The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
HEIDI DAVONNE BROWN,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 3:24-CV-853-CCB-SJF
SOUTH BEND CLINIC, et al.,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
Heidi Davonne Brown filed a pro se complaint (ECF 1) and a motion for leave to
proceed in forma pauperis (ECF 2) on October 18, 2024. Brown’s in forma pauperis motion,
submitted on a standard in forma pauperis form, details that she has no income. (ECF 2).
In her complaint, she alleges that on March 11, 2024, she was “poked” with an unsterile
needle while at The South Bend Clinic, LLC (“Clinic”). (Id. at 3). She states that the
South Bend Police Department was called to the Clinic, which violated her rights. (Id.).
Brown brings the instant claims against the Clinic for violating her “patient rights,”
failing to adhere to policy and procedure, and violating her “HIPAA right and right to
privacy.” (ECF 1 at 2).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), the Court “may authorize the commencement
[of a civil lawsuit] without pre-payment of fees [if] the person is unable to pay such
fees….” A person is unable to pay the filing fee if “because of [their] poverty [doing so
would] result in the inability to provide [her]self and dependents with the necessities of
life.” Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339 (1948) (quotations
omitted).
When deciding whether to grant in forma pauperis status to a plaintiff, the Court
must determine whether her complaint is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on
which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against an immune defendant. 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The Court has “ample authority to dismiss frivolous or
transparently defective suits spontaneously.” Hoskins v. Poelstra, 320 F.3d 761, 763 (7th
Cir. 2003).
“Although [pro se] litigants … benefit from various procedural protections,”
including liberal construction of pleadings, they “are not entitled to [exemption] from
the rules of procedure….” Jones v. Phipps, 39 F.3d 158, 163 (7th Cir. 1994). Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(a)(1) requires that complaints contain “a short and plain statement of grounds for the
court’s jurisdiction.” See Jones v. Phipps, 39 F.3d 158, 163 (7th Cir. 1994).
Federal district courts have original jurisdiction over federal question cases—that
is, “civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States”—
and diversity jurisdiction over lawsuits brought by citizens of different states when the
amount in controversy exceeds $ 75,000. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332. This Court likely lacks
diversity jurisdiction over Brown’s case, as all parties appear to be Indiana citizens.
Furthermore, federal question jurisdiction in this case is unclear. “A district court has
federal question jurisdiction only if the complaint shows, on its face, that a federal claim
is ‘sufficiently substantial.’” Johnson v. Orr, 551 F.3d 564, 570 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting
Gammon v. GC Servs. Ltd. P’ship., 27 F.3d 1254, 1256 (7th Cir. 1994)).
Brown’s complaint does not explain how the situation on March 11, 2024 violated
her rights. She simply alleges legal conclusions that the Clinic violated her “patient
rights,” including her “HIPAA right and right to privacy.” (ECF 1 at 3). Attached to her
complaint are email exchanges that seem to be her trying to file a complaint with the
Indiana Department of Health and the Department’s response stating that they were
unable to corroborate her allegation that she was a patient at the Clinic during the
alleged timeframe. (ECF 1-1 at 5). Her complaint and attachments do not allege enough
facts to state a federal claim that is sufficiently substantial. Johnson, 551 F.3d at 570.
Therefore, Brown has not established jurisdiction as required.
Even if Brown had established jurisdiction, her complaint fails to state a claim for
relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) requires that complaints contain “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” The statement
must contain enough factual matter, accepted as true, to state a plausible claim, not a
speculative one. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Her complaint does not link any facts to her legal conclusions that
her rights were violated. Therefore, Brown has stated only a speculative claim, not a
plausible one, and her complaint cannot survive.
Accordingly, the Court DENIES Brown’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis.
(ECF 2). Also pending in this case are Brown’s motions to appoint counsel (ECF 8) and a
motion to proceed without prepaying pacer account fees (ECF 11). These motions are
DENIED AS MOOT. (ECF 8, 11).
Usually, the Court would grant Brown leave to amend her complaint to become
compliant with the federal rules and refile a motion to proceed in forma pauperis,
however, there is also a pending motion to stay proceedings filed by Defendant on
December 17, 2024. (ECF 6). Defendant states that Brown filed a “Proposed Complaint
for Damages with the Indiana Department of Insurance on November 6, 2024.” (ECF 6
at 2). As noted by Defendant, “an action against a qualified health care provider may
not be commenced in an Indiana court before a Proposed Complaint has been presented
to a medical review panel and the panel has rendered an opinion on the Proposed
Complaint.” (Id.); Ind. Code § 34-18-8-4. Since Brown’s motion to proceed in forma
pauperis is denied, Defendant’s motion to stay proceedings is also DENIED AS MOOT.
(ECF 6). However, the Court CAUTIONS Brown to ensure any amended complaint
complies with Ind. Code § 34-18-8-4.
SO ORDERED on August 14, 2025.
/s/Cristal C. Brisco
CRISTAL C. BRISCO, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT