Maxwell v. Hawkins

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

DELTA DIVISION

RODERICK D. MAXWELL *

ADC #154561, *

*

Plaintiff, *

v. * No. 2:25-cv-00045-JJV

*

JOSHUA HAWKINS, Sergeant, *

East Arkansas Regional Unit, ADC *

*

Defendant. *

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff alleges that on February 13, 2025, he twice told Defendant Sergeant Hawkins he

was feeling suicidal and needed to speak to his mental health case worker. (Doc. 4.) He says

because Defendant Hawkins did not do so, Plaintiff attempted suicide by hanging himself from his

cell bars with his laundry bag.

Defendant Hawkins has now filed a Motion for Summary Judgment arguing the claim

against him should be dismissed without prejudice because Plaintiff failed to exhaust his available

administrative remedies. (Docs. 17-19.) Plaintiff has filed a Response and a Reply, (Docs. 21,

23), and Defendant filed a Reply. (Doc. 22.) After careful consideration and for the following

reasons, I find Defendant’s Motion should be granted and this case should be dismissed without

prejudice.

II. SUMMARY JUDGEMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when the record, viewed in the light most favorable to

the nonmoving party, demonstrates there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp.

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v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The moving party bears the initial burden of

demonstrating the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.

Thereafter, the nonmoving party cannot rest on mere denials or allegations in the pleadings, but

instead, must come forward with evidence supporting each element of the claim and demonstrating

there is a genuine dispute of material fact for trial. See Fed R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex, 477 U.S at

322; Holden v. Hirner, 663 F.3d 336, 340 (8th Cir. 2011). In this regard, a factual dispute is

“genuine” if “the evidence is sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the non-

moving party.” Greater St. Louis Constr. Laborers Welfare Fund v. B.F.W. Contracting, LLC, 76

F.4th 753, 757 (8th Cir. 2023).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Exhaustion Requirement

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) provides, in part, that: “No action shall be

brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law,

by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative

remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The purposes of the exhaustion

requirement include “allowing a prison to address complaints about the program it administers

before being subjected to suit, reducing litigation to the extent complaints are satisfactorily

resolved, and improving litigation that does occur by leading to the preparation of a useful record.”

Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 219 (2007); see also Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 89-91 (2006).

The PLRA requires inmates to fully and properly exhaust their administrative remedies as

to each claim in the complaint. Johnson v. Jones, 340 F.3d 624, 627 (8th Cir. 2003); Graves v.

Norris, 218 F.3d 884, 885 (8th Cir. 2000). Importantly, the Supreme Court has emphasized “it is

the prison’s requirements, and not the PLRA, that define the boundaries of proper exhaustion.”

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Jones, 549 U.S. at 218. Thus, to satisfy the PLRA, a prisoner must fully and properly comply with

the specific procedural requirements of the incarcerating facility. Id. The only exception is if

administrative remedies are unavailable. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (prisoners are only required to

exhaust “available” administrative remedies). Administrative remedies are “unavailable” if, for

instance: (1) the grievance procedure “operates as a simple dead end;” (2) the procedure is “so

opaque that it becomes, practically speaking, incapable of use;” or (3) “prison administrators

thwart inmates from taking advantage of a grievance process through machination,

misrepresentation, or intimidation.” Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 642 (2016); see also Townsend

v. Murphy, 898 F.3d 780, 783 (8th Cir. 2018).

B. ADC’s Grievance Procedure

Administrative Directive 19-34 (“AD 19-34”) establishes a three-step procedure for

exhausting administrative remedies in any ADC Unit. (Doc. 17-2.) A summary of that procedure

is included in the Inmate Handbook, a full copy is available in the prison law library, and many of

the requirements are included on the forms themselves. (Id. at § IV(C).)

First, the inmate must attempt informal resolution by submitting a Unit Level Grievance

Form to a designated problem solver within fifteen days of the incident. (Id. at § IV(E)(1)). The

form must include “a brief statement that is specific as to the substance of the issue or complaint

to include the date, place, personnel involved or witnesses, and how the policy or incident affected

the inmate submitting the form.” (Id. at § IV(E)(2)) (emphasis added.) Inmates are cautioned a

“[g]rievance must specifically name each individual involved in order that a proper investigation

and response may be completed” and an inmate who “fails to name all parties during the grievance

process may have his or her lawsuit or claim dismissed by the court or commission for failure to

exhaust against all parties.” (Id. § IV(C)(4)) (emphasis added.) And the grievance form reminds

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prisoners to include the “name of personnel involved.” (Id. at 20.) Second, if informal resolution

is unsuccessful or the problem solver does not timely respond, the inmate must file a formal

grievance within three working days. (Id. § IV(E)(11) and (F)(1).) Third, an inmate who is

dissatisfied with the Warden’s response, or who does not timely receive a response, must appeal

within five working days to the “Chief Deputy/Deputy/Assistant Director.” (Id. § IV(F)(9)) And

the response ends the grievance process. (Id.)

C. Analysis

Grievance Supervisor Terri Grigsby-Brown provided a declaration, under oath, and stated:

I have reviewed the non-medical grievance appeal files and grievance history for

Inmate Roderick Maxwell (ADC #154561). I searched for any exhausted

grievances submitted from February 13, 2025, through the date this lawsuit was

filed on March 3, 2025. I also searched the same timeframe for any exhausted

grievances that specifically named ADC Defendant Joshua Hawkins or referred to

the claims in this lawsuit. (A true and accurate copy of Inmate Maxwell’s grievance

history is attached to ADC Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment as “Exhibit

3, Roderick Maxwell’s Grievance History”). During my review, I found that

Inmate Maxwell did not file or exhaust any relevant grievances. (Ex. 3).

Specifically, he has not filed any grievances past November 6, 2024. (Ex. 3).

(Doc. 17-1 at 7.)

Exhibit 3 supports Ms. Grigsby-Brown’s declaration. Exhibit 3 shows the last grievance

Plaintiff filed was EAM24-03498, dated November 6, 2024. (Doc. 17-3 at 2.) That grievance is

wholly unrelated as it involved “Clothing-Sheets/Bedding/Footware.” (Id.)

Mr. Maxwell responds that Ms. Grigsby-Brown is lying and that he has already provided

the Court with copies of grievances he submitted. (Doc. 21.) As a part of his original Complaint,

Plaintiff submitted three grievance forms. (Doc. 2 at 15-17.) The first one is dated February 13,

2025. (Id. at 15.) The only action taken upon this grievance was submission to the problem solver

on February 13, 2025. There is no grievance number assigned, and – on its face - this grievance

was obviously not exhausted. (Id.) The second one appears to be blank. (Id. at 16.) And the

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third, curiously states a date of February 6, 2025, for Step One. As Defendant points out, this date

is a week before the alleged incident. So, Mr. Maxwell’s claim that Ms. Grigsby-Brown is lying

is not well taken.

Plaintiff suggests that the administrative remedies were “unavailable” to him because

Defendant Hawkins and others failed to make sure the documents were submitted to the grievance

officer. (Doc. 23 at 1.) See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (requiring prisoners to exhaust only “available”

administrative remedies); Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 644 (2016) (administrative remedies are

“unavailable” when “prison administrators thwart inmates from taking advantage of a grievance

process through machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation”). But without more, I am unable

to conclude that anyone thwarted Plaintiff’s attempt to pursue his administrative remedies. AD

19-34 specifically states that, “if informal resolution is unsuccessful or the problem solver does

not timely respond, the inmate must file a formal grievance within three working days.” (Doc. 17-

2 at § IV(E)(11) and (F)(1))(emphasis added.) Plaintiff fails to state any facts to show he was

prevented from filing the formal grievance when he did not receive a response from the problem

solver. Accordingly, I conclude Defendant Hawkins is entitled to summary judgment because

Plaintiff failed to properly exhaust his available administrative remedies. See Jones, 549 U.S. at

211 (“There is no question that exhaustion is mandatory under the PLRA and that unexhausted

claims cannot be brought in court”).

I realize Plaintiff may perceive this conclusion as an unfairly technical “gotcha”

mechanism to keep him out of court. To the contrary, the exhaustion requirement plays a critical

role in the remedy process, which the Eighth Circuit has explained as follows:

Beyond doubt, Congress enacted § 1997e(a) to reduce the quantity and improve the

quality of prisoner suits; to this purpose, Congress afforded corrections officials

time and opportunity to address complaints internally before allowing the initiation

of a federal case. In some instances, corrective action taken in response to an

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inmate’s grievance might improve prison administration and satisfy the inmate,

thereby obviating the need for litigation. In other instances, the internal review

might filter out some frivolous claims. And for cases ultimately brought to court,

adjudication could be facilitated by an administrative record that clarifies the

contours of the controversy.

Johnson, 340 F.3d at 626-27; see also Woodford, 548 U.S. at 89 (“Exhaustion gives an agency an

opportunity to correct its own mistakes with respect to the programs it administers before it is

haled into federal court, and it discourages disregard of [the agency’s] procedures”).

IV. CONCLUSION

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED THAT:

1. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 17) is GRANTED, and

Plaintiff's Amended Complaint against Defendant Hawkins is DISMISSED without prejudice.

2. It is certified, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an in forma pauperis appeal

would not be taken in good faith.

Dated this 14th day of August 2025.

_

JOE J. vo} PE

UNITEDSTWXTES MAGISTRATE JUDGE