“[T]he traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.”
How later courts described this case
- “[T]he traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
CHASE BROWN, # 134852, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
v. ) No. 3:25-cv-00508
)
SHERIFF ERIC CRADDOCK, ) Judge Trauger
)
Respondent. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Chase Brown, who is in pretrial custody at the Sumner County Jail in Gallatin, Tennessee,
filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. No. 1).
The respondent has filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing that the petitioner did not exhaust available
state-court remedies before bringing this action. (Doc. Nos. 12, 13). The petitioner has filed a
response (Doc. No. 17), and the court has ordered the respondent to file the relevant state-court
records (Doc. No. 25 at 3).
On August 7, 2025, the petitioner filed a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order
(“TRO Motion”) and a Motion for Emergency Hearing on TRO.1 (Doc. Nos. 27, 28). As explained
below, these motions will be denied.
I. BACKGROUND
In this action, the petitioner challenges the constitutionality of the state trial court’s actions
and inaction regarding the setting of bail. (Doc. No. 1 at 6); see U.S. Const. amend. VIII
(“Excessive bail shall not be required.”). Specifically, the petitioner alleges that the state trial court
1 The petitioner also filed a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order on May 19, 2025. (Doc. No. 8). That
motion was denied for failure to comply with Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
(Doc. No. 19). For purposes of this Order, the court uses “TRO Motion” to refer to the August 7 Motion for
Temporary Restraining Order.
“[s]et[] bail at an unattainable amount” and “refus[es] to have [a] source hearing and refus[es] to
rule on or respond to any filings regarding bail.” (Doc. No. 1 at 6).
II. MOTION FOR TRO
A. The Petitioner’s Filings
In his TRO Motion, the petitioner seeks an order directing the respondent to “release
[the petitioner] from custody on his own recognizance.” (Doc. No. 27 at 2). In his supporting
memorandum, the petitioner asserts that his “current bail is set at $480,000 for non-violent
property crimes.” (Doc. No. 27-2 at 3). In his supporting declaration, he asserts the following:
[Judge Gay] stated that “unless you come up with the bond money yourself, I am
not approving any source, or letting anyone waste money on your bond.” Without
allowing the hearing to continue, he Denied my motion for a source hearing (not to
be confused with denying my source, because he did not deny my source just denied
my opportunity to present my source), Ordered my total composite bond be
$480,000, and Ordered that in order for me to request another Source Hearing I am
required to provide proof that I am not subject to a Federal Supervised release hold.
Since it is not possible for me to resolve my federal supervised release hold without
being release from Sumner County’s custody into US Marshall custody to appear
in front of a Federal Judge, I am unable to post bail because Judge Gay will not
even allow me a Source Hearing which is required to post my bail. This is the exact
definition of Denying me bail. . . .”
(Doc. No. 27-4 at 2).
The petitioner has also submitted one page of an apparently multi-page order from the state
court dated July 16, 2024. (Doc. No. 2 at 4).
B. The Respondent’s Filings
The respondent has not responded to the TRO Motion. However, the respondent argues in
support of his Motion to Dismiss that the Petition should be dismissed because the petitioner has
failed to exhaust available state-court remedies. (Doc. No. 13 at 4−6).
C. Analysis
In determining whether to issue a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunctive
order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65, a district court ordinarily weighs the following
four factors: (1) the movant’s likelihood of success on the merits; (2) whether the movant will
suffer irreparable harm without the injunction; (3) whether granting the injunction will cause
substantial harm to others; and (4) the impact of the injunction on the public interest. Wilson v.
Williams, 961 F.3d 829, 836 (6th Cir. 2020). “These factors are not prerequisites, but are factors
that are to be balanced against each other.” Jones v. Caruso, 569 F.3d 258, 265 (6th Cir. 2009)
(quotation marks omitted). “However, where a TRO is sought, although some courts would
examine all four factors required for issuance of a preliminary injunction, a focus on the
irreparability and immediacy of harm is all that is required.” Creasy v. Frink, No. 3:22-cv-00033,
2022 WL 981575, at *3 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 30, 2022) (quotation marks and brackets omitted). “If
the plaintiff isn’t facing imminent and irreparable injury, there is no need to grant relief now as
opposed to at the end of the lawsuit.” Creasy v. Frink, No. 3:22-cv-00035, 2022 WL 989095, at *2
(M.D. Tenn. Mar. 31, 2022).
Here, the TRO Motion includes substantially similar allegations and seeks the same relief
as the Petition: release from pretrial detention. (Compare Doc. No. 1 at 6−7, with Doc. Nos. 27,
27-2). The petitioner has not alleged that he faces any imminent injury other than continued pretrial
detention. But release from custody is the “typical remedy” sought in a habeas corpus petition.
Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 693 (2008); see Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973)
(“[T]he traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.”). Preliminary
equitable relief—in the form either of a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction—is
“an extraordinary remedy which should be granted only if the movant carries his or her burden of
proving that the circumstances clearly demand it.” Overstreet v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Cty.
Govt, 305 F.3d 566, 573 (6th Cir. 2002). The petitioner has not demonstrated that the ordinary
remedy for unlawful detention—habeas corpus—is insufficient in this case. Thus, the
extraordinary remedy of a temporary restraining order is not warranted.
IH. REQUEST FOR BAIL
Construing the TRO Motion in the light most favorable to the petitioner, the court will also
treat the motion as a request for the court to exercise its “inherent authority” and grant the petitioner
bail pending resolution of his Petition. See Nash v. Eberlin, 437 F.3d 519, 526 n.10 (6th Cir. 2006).
A “district court may release petitioners on bail if there is a substantial claim of law and the
existence of some circumstance making the motion for bail exceptional and deserving of special
treatment in the interests of justice.” /d. Here, the petitioner has not demonstrated any circumstance
making the motion for bail exceptional or deserving of special treatment in the interests of justice.
Accordingly, the court declines to grant him bail before the Petition is resolved.
IV. CONCLUSION
This habeas case will proceed on the usual track. The petitioner’s TRO Motion
(Doc. No. 27) and Motion for Emergency Hearing on TRO (Doc. No. 28) are DENIED. To the
extent the petitioner separately requests that the court grant bail pending resolution of the Petition,
that request is likewise DENIED.
The court will resolve the respondent’s Motion to Dismiss in due course after the
respondent has submitted the state-court record, as previously ordered.
It is so ORDERED. Ui
Aleta A. Trauger
United States District Judge