The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION
SHANETTE JENKINS-PARKS, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) No. 25-cv-2205-SHL-tmp
)
FIRST HORIZON BANK, )
)
Defendant. )
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Before the court is pro se plaintiff Shanette Jenkins-
Parks’s complaint.1 Because Jenkins-Parks is proceeding in forma
pauperis, the undersigned must screen the complaint pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).2 For the reasons below, the undersigned
recommends that Jenkins-Parks’s complaint be dismissed.
I. PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT
Jenkins-Parks filed her complaint on February 24, 2025,
alleging violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”),
15 U.S.C. §§ 1681 et seq., and the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692 et seq. (ECF No. 2.)
1Pursuant to Administrative Order No. 2013-05, this case has been
referred to the United States magistrate judge for management of
all pretrial matters for determination or report and
recommendation, as appropriate.
2The undersigned granted Jenkins-Parks leave to proceed in forma
pauperis on July 14, 2025. (ECF No. 7.)
She alleges that she “is a consumer as defined under the FCRA,”3
and that defendant First Horizon Bank (“First Horizon”) “is a
financial institution.” (Id. at PageID 2.) She alleges that
First Horizon “reported inaccurate late payments and derogatory
marks on [her] closed account despite timely payments and
account closure at the bank's request.” (Id.) She states that
she “disputed the inaccurate information with credit reporting
agencies, yet [First Horizon] failed to conduct a reasonable
investigation.”
Jenkins-Parks seeks to bring one claim each under the FCRA
and the FDCPA.4 (Id. at PageID 3.) First, it appears that
Jenkins-Parks is alleging First Horizon violated § 1681s-2(b) of
the FCRA based on its failure to conduct a reasonable
investigation into disputed information. (Id.) Second, it
appears that Jenkins-Parks is alleging that First Horizon
violated § 1692f of the FDCPA, stating that it “engaged in
unfair and deceptive collection practices by furnishing and
maintaining inaccurate information. (Id.) As relief, she
3The FCRA defines a consumer broadly as “an individual.” 15
U.S.C. § 1681a(c). The FDCPA defines a consumer as “any natural
person obligated or allegedly obligated to pay any debt.” 15
U.S.C. § 1692a(3).
4Jenkins-Parks does not identify specific sections of either act.
(See ECF No. 2 at PageID 3.) Thus, the undersigned has attempted
to identify the relevant provisions based on the allegations of
her complaint.
requests actual, statutory, and punitive damages, as well as
costs for filing this suit. (Id. at PageID 4.)
II. PROPOSED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
A. Legal Standard
This court is required to screen in forma pauperis
complaints and must dismiss any complaint, or any portion
thereof, if the action: (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii)
fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii)
seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from
such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i-iii). To avoid
dismissal for failure to state a claim, “a complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); see also Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), 12(b)(6). “A
claim is plausible on its face if the ‘plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’” Ctr.
for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. Napolitano, 648 F.3d 365, 369
(6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Without
factual allegations in support, mere legal conclusions are not
entitled to the assumption of truth. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
Pro se complaints are held to less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers and are thus liberally
construed. Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011)
(citing Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2002)).
Even so, pro se litigants must adhere to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, see Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir.
1989), and the court cannot create a claim that has not been
spelled out in a pleading, see Brown v. Matauszak, 415 F. App’x
608, 613 (6th Cir. 2011); Payne v. Sec’y of Treas., 73 F. App’x
836, 837 (6th Cir. 2003).
B. FCRA Claim
It appears that Jenkins-Parks seeks to bring her first
claim under § 1681s-2(b) of the FCRA. “[Section] 1681s–2 is
designed to prevent ‘furnishers of information’ from spreading
inaccurate consumer-credit information.”5 Boggio v. USAA Fed.
Sav. Bank, 696 F.3d 611, 614 (6th Cir. 2012). “[It] works in two
phases.” Id. First, under § 1681s-2(a), “it imposes a duty to
provide accurate information.” Carter, 2025 WL 1065379, at *4
(citing LaBreck, 2016 WL 6927454, at *2). Second, under § 1681s-
2(b), it imposes “a duty to undertake [a reasonable]
investigation upon receipt of notice of dispute from a [consumer
5“While § 1681s-2 does not define ‘furnisher,’ courts have
defined the term as ‘any entity which transmits information
concerning a particular debt owed by a particular customer to
consumer reporting agencies.’” Carter v. Holzman L., PLLC, No.
