United States v. Larremore

Case: 24-50431 Document: 69-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/14/2025

United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

____________ United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

No. 24-50431

FILED

August 14, 2025

____________

Lyle W. Cayce

United States of America, Clerk

Plaintiff—Appellee,

versus

James Eric Larremore,

Defendant—Appellant.

______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 4:23-CR-289-1

______________________________

Before Elrod, Chief Judge, Engelhardt, Circuit Judge, and Guidry,

District Judge. *

Greg Gerard Guidry, District Judge:

Defendant-Appellant James Eric Larremore confessed to secreting

illegal aliens inside a locked horse trailer. The district court denied his motion

to suppress. Larremore conditionally pleaded guilty, and now he appeals the

district court’s ruling. We find no Fourth Amendment violation and

accordingly AFFIRM.

_____________________

*

United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Louisiana, sitting by

designation.

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No. 24-50431

I.

A.

On July 9, 2023, at approximately 1:45 p.m., Brewster County Deputy

Christopher Colona was parked on a remote section of U.S. Highway 385

monitoring traffic near a border patrol checkpoint at the time of a regularly

scheduled border patrol shift change. Deputy Colona knew smugglers often

carried out their illegal activities during the shift change. The Highway 385

checkpoint is a short distance from Marathon, Texas, and is one of the few

checkpoints near the U.S.-Mexico border that is not continuously manned.

Deputy Colona saw a white pickup truck, driven by Larremore, traveling

north pulling an empty metal horse trailer. The trailer had an open-air section

for horses and an enclosed compartment large enough to hold people.

Deputy Colona recognized the truck and the driver. He had earlier

received a tip from a fellow officer that Larremore was possibly involved in

the smuggling of people and/or drugs. Brewster County, the largest county

in Texas, encompasses over 6,000 square miles but is sparsely populated.

Deputy Colona knew Larremore worked on his father’s ranch, which was

located on the opposite end of the county.

Deputy Colona turned onto the highway, briefly accelerated, and then

followed behind Larremore for slightly more than a minute. Unprompted,

Larremore guided his truck and trailer to the shoulder. Deputy Colona pulled

in behind him. Deputy Colona never directed Larremore’s movement. He

did not engage his siren, turn on his emergency lights, physically block

Larremore’s vehicle, or otherwise explicitly suggest that Larremore had to

stop. Deputy Colona parked his patrol car behind Larremore’s trailer.

Deputy Colona then walked to the passenger side of Larremore’s

truck. Larremore extended his hand for a greeting. Deputy Colona reached

his right arm into the truck for a handshake while resting his left hand on the

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front passenger side door. Deputy Colona stated it was “good to see you”

and asked Larremore how he was doing, whether he had any work, and where

he was going. Larremore replied he was travelling to Odessa, Texas, to sell

the horse trailer. While speaking with Larremore, Deputy Colona rested his

arm on the windowsill and observed an open alcohol container in plain view.

Deputy Colona began to walk to his patrol car while asking Larremore to

“[h]ang on a sec for me.” Deputy Colona testified he paused the

conversation in order to radio his position to headquarters for officer safety,

according to protocol.

Larremore did not wait for the deputy to make the call. Instead, he

immediately exited his truck from the driver side, walked in between the

truck and trailer, and met Deputy Colona on the shoulder. Deputy Colona

could see a padlock locking the door to the enclosed compartment of the

trailer, and he asked Larremore if he had a key. Larremore said he did not.

When asked what was inside the locked compartment, Larremore replied

that he had some saddles. Deputy Colona found it suspicious that Larremore

would be selling a horse trailer containing saddles locked in a compartment

to which he had no key. He told Larremore he would like to look inside.

Larremore responded with an ambiguous shrug.

Larremore made additional inconsistent and suspicious statements.

For example, he claimed: (1) that he had just delivered a horse in Terlingua,

Texas, a border town hundreds of miles away from his father’s ranch; (2) that

he was selling a trailer registered in another person’s name; and (3) that his

girlfriend, whose name he struggled to remember, was the one who had

locked the compartment.

Deputy Colona explained that he was concerned Larremore was

smuggling drugs and stated he “want[ed] to look inside” the trailer to allay

his suspicions. He suggested he do so by cutting the lock with bolt cutters.

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For approximately the next minute, Colona continued to try to persuade

Larremore to allow him to look inside the trailer. At that point, Colona told

Larremore that he “need[ed] to look inside the trailer.” Larremore agreed

and said, “Well, I guess go get your bolt cutters.”

Larremore quickly began to equivocate. A nine-minute conversation

ensued during which Larremore asked questions and made statements. He

asked what would happen if he did not allow Deputy Colona to look in the

trailer. He also stated, “he has rights,” was “thinking, thinking, thinking,”

and this was a “big decision.” Larremore ultimately refused to allow the

compartment to be opened.

Larremore continued to give inconsistent and suspicious statements

throughout the encounter. He initially could not remember the trailer

buyer’s name, despite claiming he had recently spent a week with him, and

stated he last used the trailer a week after it was allegedly locked by his

girlfriend. Larremore also repeatedly stated that there was something

“embarrassing” in the trailer.

Deputy Colona later told Larremore that he had probable cause to

conduct a search of Larremore’s truck, because he had viewed the open

alcohol container located in plain sight. He asked Larremore if he would find

a key to the trailer in the truck. At this point, Larremore confessed that he

had “three cousins” in the trailer and quickly produced the key, which had

been hidden under the fender of the horse trailer. Upon unlocking the

compartment, Deputy Colona discovered three illegal aliens inside.

All of the events were captured on Deputy Colona’s dash camera and

body camera.

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B.

Larremore was charged with two counts of transporting illegal aliens

in violation of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii), (a)(1)(A)(v)(I), (B)(i), and

(B)(ii). He moved to suppress the evidence. The district court held a hearing

on the motion during which Deputy Colona testified.

The district court denied the motion after finding that Larremore had

been seized with reasonable suspicion. The district court reasoned that

Larremore’s consent to search the trailer, which it believed was never

withdrawn, attenuated the taint from what it found to be a trespassory search

and discovery of the open alcohol container in Larremore’s truck. Larremore

thereafter pleaded guilty to Count 2, an 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii) &

(B)(ii) violation, and reserved his right to appeal the suppression ruling.

Larremore was sentenced to 37 months of imprisonment and timely appealed

the denial of his motion to suppress.

II.

When reviewing a district court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we

review factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo, viewing

the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party—in this case

the government. United States v. Alvarez, 40 F.4th 339, 344 (5th Cir. 2022).

We may also affirm the denial of a suppression motion on any basis supported

by the record. United States v. El-Mezain, 664 F.3d 467, 540 (5th Cir. 2011).

The timing of a seizure is a factual finding reviewed for clear error.

United States v. Wise, 877 F.3d 209, 215 (5th Cir. 2017). “A factual finding is

not clearly erroneous as long as it is plausible in light of the record as a

whole.” United States v. Gomez, 623 F.3d 265, 268 (5th Cir. 2010) (quotation

omitted). In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, the district court’s

ruling will be upheld “if there is any reasonable view of the evidence to

support it.” United States v. Michalik, 5 F.4th 583, 588 (5th Cir. 2021)

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(citation omitted). The clearly erroneous standard is “particularly strong”

when, as here, the denial of a suppression motion is based on live oral

testimony. United States v. Gibbs, 421 F.3d 352, 357 (5th Cir. 2005) (quotation

omitted). However, when testimony plainly conflicts with video evidence, we

view “the facts in the light depicted by the videotape.” Scott v. Harris, 550

U.S. 372, 380–81 (2007).

Whether an officer had reasonable suspicion for a seizure requires de

novo review. United States v. Rico-Soto, 690 F.3d 376, 379 (5th Cir. 2012). So,

too, is our review of whether an officer’s actions amount to an

unconstitutional search. United States v. Roberts, 612 F.3d 306, 309 (5th Cir.

2010).

III.

Larremore makes several arguments as to why we should overturn the

district court’s suppression ruling. Each is unsuccessful.

A.

Larremore asserts he was seized without reasonable suspicion. He

presents three alternative moments of seizure: when Deputy Colona (1)

followed him on the highway over to the shoulder, (2) rested his forearm and

hand on his truck, or (3) said “hang on a sec.” These arguments fail.

First, Larremore argues Deputy Colona seized him when he followed

Larremore to the shoulder.

A “seizure occurs when an officer ‘objectively manifests an intent to

restrain’ the liberty of an individual through…a show of authority.” United

States v. Wright, 57 F.4th 524, 530 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting Torres v. Madrid,

592 U.S. 306, 317 (2021)). In the absence of physical force, a seizure occurs

when; (1) an officer exerts a sufficient show of authority and (2) the

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defendant submits to it. Id. at 531 (citing Carroll v. Ellington, 800 F.3d 154,

170 (5th Cir. 2015)).

An officer makes a sufficient show of authority when “all of the

circumstances surrounding the incident [suggest that] a reasonable person

would have believed that he was not free to leave.” United States v.

Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980). We ask “whether a reasonable person

would feel free to decline the officers’ requests or otherwise terminate the

encounter.” United States v. Flowers, 6 F.4th 651, 655 (5th Cir. 2021) (citation

omitted). Recognized shows of authority include methods “meant to bring a

person to a stop” like visual signals and physical blockades. United States v.

Morris, 40 F.4th 323, 327 (5th Cir. 2022) (citations omitted).

A consensual encounter with police is not a seizure. United States v.

Cooper, 43 F.3d 140, 145 (5th Cir. 1995). No individualized suspicion is

required, and an officer can ask “questions of that individual. . .and request

consent. . .as long as the police do not convey a message that compliance with

their requests is required.” Id. (citing Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 435

(1991)).

No pertinent case holds that simply following a car on a freely

accessible highway is a show of force. On the contrary, there is “nothing

particularly coercive about police observation in public.” United States v.

Mask, 330 F.3d 330, 337 (5th Cir. 2003). Deputy Colona did not activate his

emergency lights or siren, nor did he direct Larremore to pull over.

Larremore did so on his own accord.

Larremore’s reliance on cases in which an officer deployed a visual

signal or emergency lights is misplaced. In Wright, we held that an officer

seized an individual when the officer pulled up behind a parked vehicle with

her emergency lights on and commanded the driver to “stay in [his] car.” 57

F.4th at 528, 532. At the time the officer’s “emergency lights engaged, she []

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show[ed] a sign of authority.” Id. Morris concerned an officer who used a

visual signal to flag down a car. 40 F.4th at 323, 327–28. Because Louisiana

law created an obligation for any motorist to follow a police officer’s

direction, we held the motorist was seized by the visual signal. Id. at 327–28.

There is no comparable visual signal or directive in the instant case.

Deputy Colona did not announce any commands or otherwise initiate a stop.

Larremore pulled over to the shoulder on his own volition. Deputy Colona

testified that he followed Larremore over to the shoulder, not to investigate,

but to check on his welfare. A welfare check is generally not a seizure. See,

e.g., Tyson v. Sabine, 42 F.4th 508, 517 (5th Cir. 2022).

We find this case presents similarly to Michigan v. Chesternut, in which

the Supreme Court held that a “brief acceleration to catch up with [an

individual], followed by a short drive alongside him—[is] not so intimidating

that [he] could reasonably have believed that he was not free to disregard the

police presence.” 486 U.S. 567, 576 (1988) (quotation omitted). Here, we

discern no show of authority implicating the Fourth Amendment where

Deputy Colona briefly accelerated, then drove behind Larremore for a short

distance before following him to the shoulder of the highway.

Second, Larremore argues he was seized when Deputy Colona rested

his forearm and hand on the truck’s passenger-side door. We find no merit

to that argument.

“A seizure requires the use of force with intent to restrain. Accidental

force will not qualify.” Torres, 592 U.S. at 317. “While a mere touch can be

enough for a seizure, the amount of force remains pertinent in assessing the

objective intent to restrain.” Vardeman v. City of Houston, 55 F.4th 1045, 1051

(5th Cir. 2022) (quoting id.).

Deputy Colona’s incidental contact with Larremore’s truck does not

evidence an objective intent to restrain. Dash camera and body camera

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footage shows that Deputy Colona rested his left hand on Larremore’s truck

and right forearm on the truck’s window frame to shake Larremore’s hand.

The touching lasted a mere twenty seconds and occurred while the two

exchanged pleasantries in a casual tone. Deputy Colona stood at the

passenger door side, but he did not physically block Larremore or his truck.

“[A] seizure does not occur simply because a police officer approaches an

individual and asks a few questions.” Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434. The contact

here was de minimis. The district court considered the video footage and

hearing testimony before holding that Deputy Colona did not intend to

restrain Larremore by physical force when he rested his hand on the truck.

We find no clear error in this finding.

Third, Larremore contends Deputy Colona’s “hang on a sec”

statement was equivalent to an officer’s oral command to not move. The

district court found the statement was a pause in consensual conversation

and not a seizure. Considering its context, we cannot say that this factual

finding is clearly erroneous.

Oral directives from police may constitute a seizure when “the use of

language or tone of voice indicat[es] that compliance with the officer’s

request might be compelled.” Vardeman, 55 F.4th at 1051. But “police

questioning, by itself, does not fall within the ambit of Fourth Amendment

protections.” United States v. Chavez, 281 F.3d 479, 483 (5th Cir. 2002)

(citing INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216 (1984)). Conversations with police

can be consensual. See, e.g., Cooper, 43 F.3d at 145. We look to the following

non-exclusive factors to determine a non-consensual encounter: (1) the

threatening presence of several police officers; (2) the display of a weapon by

an officer; (3) physical touching of the person of the citizen; and (4) the use

of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with an officer’s

request was compelled. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554. We must consider not

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only these factors, but ultimately the totality of the circumstances. Flowers, 6

F.4th at 655.

