may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury....” Id. (quoting Monell v. Dep't

of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)). That is, “[a] municipality is liable

only for acts directly attributable to it ‘through some official action or imprimatur.’ ” Valle v.

City of Houston, 613 F.3d 536, 541 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237

F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir. 2001)).

To assert a claim of municipal liability under Section 1983, a plaintiff must adduce

sufficient factual matter to satisfy three elements: (1) the existence of an official policy or

custom; (2) a policymaker with final policymaking authority; and (3) a violation of constitutional

rights whose “moving force” is the policy or custom. Davis v. Tarrant County, Tex., 565 F.3d

214, 227 (5th Cir. 2009).

In the instant matter, the plaintiff has not alleged personal involvement on the part of

defendant Gautreaux in his individual or official capacity. Although pro se complaints and

arguments must be liberally construed, see Moore v. McDonald, 30 F.3d 616, 620 (5th Cir.1994),

a plaintiff in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action must plead specific facts, not “conclusory allegations.”

See Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427, 1433 (5th Cir.1995) (en banc); Biliski v. Harborth, 55 F.3d

160, 162 (5th Cir.1995); Arnaud v. Odom, 870 F.2d 304, 307 (5th Cir.1989). Here, as the plaintiff

was previously advised, the plaintiff’s assertions are entirely vague and conclusory. Plaintiff has

not made any factual allegations with regards to the “who, when, where, and how” for any claim

for which he seeks relief. The plaintiff was ordered to amend his Complaint to remedy the

foregoing, but he failed to do so. As such, the plaintiff has failed to state a claim against

defendant Gautreaux.

RECOMMENDATION

It is recommended that Plaintiff’s claims against all defendants, be dismissed, with

prejudice, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§

1915(e) and 1915A.2

Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on July 16, 2025.

S

RICHARD L. BOURGEOIS, JR.

U NITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

2 Plaintiff is advised that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) provides that, “In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or

appeal a judgment in a civil action or proceeding under this section [Proceedings in forma pauperis] if the prisoner

has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a

court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.”

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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