Doe v. Wright

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

PENDLETON DIVISION

JANE DOE, Case No. 2:23-cv-00332-HL

Plaintiff,

OPINION AND ORDER

v.

BILL WRIGHT AND

CITY OF UMATILLA,

Defendants.

_________________________________________

HALLMAN, United States Magistrate Judge:

Plaintiff Jane Doe filed a Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”), ECF 65, naming the

City of Umatilla (“City”) and Bill Wright (“Wright”), a former Detective Sergeant with the

Umatilla Police Department, as Defendants. Plaintiff is proceeding under a pseudonym to protect

her identity. In addition, to protect certain allegations against Wright, she moved to file the

Second Amended Complaint under seal. ECF 63. Wright filed a Motion to Strike certain

allegations from the complaint, ECF 70, in which the City joins, ECF 72. The City has also

moved to dismiss the allegations against it for failure to state a claim for relief. ECF 71.1

For the reasons discussed below, this Court orders the following: the City’s Motion to

Dismiss is GRANTED, and the claims against the City are dismissed WITH PREJUDICE. The

Motion to Strike is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Plaintiff’s Motion to Seal the

Second Amended Complaint is GRANTED. Plaintiff is directed to file a Third Amended

Complaint, not under seal, that does not contain the material in paragraphs 10, 12–17, 19, and 82

of the Second Amended Complaint. With respect to Plaintiff proceeding under a pseudonym, the

Parties are directed to confer regarding a supplemental protective order that will limit the need

for filings under seal and ensure the public’s right to observe court proceedings while

maintaining Plaintiff’s confidentiality.

MOTION TO DISMISS

This Court previously concluded that (1) Plaintiff stated a claim that Wright violated her

right to equal protection, and (2) he was not entitled to qualified immunity when he allegedly

denied protective services to her based on her gender. Op. & Order 9–21, ECF 27. In that

Opinion, this Court also dismissed Plaintiff’s Monell claims against the City, in part because she

“failed to plead with particularity that the City had a custom or practice to discriminate against

female victims of sexual assault.” Id. at 27. Plaintiff has now repleaded that claim, asserting that

the City delegated its policymaking in the area of criminal investigations to Wright, and that he

was acting as a policymaker when he allegedly denied protective services to Plaintiff on the basis

of her gender. Pl.’s Resp. to Mot. to Dismiss 7, ECF 73. For the reasons discussed below,

Plaintiff has not pleaded facts that would plausibly demonstrate that Wright was acting as a

1 This Court concludes that this matter can be appropriately resolved without oral argument.

policymaker. The City’s motion is therefore GRANTED, and the claims against the City are

dismissed WITH PREJUDICE.

I. Standard of review.

A Fed. R. Civ. P. (“Rule”) 12(b)(6) motion tests whether there is a cognizable legal

theory or sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory. Taylor v. Yee, 780 F.3d 928, 935

(9th Cir. 2015). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “the complaint must allege ‘enough facts to

state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550

U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation

of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a

claim may be granted only when there is no cognizable legal theory to support the claim or when

the complaint lacks sufficient factual allegations to state a facially plausible claim for relief.

Mollett v. Netflix, Inc., 795 F.3d 1062, 1065 (9th Cir. 2015); see also Shroyer v. New Cingular

Wireless Servs., Inc., 622 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2010).

When evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint’s factual allegations, the court must

accept as true all well-pleaded material facts alleged in the complaint and construe them in the

light most favorable to the plaintiff. Davidson v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 889 F.3d 956, 971 (9th

Cir. 2018) (citing Daniels-Hall v. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, 629 F.3d 992, 998 (9th Cir. 2010)); Dowers

v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC, 852 F.3d 964, 969 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).

If a complaint fails to state a plausible claim, “[a] district court should grant leave to

amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading

could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122,

1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Doe v. United States, 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir. 1995));

see also Gardner v. Martino, 563 F.3d 981, 990 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding no abuse of discretion in

denying leave to amend when amendment would be futile).

II. Monell liability.

Under the Supreme Court’s holding in Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of New York, 436

U.S. 658 (1978), a municipal entity may be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when a plaintiff

demonstrates that the constitutional violation complained of was caused by a municipal “policy

or custom.” 436 U.S. at 694. To establish Monell liability, a plaintiff must allege that (1) she was

deprived of a constitutional right; (2) the municipality had a policy, custom, or practice; (3) the

policy, custom, or practice amounted to deliberate indifference of the plaintiff’s constitutional

right; and (4) the policy, custom, or practice was the “moving force” behind the constitutional

violation. Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 900 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation modified).

