N.T. v. Galesburg Community Unit School District No. 205

IN THE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

ROCK ISLAND DIVISION

N.T. and P.T., individually and as

Parent and Next Friend of C.T.,

Plaintiffs,

Case No. 4:24-cv-04124-JEH

v.

GALESBURG COMMUNITY UNIT

SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 205,

Defendant.

Order

Now before the Court is Plaintiffs N.T. and P.T., individually and as Parent

and Next Friend of C.T.’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs (D. 62).1 For the

reasons set forth infra, the Motion is granted.

I

Plaintiffs N.T. and P.T., individually and as Parents and Next Friends of

C.T., filed their Complaint (D. 1) against Defendant Galesburg Community Unit

School District No. 205 (District) and the Illinois State Board of Education2 on July

15, 2024. The Plaintiffs claimed the District violated the Individuals with

Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1409, when it insisted and

was insisting that C.T., the Plaintiffs’ son then in the middle of first grade, be sent

an hour and 15 minutes away to a school in Peoria, Illinois, a segregated school

fully isolated from C.T.’s non-disabled peers. C.T., diagnosed with attention

deficit hyperactivity disorder, anxiety, sensory disturbance, and other challenges,

1 Citations to the electronic docket are abbreviated as “D. ___ at ECF p. ___.”

2 The Illinois State Board of Education was terminated from this case on September 23, 2024 pursuant to

the parties’ Rule 41 Notice of Dismissal of the Illinois State Board of Education (D. 23).

began kindergarten at Silas Willard Elementary in Galesburg, Illinois, the local

school. Following C.T.’s transfer at his family’s request to King Elementary, a

Behavior Intervention Plan which resulted from a Functional Behavior

Assessment was monitored. After C.T.’s return in November 2023 to Silas Willard

to continue in the first grade, an IEP was ultimately developed in December 2023

for C.T. which specified C.T.’s placement in the school in Peoria, a therapeutic day

school.

The Plaintiffs then requested and received a due process hearing. After the

March-April 2024 hearing, an impartial hearing officer ruled that District 205 had

met its obligations under the IDEA, affirming that the Peoria school, or a similar

therapeutic setting, was appropriate based on C.T.’s ongoing behavioral

challenges and needs, and the Peoria school was the least restrictive environment

where C.T. could receive a free and appropriate public education while receiving

the intensive, structured support necessary for both behavioral and academic

progress. Upon the Plaintiffs filing the instant lawsuit in July 2024 seeking judicial

review of the administrative ruling below, C.T. remained at Silas Willard pursuant

to a “stay put” provision of the IDEA.

The District filed a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and

Preliminary Honig Injunction (D. 6) on July 31, 2024 which prompted several

proceedings in court and a responsive brief from the Plaintiffs. After the Motion

proceeded to hearing on September 12, 2024 at which the Defendant presented

evidence, the Defendant withdrew the Motion and the Court scheduled the matter

for the following month for hearing on the merits of the Plaintiffs’ Complaint. The

parties submitted pretrial memorandums, the case proceeded to a bench trial on

October 21, 2024, and the parties filed post-trial memorandums and responses to

those memorandums. On December 5, 2024, the Court reversed the April 11, 2024

administrative ruling below, vacated the District’s December 2023 IEP, and

ordered the District to create an appropriate IEP for C.T. at Silas Willard. After

judgment was entered on December 6, 2024, the Defendant filed its Notice of

Appeal (D. 45) on January 3, 2025. Ultimately, on April 17, 2025, the Plaintiffs filed

the instant Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs to which the Defendant

responded (D. 66) and the Plaintiffs filed their Reply (D. 68).

II

Section 1415(i)(3) of the IDEA provides, in relevant part: “In any action or

proceeding brought under this section, the court, in its discretion, may award

reasonable attorneys’ fees as part of the costs . . . to a prevailing party who is the

parent of a child with a disability”. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(I). The District does

not dispute the Plaintiffs’ “prevailing party” status. See Linda T. ex rel. William A.

v. Rice Lake Area School Dist., 417 F.3d 704, 707-08 (7th Cir. 2005) (“A party ‘prevails’

for purposes of federal fee-shifting statutes when he or she obtains ‘actual relief

on the merits’ of a claim that ‘materially alters the legal relationship between the

parties by modifying the defendant’s behavior in a way that directly benefits the

plaintiff.’”) (quoting Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 111-12 (1992)). Section

1415(i)(3)(C) provides, in relevant part: “Fees awarded under this paragraph shall

be based on rates prevailing in the community in which the action or proceeding

arose for the kind and quality of services furnished.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(C).

“The most useful starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee is

the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a

reasonable hourly rate.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). “[T]he fee

applicant bears the burden of establishing entitlement to an award and

documenting the appropriate hours expended and hourly rates.” Id. at 437. The

“lodestar” amount, once calculated, may be adjusted in limited circumstances.

Johnson v. GDF, Inc., 668 F.3d 927, 929 (7th Cir. 2012); see also Pickett v. Sheridan

Health Care Ctr., 664 F.3d 632, 640 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Once the district court has

established the lodestar, the court may adjust it to account for factors not

subsumed by the lodestar calculation.”) (citing Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 559

U.S. 542, 552-53 (2010)).

Here, the Plaintiffs seek to recover their lodestar of $245,170.50 for 516.10

hours their counsel, Hughes Socol Piers Resnick and Dym, Ltd. (HSPRD), worked

at HSPRD’s standard 2024 hourly rates on this federal court litigation.

A

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has stated its “preference” to

compensate attorneys under fee-shifting statutes in civil rights legislation “for the

amount that they would have earned from paying clients, i.e., the standard hourly

rate.” Mathur v. Bd. of Trs. of S. Ill. Univ., 317 F.3d 738, 743 (7th Cir. 2003). An

“attorney’s actual billing rate for comparable work is presumptively appropriate

to use as the market rate.” Id. Here, two HSPRD attorneys worked on this case:

Charles D. Wysong and Caryn C. Lederer. Attorney Wysong’s 2024 standard

billing rate was $465 per hour whereas Attorney Lederer’s 2024 standard billing

rate was $525 per hour.3

Attorney Wysong, who worked on this federal litigation from beginning to

end, graduated from law school in 2012, previously clerked for a Seventh Circuit

judge and worked for Equip for Equality where he assisted more than 200 families

and students with disabilities in education disputes including special education

proceedings as well as disputes relating to discrimination and discipline, and, at

HSPRD where he is a shareholder, continues to represent students and families in

special education, education, and discrimination claims. He has repeatedly

litigated discrimination claims against the City of Chicago and represents

whistleblowers in litigation around the country. HSPRD Attorney Lederer was

3 Their respective 2025 standard billing rates are $485 and $545. Pls.’ Ex. B Wysong Decl. ¶12 (D. 62-1 at

ECF p. 8); Pls.’ Ex. C Lederer Decl. ¶9 (D. 62-1 at ECF p. 33).

brought into this case after the Defendant filed its Motion for Temporary

Restraining Order (TRO). Due to such filing the Court set an expedited briefing

and hearing schedule. Attorney Lederer graduated from law school in 2004,

previously worked as a litigation associate in a New York office and in the Special

Litigation Unit of New York Legal Assistance Group where she litigated impact

litigation and class actions on behalf of low-income New York residents, and at

HSPRD where she is a shareholder and has litigated dozens of civil rights and

employment matters.

Attached to Attorney Wysong’s Declaration (D. 62-1 at ECF pp. 6-11) are

redacted invoices reflecting the standard billing rates HSPRD used - $465 for

Wysong – for hourly-paying HSPRD clients in 2024. In Attorney Lederer’s

Declaration (D. 62-1 at ECF pp. 30-34), she states HSPRD adjusts its rates upward

annually, with Lederer’s 2023 standard billing rate at $505 whereas her 2025

standard billing rate is now $545. She cites cases in which other courts approved

of HSPRD’s standard billing rates. See, e.g., Jimenez v. GLK Foods LLC, No. 12-cv-

00209 (E.D. Wis. Jan. 23, 2018), Order (D. 209); Wenckaitis v. Specialty Contactors,

Inc., No. 20-cv-03743 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2024), Order (D. 126). To bolster the point

that Wysong’s and Lederer’s 2024 standard billing rates are reasonable, the

Plaintiffs include Declarations from practitioners in special education litigation:

Olga Pribyl at Equip for Equality, Illinois’s largest legal non-profit serving people

with disabilities, who charges $550 per hour; and Matthew D. Cohen who

represents families in special education disputes and who charges $600 per hour.

Additionally, the Plaintiffs attached the Declarations, (D. 62-1 at ECF pp. 67-78), of

experienced litigators who attest that they charge even higher rates (between $625

and $850 per hour) to litigate civil rights and discrimination claims.

Given Attorneys Wysong’s and Lederer’s Declarations, the Court has no

difficulty determining their true billing rates. The Court also has the “next best

evidence” as well – “the rate charged by lawyers in the community of reasonably

comparable skill, experience, and reputation.” People Who Care v. Rockford Bd. of

Educ., Sch. Dist. No. 205, 90 F.3d 1307, 1310 (7th Cir. 1996). The Defendant,

however, takes issue with Plaintiffs’ counsel’s redacted invoices as well as the

Declarations by fellow practitioners in special education, Pribyl and Cohen. The

Defendant argues the Plaintiffs do not assert that clients paying those invoices are

families in special education disputes, the fellow practitioners omit concrete

evidence that clients actually pay the stated hourly rates, and the Plaintiffs’ cited

judicially approved fee awards to HSPRD do not involve special education IDEA

disputes.

The Defendant goes too far in arguing the Plaintiffs have not presented any

“concrete evidence” showing that they and their comparators in the field charge

and/or receive payments from clients at or close to the hourly rates claimed here

by HSPRD. Def.’s Resp. (D. 66 at ECF pp. 18-19). The case law does not require

evidence of an attorney’s actual billing rate for exactly the same work, but instead

for “comparable work”. In their Reply, the Plaintiffs clarify that HSPRD does not

have different or lower rates for education cases, special education cases, or for

representing students; instead, HSPRD charges hourly clients “standard” rates

across practice areas. Nor has the Defendant, as the Plaintiffs point out, presented

any evidence that the market rates for parent-side special education lawyers is

markedly different than for other types of plaintiff discrimination and civil rights

litigation. Compare K.S. v. Bd. of Educ. of Vandalia Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 203, No.

16-CV-22-NJR-DGW, 2018 WL 3993628, at *9 (S.D. Ill. Aug. 21, 2018) (“The Court

agrees that the complex nature of special education cases does justify a relatively

higher hourly rate due to the specialization of practitioners . . .”.) (emphasis

added). In K.S., the court determined Attorney Pribyl’s rate of $425 in 2018 was

reasonable for the Chicago area and did not lower that rate for purposes of

awarding attorneys’ fees in a case litigated in the Southern District of Illinois. 2018

WL 3993628, at *8.

Similarly, here, the Court finds Wysong’s and Lederer’s respective hourly

billing rates are reasonable, though their firm is located in Chicago. In Mathur, the

Seventh Circuit explained:

[I]f an out-of-town attorney has a higher hourly rate than local

practitioners, district courts should defer to the out-of-town

attorney’s rate when calculating the lodestar amount, though if local

attorneys could do as well, and there is no other reason to have them

performed by the former, then the judge, in his discretion, might

allow only an hourly rate which local attorneys would have charged

for the same service.

Mathur, 317 F.3d at 744 (quotation marks omitted). Here, Plaintiff P.T.’s

Declaration (D. 62-1 at ECF p. 3) provides that she sought legal assistance for the

education and special education issues facing her child, C.T., that P.T. searched for

an attorney in Galesburg, Peoria, Springfield, and throughout central Illinois for

an attorney who would take the case, and that P.T. could not locate any attorneys

in central Illinois who were able to represent the Plaintiffs at the administrative

level. Her Declaration further provides that she again searched for lawyers in

central Illinois to take the Plaintiffs’ federal case, could not locate anyone in the

area, and did not find any law firms willing to litigate the case other than HSPRD.

Such inability to locate a “local” attorney coupled with HSPRD’s willingness to

take on this case and their credentials amount to Wysong and Lederer possessing

“qualities which command a premium.” Mathur, 317 F.3d at 743.

Finally, that the Plaintiffs failed to attach the actual fee agreement between

P.T. and HSPRD nor any paid invoices from P.T. is not a critical omission. Plaintiff

P.T.’s attached Declaration provides she:

agreed to pay HSPRD their standard hourly rates, including for 2024

$465 per hour for Charlie Wysong, $525 per hour for Caryn Lederer,

and $220 per hour for paralegal work. Given the uncertainty and

potentially significant time required for federal court litigation, I

agreed to pay HSPRD their standard hourly rates, with the agreement

that if the work exceeded a threshold, HSPRD would work on a

contingency and seek to recover the fees through a fee petition. The

case exceeded the threshold.

Pls.’ Ex. A P.T. Decl. ¶10 (D. 62-1 at ECF p. 4). Attorney Wysong’s Declaration

echoes those statements. The Court rejects the Defendant’s attempt to undermine

the presumptive reasonableness of Plaintiffs’ counsel’s hourly rates merely

because the Plaintiffs agreed to pay and are paying HSPRD “their full standard

hourly rate and expenses for this litigation, up to a threshold amount. Beyond that

amount . . . HSPRD is working on a contingency basis.” Pls.’ Ex. B Wysong Decl.

¶19 (D. 62-1 at ECF p. 10). HSPRD risked being paid only so much – perhaps

$5,000 per the Defendant’s hypothetical – with only the possibility of recovering

attorneys’ fees for the full time and effort actually expended on this case. The

Plaintiffs prevailed and did so because of the time and effort their attorneys spent

on their case. Contingency fee arrangements provide a viable means of

encouraging well qualified attorneys to take on cases that no other attorney would

(a fact illustrated in this case). The Plaintiffs’ counsel should not be punished by

the Court reducing their hourly rate because they took this case, in part, on a

contingent basis. See Pickett, 664 F.3d at 639 (“The lodestar approach forms the

centerpiece of attorneys’ fee determinations, and it applies even in cases where the

attorney represents the prevailing party pursuant to a contingent fee agreement.”).

To lower the hourly rate here would disincentivize attorneys from taking cases on

a contingent fee basis. Moreover, to lower the hourly rate here because of the

hybrid fee arrangement would be contrary to the IDEA’s fee-shifting provision

which is contained therein in order “[t]o ease the financial burden on parents

making claims[]”. T.D. v. LaGrange Sch. Dist. No. 102, 349 F.3d 469, 471 (7th Cir.

2003).

The Court finds Attorney Wysong’s 2024 standard billing rate of $465 per

hour and Attorney Lederer’s 2024 standard billing rate of $525 per hour are

reasonable given the attorneys’ credentials, those rates were their standard hourly

billing rates in 2024 for comparable work, they were willing to take the case when

others would not, and they obtained a favorable outcome on behalf of their clients

in this case.

B

The Plaintiffs seek attorneys’ fees for a total of 516.10 hours expended on

this case: 350.4 hours by Attorney Wysong; 150.1 hours by Attorney Lederer; and

15.6 hours by Marie Valles, a HSPRD litigation paralegal. The Court must examine

whether HSPRD’s attorneys exercised “billing judgment” in making their claim

that the number of hours they have submitted in their fee request was reasonable.

Spegon v. Cath. Bishop of Chi., 175 F.3d 544, 552 (7th Cir. 1999) (citing Hensley, 461

U.S. at 434). “Counsel for the prevailing party should make a good faith effort to

exclude from a fee request hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise

unnecessary, just as a lawyer in private practice ethically is obligated to exclude

such hours from his fee submission.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434. Additionally,

attorneys must adequately document their time. People Who Care, 90 F.3d 1307 at

1314.

The Plaintiffs attached to the instant Motion HSPRD’s contemporaneous

time records for this case, billed to the tenth of the hour, and they state that counsel

omitted time for any tasks of 0.1, removed time spent on necessary work collateral

to the federal court litigation, and have petitioned for Wysong’s and Lederer’s time

and not for other attorneys who worked on this matter. Plaintiffs’ counsel’s time

records span 10 pages, clearly identify the date, clearly identify Wysong or Lederer

or Valles, detail tasks succinctly, and further break a given date’s tasks into smaller

increments (e.g., CDW (Wysong) documented an email for .3, another email for .3,

and conference and follow up email for .3 for a total of 0.90 hours on 10/11/2024).

Pls.’ Ex. H (D. 62-1 at ECF pp. 80-89); id. at ECF p. 85. Nevertheless, the Defendant

District seeks a 60% reduction in the compensable number of hours, from 500 to

200 hours.

The Defendant District says it is “baffled” by how a case could proceed with

such uncommon efficiency and yet result in 500 hours of legal work. Def.’s Resp.

(D. 66 at ECF p. 4). The Defendant further argues several points including that

Plaintiffs’ counsel spent too much time on the TRO request the District made,

especially in light of the experience of Plaintiffs’ counsel, there was no formal

discovery nor any motion practice or protracted disputes prior to or during the

trial, and TRO hearing preparation would have positioned Plaintiffs’ counsel well

for the bench trial in October 2024. It also argues there is no reasonable justification

for how Plaintiffs’ counsel could have incurred 40 hours on broadly defined “post-

judgment” matters, the Plaintiffs’ claim that it took approximately 30 hours to craft

their fee petition is unreasonable, and 500 attorney hours by Plaintiffs’ counsel is

unreasonable when compared to the number of billed hours by the firm who

represented the Plaintiffs in the underlying administrative case and when

compared to the amount of time expended by the District’s previous counsel in

this federal court litigation.

Beginning with the last point, the Court does not put much stock in it as “the

losing counsel’s testimony that he could have done the winning counsel’s work in

less time, while relevant, is not worth much standing by itself. If the winning

counsel had taken less time, he might not be a [sic] position to ask for attorneys’

fees.” Mohr v. Chi. Sch. Reform Bd. of Trs. of Bd. of Educ. of the City of Chi., 194 F.

Supp. 2d 786, 789 (N.D. Ill. 2002). The Court has reviewed each of the specific

entries the Defendant highlights in its Response, (D. 66 at ECF pp. 10-11), but the

Court does not agree that they reveal duplicative work between two partners at

HSPRD, or are otherwise vague, unnecessary, and/or show inefficient use of time.

The District also had two attorneys litigate this case until current counsel was

substituted in on February 10, 2025. See Lenard v. Argento, 808 F.2d 1242, 1245 (7th

Cir. 1987) (“The defendants should not have wasted our time . . . with complaining

that [the plaintiff] was represented by three lawyers. The defendants were also

represented by three lawyers . . .”.). The mere fact that a party has more than one

attorney working on his/her case does not necessarily mean there was

duplication, and certainly not the type of duplication that would warrant a

reduction in hours for purposes of the lodestar calculation.

Indeed, Plaintiffs’ counsel’s entries are sufficiently specific for the Court to

understand how the hours listed were spent which, in turn, shows Wysong and

Lederer worked efficiently and spent time on necessary tasks. The hours

expended, particularly in light of the entries’ details, do not appear excessive to

the Court, and even if they did, a district court “may not ‘eyeball’ and decrease the

fee by an arbitrary percentage because of a visceral reaction that the request is

excessive.” Schlacher v. Law Offs. of Phillip J. Rotche & Assocs., P.C., 574 F.3d 852,

857 (7th Cir. 2009). To the extent the Defendant argues Attorney Lederer “block-

billed”, “although ‘block-billing’ does not provide the best possible description of

attorneys’ fees, it is not a prohibited practice.” Farfaras v. Citizens Bank & Tr. of Chi.,

433 F.3d 558, 569 (7th Cir. 2006). The Defendant identifies just three instances of

block-billing, but in each, Attorney Lederer provided enough specificity to make

up for that fact.

The Court is similarly unconcerned with the redactions that appear in those

entries. As the Plaintiffs put it, the redactions are “modest”, and several are

susceptible to the conclusion that the Plaintiffs’ names4 appear in the unredacted

version of the contemporaneous time records. Pls.’ Reply (D.68 at ECF p. 8). The

others, the Plaintiffs state, were done to preserve privilege and work product,

especially since an appeal is pending. There are enough unredacted details in

those entries to permit the Court to determine whether the time expended was

reasonable in relation to the substance of this litigation.