The Mendenhall factors do not support a seizure in this case. Deputy

Colona was the only officer present, and he never touched Larremore. As to

the display of a weapon, it is true Deputy Colona was in uniform with a

holstered firearm. But the Supreme Court has held that this fact had “little

weight in the [seizure] analysis.” United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 204–

205 (2002). “[A]bsent active brandishing,” a mere holstered firearm is

“unlikely” to indicate a coercive encounter. Id. at 205. Deputy Colona did

not brandish or otherwise reference his weapon. This factor, too, weighs

against finding a seizure.

We now consider the language and meaning of the “hang on a sec”

statement. The statement was made in a casual tone and was bookended by

consensual conversation. It was not repeated. Deputy Colona’s questions

were innocuous and friendly. He asked how Larremore was doing, whether

he was working, where he was heading, etc. The Supreme Court has held that

the lack of “an authoritative tone of voice” with “no application of force, no

intimidating movement, no overwhelming show of force, no brandishing of

weapons, no blocking of exits, no threat, [and] no command” give “ample

grounds” for a district court to conclude that a police interaction was

consensual. Drayton, 536 U.S. at 204. Such is the case here. Deputy Colona’s

tone is anything but authoritative; he paused the conversation only to radio

his location to headquarters for his safety. He exhibited no show of force.

Next, the meaning of “hang on a sec” does not plainly order someone

to a location. Officer statements are not made in a vacuum. Indeed,

Larremore himself did not interpret these words as an order to stay put. He

immediately exited his truck and met Deputy Colona on the side of the road.

Deputy Colona did not object to Larremore’s actions, nor did he repeat his

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statement. If Deputy Colona had issued an order, he certainly could have

repeated it considering Larremore’s non-compliance. Therefore, context

before and after the statement suggests a consensual conversation.

When this court has recognized that an officer’s verbal order among

other actions is a seizure, the orders are express in their terms and are often

repeated. For example, in Wright, the officer turned on her emergency lights

when pulling up to a parked car and ordered the driver three times to “stay

in [his] car.” 57 F.4th at 528, 532. No other meaning can plausibly be derived

from those statements. This instantaneous and express order coupled with

the emergency lights meant a reasonable person would not feel free to leave.

Id. at 532. Likewise in Morris, the officer unambiguously ordered the driver

to exit his car and then repeated express demands to search the vehicle. 40

F.4th at 326, 328. “Both the express terms of the deputy’s demand” and its

“repet[ition]” suggested that compliance was required. Id. at 328. (citing

Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 555). In these cases, we noted that “it is hard to

conclude that a person ordered to a certain location by police would feel free

to leave.” Morris, 40 F.4th at 328; Wright, 57 F.4th at 532.

Deputy Colona’s statement is not express, immediately announced,

or repeated. He did not ask any questions pertinent to a specific investigation

before making the statement. The questions were permissible and do not

establish a seizure absent a separate nonconsensual restraint. See United

States v. Brigham, 382 F.3d 500, 508 (5th Cir. 2004).

Our review is guided by the clearly erroneous standard. Only if we are

left with “a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed”

can we upset the district court’s factual finding. United States v. Alkheqani,

78 F.4th 707, 723 (5th Cir. 2023) (quotation omitted). The deference given

to the district court is even stronger here because it based its factual findings,

in part, on Deputy Colona’s suppression hearing testimony. See, e.g., Gibbs,

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421 F.3d at 357. Deputy Colona testified that he meant the statement to be a

pause in conversation, and the district court found Colona’s testimony

credible.

We should not second-guess witness credibility “because the

[district] judge had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the

witnesses.” United States v. Robinson, 741 F.3d 588, 594 (5th Cir. 2014)

(quotation omitted). Indeed, we must affirm if there is a reasonable view of

the evidence that supports the district court’s conclusion. Michalik, 5 F.4th

at 588. A pause in consensual conversation rather than a seizure is certainly

a reasonable view of the evidence. We accordingly find no clear error.

The district court held Colona seized Larremore when he stated that

he “need[ed] to look inside the trailer.” We find Larremore was seized a

minute earlier: when Deputy Colona relayed his suspicions of smuggling and

stated that he “want[ed] to look inside” the trailer. A reasonable person

would not feel free to leave under those circumstances. See United States v.

Hanson, 801 F.2d 757, 761 (5th Cir. 1986) (“[W]hen [the officer] . . .informed

[the defendant] that he. . .[was] suspected of carrying drugs, a reasonable

person would not have believed that he was free to go.”). Larremore’s

consensual interaction then transformed into a Terry stop where reasonable

suspicion is required. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 365 F.3d 399, 405

(5th Cir. 2004). We now address the lawfulness of this Terry stop.

B.

Larremore argues Deputy Colona never had reasonable suspicion and

impermissibly extended Larremore’s detention. We disagree and conclude

Deputy Colona executed a permissible Terry stop.

A Terry stop is a seizure that requires reasonable suspicion. Wright, 57

F.4th at 529; see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). The stop must be “(1)

justified at its inception; and (2) reasonably related in scope to the

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circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.” United

States v. Lopez-Moreno, 420 F.3d 420, 430 (5th Cir. 2005) (quotation

omitted). Larremore challenges the encounter on both prongs. Our review is

de novo. Alvarez, 40 F.4th at 344.

First, we find Deputy Colona had reasonable suspicion to initiate a

Terry stop. Reasonable suspicion means an officer has “specific and

articulable facts” supporting a reasonable belief “that a particular person has

committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime.” United States v.

Monsivais, 848 F.3d 353, 357 (5th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). The proof

needed is “considerably less than. . .a preponderance of the evidence.”

Kansas v. Glover, 589 U.S. 376, 380 (2020).

The reasonable suspicion analysis is intensely fact specific. Flowers, 6

F.4th at 656. We look to the entire encounter because “factors which by

themselves may appear innocent, may in the aggregate rise to the level of

reasonable suspicion.” United States v. Ibarra-Sanchez, 199 F.3d 753, 759 (5th

Cir. 1999). Officers develop reasonable suspicion through commonsense

judgments and inferences about human behavior. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528

U.S. 119, 125 (2000). Accordingly, they can consider a suspect’s behavior

and may make conclusions based on their experience in law enforcement.

Alvarez, 40 F.4th at 346.

Deputy Colona first began to develop suspicion from the location and

timing of where Larremore was driving. While mere presence in a certain

location is generally not enough to support reasonable suspicion, the

“relevant characteristics of a location can contribute to a finding of

reasonable suspicion, and the timing of one’s movements [is] a permissible

consideration in [the] reasonable suspicion analysis.” United States v. Roper,

63 F.4th 473, 478 (5th Cir. 2023) (quotation omitted).

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Larremore was travelling on Highway 385 near the border patrol

checkpoint when the scheduled patrol shift change would occur. Both the

route and the timing can contribute to a finding of reasonable suspicion. This

Court has recognized that Highway 385 is “known to be a route preferred by

drug smugglers,” and its checkpoint is one of the few not continuously

monitored by border patrol. United States v. Neufeld-Neufeld, 338 F.3d 374,

380 (5th Cir. 2003); United States v. Rodriguez–Rivas, 151 F.3d 377, 378–79

(5th Cir. 1998) (suggesting that the Highway 385 checkpoint is not

continuously manned). Deputy Colona testified that, based on his

experience, smugglers often time their runs during the shift changes.

Larremore’s responses to Deputy Colona’s initial questions provided

more information. Inconsistent and nonsensical answers can create

reasonable suspicion. Roper, 63 F.4th at 479. The “most likely single

alternative explanation” for inconsistent, nervous, or nonsensical stories or

behavior, “particularly when the stop occurs on a highway that is frequently

used by smugglers,” is “that the occupants are carrying contraband.” United

States v. Pack, 612 F.3d 341, 362 (5th Cir. 2010), opinion modified on denial of

reh’g, 622 F.3d 383 (5th Cir. 2010). It is reasonable for an officer to

investigate that possibility. Id.

When questioned about the trailer, Larremore gave patently

inconsistent and suspicious answers. He claimed he was selling the horse

trailer with a locked compartment containing saddles to which he did not

have a key. Despite emphatically stating that his girlfriend had locked the

compartment, he struggled to remember her name. Larremore also admitted

he was heading northbound from Terlingua, a border town, after delivering a

horse. A trip commencing from a border town is relevant to reasonable

suspicion because Mexico is “a common origin of illicit drugs.” United States

v. Estrada, 459 F.3d 627, 632 (5th Cir. 2006). Considering the totality of the

circumstances, Deputy Colona had reasonable suspicion to justify a Terry

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stop when he told Larremore that he suspected him of smuggling and wanted

to see inside the trailer.

Next, we find the Terry stop was justified in its scope. Deputy

Colona’s questioning was permissible, and he did not unreasonably extend

the encounter.

“There is no hard-and-fast time limit for reasonable traffic stops.

Rather, the stop must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to

effectuate the purpose of the stop.” United States v. Smith, 952 F.3d 642, 647

(5th Cir. 2020) (quotation omitted). Questioning on a subject unrelated to

the purpose of the stop is itself not a Fourth Amendment violation. United

States v. Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431, 436 (5th Cir. 1993). “An officer may [] ask

about the purpose and itinerary of a driver’s trip.” Brigham, 382 F.3d at 508.

He may continue his questioning if his suspicion is increased by the

detainee’s conduct. Id.

The Terry stop was reasonable in scope given Larremore’s continued

nervous, evasive, and suspicious behavior. For example, he repeatedly

claimed that something “embarrassing” to him was inside the trailer without

providing any explanation. Deputy Colona was therefore entitled to broaden

the length and scope of his questioning. See, e.g., Brigham, 382 F.3d at 508.

Any delay in this encounter was caused by Larremore’s hesitation and

equivocations. Despite previously telling Deputy Colona to get his bolt

cutters to search the trailer’s locked compartment, Larremore changed

course and asked what would happen if he did not agree to the search. The

subsequent nine-minute conversation appears to have been a delay tactic by

Larremore in an effort to conceal his criminal activity. Larremore extended

the interaction with responses such as “thinking, thinking, thinking,” and

“big decision.” An officer does not unreasonably extend a detention when

he is not the cause of the delay. Only when it became clear Larremore was

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stalling did Deputy Colona say he would search the truck because of the open

alcohol container. Larremore then confessed to trafficking humans and

immediately produced the key. His seizure was clearly supported by

reasonable suspicion.

C.

Apart from the seizure issue, Larremore maintains Deputy Colona

committed a trespassory search of his truck when he discovered the open

alcohol container. We hold there was no Fourth Amendment violation

surrounding Deputy Colona’s plain view discovery.

Larremore argues the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine requires

the suppression of his confession and other evidence. He asserts Deputy

Colona committed a common-law trespassory search under United States v.

Jones, when he rested his hand on the window frame. 565 U.S. 400, 404–07

& n.3 (2012). Deputy Colona saw the open alcohol container while touching

the truck, and Larremore contends this alone is a trespassory search. But

for the discovery of the open alcohol container, Larremore maintains,

Deputy Colona would not have later been able to say that he had probable

cause to search Larremore’s truck thereby triggering his confession. Id.

The district court believed Deputy Colona committed a trespassory

search. However, it held there was no Fourth Amendment violation,

because Larremore’s initial consent to search the trailer was not withdrawn

thereby attenuating any taint. We agree there was no constitutional

violation but on different grounds. Deputy Colona’s incidental contact with

Larremore’s truck does not constitute a trespassory search.

A common-law trespassory search under Jones occurs when there is

a physical trespass “conjoined with an attempt to find something or obtain

information.” United States v. Richmond, 915 F.3d 352, 357 (5th Cir. 2019)

(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Jones, 565 U.S. at 408 n.5). Our

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precedents are sparse on what constitutes “an attempt to find something or

obtain information.” Other courts characterize this to mean an officer acts

with an “investigatory purpose.” United States v. Poller, 129 F.4th 169, 181

n.9 (2d Cir. 2025) (citing Richmond, 915 F.3d at 358; Taylor v. City of

Saginaw, 922 F.3d 328, 332–33 (6th Cir. 2019)).

This court has noted that “mere physical touching, such as when an

officer leans on the door of a car while questioning its driver,” is not a

trespassory search because it is not “conjoined with an attempt to find

something or obtain information.” Richmond, 915 F.3d at 357 (quotation

omitted).

Accordingly, we find Deputy Colona’s incidental contact with the

passenger-side door is not a trespassory search. The video footage shows

Deputy Colona merely leaned on the truck while speaking with Larremore.

The evidence fails to establish that Deputy Colona touched the truck to

discover information. Deputy Colona’s safety verification was totally

divorced from detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence, and his

initial questioning was consensual. Although the district court considered

this a search, our review is de novo, and we may affirm on any basis supported

by the record. United States v. Rodriguez, 601 F.3d 402, 405 (5th Cir. 2010);

El-Mezain, 664 F.3d at 540.

We conclude Deputy Colona had a right to be where he was at the

moment he observed the open alcohol container in plain sight, and any

physical contact with the truck was minor and incidental. Because the open

alcohol container discovery was lawful, it had no effect on any evidence

obtained thereafter. The evidence is not subject to suppression.

IV.

For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.

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Jennifer Walker Elrod, Chief Judge, concurring in part and

dissenting in part:

I concur in the majority opinion’s holding that Deputy Colona did not

commit a trespassory search of Larremore’s truck. But I respectfully

disagree that Larremore was not seized under the Fourth Amendment.

While driving his pickup truck and trailer on a desolate two-lane

highway in West Texas, James Larremore passed Deputy Colona’s patrol car

sitting on the side of the road. All agree that Deputy Colona lacked

reasonable suspicion to pull over Larremore at that moment, including

Deputy Colona. Nevertheless, Deputy Colona chased Larremore’s truck at

speeds of upwards of 94 miles an hour and tailed him closely for more than a

minute, and then, after Larremore pulled to the side of the road, questioned

him repeatedly about his route and the contents of his trailer. Thirty seconds

into the interaction, Deputy Colona directed Larremore not to leave, saying

“hang on one sec for me.”

In my view, Deputy Colona seized Larremore as soon as he directed

him to “hang on.” In fact, Deputy Colona thought so too—at the

suppression hearing, he admitted that a person in Larremore’s position

would not have felt free to leave.

Accordingly, Deputy Colona’s unlawful seizure of Larremore gives

rise to the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine. And Larremore’s confession

and any other evidence obtained after Deputy Colona’s unconstitutional

seizure should have been suppressed. With great respect for my colleagues,

I dissent.

I

As the majority opinion correctly observes, a seizure can be

established in the absence of physical force through an officer’s objective

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intent to restrain a person by a show of authority, after which the person

submits to the show of authority. Ante at 6–7 (citing United States v. Wright,

57 F.4th 524, 530–31 (5th Cir. 2023)). In this context, we must look at

whether, in light of “all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a

reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.”

Wright, 57 F.4th at 531 (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544,

554 (1980)). Critically, reasonable suspicion must exist prior to the seizure.

See United States v. Monsivais, 848 F.3d 353, 357, 359 (5th Cir. 2017). But

where the interaction is “not so intimidating that [a person] could reasonably

have believed that he was not free to disregard the police presence and go

about his business,” no seizure occurs. Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567,

576 (1988) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Moreover, even under the taxing clear error standard, “video

recordings are given a presumption of reliability and significant evidentiary

weight[.]” Wright, 57 F.4th at 530. “Accordingly, where testimony conflicts

with video evidence, our court must view the ‘facts in the light depicted by

the videotape’.” Id. (quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380–81 (2007));

see also United States v. Anderson, No. 23-50110, 2024 WL 2829243, at *3 (5th

Cir. June 4, 2024).

II

In this case, the dashcam footage from Deputy Colona’s patrol car

shows that after Larremore’s truck passed him on the side of the desolate

two-lane highway: (1) Deputy Colona immediately made a U-turn and began

pursuing Larremore, reaching speeds of up to 94 miles per hour; (2) after

catching up to Larremore’s truck, Deputy Colona followed behind him

closely for more than one minute of drive time; (3) Larremore moved to the

side of the road—seemingly to let Deputy Colona pass his truck—and

Deputy Colona pulled over behind him and stopped within a few feet of the

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back of the trailer; and (4) Deputy Colona exited his car within five seconds

of stopping and immediately looked in the back of the trailer to ascertain its

contents while approaching the passenger side window of Larremore’s truck.

After approaching Larremore, Deputy Colona leaned on his truck, peered his

head inside and scanned its interior, and questioned Larremore about his

route and the contents of his trailer. Within thirty seconds of stopping

Larremore, Deputy Colona directed him to “hang on one sec for me.”

Under the totality of the circumstances, Larremore was seized at that

moment. As the Supreme Court has long instructed, a seizure is a

“meaningful interference, however brief, with an individual’s freedom of

movement.” United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 n.5 (1984)

(emphasis added). We have recognized that “the use of language . . .

indicating that compliance with the officer’s request might be compelled”

could amount to a seizure. Vardeman v. City of Houston, 55 F.4th 1045, 1051

(5th Cir. 2022) (quoting Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554). Therefore, an

objective person would only need to “perceive that at least briefly, there was

no freedom to go.” Id. at 1052 (citing Torres v. Madrid, 592 U.S. 306, 317–18

(2021)).

After viewing Deputy Colona’s bodycam footage, his statement to

“hang on one sec for me” might not have been in a traditionally authoritative

tone, but it indicated to Larremore that he should not go anywhere until

Deputy Colona allowed him to go. See United States v. Morris, 40 F.4th 323,

328 (5th Cir. 2022) (“Under the Fourth Amendment’s ‘free to leave’ test, it

is hard to conclude that a person ordered to a certain location by police would

feel free to leave.”). Deputy Colona may not have explicitly ordered

Larremore to a certain location, but he did direct Larremore not to leave a

particular location—no matter how friendly his tone. Under our precedent,

that is enough. See United States v. McKinney, 980 F.3d 485, 491 (5th Cir.

2020) (concluding that a seizure occurred when police instructed woman

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walking away from officers to return); cf. Morris, 40 F.4th at 328 (“The

district court also erred in failing to consider whether the deputies effected a

stop when they ordered Morris out of his car . . . .”). In fact, Deputy Colona

testified that he did not believe that a reasonable person in Larremore’s

position would have felt free to leave after being told to “hang on one sec for

me.” 1

Further, the context and facts surrounding Deputy Colona’s

command make it all the more apparent that Larremore was not free to leave.