A Monell claim for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 liability against a public entity may be stated in one

of three circumstances: (1) a municipal employee committed the alleged constitutional violation

“pursuant to a formal governmental policy or longstanding practice or custom which constitutes

the standard operating procedure of the local governmental entity;” (2) the individual who

committed the constitutional violation was an official with “final policy-making authority and

that the challenged action itself thus constituted an act of official government policy;” or (3) the

plaintiff may demonstrate that “an official with final policy-making authority ratified a

subordinate's unconstitutional decision or action and the basis for it.” Gillette v. Delmore, 979

F.2d 1342, 1346–47 (9th Cir. 1992) (citation modified). “[R]igorous standards of culpability and

causation must be applied to ensure that the municipality is not held liable solely for the actions

of its employee.” Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty., Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 405 (1997).

“Where a court fails to adhere to rigorous requirements of culpability and causation, municipal

liability collapses into respondeat superior liability.” Id. at 415.

As relevant here, “[a] choice made by a municipal officer with final policy-making

authority . . . may also serve as the Monell hook for municipal liability.” Ash v. City of Portland,

No. 3:24-CV-434-SI, 2024 WL 4794542, at *9 (D. Or. Nov. 14, 2024) (citing Pembaur v. City of

Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 482–83 (1986)); see also City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112,

127 (1988); Lytle v. Carl, 382 F.3d 978, 983 (9th Cir. 2004). “The fact that a particular official—

even a policymaking official—has discretion in the exercise of particular functions does not,

without more, give rise to municipal liability based on an exercise of that discretion.” Pembaur,

475 U.S. at 481–82. Rather, “[t]he official must also be responsible for establishing final

government policy respecting such activity before the municipality can be held liable.” Id. at

482–83. To determine whether an official has final policy-making authority, courts look to state

law. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 124. “[S]tate law (which may include valid local ordinances and

regulations) will always direct a court to some official or body that has the responsibility for

making law or setting policy in any given area of a local government's business.” Id. at 125

(emphasis added).

“When an official’s discretionary decisions are constrained by policies not of that

official’s making, those policies, rather than the subordinate’s departures from them, are the act

of the municipality.” Id. at 127. “Similarly, when a subordinate’s decision is subject to review by

the municipality’s authorized policymakers, they have retained the authority to measure the

official’s conduct for conformance with their policies.” Id. Conversely, “[a]n official may be

found to have been delegated final policymaking authority where the official’s discretionary

decision is not constrained by policies not of that official’s making and not subject to review by

the municipality’s authorized policymakers.” Ulrich v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 308 F.3d

968, 986 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation modified) (citing Christie v. Iopa, 176 F.3d 1231, 1236–37

(9th Cir. 1999)).

III. Supplemental background.

In the prior Opinion and Order, this Court set forth in detail the factual allegations

underlying Plaintiff’s claims, Op. & Order 3–8, and it incorporates that discussion herein. In the

Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff pleads additional facts with respect to the Monell claim

that are discussed below and presumed true for purposes of this analysis.2

Plaintiff’s Monell claim is predicated on her assertion that Wright was acting as a

policymaker when he engaged in gender-based discrimination in his criminal investigations.

SAC ¶¶ 80-89; Pl.’s Resp. to Mot. to Dismiss 7. To that end, Plaintiff alleges the following

concerning Wright’s conduct as policymaker:

27. On or about February 16, 2005, [] Wright was assigned lead

investigator for all criminal cases investigated by the City’s police department and

remained in that position at all material times.

28. On or about February 16, 2005, until January 19 of 2023, the

City’s police department, through Chief Huxel, delegated final policy making

decisions to [] Wright regarding all criminal investigations.

29. At all material times, neither Lt. Kennedy nor Chief Huxel

supervised nor reviewed [] Wright’s criminal investigations.

30. At all material times, the City provided no supervision or review of

[] Wright’s criminal investigations. In part this is evidenced by the fact that []

Wright would write his own reports on investigations and as a matter of policy no

one would review those reports.

2 Plaintiff also includes excerpts of the deposition of Wright with his response to the motion to

dismiss. Pl.’s Resp. to Mot. to Dismiss Ex. 1, ECF 73-1. This Court does not consider extrinsic

evidence when evaluating a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), and, in any event,

Wright’s alleged denial that he violated any City policies does not impact this Court’s Monell

analysis.

SAC ¶¶ 27–30. Plaintiff also alleges that both Chief Huxel and Lt. Kennedy had supervisory

authority over Wright. Id. at ¶¶ 23, 26. In 2023, Chief Huxel exercised that supervisory authority

when she implemented a new policy prohibiting Wright from reviewing his own reports. Id. at ¶

71. Plaintiff also alleges that Wright remained subject to numerous Department policies and

violated them with his conduct in this case. Id. at ¶ 69.

IV. Analysis.

Plaintiff’s new allegations fail to plausibly demonstrate that Wright was acting as a

policymaker when he was allegedly given authority over criminal investigations and then

engaged in gender-based discrimination in those investigations.

First, Plaintiff does not raise or cite any authority—whether a local ordinance, regulation,

or state statute—establishing that a municipality or the Police Chief can delegate final policy

making decisions regarding criminal investigations to a subordinate officer. Plaintiff cites several

policies from the City of Umatilla and Umatilla Police Department, but she does so only for the

proposition that Wright’s conduct in the present case violated those policies. Id. at ¶ 69. There is

no assertion that Wright was properly delegated authority for criminal investigations as a matter

of Oregon state law, whether through State statute or Rule or under the City’s municipal

authority. 3 Because state law “will always direct a court to some official or body” with that

responsibility, see Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 124, and because there are no allegations that state

3 Although numerous Oregon statutes govern police power and policing in Oregon, Oregon does

not have a general statutory scheme that authorizes municipalities to establish a police

department and exercise police power. Rather, under home-rule authority, cities have the power

to adopt a policy or ordinance regarding policing “so long as ‘it conflicts with neither a

constitutional provision nor with a statute, and if it constitutes a proper exercise of the city's

police power.’” Owen v. City of Portland, 368 Or. 661, 686 (2021) (citing Covey Drive Yourself

& Garage v. City of Portland, 157 Or. 117 (1937)). Thus, the relevant Oregon state law

governing criminal investigations would likely be a City policy or ordinance or the City’s

general exercise of police power.

law allowed for the delegation of the City’s police power to a subordinate officer, Plaintiff has

failed to demonstrate, as a matter of law, that the City delegated authority to Wright for purposes

of Monell liability.

Even if it were not necessary for Plaintiff to point to some source of state law for the

delegation, she still could not establish a Monell violation based on the facts pleaded in the

complaint. Although Plaintiff alleges that the City delegated “policy making decisions” to

Wright, the factual allegations do not plausibly support a conclusion that Wright was acting as a

policymaker for purposes of Monell liability. The fact that Wright allegedly had “discretion in

the exercise of particular functions does not, without more, give rise to municipal liability based

on an exercise of that discretion.” Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 481–82. To the contrary, Wright’s

decision-making was constrained by policies not of his making, which is evidenced by the fact

that his actions in this case violated multiple municipal policies. SAC ¶ 69. And his actions were

ultimately subject to review by the City’s authorized policymakers, which is evidenced by the

fact that Wright’s supervisors revoked his authority to review his own reports as a result of this

matter. Id. at ¶ 71. Therefore, Wright was not acting as a final policymaker for purposes of

Monell liability. See Ulrich, 308 F.3d at 986; Nguyen v. City of San Jose, No. 5:21-CV-00092-

EJD, 2022 WL 912891, at *12 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2022) (police officer with authority for

investigating certain crimes was delegated discretion to act, not policymaking authority).

In sum, because Plaintiff’s Monell claims against the City are predicated on the theory

that Wright was acting as a final policymaker, and because the allegations do not plausibly

suggest that he was acting as a final policymaker, those claims are subject to dismissal under

Rule 12(b)(6). Further, because Plaintiff has had prior opportunities to amend her complaint, her

claims against the City are dismissed WITH PREJUDICE and WITHOUT LEAVE TO

AMEND. Chodos v. W. Publ'g Co., 292 F.3d 992, 1003 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining that

discretion to deny leave to amend is particularly broad when a plaintiff has had prior

opportunities to amend).

MOTION TO STRIKE

Wright moves to strike portions of Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint—specifically

paragraphs 10–19, 61–63, and portions of paragraphs 65 and 82—that pertain to (1) his alleged

sexual misconduct prior to and during his employment with the City and (2) allegations

regarding another victim of the same perpetrator. Mot. to Strike, ECF 70. For the following

reasons, Wright’s motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, and this Court strikes

paragraphs 10, 12–17, 19, and 82. Plaintiff is directed to file a Third Amended Complaint—not

under seal—without any reference to the allegations in those paragraphs.

