Arthur Huggins v. School District of Manatee County

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[PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 22-13325

____________________

ARTHUR HUGGINS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

SCHOOL DISTRICT OF MANATEE COUNTY,

A Florida Governmental Entity,

MANATEE COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD,

A Florida Governmental Entity,

CYNTHIA SAUNDERS,

In her individual and official capacity,

PAUL DAMICO,

In his individual and official capacity,

MIKE BARBER,

In his individual and official capacity,

ADAM WOLLARD,

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2 Opinion of the Court 22-13325

In his individual and official capacity,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 8:22-cv-01183-WFJ-TGW

____________________

Before ROSENBAUM, BRANCH, and KIDD, Circuit Judges.

ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judge:

Noted free-speech advocate Mike Godwin has remarked

that the First Amendment “was designed to protect offensive

speech because no one ever tries to ban the other kind.” David

Pescovitz, Indecency on the Net, Cincinnati CityBeat, Mar. 9–15,

1995, at 12, https://digital.cincinnatilibrary.org/digital/collec-

tion/p16998coll73/id/6589/rec/17. So true. But offensive speech

is in the ear of the hearer.

Here, Plaintiff-Appellant Arthur Huggins criticized Defend-

ants-Appellees the School Board of Manatee County, Florida

(“Board”),1 and District School Superintendent Cynthia Saunders’s

1 Huggins brought claims against the “School District of Manatee County” and

the “Manatee County School Board.” Defendants-Appellees assert that these

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22-13325 Opinion of the Court 3

decision to take control of Lincoln Memorial Academy, a local

charter school, and to remove its administration. His fellow com-

munity members who agreed with him no doubt took no offense

from Huggins’s comments.

But we cannot say the same thing about Saunders. Accord-

ing to Huggins’s complaint, because of his comments about the

Board and Saunders’s actions towards Lincoln Memorial, Saunders

prevented Huggins from speaking at a public Board meeting. She

arranged through the school district’s Chief of Security, Paul

Damico, to have City of Bradenton Police Officer Adam Wollard

remove Huggins from the meeting before he had a chance to de-

liver his remarks.

To Huggins, it was a clear case of viewpoint discrimination

and retaliation against his earlier advocacy.

So Huggins sued. He brought several claims against the

Board, the City of Bradenton, and individuals involved in his arrest

and the aftermath. But the district court dismissed Huggins’s com-

plaint for failure to state a claim. Huggins appeals the dismissal of

his First Amendment claims and the district court’s denial of leave

to amend his complaint a second time.

are not correct names and that the single entity responsible for the establish-

ment, organization, and operations of schools in Manatee County’s district

school system is “the School Board of Manatee County, Florida.” Florida law

appears to support the same naming convention. See Fla. Stat. § 1001.40. So

we use that term.

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4 Opinion of the Court 22-13325

After careful consideration and with the benefit of oral argu-

ment, we now reverse the district court’s dismissal of Huggins’s

claims against Saunders. Saunders did not satisfy her burden to in-

voke qualified immunity, and Huggins plausibly alleged his claims.

As for the district court’s dismissal of the remaining claims, we af-

firm. We also affirm the district court’s denial of Huggins’s request

for leave to amend his pleadings a second time.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

We are reviewing an order of dismissal, so we recount the

facts as Plaintiff-Appellant Huggins’s First Amended Complaint al-

leges them. See Ounjian v. Globoforce, Inc., 89 F.4th 852, 856 (11th

Cir. 2023).

We start with Defendants-Appellees. The Board operates,

controls, and supervises the free public schools in Manatee County.

During the events alleged here, Cynthia Saunders served as the Dis-

trict School Superintendent for the Board. In that capacity, she ad-

ministered and managed the public schools in Manatee County.

See Fla. Stat. § 1001.32(3). She also supervised instruction. See id.

As far as the Board went, as District School Superintendent, Saun-

ders served as secretary and executive officer and bore the respon-

sibility of making recommendations to the voting members of the

Board. See id. §§ 1001.48, 1001.51.

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When the Board met on November 12, 2019, Saunders was

present. Among other items, the agenda included a discussion of

funding for Lincoln Memorial.

Lincoln Memorial was a Black-owned charter school in

Manatee County. The Board had recently taken control of it and

removed its administration.

That did not go over well with several Bradenton commu-

nity members, including Plaintiff-Appellant Arthur Huggins. As a

result, Huggins and other community members began attending

Board meetings to give public comment. And sometimes, things

at the meetings became heated. In one July 2019 meeting, the

Board chair threatened to remove certain community members

from the meeting room. In another, police arrested a community

member while he was making a public comment, although charges

were dismissed. Around this same time, the Board imposed new

security measures like metal detectors, moved public comment

from the beginning to the end of meetings, and required commu-

nity members who wanted to give public comment to sign up

ahead of time.

For his part, Huggins had consistently criticized the Board

and Saunders. He regularly attended Board meetings, where he

denounced the Board’s decisions to hire Saunders and to remove

the administration from Lincoln Memorial.

In August 2019, a local news article quoted Huggins as call-

ing for an “audit” into the activities of the Board and suggesting

that the Board had undermined Lincoln Memorial. Then, in

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September, Huggins advocated for disciplinary action against

Saunders at a hearing on an administrative complaint from the

Florida Commissioner of Education. The Commissioner of Edu-

cation had alleged Saunders inflated graduation rates for her

schools in some years.

That brings us to the night of November 12, 2019. Huggins

went to that evening’s Board meeting intending to speak about the

approval of funds for Lincoln Memorial. But as Huggins walked

towards the door, Defendant-Appellee Mike Barber, the school dis-

trict’s Communications Director, told him no seats were available

and discouraged him from entering. So Huggins pointed out open

seats inside the room. He took a seat and sat for most of the four-

hour meeting.

Eventually, though, Huggins’s pre-existing back injuries

acted up, so he stood up quietly against the rear wall to relieve his

back pain. That’s when things escalated.

Defendant-Appellee Paul Damico, the school district’s Chief

of Security, went over to Huggins. He told Huggins to “either have

a seat or leave the meeting.” Damico added that Saunders, his boss,

was giving this order.

Huggins tried to explain that he was standing only to address

his back pain. But Damico immediately left and fetched Defend-

ant-Appellee City of Bradenton Police Officer Adam Wollard.2

2 Huggins’s complaint alleges that Officer Wollard is both “employed as a po-

lice officer for the City of Bradenton and as a security officer by the . . . Board.”

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Wollard instructed Huggins to leave the room. So Huggins went

to wait in the main lobby. But there, Wollard placed his hand on

Huggins’s back and ushered him outside. Huggins was not allowed

to return that night to give his public comment.

But the story doesn’t end there. Huggins gave interviews to

local news outlets about his removal. In them, he strongly criti-

cized his treatment at the Board meeting.

At the next week’s meeting, Saunders apologized to the

Board for the incident. She said, “the public is welcome inside this

chamber,” and pledged to “do better to make sure everyone is safe,

and everyone feels that they are welcome.” One Board member

apologized to Huggins for his removal and promised, “that will not

happen to you or anybody else again.” Another called for an exec-

utive session with staff to go over the Board’s safety protocols.

The Board and staff held that executive session in early De-

cember. There, Mike Barber, the school district’s Communica-

tions Director, showed the Board a video he had created. That

video combined clips of public meetings in other states where at-

tendees had gotten violent against board members with footage of

Huggins’s removal from the November 12 meeting. Barber then

shared the video with the Sarasota Herald-Tribune. The paper pub-

lished the video online, where it remains today.

B. Procedural History

Huggins filed suit in state court against the Board, Saunders,

Damico, Barber, and Wollard in April 2022. The next month,

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Defendants removed the case to the U.S. District Court for the

Middle District of Florida. After the district court granted Defend-

ants’ motions for a more definite statement, Huggins filed the op-

erative First Amended Complaint (“Complaint”). The Complaint

alleges 19 counts, including violations of the First Amendment, the

Fourth Amendment, the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment, the equal benefit clause of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and sev-

eral state laws.

Defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint. And Huggins

sought leave to amend his pleadings a second time. The district

court denied Huggins’s motion and granted Defendants’ motion to

dismiss. In its order dismissing the Complaint, the court said that

the Complaint continued to suffer from “multiple pleading defi-

ciencies previously identified” in its earlier orders. Still, the court

addressed the substance of Huggins’s claims.

The district court dismissed Huggins’s federal claims with

prejudice under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-

dure. It held that the individual Defendants were entitled to quali-

fied immunity and Huggins had not established that the Board or

City of Bradenton were subject to municipal liability. 3 As for Hug-

gins’s state claims, the district court declined to exercise supple-

mental jurisdiction over them. Huggins now appeals.

3 Huggins sued Officer Wollard in both his individual capacity and in his offi-

cial capacity. The claims against Wollard in his official capacity are effectively

claims against Wollard’s employer, the City of Bradenton. See McMillian v.

Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781, 785 n.2 (1997).

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II. LEGAL STANDARD

We review de novo the grant of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to

dismiss for failure to state a claim. Burban v. City of Neptune Beach,

920 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2019). We accept a complaint’s well-

pleaded allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the

plaintiff’s favor. See Newton v. Duke Energy Fla., LLC, 895 F.3d 1270,

1275 (11th Cir. 2018).

“Although we ordinarily review district court orders deny-

ing leave to amend a complaint for abuse of discretion . . . we re-

view such decisions de novo when the denial is based on a legal

determination that amendment would be futile.” Taveras v. Bank

of Am., N.A., 89 F.4th 1279, 1285 (11th Cir. 2024) (quotation marks

and italicization omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

We address Huggins’s appeal in five parts. First, we assess

his First Amendment claims against Saunders. We hold that Saun-

ders did not satisfy her burden to invoke qualified immunity and

that Huggins pled sufficient facts to state a claim against her. Sec-

ond, we consider the claims against Damico and Wollard. We de-

termine that the district court properly granted them qualified im-

munity. Third, we conclude that the district court also was correct

to dismiss the claim against Barber because he’s entitled to qualified

immunity. Fourth, we review Huggins’s claims against the Board

and the City of Bradenton. There, we affirm the district court’s

decision that he failed to establish municipal liability. Fifth, we

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uphold the district court’s denial of leave for Huggins to further

amend his Complaint.

A. Saunders

Huggins alleges that Saunders violated his First Amendment

rights in two ways when she directed his removal from the

November 12, 2019, Board meeting. Count 9 asserts that Saunders

abridged Huggins’s free-speech rights by preventing him from

giving public comment. And Counts 11 and 16 allege that Saunders

caused Huggins to be expelled in unconstitutional retaliation for

his prior speech. 4

The district court dismissed these claims on the basis of

qualified immunity. Because Saunders fails to carry her burden to

invoke qualified immunity and because Huggins plausibly alleges

speech-restriction and First Amendment retaliation claims against

her, we reverse.

1. Qualified Immunity

We begin with qualified immunity. The doctrine shields

government officials performing discretionary functions from civil

4 Count 11 discusses “freedom of speech (retaliation).” And Count 16 ad-

dresses “governmental retaliation after petition for redress of grievances.”

The same standard applies to alleged retaliation for a plaintiff’s speech or for

the exercise of his right to petition the government. See DeMartini v. Town of

Gulf Stream, 942 F.3d 1277, 1288–89 (11th Cir. 2019). Both counts rest on the

same alleged act of retaliation and reference Huggins’s same allegedly moti-

vating earlier public comments. We analyze Counts 11 and 16 together for

purposes of this decision.

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liability unless their conduct violates clearly established statutory

or constitutional rights that a reasonable person would have

known about. Baker v. City of Madison, 67 F.4th 1268, 1278 (11th

Cir. 2023). We employ a burden-shifting analysis to assess whether

a government official’s conduct is protected.

First, a government official raising a defense of qualified im-

munity must “prove that [s]he acted within the scope of h[er] dis-

cretionary authority.” Spencer v. Benison, 5 F.4th 1222, 1230 (11th

Cir. 2021). That means she must have acted (1) in accordance with

her job-related duties, and (2) within the scope of her authority. Id.

When considering this showing, the district court must “look[] to

the general nature of [the defendant’s] action,” temporarily disre-

garding the alleged illegality of that act. Id. at 1231 (quoting Est. of

Cummings v. Davenport, 906 F.3d 934, 940 (11th Cir. 2018)).

Second, if the defendant makes her discretionary-authority

showing, the burden shifts. The plaintiff must then show (1) that

the defendant “violated [his] statutory or constitutional right, and

(2) that the right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the chal-

lenged conduct.” Echols v. Lawton, 913 F.3d 1313, 1319 (11th Cir.

2019) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011)).

Saunders has not carried her burden to invoke the protec-

tion of qualified immunity. She has not shown that directing the

removal of a community member from a Board meeting falls

within the scope of her discretionary authority.

To be sure, Florida law vests in the “presiding officer” of a

district school board meeting the authority to “order the removal

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. . . of any person interfering with the expeditious or orderly pro-

cess of such meeting.” Fla. Stat. § 1001.372(3). But Huggins alleges

that the Board’s chair, Dave Miner 5—not Saunders—was the “pre-

siding officer” at the November 12, 2019, meeting. First Am.

Compl. ¶ 33, Dist. Ct. ECF No. 37. On a motion to dismiss, we

accept that allegation as true.

Saunders does not establish that she had been delegated the

presiding officer’s authority to remove unruly members of the pub-

lic, either. 6 Instead, she suggests we should draw this conclusion

from allegations that Saunders at all relevant times “acted under

color of law as a Superintendent of, and with the authority of . . .

[the] Board.”

But we read the Complaint in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party (here, Huggins), Julmist v. Prime Ins. Co., 92 F.4th

1008, 1016 (11th Cir. 2024), and we understand this allegation to

assert the facts necessary to invoke our color-of-law precedent, cf.

Griffin v. City of Opa-Locka, 261 F.3d 1295, 1303 (11th Cir. 2001) (“A

5 At times, the Complaint also refers to the Board chair as “Todd Miner.” Pub-

lic reporting uses the name “Dave Miner.” See Giuseppe Sabella, Manatee

County School Board Member Dave Miner Files for Re-election, Bradenton Herald

(May 22, 2020, at 18:54 ET), https://www.bradenton.com/news/local/edu-

cation/article242938381.html [https://perma.cc/L98U-UMKN].

6 Huggins alleges in an unrelated equal-protection count that “[t]he BOARD

delegated the duty reserved to the presiding chair and deferred it to

SAUNDERS who instigated the detainment and removal of Plaintiff, an Afri-

can American, for standing in the same manner as white citizens.” We under-

stand this as an alternative theory of relief, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(2)–(3), so we

do not treat this allegation as defeating those in the relevant counts.

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person acts under color of state law when he acts with authority

possessed by virtue of his employment with the state.”). Saunders

also doesn’t point to any indication that the presiding officer di-

rectly warned Huggins before Officer Wollard removed him. Yet

state law appears to require such a warning. See Fla. Stat.

§ 1001.372(3). Because she fails to show that she acted within the

scope of her discretionary authority, Saunders cannot successfully

invoke qualified immunity. 7

7 Even if Saunders were able to establish that she had authority to remove

Huggins as an “executive officer” of the Board, see Fla. Stat. § 1001.48, qualified

immunity would not protect her from liability. Officials performing discre-

tionary functions are still liable for violations of clearly established rights. And

as we explain later in this opinion, Huggins plausibly alleges that Saunders

prevented him from speaking because of his viewpoint. The right to be free

from viewpoint-based discrimination is a foundational—and long clearly es-

tablished—constitutional right. See, e.g., Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland,

370 F.3d 1252, 1282 (11th Cir. 2004).

Huggins also alleges that Saunders arbitrarily applied the Board’s disorderly-

conduct rule to him. Specifically, Huggins alleges that Saunders had him re-

moved for “standing at the rear wall, in a nondisruptive manner” and that no

other citizen had been removed for similar behavior under the rule. Because

we ultimately conclude that Huggins has stated a claim based on viewpoint

discrimination, we don’t need to decide whether the Board’s disorderly-con-

duct policy is reasonable in light of the forum’s purpose or whether Saunders’s

allegedly arbitrary enforcement of the disorderly-conduct rule violated Hug-

gins’s clearly established First Amendment right. Cf. Minn. Voters All. v. Man-

sky, 585 U.S. 1, 16–17, 21–22 (2018) (concluding that a prohibition on “politi-

cal” apparel in polling places created a risk of arbitrary enforcement due to

vague statutory language, “haphazard” official interpretations, and significant

discretion vested in election officials).

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2. Speech Restriction

Because Saunders is not entitled to qualified immunity, we

next consider whether Huggins stated claims upon which relief

may be granted. See Olhausen v. Arriva Med., LLC, 124 F.4th 851,

864 (11th Cir. 2024) (holding that we can affirm the district court

for any reason in the record); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). As it turns

out, Huggins has alleged sufficient facts to plausibly plead both his

speech-restriction and retaliation claims against Saunders. So we

reverse the district court’s judgment as to these claims.

Huggins bases his speech-restriction claim against Saunders

on a straightforward theory of viewpoint discrimination. That

type of claim requires us to conduct a forum analysis to determine

the appropriate standard to apply to Saunders’s alleged censorship

of Huggins’s speech. McDonough v. Garcia, 116 F.4th 1319, 1322

(11th Cir. 2024) (en banc).

We have referred to four types of fora: the traditional public

forum, designated public forum, limited public forum, and non-

public forum. Id. We often classify public comment periods at

school-board meetings as limited public fora. Id. at 1328–29. But

whether a specific public comment period is a designated public

forum or a limited public forum is fact-dependent. Id. And Hug-

gins’s complaint doesn’t clarify whether the Board reserved its pub-

lic comment period “for certain groups or for the discussion of cer-

tain topics.” Id. at 1328 (quoting Good News Club v. Milford Cent.

Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106 (2001)). Still, even assuming the less-

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protective standard of a limited public forum applies here, Huggins

plausibly pleads that Saunders violated his First Amendment rights.

The government may restrict speech in a limited public fo-

rum only if the restrictions are both (1) reasonable in light of the

forum’s purpose and (2) viewpoint neutral. Id. at 1329. We do not

address the reasonableness requirement here because, as alleged,

Saunders’s removal of Huggins was not viewpoint neutral. See id.

at 1324 (recognizing that reasonableness and viewpoint neutrality

are distinct requirements). So if Huggins can prove his allegations,

Saunders’s removal of him violated the First Amendment. After

all, Saunders knew the opinion Huggins wished to convey, ordered

his removal, and—we can reasonably infer—did so because of

Huggins’s viewpoint.

First, Huggins alleges that Saunders knew he intended to

speak about “approval of funds for Lincoln Memorial.” And his

other allegations support that conclusion. Huggins asserts that the

Board required community members to sign up before giving pub-

lic comment, and Huggins had a history of speaking out against the

Board’s actions at Lincoln Memorial. Indeed, Huggins averred that

he frequently participated and spoke at Board meetings earlier in

the year. And as Saunders notes, the law required her to attend

those meetings. Fla. Stat. § 1001.51(2); see also id. § 1001.48 (estab-

lishing superintendent as secretary of the district school board).

A local TV news station had also recently quoted Huggins’s

criticism of the Board’s funding decisions on Lincoln Memorial, the

very topic on the Board’s agenda the night that Saunders had

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Huggins removed from the meeting. So we can reasonably infer

that Saunders believed Huggins would express similar criticism at

the November 12, 2019, meeting. See Barrett v. Walker Cnty. Sch.

Dist., 872 F.3d 1209, 1228 (11th Cir. 2017).

Second, Damico told Huggins that Saunders was the one

who ordered Huggins’s removal from the meeting.

Third, for two reasons, we can reasonably infer that Saun-

ders ordered Huggins’s removal because of his viewpoint.

For one thing, “[s]uspicion that viewpoint discrimination is

afoot is at its zenith when the speech restricted is speech critical of

the government, because there is a strong risk that the government

will act to censor ideas that oppose its own.” Ridley v. Mass. Bay

Transp. Auth., 390 F.3d 65, 86 (1st Cir. 2004). That principle applies

with even more force here. Saunders and the Board were receiving

public pressure from the media, community members, and the

state Commissioner of Education, including for their decisions

about Lincoln Memorial, the topic Saunders knew Huggins

planned to speak about.

And for another, the record contradicts Saunders’s alterna-

tive rationale. Saunders suggests that she ordered Huggins re-

moved to uphold content-neutral “decorum-based” policies that

“apply equally to all citizens”—a run-of-the-mill time, place, and

manner limitation. But Saunders later apologized to the rest of the

Board for the “incident.” And that wasn’t the only apology. The

Board’s vice-chair also apologized to Huggins for his removal and

said, “that will not happen to you or anybody else again.”

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Plus, Saunders acted without following the established pro-

cedures for maintaining decorum. The Board’s written policy

gives the Board chair the power to remove unruly attendees. State

law also appears to require the presiding officer (the chair) to issue

a warning before removing someone who is “interfering with the

expeditious or orderly process” of a meeting. Fla. Stat.

§ 1001.372(3). But the Board chair did not participate in Huggins’s

removal.

It’s tough to square these allegations—which we must ac-

cept as true—with a content- and viewpoint-neutral effort to main-

tain decorum. Along with Saunders’s knowledge of Huggins’s

viewpoint, these allegations support the reasonable inference that

Saunders removed Huggins because of his “specific motivating ide-

ology or . . . opinion or perspective.” Rosenberger v. Rector & Visi-

tors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995). And a purportedly

content-neutral restriction can’t stand if a desire to suppress a par-

ticular viewpoint actually motivates it. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal

Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 812 (1985).

At this stage, Huggins has met his burden to plausibly plead

that Saunders violated his First Amendment rights by restricting his

speech because of his viewpoint. 8

8 Huggins also seeks to support his First Amendment claim against Saunders

by referencing the unbridled-discretion doctrine. We don’t think that doctrine

fits the alleged facts here. The unbridled-discretion doctrine permits a facial

challenge to a particular type of speech regulation—one that gives a

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3. First Amendment Retaliation

Huggins has also plausibly alleged First Amendment retalia-

tion by Saunders. We have set out three requirements to state a

First Amendment retaliation claim:

(1) [the plaintiff] engaged in constitutionally pro-

tected speech, such as h[is] right to petition the gov-

ernment for redress; (2) the defendant’s retaliatory

conduct adversely affected that protected speech and

right to petition; and (3) a causal connection exists be-

tween the defendant’s retaliatory conduct and the ad-

verse effect on the plaintiff’s speech and right to peti-

tion.

DeMartini v. Town of Gulf Stream, 942 F.3d 1277, 1289 (11th Cir.

2019). For purposes of this motion to dismiss, Huggins satisfies all

three.

First, it’s beyond debate that the First Amendment protects

Huggins’s planned speech. See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460,

468–69 (2010) (listing unprotected categories); Ocheesee Creamery

LLC v. Putnam, 851 F.3d 1228, 1234–35 (11th Cir. 2017) (noting

lesser protection for commercial speech).

Second, as for an adverse effect on protected speech or peti-

tioning, we consider whether the allegedly retaliatory conduct

government official the discretion whether to permit or forbid speech but

lacks adequate standards to guide her decision. See Barrett, 872 F.3d at 1221–

22. But here, Huggins alleges that Saunders had him removed even though

the Board’s policy vested someone else—the chair—with the authority to do so.

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“would likely deter a person of ordinary firmness from the exercise

of First Amendment rights.” Bailey v. Wheeler, 843 F.3d 473, 481

(11th Cir. 2016) (quoting Bennett v. Hendrix, 423 F.3d 1247, 1254

(11th Cir. 2005)). This presents an objective question. Bennett, 423

F.3d at 1251.

Huggins has alleged enough facts to show that the alleged

retaliation would deter a person of ordinary firmness. For starters,

being ordered out of a meeting room by a chief of security and a

police officer can be, as Huggins alleges, humiliating and damaging

to a person’s personal reputation. That’s particularly true here

because members of the community widely attended the Board

meetings in 2019. And “‘since there is no justification for harassing

people for exercising their constitutional rights,’ the adverse effect

‘need not be great’” to support a violation. Echols, 913 F.3d at 1323

(quoting Bennett, 423 F.3d at 1254).

Plus, Huggins’s expulsion showed Huggins that he would

face a hard choice if he tried to express his views at a future meet-

ing. He could endure potentially several hours of physical pain

from his injuries while sitting through the lengthy proceedings be-

fore public comment. Or he would risk a credible threat of arrest

if he again sought to relieve his pain by standing in the back of the

hearing room or in the lobby until his time to speak came.

“The threat of arrest is the quintessential retaliatory conduct

that would deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising

First Amendment rights.” Turner v. Williams, 65 F.4th 564, 580

(11th Cir. 2023). Huggins’s removal was no “mere frown from a

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20 Opinion of the Court 22-13325

supervisor.” Hou. Cmty. Coll. Sys. v. Wilson, 595 U.S. 468, 477

(2022). The involvement of a police officer in removing Huggins,

that officer’s physical “forc[ing]” of Huggins out of the lobby, and

the “unlawful[] arrest” of another community member during a re-

cent Board meeting made arrest a real threat if Huggins chose to

persist.

Defendants highlight allegations they say suggest Huggins

may have returned to another Board meeting the following week.

But again, this is an objective inquiry. And we consider a person of

ordinary firmness. Whether Huggins was willing to risk discom-

fort and arrest is irrelevant. 9 So we have no trouble concluding that

Huggins has satisfied the second requirement.

Huggins also satisfies the third requirement—causation.

Huggins must show that his speech was a but-for cause of Saun-

ders’s adverse action against him. See Nieves v. Bartlett, 587 U.S. 391,

399 (2019). Because producing direct evidence of an official’s inner

motivations is often not possible, we have relied on circumstantial

evidence to establish the causal link. See Bailey, 843 F.3d at 483.

Other circuits adopt the same practice. See, e.g., Hannon v. Beard,

9 Of course, the same expulsion that Huggins frames as the “retaliatory con-

duct” in his First Amendment retaliation claim also prevented him from speak-

ing on November 12, 2019. Earlier in the opinion, we analyzed this alleged

harm as part of Huggins’s speech-restriction claim. Directly restricting speech

strikes us as categorically different than “deterring” a person from speaking.

Bailey, 843 F.3d at 486. For that reason, we don’t consider Huggins’s inability

to speak later that night within the adverse-effect prong of the First Amend-

ment retaliation inquiry. See DeMartini, 942 F.3d at 1289.

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645 F.3d 45, 49 (1st Cir. 2011); Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 475 (6th

Cir. 2010).

Here, several allegations support the conclusion that Saun-

ders caused Huggins to be removed from the meeting because of

Huggins’s speech. First, Huggins consistently and repeatedly criti-

cized Saunders. He did so both to the Board and in advocating for

disciplinary action against Saunders relating to the Florida Com-

missioner of Education’s administrative complaint against her.

Second, the temporal proximity between Huggins’s speech

and his removal from the Board meeting supports causation. Two

months earlier, at the hearing about the Florida Commissioner of

Education’s administrative complaint, Huggins advocated for dis-

ciplinary action against Saunders. To be sure, a gap of two months

may be weaker support of a causal link when a plaintiff and defend-

ant interact daily, like in the workplace or a prison. But in these

circumstances, where Saunders’s and Huggins’s interactions were

more sporadic, the temporal proximity is rather suggestive. Cf.

Akins v. Fulton County, 420 F.3d 1293, 1298–99, 1305 (11th Cir. 2005)

(holding the “close temporal proximity . . . suggest[s] a causal rela-

tionship” where the alleged First Amendment retaliation stretched

over the weeks and months after employees reported bidding ir-

regularities by their supervisor); Anders v. Cuevas, 984 F.3d 1166,

1177 (6th Cir. 2021) (holding police department’s removal of plain-

tiff’s business from list of approved towing companies four months

after he participated in investigation of officers supported a reason-

able inference of causation).

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22 Opinion of the Court 22-13325

Third, as we noted, Saunders has offered no viable alterna-

tive rationale for removing Huggins. She hasn’t identified any way

that Huggins violated a decorum policy applicable to Board meet-

ings. And she also apparently ignored the established procedures

for removing a disruptive attendee. (Besides, accepting his allega-

tions as true, Huggins was not interfering with the meeting.)

Finally, we have Saunders’s apparent admission of wrong-

doing in her apology to the Board one week after Huggins’s re-

moval.

Of course, Saunders may later present evidence that she

lacked retaliatory animus or would have directed Huggins to be

removed regardless of his past speech. But the face of the Com-

plaint doesn’t support those conclusions. So we reverse the dismis-

sal of Huggins’s First Amendment claims against Saunders.

B. Damico and Wollard

Next, Huggins appeals the dismissal of his First Amendment

claims against Damico and Wollard in their individual capacities. 10

The district court held that both Damico and Wollard were entitled

to qualified immunity. We agree.

We can quickly move past the discretionary-authority step

of the analysis. Huggins does not challenge the district court’s de-

termination that Damico and Wollard each acted within the scope

10 We discuss the claims against Wollard in his official capacity in the section

on municipal liability, Section III.D.

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22-13325 Opinion of the Court 23

of their discretionary authority.11 So we turn to the next question

for qualified immunity—whether, taking the facts as he alleged

them, Huggins showed that these officials violated his constitu-

tional right. Echols, 913 F.3d at 1319.

At this step, Huggins’s claims against Damico and Wollard

suffer from the same fatal shortcoming: a lack of knowledge. Hug-

gins doesn’t allege that either of them knew the viewpoint that he

intended to convey that night or had expressed in his past speech.

At most, Huggins conclusorily alleges that Damico and Wollard

intended to restrict his speech or retaliate against him: Huggins al-

leges, for instance, that “DAMICO, and, WOLLARD, removed

Plaintiff from the meeting to abridge his freedom of speech.” First

Am. Compl. ¶ 127, Dist. Ct. ECF No. 37. But Huggins’s assertions

are legal conclusions, not well-pleaded factual allegations. And we

are not bound to accept them as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,

678 (2009).

We can’t impute Saunders’s motive to people who carried

out her instructions with no apparent knowledge of her allegedly

11 Huggins’s choice not to challenge this aspect of the district court’s ruling is

meaningful. The scope of our review is “limited to the four corners of the

complaint.” Meshal v. Comm’r, Ga. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 117 F.4th 1273, 1282

(11th Cir. 2024) (quoting Corbitt v. Vickers, 929 F.3d 1304, 1311 (11th Cir. 2019)).

And here, the Complaint does not clearly define the scope of Damico’s and

Wollard’s job-related duties or authority at Board meetings (although Huggins

in district court conceded the discretionary-authority point as to Damico). So

while it is not obvious from the Complaint that either man acted within the

scope of his discretionary authority, we need not decide that question.

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24 Opinion of the Court 22-13325

unconstitutional reason for giving them. See id. at 676 (“[V]icarious

liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits[.] [A] plaintiff must plead

that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s

own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”). Huggins

must allege a factual connection between his speech and each indi-

vidual official’s conduct for both his speech-restriction and First

Amendment retaliation claims. After all, viewpoint discrimination

requires a defendant to have based his conduct on the plaintiff’s

viewpoint. And retaliation requires that the plaintiff’s past speech

be the but-for cause of the specific defendant’s conduct. So an offi-

cial who does not even know about Huggins’s viewpoint or past

speech lacks the necessary connection to that speech to have re-

strained Huggins’s speech and retaliated against him in violation of

the First Amendment.12

12 Of course, a speech restriction in a limited public forum will also violate the

First Amendment if it’s unreasonable in light of the forum’s purpose.

McDonough, 116 F.4th at 1329. But the reasonableness prong doesn’t alter our

conclusion here. We don’t analyze Damico’s conduct under that prong be-

cause Huggins frames his speech-restriction claim against Damico in terms of

viewpoint discrimination. The reasonableness prong doesn’t help Huggins

with Wollard, either. Florida law defines the process for removing disruptive

attendees, which culminates with a “law enforcement authority” carrying out

the removal. Fla. Stat. § 1001.372(3). Wollard is a police officer who was

providing security for the Board. He complied when the Board’s Chief of Se-

curity instructed him to remove Huggins. But a plaintiff must show the

wrongfulness of a defendant’s own individual actions to establish Section 1983

liability. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. At a minimum, Huggins identifies no “clearly

established law” showing that—by failing to refuse the Chief of Security’s

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22-13325 Opinion of the Court 25

Because Huggins fails to allege that Damico or Wollard

knew the content or viewpoint of his speech, Huggins has not

shown that either violated his constitutional right. So we affirm

the district court’s ruling that qualified immunity forecloses Hug-

gins’s individual-capacity claims against Damico and Wollard.

C. Barber

We also affirm the dismissal of Huggins’s First Amendment

retaliation claim against Barber. 13 Huggins asserts Barber was re-

taliating against Huggins’s speech when he created and dissemi-

nated to the Sarasota Herald-Tribune the video combining footage

of Huggins’s removal with instances of violence at public meetings

in other communities. The district court held that qualified im-

munity forecloses liability for Barber. We think the district court

got it right.

Once more, we start by asking whether Barber was acting

within the scope of his discretionary authority. Spencer, 5 F.4th at

1230–31. Barber served as Communications Director for the

Board. So sharing materials with the press about Board matters

falls well within his discretionary authority.

instructions—Wollard is responsible for a speech restriction that was unrea-

sonable in light of the forum’s purpose. Echols, 913 F.3d at 1323.

13 Count 12 does not specify on its face whether it is brought against Barber in

his individual or official capacity. Based on Huggins’s later clarification, the

district court construed Count 12 as an individual-capacity claim. We do the

same.

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26 Opinion of the Court 22-13325

We next move to whether the right that Huggins claims Bar-

ber violated was clearly established. Echols, 913 F.3d at 1319.

Courts may analyze this prong of the qualified-immunity analysis

and the rights-violation prong in any order. Pearson v. Callahan,

555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). Huggins points to no clearly established

law indicating that merely “insinuating” someone is dangerous can

support a First Amendment retaliation claim. As a result, the dis-

trict court properly held that Barber has qualified immunity against

Huggins’s claim.

D. The School Board and the City of Bradenton

Next, we consider Huggins’s claims against the Board and

the City of Bradenton. Under the Monell line of cases, a municipal-

ity does not incur Section 1983 liability solely because of its em-

ployer-employee relationship with an alleged wrongdoer. See Mo-

nell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 692–94 (1978). Instead, “a

municipality may be held liable ‘only if such constitutional torts re-

sult from an official government policy, the actions of an official

fairly deemed to represent government policy, or a custom or prac-

tice so pervasive and well-settled that it assumes the force of law.’”

Doe v. Sch. Bd. of Broward Cnty., 604 F.3d 1248, 1263 (11th Cir. 2010)

(quoting Denno v. Sch. Bd. of Volusia Cnty., 218 F.3d 1267, 1276 (11th

Cir. 2000)). Huggins has failed to show that’s the case here.

We start with Huggins’s claims against the Board. Huggins

first suggests that the Board’s decorum policy violates his First

Amendment rights because it effectively gives Saunders carte

blanche to remove citizens because of their views. But this

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22-13325 Opinion of the Court 27

assertion conflicts with the facts Huggins alleges. That is, Huggins

alleges Saunders flouted the requirements of the Board’s policy on

removing disorderly citizens. So this theory can’t work.

Then, Huggins advances a “ratification” theory—that the

Board, which has final decision-making authority, assumed respon-

sibility for Saunders’s action by failing to intervene. This theory

fares no better. When a plaintiff complains about a single incident

of misconduct, he must show that the “local government policy-

makers had an opportunity to review the subordinate’s decision

and agreed with both the decision and the decision’s basis before a

court can hold the government liable on a ratification theory.” Sal-

vato v. Miley, 790 F.3d 1286, 1296 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting Thomas

ex rel. Thomas v. Roberts, 261 F.3d 1160, 1174 n.12 (11th Cir. 2001)).

Here, the Board had no ability to review Saunders’s action in real

time. And then the Board expressed disapproval at the next week’s

meeting. So a ratification theory doesn’t work.

Finally, Huggins gestures towards a “custom and practice

theory.” But Huggins makes only conclusory allegations that the

Board consistently allowed its employees to remove citizens from

meetings because of their speech. That doesn’t get him where he

needs to be.

Beside vague allusions to “similar wrongful and unlawful

conduct,” Huggins identifies only one specific earlier threat to re-

move individuals from a meeting and one arrest of another com-

munity member during a public-comment period. That’s not

enough to show a practice “so pervasive and well-settled that it

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28 Opinion of the Court 22-13325

assumes the force of law.’” Doe, 604 F.3d at 1263 (quoting Denno,

218 F.3d at 1276).

In short, Huggins can’t show that the Board is “actually re-

sponsible” for Saunders’s actions. Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati,

475 U.S. 469, 479 (1986).

Huggins’s municipal-liability theory against the City of

Bradenton fails for the same reason.14 He contends that the City

“adopted the Board’s policy when it allowed its officers to partici-

pate” in removing citizens from Board meetings. But Huggins

never shows that a wrongful Board “policy” existed for the City to

adopt.

Because Huggins fails to state a claim against the Board or

the City of Bradenton, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of his

First Amendment claims against them.

E. Leave to Amend

Finally, Huggins appeals the denial of leave to amend his

complaint a second time. A second amendment to pleadings re-

quires either the consent of the opposing party or the court’s leave.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). District courts must “freely give leave

when justice so requires.” Id. But a district court need not grant

leave “(1) where there has been undue delay, bad faith, dilatory

motive, or repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments

14 Huggins’s claims against Wollard in his official capacity are effectively

against the City. See Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471–72 (1985).

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22-13325 Opinion of the Court 29

previously allowed; (2) where allowing amendment would cause

undue prejudice to the opposing party; or (3) where amendment

would be futile.” Bryant v. Dupree, 252 F.3d 1161, 1163 (11th Cir.

2001) (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)).

The district court denied Huggins’s motion, holding that

leave would be futile and would unduly prejudice Defendants. We

agree on both points.

As the district court correctly noted, Huggins’s proposed

Second Amended Complaint had only minimal differences from

the operative First Amended Complaint. Huggins does not iden-

tify any way that the Second Amended Complaint would alter the

outcome of any claim against any Defendant. (The most meaning-

ful changes seem to be removing Defendants from certain counts.)

None of the proposed changes would strengthen the claims that

will move forward against Saunders, either. The futility of Hug-

gins’s proposed amendments is reason enough to deny leave. See

Swinford v. Santos, 121 F.4th 179, 192 (11th Cir. 2024). 15

15 Huggins objects to the denial of his motion for leave to amend. But we

could construe Huggins’s arguments as contesting the district court’s decision

to dismiss his claims with prejudice. That said, our precedent squarely rejects

Huggins’s suggestion that he is entitled an opportunity to amend with the ben-

efit of a ruling on the issues posed by Defendants’ motions to dismiss. See

Almanza v. United Airlines, Inc., 851 F.3d 1060, 1075 (11th Cir. 2017). Huggins

also identifies no ways that a hypothetical amended complaint would address

the flaws underlying the district court’s rulings that we uphold today or that

he declined to appeal. So if we construe Huggins’s argument as contesting the

district court’s decision to dismiss his claims with prejudice, the same futility

problems stand in Huggins’s way. See id.

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30 Opinion of the Court 22-13325

But granting leave also would have mooted five then-pend-

ing motions to dismiss. So Defendants would have had to expend

further time and resources to invoke qualified immunity again, in

the face of immaterial changes in Huggins’s pleadings. We cannot

say that the district court exceeded its discretion in holding that this

would unduly prejudice Defendants.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons we’ve discussed, we reverse the district

court’s dismissal of Counts 9, 11, and 16 against Saunders. We af-

firm the dismissals with prejudice of those counts as to all other

Defendants. We also affirm the dismissals with prejudice of

Counts 10 and 12. Because the district court based its decision not

to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims on its

dismissal of all of Huggins’s federal claims, we vacate that decision.

The district court may consider whether exercising supplemental

jurisdiction over any or all state claims is now appropriate. We

express no view on the proper resolution of that question.

We remand to the district court for further proceedings in

accordance with this opinion.

REVERSED IN PART, AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED

IN PART, AND REMANDED.