Although Deputy Colona never activated his lights or sirens, he chased

Larremore until he pulled over to the side of the road in a manner resembling

a traffic stop. 2 Then, before directing Larremore to “hang on,” Deputy

Colona can be seen on video leaning with his hands on Larremore’s truck,

while peering his head inside and scanning its interior. Importantly, Deputy

Colona’s body position at that time would have most certainly made it

particularly dangerous for Larremore to leave. See, e.g., Barnes v. Felix, 605

U.S. ----, 145 S. Ct. 1353, 1356 (2025); United States v. Flowers, 6 F.4th 651,

659–60 (5th Cir. 2021) (Elrod, J., concurring) (collecting cases holding that a

defendant is seized when an officer physically impedes the defendant’s ability

_____________________

1

While Deputy Colona admits that he did not think a reasonable person would have

felt free to leave and that he had not built any reasonable suspicion by this point, his

subjective belief is not dispositive. See United States v. Mask, 330 F.3d 330, 336–37 (5th Cir.

2003). The government does not dispute that it may be considered.

2

Indeed, the district court acknowledged that a reasonable person in Larremore’s

position may have believed that he was subject to a traffic stop. See Order Denying Def.

Mot. to Suppress 10, ECF No. 44, United States v. Larremore, No. 4:23-cr-00289 (W.D.

Tex. Oct. 6, 2023) (“Perhaps a reasonable person—thinking an officer following so closely

on a two-lane highway wished to pass—would feel they were being stopped when that

officer followed them onto the shoulder and parked behind them.”). Moreover, Deputy

Colona testified that his actions would likely communicate to a reasonable person that the

officer wanted to “engage [him].” Nevertheless, the district court denied the motion to

suppress.

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to leave). And it is also during this portion of the interaction that Deputy

Colona questioned Larremore about his route and the contents of the trailer. 3

In addition, Deputy Colona testified that he told Larremore to “hang

on” because he was “pausing” the conversation to go radio his location to

dispatch. But he never radioed his location. Instead, Deputy Colona can be

seen stopping halfway to his patrol car, knocking on Larremore’s trailer with

his knuckle, and turning around to ask Larremore whether he had a key for

the trailer and whether there was anything in there that was not supposed to

be. Meaning that, less than a minute after parking behind Larremore, Deputy

Colona revealed his true intent as to why he pulled over behind Larremore—

to look in the trailer. See United States v. Macias, 658 F.3d 509, 524 (5th Cir.

2011) (holding that defendant was seized when defendant had “not been told

he was free to leave” and officer asked the defendant about “possible

contraband in the truck before requesting consent” to search it).

The majority opinion also focuses on the fact that Larremore must

have not interpreted “hang on one sec for me” as a command because he

exited his truck, crossed over the trailer hitch, and met Deputy Colona on the

side of the road to continue their conversation, ante at 10, but we have

rejected similar arguments previously. See Wright, 57 F.4th at 532–33

(holding that, although the defendant did not fully comply with the officer’s

commands to stay in the vehicle, he “objectively appeared to believe he was

not free to leave, and he did not attempt to flee, nor terminate the

encounter”). As in Wright, Larremore’s decision to exit his truck after

Deputy Colona commanded him to “hang on one sec for me” does not nullify

_____________________

3

The types of questions posed by Deputy Colona are generally permitted during a

valid traffic stop. See United States v. Brigham, 382 F.3d 500, 508 (5th Cir. 2004) (“An

officer may also ask about the purpose and itinerary of a driver’s trip during the traffic

stop.”).

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the fact that he never left and objectively appeared to understand that he was

not free to leave, as he did not attempt to flee or terminate the encounter, and

he continued to answer Deputy Colona’s questions. See id.

When viewing all of the circumstances surrounding the interaction, it

is clear that Deputy Colona’s high-speed pursuit of Larremore, combined

with his neighborly approach with subtle pressure from his body position and

hand placement, his touching and leaning into Larremore’s truck and trailer,

and his immediate questioning Larremore’s route and contents of the trailer,

indicated to Larremore that he was not free to leave. See id. at 531.

* * *

In sum, I would hold that Deputy Colona unreasonably seized

Larremore without reasonable suspicion. Therefore, Larremore’s

confession and the discovery of other evidence are products of a Fourth

Amendment violation and should have been suppressed.

Our “forefathers, after consulting the lessons of history, designed our

Constitution to place obstacles in the way of a too permeating police

surveillance, which they seemed to think was a greater danger to a free people

than the escape of some criminals from punishment.” United States v. Di Re,

332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948) (Jackson, J.). Here, no one disputes that

Larremore’s actions were illegal. But so too was his seizure, and the Fourth

Amendment therefore requires suppression.

Accordingly, I respectfully dissent in part.

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