I. Standard of review.

The Court may strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant,

immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). The essential function of a

Rule 12(f) motion “is to avoid the expenditure of time and money that must arise from litigating

spurious issues by dispensing with those issues prior to trial.” Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 984 F.2d

1524, 1527 (9th Cir. 1993) (citation modified), rev'd on other grounds, 510 U.S. 517 (1994).

Matter is immaterial if it lacks an “‘essential or important relationship to the claim for relief or

the defenses being pleaded.’” Id. (quoting Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal

Practice and Procedure § 1382, at 706–07 (1990)). “Scandalous matters are allegations that

‘unnecessarily reflect on the moral character of an individual or state anything in repulsive

language that detracts from the dignity of the court,’ and ‘include allegations that cast a cruelly

derogatory light on a party or other person.’” Cantu v. City of Portland, No. 3:19-CV-01606-SB,

2020 WL 2952972, at *2 (D. Or. June 3, 2020) (citation modified) (quoting Consumer Sols.

REO, LLC v. Hillery, 658 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1020 (N.D. Cal. 2009)).

“‘Motions to strike are generally not granted unless it is clear that the matter to be

stricken could have no possible bearing on the subject matter of the litigation.’” A.B. v. Interstate

Mgmt. Co., LLC, No. 3:23-CV-00388-IM, 2024 WL 5264652, at *5 (D. Or. Dec. 31, 2024)

(quoting LeDuc v. Kentucky Cent. Life Ins. Co., 814 F. Supp. 820, 830 (N.D. Cal. 1992)). Courts

view the pleading “in the light more favorable to the pleader.” Bassiri v. Xerox Corp., 292 F.

Supp. 2d 1212, 1220 (C.D. Cal. 2003), rev'd on other grounds, 463 F.3d 927 (9th Cir. 2006). “A

court granting a Rule 12(f) motion should generally grant leave to amend, unless the amendment

would be futile.” Freeman v. Alta Bates Summit Med. Ctr. Campus, et al., No. C 04-2019 SBA,

2004 WL 2326369, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 2004) (internal citations omitted).

II. Analysis.

A. Wright’s alleged sexual misconduct.

Plaintiff alleges that Wright engaged in sexual misconduct with women before and after

his employment with the City. SAC ¶¶ 10, 12–17. Plaintiff further alleges that the City knew

about that alleged misconduct, id. at ¶¶ 19, 82, and nevertheless delegated him authority for

criminal investigations, as discussed above. Plaintiff alleges that, due to that knowledge, “these

allegations are not only timely—they are legally indispensable to [her] Monell claim and must be

permitted to proceed.” Pl.’s Resp. to Mot. to Strike 12, ECF 74; see also id. at 13 (arguing that

the allegations are “directly relevant to Plaintiff’s Monell theory of liability against the City”

because they “support the City’s deliberate indifference in delegating final policymaking

authority to a known offender whose misconduct had already been documented”). Plaintiff does

not allege that the allegations of sexual misconduct are relevant to the claims against Wright

individually. See SAC ¶¶ 78–79.

This Court agrees with Wright that these allegations are impertinent and immaterial,

albeit for different reasons than those he advances. Simply put, because the allegations regarding

Wright’s sexual misconduct are advanced in support of the Monell claim, and the Court has now

dismissed that claim, the allegations no longer have any “possible bearing on the subject matter

of the litigation.” A.B., 2024 WL 5264652, at *5. The allegations are therefore immaterial.4

Accordingly, Wright’s Motion to Strike the allegations in paragraphs 10, 12–17, 19, and 82

concerning his alleged sexual misconduct is GRANTED.5 Plaintiff is directed to file a Third

Amended Complaint—not under seal—without any reference to the allegations in those

paragraphs.

B. Allegations concerning Jane Doe 2.

Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint includes allegations that another minor female,

Jane Doe 2, was contacted by the same perpetrator, and that she reported her allegations to

another police department. SAC ¶¶ 61–63. Plaintiff further alleges that, after her mother learned

of Jane Doe 2, Plaintiff’s mother “called the FBI herself because it was apparent to her that the

City would not stop the abuse.” Id. at ¶ 65. Wright argues that these allegations are immaterial

and impertinent because they concern allegations reported to another police department, and

Wright was not directly involved in them. Mot. to Strike 8. This Court disagrees. While the

4 Because this Court concludes that the allegations are immaterial, it need not consider whether

they are also scandalous.

5 Wright asserts that if Plaintiff maintains that Wright’s alleged sexual misconduct is “relevant to

prove motive or anything else at trial, she can file a motion in limine; this Motion to Strike does

not seek any prejudice to Plaintiff’s future rights to raise these issues in limine where a more

complete evidentiary hearing can take place.” Mot. to Strike 8. This Court agrees and does not

address whether Wright’s alleged prior sexual misconduct would be admissible at trial.

admissibility and evidentiary value of these allegations is unsettled, it is readily apparent that the

allegations bear on Plaintiff’s mother’s decision to contact the FBI and her alleged realization

that the City would not stop the abuse. Accordingly, Wright’s Motion to Strike those allegations

is DENIED.

PLAINTIFF’S USE OF A PSEUDONYM AND MOTION TO SEAL

Plaintiff initially filed this case under a pseudonym without objection from Defendants.

And the Court previously concluded that this is the “unusual case” where anonymity is necessary

“to preserve privacy in a matter of sensitive and highly personal nature.” Op. & Order 3 n.1

(quoting Does I thru XXIII v. Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F.3d 1058, 1067–68 (9th Cir. 2000)).

But the Court also noted that it must determine whether to allow Plaintiff to remain anonymous

at “each stage of the proceedings.” Id.

Plaintiff moved to file the Second Amended Complaint under seal, which Defendants

initially opposed. Pl. Mot. Seal, ECF 63. Then, in the motion to strike, Wright took the position

that, if the Court requires public rather than sealed filings in this case, then it should also require

Plaintiff to proceed using her name. Mot. to Strike 2. For her part, Plaintiff objects to proceeding

under her real name but asserts that the Second Amended Complaint can be unsealed, as it was

filed under seal “[s]oley out of consideration” for Wright. Pl.’s Resp. to Mot. to Strike 5.

Given this Court’s resolution of the Motion to Strike, it is appropriate to seal the Second

Amended Complaint, which will no longer be the operative pleading. Plaintiff’s motion to seal is

therefore GRANTED. Subsequent complaints, however, including the Third Amended

Complaint, should not be filed under seal.

As to Plaintiff’s anonymity, at this stage of the proceedings, this Court adheres to its prior

conclusion that maintaining Plaintiff’s anonymity is necessary “to preserve privacy in a matter of

sensitive and highly personal nature.” See Does I thru XXIII, 214 F.3d at 1068 (citation

modified). The necessity of Plaintiff’s anonymity has no bearing on whether information

concerning Wright must be filed under seal, and, as discussed above, this Court has now struck

the disputed allegations concerning Wright. Therefore, Plaintiff may continue to proceed under a

pseudonym through dispositive motions.

But this Court must determine whether to allow Plaintiff to remain anonymous at “each

stage of the proceedings.” Id. Given that Plaintiff is now an adult, this Court will not permit

Plaintiff to proceed under a pseudonym at trial if doing so would result in prejudice to Wright at

trial or jeopardize the public’s access to Court proceedings. Therefore, the Parties are directed to

confer regarding a supplemental protective order that will limit the need for filings under seal

and ensure the public’s right to observe court proceedings while also maintaining Plaintiff’s

confidentiality. 6 If the Parties cannot agree on the scope of a supplemental protective order, then

Plaintiff should file a motion for a protective order regarding maintaining her confidentiality at

trial.

CONCLUSION

The City’s Motion to Dismiss, ECF 71, is GRANTED, and the claims against the City are

dismissed WITH PREJUDICE. Wright’s Motion to Strike, ECF 70, is GRANTED in part and

DENIED in part. Plaintiff’s Motion to Seal the Second Amended Complaint, ECF 63, is

GRANTED. Plaintiff is directed to file a Third Amended Complaint—not under seal—that does

not contain the material in paragraphs 10, 12–17, 19, and 82 of the Second Amended Complaint.

6 The current protective order, ECF 33, does not address the confidentiality of testimony and

documents pertaining to Plaintiff’s identity at trial.

With respect to Plaintiff proceeding under a pseudonym, the Parties are directed to confer

regarding a supplemental protective order concerning Plaintiff's anonymity at trial.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this 14th day of August, 2025. IA (J

ANDREW HALLMAN

United States Magistrate Judge

PAGE 14- OPINION AND ORDER