CV 24-11990, 2025 WL 1065379, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 13, 2025),
report and recommendation adopted, 2025 WL 868615 (E.D. Mich.
Mar. 20, 2025) (quoting LaBreck v. Mid-Mich Credit Bureau, 2016
WL 6927454, at *2 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 28, 2016)).
reporting agency].” Id. (citing LaBreck, 2016 WL 6927454, at
*2).
“A private cause of action against a furnisher of
information [under § 1681s-2(b)] does not arise until a consumer
reporting agency provides proper notice of a dispute.” Brown v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 507 F. App'x 543, 547 (6th Cir. 2012)
(citing Boggio, 696 F.3d at 615-16). Thus, to plausibly state a
claim under § 1681s-2(b), a plaintiff must at least allege that
they disputed an inaccuracy with a consumer reporting agency,
that the consumer reporting agency then notified the furnisher
of that dispute, and that the furnisher then violated a
statutory duty under § 1681s-2(b)(1)(A)-(E). See Rajapakse v.
Credit Acceptance Corp., No. 19-1192, 2021 WL 3059755, at *2
(6th Cir. Mar. 5, 2021) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b)(1)(A)-
(E); Boggio, 696 F.3d at 616-18) (affirming dismissal of
complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) because plaintiff “did not allege
that [defendant] violated any of the statutory duties to
investigate and properly report information once notified of her
dispute related to [defendant]”); see also Green v. Cont.
Callers, Inc., No. 3:21-CV-2005, 2022 WL 2209436, at *2 (N.D.
Ohio June 21, 2022) (citing Rajapakse, 2021 WL 3059755, at *2)
(finding that plaintiff failed to state a § 1681s-2(b) claim).
Here, Jenkins-Parks’s allegations are bare bones. She
alleges only that First Horizon reported inaccurate information,
that she disputed that information with “credit reporting
agencies,” and that First Horizon then failed to conduct a
reasonable investigation. (ECF No. 2 at PageID 2.) She has not
alleged any facts to plausibly plead a claim.
First, she refers vaguely to “late payments and derogatory
marks,” (id.), but has not alleged any facts describing what
those mischaracterized late payments and “derogatory remarks”
were or how they were inaccurate. See Settles v. Trans Union,
LLC, No. 3:20-CV-00084, 2020 WL 6900302, at *5 (M.D. Tenn. Nov.
24, 2020) (“[T]o establish any FCRA violation Plaintiff must
show that the credit report is patently incorrect or materially
misleading”; finding that plaintiff had not plausibly alleged
that the reported information was inaccurate and dismissing for
failure to state a claim). Second, Jenkins-Parks has not alleged
that a consumer reporting agency notified First Horizon of her
dispute to trigger its duties under the FCRA—let alone
identified which consumer reporting agencies she filed a dispute
with. See Green v. Navy Fed. Credit Union, No. 3:24-CV-632, 2024
WL 4564421, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 24, 2024) (“Absent this
essential element, Plaintiff's FCRA claim cannot proceed and
fails as a matter of law.”). Lastly, she has not alleged any
facts as to how First Horizon “violated any of the statutory
duties to investigate and properly report information once
notified of her dispute.” Rajapakse, 2021 WL 3059755, at *2
(citing 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b)(1)(A)-(E); Boggio, 696 F.3d at
616-18). Accordingly, Jenkins-Parks fails to state a § 1681s-
2(b) claim, and the undersigned recommends that her claim under
this section be dismissed.
C. FDCPA Claim
It appears that Jenkins-Parks seeks to bring her second
claim under § 1692f of the FDCPA. “Congress passed the FDCPA to
address the widespread and serious national problem of debt
collection abuse by unscrupulous debt collectors.” Currier v.
First Resol. Inv. Corp., 762 F.3d 529, 533 (6th Cir. 2014)
(citations omitted). Section 1692f of the FDCPA “prohibits a
debt collector from using unfair or unconscionable means to
collect or attempt to collect any debt.” Carter, 2025 WL
1065379, at *6 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692f) (citation modified).
“It sets forth a non-exhaustive list of conduct that rises to
that level.” Currier, 762 F.3d at 534. (citing Glazer v. Chase
Home Fin. LLC, 704 F.3d 453, 461–62 (6th Cir. 2013), abrogated
by Obduskey v. McCarthy & Holthus LLP, 586 U.S. 466 (2019);
Limited, Inc. v. C.I.R., 286 F.3d 324, 332 (6th Cir. 2002)). To
state a claim under the FDCPA, Jenkins-Parks must allege that:
(1) she is a “consumer” under the FDCPA; (2) the “debt” arises
out of transactions entered primarily for personal, family or
household purposes; (3) First Horizon is a “debt collector” as
defined by the FDCPA, and (4) First Horizon violated a provision
of the FDCPA in attempting to collect a debt. White v. Universal
Fid., LP, 793 F. App'x 389, 391 (6th Cir. 2019) (citing Bauman
v. Bank of Am., N.A., 808 F.3d 1097, 1100 (6th Cir. 2015)).
Jenkins-Parks fails to state a FDCPA claim. She has not
plausibly alleged any facts identifying a personal debt or
suggesting that First Horizon (a bank) qualifies as a debt
collector.6 Barnes v. Cap. One Fin. Corp., No. 1:23-CV-182, 2023
WL 6606026, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 10, 2023) (finding that
plaintiff failed to plead a FDCPA claim where her complaint
“consist[ed] of little more than legal conclusions, with
virtually no supporting factual allegations”), report and
recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 9271174 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 30,
2023). And although § 1692f is meant to be non-exhaustive,
Jenkins-Parks has not alleged any facts demonstrating how First
Horizon’s alleged “furnishing and maintaining inaccurate
information,” (ECF No. 2 at PageID 3), was an unfair or
unconscionable attempt to collect a debt. See Jones v. U.S.
Dep't of Educ., No. 2:15-CV-10171, 2017 WL 9471877, at *12 (E.D.
Mich. Feb. 12, 2017) (finding plaintiff failed to allege facts
demonstrating how “the defendant used an unfair or
6The Sixth Circuit has held that “a bank that is a creditor is
not a debt collector for the purposes of the FDCPA and creditors
are not subject to the FDCPA when collecting their accounts.”
Montgomery v. Huntington Bank, 346 F.3d 693, 699 (6th Cir. 2003)
(quoting Stafford v. Cross Country Bank, 262 F. Supp. 2d 776,
794 (W.D. Ky. 2003)) (collecting cases) (citation modified).
unconscionable practice to collect or attempt to collect the
debt” under § 1692f), report and recommendation adopted, 2017 WL
875297 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 6, 2017), aff'd, No. 17-1516, 2017 WL
9291893 (6th Cir. Dec. 8, 2017). Accordingly, Jenkins-Parks
fails to state a § 1692f claim, and the undersigned recommends
that this claim be dismissed.
III. RECOMMENDATION
For the above reasons, the undersigned recommends that
Jenkins-Parks’s complaint be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B).
Respectfully submitted,
s/Tu M. Pham
TU M. PHAM
Chief United States Magistrate Judge
July 14, 2025
Date
NOTICE
WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS AFTER BEING SERVED WITH A COPY OF THIS
REPORT AND RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION, ANY PARTY MAY SERVE AND FILE
SPECIFIC WRITTEN OBJECTIONS TO THE PROPOSED FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS. ANY PARTY MAY RESPOND TO ANOTHER PARTY’S
OBJECTIONS WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS AFTER BEING SERVED WITH A
COPY. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b)(2); L.R.
72.1(g)(2). FAILURE TO FILE OBJECTIONS WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS
MAY CONSTITUTE A WAIVER AND/OR FORFEITURE OF OBJECTIONS,
EXCEPTIONS, AND FURTHER APPEAL.