In addition to the foregoing, the Court finds the hours Plaintiffs’ counsel

expended in this case reasonable where counsel did the following over the course

of less than six months: Plaintiffs’ counsel had to quickly absorb an administrative

record that was over 1,700 pages long upon HSPRD taking over the case from prior

counsel; had to defend against the Defendant’s TRO motion filed two weeks after

the Plaintiffs filed their Complaint; had to prepare for a hearing on the merits of

their Complaint scheduled barely more than a month after the Defendant

withdrew its TRO motion; had to litigate a bench trial; and had to file a written

submission following the bench trial. Plaintiffs’ counsel did so with an outcome

fully favorable to their clients. The Court will not delve any further into the

Defendant’s arguments in support of their hours reduction request because a

“request for attorney’s fees should not result in a second major litigation.” Hensley,

461 U.S. at 437.

C

The Plaintiffs have sustained their burden in establishing the reasonableness

of Attorneys Wysong’s and Lederer’s hourly billing rates and the hours those two

attorneys expended on this case. The Defendant District does not argue otherwise

as to HSPRD paralegal Valles’s hourly billing rate and the hours she expended on

this case. See Def.’s Resp. (D. 66 at ECF p. 21 n. 7) (“[T]he District does not dispute

4 The Plaintiffs’ full names have been redacted in this case from the very beginning. See Pls.’ Compl. (D. 1).

the 15.6 hours of paralegal work completed by Ms. Valles.”). “Where a plaintiff

has obtained excellent results, his attorney should recover a fully compensatory

fee.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435; see also Sommerfield v. City of Chi., 863 F.3d 645, 651

(7th Cir. 2017) (“[a] plaintiff who achieves excellent results should receive the

entire lodestar, but where a plaintiff has achieved only partial or limited success,

the lodestar may be an excessive amount.”) (quoting Montanez v. Simon, 755 F.3d

547, 556 (7th Cir. 2014)).

The Plaintiffs are entitled to $245,170.50 in attorneys’ fees for 516.10 hours

expended by their counsel, HSPRD, comprised of: Attorney Wysong’s 2024

standard billing rate of $465 per hour for 350.4 hours ($162,936); Attorney

Lederer’s 2024 standard billing rate of $525 per hour for 150.1 hours ($78,802.50);

and Paralegal Valles’s 2024 standard billing rate of $220 per hour for 15.6 hours

($3,432).

D

The Plaintiffs additionally request an award of pre-judgment interest on

their attorneys’ fees. “Prejudgment interest is presumptively available to victims

of federal law violations.” McRoberts Software, Inc. v. Media 100, Inc., 329 F.3d 557,

572 (7th Cir. 2003). The purpose of such “is to ensure that an award is fully

compensatory.” Ryan M. v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chi., Dist. 299, 731 F. Supp. 2d

776, 795 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (citing City of Milwaukee v. Cement Div., Nat’l Gypsum Co.,

515 U.S. 189, 198 (1995)).

Pursuant to its discretion, the Court awards prejudgment interest in order

to account for the delay in payment. The Court finds such an award especially

warranted where the Plaintiffs petition for fees at their attorneys’ 2024 rates and

their attorneys may not ultimately be paid for some time. The Seventh Circuit’s

“practice has been to use the prime rate as the benchmark for prejudgment

interest” where there is no statutorily defined rate and “the district court [does

not] engage[] in refined rate-setting directed at determining a more accurate

market rate for interest.” First Nat’l Bank of Chi. v. Standard Bank & Tr., 172 F.3d

472, 480 (7th Cir. 1999). The current prime rate is 7.5%. WSJ MARKETS,

https://www.wsj.com/market-data/bonds/moneyrates (last visited Aug. 14,

2025).

The Defendant District argues that if the Court determines prejudgment

interest is appropriate, it should order such interest to begin no earlier than 30

days following the submission of the Plaintiffs’ attorney fee petition on April 17,

2025. Because the Court has determined prejudgment interest is appropriate, it

will do as the Defendant suggests. The Plaintiffs are entitled to prejudgment

interest on their attorneys’ fees award of $245,170.50 at the prime rate of 7.5%

starting May 17, 2025. See Judah M. v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chi., Dist. 299, 798 F.

Supp. 2d 942, 953-54 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (explaining the court believed it reasonable

that in order for the defendant to have a period of time to review the plaintiffs’ fee

petitions, like a client would have, without being charged interest, the plaintiffs

were entitled to prejudgment interest on their fees beginning thirty days after the

submission of those petitions to the defendant).

III

The Plaintiffs additionally seek to recover their costs and expenses as

provided by Section 1415(i)(3) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54. See FED. R.

CIV. P. 54(d) (providing in relevant part that “[u]nless a federal statute, these rules,

or a court order provides otherwise, costs--other than attorney’s fees--should be

allowed to the prevailing party.”). Specifically, they seek $3,069.85 in costs and

expenses, comprised of $1,658.29 in taxable costs5 pursuant to Rule 54(d)(1) and

5 The Plaintiffs, for completeness, separately filed a Bill of Costs (D. 63) for taxable costs with supporting

documentation.

$1,411.56 in non-taxable costs. The Defendant District makes no argument in

opposition to the expenses sought.

The costs for the complaint filing fee ($405), service of process ($147.64), a

transcript (340.60), and half of the hearing transcript fee (split with the Defendant)

($765.05) are permissible under 28 U.S.C. § 1920. See also Collins v. Gorman, 96 F.3d

1057, 1060 (7th Cir. 1996) (reasoning that Section 1920 permits “the prevailing

party to recover service costs that do not exceed the marshal’s fees, no matter who

actually effected service[]”). It costs $65 per hour for each item served plus travel

costs and any other out-of-pocket expenses when the U.S. Marshals serve process

personally. 28 C.F.R. § 0.114(a)(3). The invoice billed to HSPRD itemizing the total

balance of $147.64 the Plaintiffs seek for their process service fee for serving the

“Stephanie M. Jackson Subpoena” is both in line with the U.S. Marshals’ cost (here,

$60 plus mileage, paper printing, and rush service) and the $147.64 is not

challenged by the Defendant. The Plaintiffs are entitled to $1,658.29 in taxable

costs pursuant to Rule 54 and recoverable under the IDEA.

The Plaintiffs’ non-taxable costs include $648.61 for Westlaw research fees,

$30 for a TransUnion search charge to locate a TRO hearing witness, $401.78 for

travel expenses to the TRO hearing in Peoria, Illinois, and $331.17 for travel

expenses to the October 21, 2024 bench trial. “What expenses are recoverable as a

portion of an attorneys’ fee award under fee shifting provisions . . . is a decision

within the discretion of the trial court.” Doe v. Purdue Univ., No. 4:18-CV-89-JEM,

2023 WL 2734329, at *6 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 31, 2023). “[T]he costs that may be charged

to losing defendants [in a fee-shifting case] include those reasonable out-of-pocket

expenses incurred by the attorney which are normally charged to a fee-paying

client, in the course of providing legal services.” Greenfield Mills, Inc. v. Carter, 569

F. Supp. 2d 737, 759 (N.D. Ind. 2008) (quotation marks omitted). The Plaintiffs’

non-taxable costs are of the type that are normally charged to a fee-paying client

in the course of providing legal services. Furthermore, the amounts sought are

reasonable and are not challenged by the Defendant. The Plaintiffs are entitled to

$1,411.56 in non-taxable costs pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(I).

IV

For the reasons set forth supra, Plaintiffs N.T. and P.T., individually and as

Parent and Next Friend of C.T.’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs (D. 62) is

GRANTED. The Plaintiffs are awarded $245,170.50 in attorneys’ fees, $3,069.85 in

costs and expenses. The Plaintiffs’ Bill of Costs (D. 63) is thus ALLOWED, the

amount of which - $1,658.29 – is included in the costs awarded herein. The Plaintiffs

are awarded pre-judgment interest on their attorneys’ fees award at the prime rate

of 7.5% starting May 17, 2025. The Clerk is directed to enter an amended

judgment.

It is so ordered.

Entered on August 15, 2025

s/Jonathan E. Hawley

U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE