The opinion
Case: 24-20431 Document: 75-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/15/2025
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
____________ United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
No. 24-20431 FILED
August 15, 2025
____________
Lyle W. Cayce
Evan Norman, Clerk
Plaintiff—Appellee,
versus
Lee Ingle; Christopher Sutton,
Defendants—Appellants.
______________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. 4:23-CV-1042
______________________________
Before Higginbotham, Jones, and Southwick, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:
Evan Norman alleges that Deputies Lee Ingle and Christopher Sutton
violated his constitutional rights by applying excessive force, denying or
delaying medical care, failing to intervene, wrongfully arresting Norman,
maliciously prosecuting him, and violating his First Amendment rights. We
find no questions of material fact or denial of constitutional rights, and that
the Deputies are entitled to qualified immunity. We REVERSE the
judgment of the district court.
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No. 24-20431
I.
On March 21, 2021, Evan Norman went to Bombshells Restaurant and
Bar, consumed “at least seven alcoholic beverages within a two-hour time
span,” and fell asleep. Deputy Ingle removed Norman from Bombshells at its
request and instructed Norman to go home. Norman replied: “right, so you
got a little short man complex?” Deputy Ingle offered Norman the choice of
going home or being arrested for public intoxication. Norman responded with
a request for Deputy Ingle’s and Deputy Sutton’s names and badge numbers.
Deputy Ingle provided his and Deputy Sutton did not. As Deputy Ingle began
to walk back into Bombshells, Norman asked if he was “running away.”
Deputy Ingle responded “you are going to go home now.” Deputy Sutton
encouraged Deputy Ingle to return to the bar and put his arm between them.
When Norman reached over Deputy Sutton’s arm and pointed his finger at
Deputy Ingle, Deputy Sutton shoved Norman while telling him to “get
back.” As the Deputies returned to Bombshells, Norman followed them,
again asking for Deputy Sutton’s name and badge number. As the Deputies
turned toward Norman, Deputy Sutton put his finger in Norman’s face
saying “if you walk up on me again, I’m gon’ get—” and shoved Norman
with both hands while shouting “get back!”
As the Deputies continued the walk toward Bombshells, Norman
followed. Then, in a matter of seconds, Deputy Ingle shoved Norman away
from the entrance and, as Norman stumbled, walked toward him yelling “get
the f--- back!” Norman regained his footing and swung his closed fist at
Deputy Ingle, narrowly missing his head, but with his arm behind Deputy
Ingle’s head, Norman had him in a headlock. With Deputy Ingle’s arm
around Norman and tussling on foot, Deputy Sutton punched Norman in the
head. As Norman fell to the ground, Deputy Ingle punched him in the head
three times. As they hit the ground, a third officer grabbed Norman’s right
arm while Deputy Ingle kneeled on Norman’s left arm and punched him in
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No. 24-20431
the head at least six times in quick succession. Video evidence does not show
that Norman resisted arrest while on the ground. While still kneeling on
Norman’s left arm, Deputy Ingle asked “you done?” three times. Four
seconds after his last punch, Deputy Ingle punched him in the head again.
The Deputies then placed Norman under arrest.
At this point, the Deputies addressed concerned bystanders and then
Deputy Sutton immediately requested medical help for Norman. The
Deputies left Norman facedown for around ten minutes awaiting medical
assistance. Norman suffered a fractured orbital rim and orbital roof, a broken
nose, hemorrhaging in his sinus cavity, and subcutaneous emphysema.
Norman filed this suit against Harris County, Deputy Ingle, Deputy
Sutton, and Sheriff Ed Gonzalez. The district court dismissed the claims
against Harris County and Sheriff Gonzalez, leaving claims against the
Deputies for assault, excessive force, false arrest, failure to give medical
attention, malicious prosecution, wrongful prosecution, and failure to
intervene.
The Deputies filed motions for summary judgment, asserting
qualified immunity among other defenses. The district court denied the
motions, finding genuine disputes of fact as to whether Norman posed an
immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, resisted arrest, and
was denied immediate medical attention, and that Norman’s assault claims
were barred by the Texas Torts Claims Act, but that the Deputies were not
entitled to qualified immunity. The Deputies timely appealed.
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II.
Norman argues that this court lacks jurisdiction because the district
court found that a genuine dispute of fact prevents summary judgment,
foreclosing jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. When a defendant appeals a
denial of summary judgment based on qualified immunity, we “have
interlocutory jurisdiction to determine whether [the plaintiff’s] summary
judgment facts state a claim under clearly established law.” 1 To the extent
that there are factual disputes, the video evidence of the encounter permits
us to review the materiality and genuineness of those disputes. 2 This court
has jurisdiction over this appeal.
III.
We review a denial of qualified immunity de novo, 3 deciding issues of
law, such as whether the officer’s conduct is “objectively unreasonable in
light of clearly established law,” 4 as well as “the materiality (i.e., legal
significance) of factual disputes the district court determined were genuine,
not their genuineness (i.e., existence).” 5 We may also review genuineness
when, as here, video evidence is available. 6
On summary judgment, the movant must generally show that “there
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
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1
Flores v. City of Palacios, 381 F.3d 391, 394 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting Nerren v.
Livingston Police Dep’t, 86 F.3d 469, 472 (5th Cir. 1996)).
2
See Argueta v. Jaradi, 86 F.4th 1084, 1088 (5th Cir. 2023).
3
Id.
4
Betts v. Brennan, 22 F.4th 577, 581 (5th Cir. 2022) (quoting Hogan v. Cunningham,
722 F.3d 725, 731 (5th Cir. 2013)).
5
Argueta, 86 F.4th at 1088.
6
Id.
4
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No. 24-20431
judgment as a matter of law.” 7 “The court reviews the evidence in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party and draws all reasonable inferences in
its favor.” 8 However, when “contrary video evidence provides so much
clarity that a reasonable jury could not believe [the nonmovant’s] account,”
a court may discredit the nonmovant’s version of events. 9
IV.
When a defendant is a public official who makes “‘a good-faith
assertion of qualified immunity,’ that ‘alters the usual summary-judgment
burden of proof, shifting it to the plaintiff to show that the defense is not
available.’” 10 To do so, the plaintiff must show that a constitutional right
asserted was “clearly established” at the time of the violation. 11
The Deputies here made a good-faith assertion of qualified immunity,
and Norman has the burden of showing that qualified immunity is unavailable
because they violated at least one clearly established constitutional right.
Norman argues that the Deputies applied excessive force, denied or delayed
medical care, failed to intervene, wrongfully arrested Norman, maliciously
prosecuted him, and violated his First Amendment rights.
The Deputies contend that the district court erred by failing to analyze
their qualified immunity defenses separately. They are correct. When a
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7
Martinez v. City of Rosenberg, 123 F.4th 285, 289-90 (5th Cir. 2024) (quoting FED.
R. CIV. P. 56(a)).
8
Id.
9
Aguirre v. City of San Antonio, 995 F.3d 395, 410 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting Darden
v. City of Fort Worth, 880 F.3d 722, 730 (5th Cir. 2018)).
10
Joseph ex rel. Est. of Joseph v. Bartlett, 981 F.3d 319, 329-30 (5th Cir. 2020)
(quoting Orr v. Copeland, 844 F.3d 484, 490 (5th Cir. 2016)).
11
Id. at 329.
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plaintiff asserts claims against multiple officers stemming from a single event,
“a reviewing court of course ‘must analyze the officers’ actions
separately.’” 12
The Deputies assert that no dispute of material fact exists because
there are video recordings of the events. Moreover, according to Deputy
Sutton, because Norman has no memory of the incident, the video evidence
controls, and the case turns on an issue of law. Norman retorts that although
the video captures “some undisputed, material facts,” the Deputies’ version
of events “are wrong, disputed, not material, or significantly spun.”
Here, video evidence provides sufficient clarity that no reasonable
jury could find that either deputy violated Norman’s constitutional rights—
clearly established or not.
Excessive Force
Norman argues that the Deputies violated his constitutional right to
be free of excessive force. To prove excessive force, Norman must show
“(1) injury, (2) which resulted directly and only from a use of force that was
clearly excessive, and (3) the excessiveness of which was clearly
unreasonable.” 13 The last two elements “collapse into a single objective-
reasonableness inquiry.” 14
We use the Graham factors to determine the reasonableness of the
officer’s use of force, “judg[ing] from the perspective of a reasonable officer
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12
Buehler v. Dear, 27 F.4th 969, 985 (5th Cir. 2022) (quoting Darden, 880 F.3d at
731).
13
Bailey v. Ramos, 125 F.4th 667, 680 (5th Cir. 2025) (quoting Deville v. Marcantel,
567 F.3d 156, 167 (5th Cir. 2009)).
14
Id. (quoting Pena v. City of Rio Grande City, 879 F.3d 613, 619 (5th Cir. 2018)).
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on the scene”: 15 “(1) the severity of the crime at issue, (2) whether the
suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and
(3) whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by
flight.” 16 Here, the Graham factors lead us to determine that each deputy’s
use of force was reasonable.
We also assess “the relationship between the need and the amount of
force used.” 17 An analysis of an officer’s use of force should consider “[t]he
timing, amount, and form” of the suspect’s resistance. 18 The crux of the
matter is that Norman attempted to punch a sheriff’s deputy and placed him
in a headlock. Each individual deputy’s response to that act occurred within
seconds of battling with Norman. Given Norman’s effort to strike an officer
with a closed fist, subsequent headlock, and the speed with which this event
progressed, a total of mere seconds, we cannot now find that the responsive
actions of the Deputies were clearly unreasonable. We are not persuaded that
the force used by each deputy in the exchange was excessive.
Denial or Delay of Medical Care
Norman’s argument as to medical care is brief—two sentences. He
asserts, without any legal citation, that “Deputy Ingle admits, and the videos
show, that Evan was left face down for 11 minutes before he was adjusted
upright. This positional asphyxiation was against policy and was deliberately
indifferent to his medical need to breathe.”
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15
Id.; see Graham v. Conner, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989).
16
Bailey, 125 F.4th at 680 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Deville, 567
F.3d at 167).
17
Joseph, 981 F.3d at 332 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Deville, 567
F.3d at 167).
18
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Deville, 567 F.3d at 167).
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Deputy Sutton used his radio to call for medical assistance as soon as
Norman was secure and any potential conflict between the Deputies and
Bombshells’ patrons was extinguished. 19 There can be no genuine dispute of
material fact on this point, and Norman’s two-sentence argument is
insufficient to satisfy his burden of proving a constitutional violation due to
denial or delay of medical care rising to a denial of constitutional rights.
Failure to Intervene
Norman contends that Deputy Sutton failed to intervene to stop
Deputy Ingle’s use of excessive force, encouraged Officer Ingle to hit
Norman, and held Norman during the use of excessive force. Deputy Sutton
responds that there is no genuine dispute of fact that he had only five or six
seconds to intervene. Deputy Ingle’s application of force lasted for only a few
seconds, during which Deputy Sutton both encouraged the use of force and
its end.
“[A]n officer may be liable under § 1983 under a theory of bystander
liability where the officer ‘(1) knows that a fellow officer is violating an
individual’s constitutional rights; (2) has a reasonable opportunity to prevent
the harm; and (3) chooses not to act.’” 20 “[W]e also consider whether an
officer ‘acquiesce[d] in’ the alleged constitutional violation.” 21 Finally,
because the Deputies have asserted qualified immunity, Norman must also
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19
See Baldwin v. Dorsey, 964 F.3d 320, 327 (5th Cir. 2020).
20
Whitley v. Hanna, 726 F.3d 631, 646 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting Randall v. Prince
George’s Cnty. Police Dep’t, 302 F.3d 188, 204 (4th Cir. 2002)).
21
Id. at 647 (quoting Hale v. Townley, 45 F.3d 914, 919 (5th Cir. 1995)) (second
alteration in original).
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“identify clearly established law requiring an officer” to intervene under
similar circumstances. 22
Norman points to no case for failure to intervene specifically, but
argues generally that “[w]ith respect to qualified immunity, the Graham
factors themselves and the Joseph case are both instructive.” In Joseph, the
plaintiff brought failure to intervene claims against a group of police officers.
The officers held the plaintiff down, provided the baton, offered a taser, and
assisted in dragging the plaintiff “toward a more open area.” 23 The court
found a genuine dispute of fact that should be resolved by the jury, but
ultimately granted qualified immunity to the bystander officers on the clearly
established prong. 24
Here, Deputy Sutton did not actively participate in the challenged
conduct, offering only a few words in the few seconds of the challenged
conduct. Norman offers no analogous case law that a reasonable officer would
know of his duty to intervene under these circumstances. And as in Joseph,
“[t]he [district] court did not assess the clearly established law applicable”
to the bystanding officer. 25 As there is no briefing from Norman on this claim
and “no district-court analysis to review,” 26 Norman has not met his burden
of demonstrating that this claim of bystander liability is not barred by
qualified immunity.
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22
Id. at 647 n.13.
23
Joseph, 981 F.3d at 344.
24
Id. at 345-46.
25
Id. at 346.
26
Id.
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Wrongful Arrest, Malicious Prosecution, and First Amendment
The Deputies argue that Norman abandoned his false arrest,
malicious prosecution, and First Amendment claims and to the extent
Norman is pursuing these claims, they fail. Norman’s response to the
motions for summary judgment provides the following: “Although Plaintiff
refers to false arrest, malicious prosecution, and First Amendment claims in
his complaint, upon review of the evidence provided, he does not pursue
them here.” These claims are abandoned and fail.
V.
Given the video evidence, we find no question of material fact and that
no constitutional right was violated and REVERSE.
10