Williams v. Dumkwu

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

No. 6:23-cv-00281

Mongo J. Williams,

Plaintiff,

V.

Anthony Dumkwu et al.,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Mongo J. Williams, a prisoner confined within the

Texas Department of Criminal Justice proceeding pro se, filed

this civil-rights proceeding pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The

case was referred to a magistrate judge. Doc. 2.

I. Procedural history

Plaintiff initiated this proceeding in June 2023. Doc. 1. After

plaintiff filed an amended complaint (Doc. 8), the magistrate

judge issued an order to answer and scheduling order (Doc. 10)

directing defendants to answer or otherwise respond to plaintiff’s

amended complaint.

Defendants Bradley, Dumkwu, and Holman filed a motion to

dismiss (Doc. 15) that was granted only as to defendant Bradley;

plaintiffs claims against Bradley were dismissed with prejudice.

Doc. 23. Plaintiff’s claims against defendant Dumkwu for

excessive force and defendant Holman for failure to protect

remained. /d. Defendants Dumkwu and Holman filed a motion for

summary judgment. Doc. 44.

After reviewing that motion, the pleadings, and the summary

judgment evidence, the magistrate judge issued a report and

recommendation that defendants’ motion for summary judgment

be granted and that plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment be

denied. Doc. 64. In so doing, the magistrate judge determined that

the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. Jd. at 23.

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Further, because plaintiff has no cause of action upon which relief

may be granted, the magistrate judge dismissed the plaintiff’s sole

remaining claim against defendant Ragsdale. Id.

Specifically, the magistrate judge found that the Hudson

factors ultimately weighed in favor of the defendants. Id. at 9–18

(citing Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992)). Though

plaintiff insists that he was a victim of a vicious attack and was

“slammed” against the wall in the hallway at the Beto Unit,

Doc.66 at 2, the magistrate judge determined that such allegations

were plainly contradicted by the video in this case. Doc. 64 at 17.

Therefore, the court held that the surveillance video discredits

plaintiff’s version of the events and found that defendants are

entitled to qualified immunity. Id. at 21–23. Additionally, the

plaintiff provided no facts that defendant Ragsdale’s failure to

check on plaintiff amounted to a constitutional violation. Id. at 23.

Because Ragsdale, head warden on the day in question, ensured

plaintiff received a medical evaluation for his injuries, Ragsdale’s

failure “to check on” plaintiff or “investigate” further than the

produced incident report, does not amount to a claim upon which

relief may be granted. See Doc. 48-8 at 2; Doc. 8 at 3; Doc. 64 at

23. Plaintiff filed timely objections to the report and

recommendation. Doc. 66.

II. Plaintiff’s objections

Plaintiff insists that he was attacked by defendant Dumkwu

and suffered injuries on December 12, 2022. Doc. 66. He claims

that he was walking away when defendant Dumkwu “ran up from

behind towards” him and then slammed him against the window

and walls—consisting of a brutal and “vicious attack.” Id. at 2. He

insists that he has not conducted interrogatories of the defendants

and maintains other camera angles exist. Id. at 2–3. Plaintiff states

that he was “simply walk[ing] away” before he was attacked. Id.

at 2.

As to defendant Holman, plaintiff objects to the report and

recommendation by insisting Holman watched the allegations set

forth against Dumkwu above occur and “did not run to plaintiff’s

aid when . . . [plaintiff’s] life was in danger.” Id. at 1.

As to defendant Ragsdale, plaintiff provides no factual

objections, but continues to assert his claims against Ragsdale

should proceed. Id. at 3.

III. Discussion and analysis

When timely objections to a magistrate judge’s report and

recommendation are filed, the court reviews them de novo.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(3); see also Douglass v.

United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1420 (5th Cir. 1996) (en

banc), superseded by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)

(extending the time to file objections from ten to fourteen days).

Plaintiff’s objections confirm the accuracy of the report and

recommendation.

It is well-established that the use of excessive physical force

against a prisoner may constitute cruel and unusual punishment.

See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 4 (1992). Because prison

officials—when confronted with prison disturbances—have the

difficult job of balancing “the threat unrest poses to inmates,

prison workers, administrators, and visitors against the harm

inmates may suffer if guards use force,” the core question is

whether the force used against a prisoner was applied in a “good-

faith effort to maintain or restore discipline” inside the prison or,

conversely, whether the force was applied “maliciously and

sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.” Id. at 6–7; see

also Baldwin v. Stalder, 137 F.3d 836, 838 (5th Cir. 1998). Courts

consider the Hudson factors to determine whether prison guards

unnecessarily and wantonly inflicted pain in violation of a

prisoner’s Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and

unusual punishment, including: (1) the extent of the injury

suffered, (2) the need for the application of force, (3) the

relationship between the need and the amount of force used,

(4) the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible officials,

and (5) any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful

response. Baldwin, 137 F.3d at 839. Each factor is neither exclusive

nor determinative; “each case must be judged on its own facts.”

Id.

When video footage exists that “blatantly contradicts the

plaintiff’s allegations,” this court should not adopt the plaintiff’s

version of the facts but, instead, should view the facts in the light

depicted by the footage. Hodge v. Engleman, 90 F.4th 840, 845–46

(5th Cir. 2024) (“The video contradicted the plaintiff’s claim of

‘a genuine dispute that his constitutional rights had been

violated,’ entitling the defendants to QI.” (citing Livingston v.

Texas, No. 22-40719, 2023 WL 4931923, at *2 (5th Cir. Aug. 2,

2023)).

Plaintiff’s allegations that he was violently, brutally, and

viciously attacked are wholly contradicted by the surveillance

footage of the incident. Doc. 44 Ex. C. The footage does not

depict defendant Dumkwu running up from behind plaintiff and

then slamming plaintiff against the wall. Id. Similarly, it does not

show running or an “ambush” as plaintiff insinuates. Id. Plaintiff

states that he was beaten and slammed on the wall, but the footage

shows no such thing. Id. In fact, the footage reveals that no

punches were actually thrown. Id.

Though plaintiff filed his complaint containing his facts sworn

to penalty of perjury, the surveillance footage depicts defendant

Dumkwu and plaintiff arguing in the prison hallway before

plaintiff begins to walk away from Dumkwu after Dumkwu gave

him an order to return to his housing area. Id. at 2:04–13. Dumkwu

attempts to grab plaintiff’s arm as he is walking away, and plaintiff

then pulls away aggressively. Id. at 2:14–15. Dumkwu then places

plaintiff against the wall, and plaintiff is ultimately handcuffed. Id.

at 2:15–25.

Given the footage demonstrating Dumkwu and plaintiff

arguing before plaintiff begins to walk away, plaintiff’s contention

that Dumkwu “ran up” on him “from behind” before he walked

away is disingenuous. Doc. 66 at 2. The magistrate judge correctly

determined that the court should discredit plaintiff’s version of

events because the surveillance footage directly contradicts his

claims. Doc. 64 at 21; see also Craig v. Martin, 49 F.4th 404, 409

(5th Cir. 2022) (reversing the denial of qualified immunity

because the plaintiff’s allegations were “blatantly” contradicted

by the video evidence).

Plaintiff’s actions—refusing to comply with a direct order and

then pulling away from an officer—necessitated the use of force

even though plaintiff suffered an injury to his finger. See

Waddleton v. Rodriguez, 750 F. App’x 248, 254 (5th Cir. 2018) (per

curiam) (unpublished) (explaining that though the force incident

resulted in some injury, “[a]s to the second and third [Hudson]

factors, Waddleton’s sudden movement created a need for the use

of force and the relationship between the need for force and the

amount of force used was appropriate.”); McCoy v. Esquivel, 798

F. App’x 818, 819–20 & n.1 (5th Cir. 2020) (per curiam)

(unpublished) (placing emphasis on McCoy’s refusal to comply

with orders and his “pulling away” from officers in concluding

the force used was not unreasonable).

Plaintiff discounts the severity of his refusal to comply:

walking away from a direct order and pulling away from an officer

in a prison setting. Johnson v. Hill, 514 F. Supp. 3d 958, 968 (S.D.

Tex. 2021) (“Disobeying orders poses a threat to the order and

security of an institution.”); see also Minix v. Blevins, 2007 WL

1217883, at *24 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 23, 2007) (recognizing that, even

where a prisoner believes an order is unjustified or improper, that

“does not give him the right to disobey them at his whim.”).

Plaintiff insists that the “force” was unreasonable. But, as the

magistrate judge concluded, the surveillance footage of the

incident proves otherwise. Doc. 64 at 21. The video does not

document an ambush or a beating. Rather, the video depicts a

small amount of force in which Dumkwu placed plaintiff against

the wall after he walked away while simultaneously disobeying

Dumkwu’s direct order. Doc. 44 Ex. C; see also Hobart v. Estrada,

582 F. App’x 348, 351–52 (5th Cir. 2014) (unpublished) (“This

court has further said that it assigns greater weight, even at the

summary judgment stage, to facts evident from video recordings

taken at the scene.”); see also Meadows v. Gibson, 855 F. Supp. 223,

225 (W.D. Tenn. 1994) (“Prisoners may not pick and choose

which prison rules they will obey.”).

The Hudson factors ultimately weigh in favor of defendants,

especially considering the surveillance footage, and defendants

are entitled to qualified immunity. Since the “force” placed on

plaintiff by Dumkwu did not amount to a constitutional violation,

plaintiff cannot maintain a bystander action against defendant

Holman for watching constitutional conduct. Martinez v. City of

Rosenberg, Texas, 123 F.4th 285, 290 (5th Cir. 2024) (“district

court properly dismissed [plaintiff’s] bystander liability claim

because it cannot stand absent an underlying constitutional

violation.”). Plaintiff identifies no error in the magistrate judge’s

report.

Further, due to plaintiff’s lack of factual allegations in his

amended complaint (Doc. 8), plaintiff’s own admission that

warden Ragsdale ensured a “use-of-force report” (Doc. 48-8),

including a medical evaluation, was completed, and the lack of

substantive objections to the magistrate judge’s report and

recommendations as to defendant Ragsdale, plaintiff’s claims

against defendant Ragsdale are dismissed. See Lewis v. Lynn, 236

F.3d 766, 768 (5th Cir. 2001) (when a different defendant

“establishes that plaintiff has no cause of action . . . this defense

generally inures also to the benefit of [the] defaulting defendant”

even though the defaulting defendant did not join the summary

judgment motion).

For the reasons given above, the court accepts the magistrate

judge’s report and overrules plaintiff’s objections. Docs. 64, 66.

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Doc. 44) is granted.

Plaintiff’s motion to dismiss defendants’ motion for summary

judgment (Doc. 46) and motion to dismiss defendants’ reply

(Doc. 58) are denied. Claims against defendant Dumkwu and

defendant Holman are dismissed with prejudice. All claims

against defendant Ragsdale are dismissed with prejudice. Any

pending motions are denied as moot.

So ordered by the court on August 14, 2025.

ji CAMPBELL BARKER

United States District Judge

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